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In this paper, we conduct a pan-European efficiency analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies of scope and, thus, produce railway services with a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient, we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a reference set consisting of separated firms which use a different production technology. We find that for a majority of European railways economies of scope exist.
During the nineties of the last century, several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry is shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this 'revised' contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany sections, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network only. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non contestable monopolistic networks.
Despite the scepticism raised by the German Monopoly Commission our analysis shows that the revised theory of contestable markets can be applied to the telecommunications market better than expected. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exits possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeds the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are complied with for potential competition to exist. We applied the 'revised' contestable market theory to the German telecommunication market and have been able to clearly identify the sections in which regulation is required. Under the present conditions local loops - which should be seen as natural monopolies - are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. Local loops can be identified as bottlenecks therefore. Regional and local connection networks should also be regulated because a high entry lag and a low price adjustment lag have to be expected as well as current competition does not exist today. The national connection network shows current competition between several network providers, hence regulation can be abolished in this field. Moreover, services can be supplied by several firms, and we predict strong potential competition.. There are no arguments favouring a natural monopoly in the section of terminals.
In the course of railway reforms at the end of the last century, European national governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of scope associated with vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of e±ciency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more e±cient we apply an innovative Data Envelopment Analysis super-e±ciency bootstrapping model which relates the e±ciency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology and which is applicable to other network industries as energy and telecommunication as well. Our ¯ndings are that for a majority of European Railway companies economies of scope exist.