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This doctoral thesis examines how Sustainability-Oriented Innovations (SOIs) are emerging at small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and how they can be managed. SOIs in the form of new products that lessen negative environmental impact, or even create a positive impact can play an important role, particularly at established SMEs who see business opportunities in sustainable development and consider a possible diversification into new sustainability markets. Whereas the extant literature discusses what SOIs are and why firms develop them, little is known about how they are developed. To enable firms to innovate for sustainability, it is essential to know more about the processes underlying SOI development, which are considered as very difficult, with many firms failing. Drawing on several academic papers and relying on qualitative research methods, the thesis uses the Fireworks model to examine how innovation processes unfold at established SMEs. The main contribution of the thesis is to advance the Fireworks model to the context of SOIs unfolding at SMEs. The findings reveal that SOIs unfold in an emergent, somewhat chaotic way, that duration and outcome are uncertain, that the overall journey is composed of multiple intertwined innovation paths, of which several will likely lead to setbacks. To manage this complex process, the thesis suggests to set four management foci: first, to create a dedicated organizational unit for exploration, second to create conditions allowing intelligent learning for efficient exploration, third to carry out in-depth investigation of the related technological innovation systems, and fourth to plan carefully the re-integration of the innovation into the core business for commercialization. This research contributes to the SOI literature by advancing the Fireworks model and thereby proposing a meta-model of how SOIs may dynamically unfold. Being both holistic and detailed, the model opens several avenues for future research. Finally, the research contributes to management practice by providing a heuristic to manage SOI development at SMEs.

The dissertation project focuses on empirically investigating consumers´ attitudes, motiva-tions and purchasing decisions regarding sustainable products. The focus on this micro per-spective, however, does not reflect consumers´ roles within the transformation towards sus-tainable consumption. Therefore, the present framework paper puts the included papers into a greater context and evaluates the findings on a meta-level by applying an enhanced transition management theory. The analysis underlines that consumers´ limited personal capabilities are an underlying reason for unsustainable practices. Therefore, the active engagement not only of consumers, but also of companies is required if the transformation is to be successful. If companies actively support consumers in making sustainable choices, consumers can engage in sustainable consumption with only low cognitive efforts. On this basis, genuine sustainable choices are enabled. The dissertation provides practical implications by highlighting potential measures which will help to promote sustainable products from niches to mainstream. In sum, the dissertation project enhances academic understanding of consumers´ sustainable purchas-ing behavior and reveals the potential of integrating such insights into the management of transformations towards sustainable consumption.

Over the last decades corporate irresponsibility has gained increasing interest among practitioners and researchers. Corporate irresponsibility is often the result of intentionally irresponsible strategies, decisions, or actions, which negatively affect an identifiable stakeholder or environment. For instance, these range from the violation of the human rights and labor standards to environmental damages. Organizations enacting irresponsible practices rely on different factors upon multiple levels (field, organizational, individual) and its interrelations as well as processes evolving within the organization leading to such behavior. However, reasons for the occurrence of and explanations for corporate irresponsibility so far have been limited, leaving a fragmented understanding of this phenomenon. This dissertation helps to improve the understanding and explanation of corporate irresponsibility by identifying driving patterns of corporate irresponsibility and showing how the interactions across multiple levels add to this phenomenon. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the topic of corporate irresponsibility, the theoretical approaches of this dissertation and an introduction to the chapters. The second chapter offers a review and analysis of the corporate irresponsibility literature. The chapter presents a variance model outlining the concept, antecedents, moderators and outcomes of recent corporate irresponsibility literature as well as the different factors across levels (field, organizational, individual). Chapter 2 offers a critical analysis of what we know by referring to current literature and offers insights on what we don´t know by deriving main implications for future research on corporate irresponsibility. Chapter 3 enlarges the understanding of corporate irresponsibility introducing a process approach to explain how corporate irresponsibility evolves over time and under which conditions. Based on a qualitative meta-analysis findings converge around two distinct process paths of corporate irresponsibility, the opportunistic-proactive, and, the emerging-reactive, subdivided into three phases. Chapter 3 sheds different lights upon the phases of corporate irresponsibility and its underlying mechanisms. The final chapter 4 focuses on different underlying mechanisms driving the final downfall or demise of organizations, organizational failure. Chapter 4 offers an alternative explanation to the competing extremism and inertia mechanisms driving organizational failure in recent studies by suggesting that these explanations are rather complementary. In addition, chapter 4 enlarges the explanation of organizational failure identifying the role of conflict mechanisms and its interplay with rigidity mechanisms. In sum, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of what causes and increases corporate irresponsibility, and a better explanation of how and why corporate irresponsibility and organizational failure emerges, develops, grows or terminates over time. Hopefully all three articles motivate more research on this important topic to prevent such behavior in advance. 4

A characteristic of the German health care market is the high complexity, amongst others due to the plurality of actors and interest groups. With so many players involved, health care reforms necessarily are the outcome of a quest for influence reflecting the relative power of interest groups. However, in much of the health economics literature, this fact is neglected, with the consequence that public regulation fails to have the intended effect. The treatment of social (interest) groups is central to understand political economic processes. Basic models in this area are the models of Olson (1965), Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983). The objective of such model considerations in the health care market is to maximize efficiency and quality of care and thereby reduce expenditures. The section “The German health care market and its players: An overview from an economic perspective” analyses the structure of the health care market in Germany together with selected health challenges of the last decade. It questions to which extent the new political economy in contrast to welfare economy is able to explain health economic aspects. The section “Drug Prices and Pressure Group Activities in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Becker Model” analyses the shift of power and influence among the pharmaceutical industry, the pharmacies and the social health insurers (SHI). Since the health care reform in 2004, these interest groups have been negotiating the structure of surcharges and discounts among each other without any intervention from the government. This reflects the assumption of a passive government in the Becker (1983) model and makes this model to a good choice for application. The negotiations and the resulting amendments of this ordinance express the shift of power and influence among the involved interest groups in the German health care market after 2004. The first assumption is a closed system based on the theoretical work by Becker. The amount of total budget and the amount of total influence is constant and defined as 10. In such a standardized system, the influence by producers and pharmacies decreases about 0.007 units of political pressure to the value 9.989, whereas the influence by SHI increases about 0.007 units to the value 0.011 between 2008 and 2010. More realistic is the second assumption, the assumption of an open system where the amount of total budget and the amount of total influence can change over the years. With this assumption a trend becomes apparent which shows an increase in political pressure by SHI about 0.015 units to the value 0.036 and a decrease of political pressure by pharmacies and producers about 18.326 units to the value 34.022 between 2008 and 2010. This reflects the cost control trend in combination with the empowerment incentives for SHI. Noteworthy is the high pressure level of producers compared to the other interest groups. As a conclusion one can say that the last years show a movement to more competition between the interest groups. This leads to more balanced power relations. But nevertheless, the most powerful group is still the producer group and the influence of the SHI is still very low. However, the government does not always behave passively. On sensitive issues for voters such as co-payments, the government tries to maximize votes. So, in the section “Drug Prices, Rents, and Votes in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Peltzman Model”, the reaction of consumers (insured persons) and producers (pharmaceutical industry) based on electoral behavior and relating to drug prices and co-payments imposed on drugs is analyzed, using the health care reform of 2004 as an experience. The changes in prices and medications after this reform make it to a natural choice. For the analysis, the interest group model by Peltzman (1976) is applied to the German health care market. The vote-maximizing government has to find the optimal combination of rent and price of regulation. For the optimum solution, the variation of votes on the part of pharmaceutical industry has to equal the variation of votes on the part of consumers. Reflecting different power structures leads to drug prices ranging from 5 to 50 Euros, associated with a co-payment of 5 Euros. Prices between 50 and 100 Euros are possible as well, reflecting a balance of power facing the pharmaceutical industry. These prices are associated with a co-payment of 10% of the selling price. Concerning the transition from 1989 reference price regime to the 2004 reform one can say that producers who had accepted the reference price had an incentive to increase their price while lowering their sales volume.