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Im Zuge der wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen der letzten Jahre haben sich auch die Aufgaben des HR-Managements nachhaltig verändert. Mitarbeiter im Personalbereich müssen heute über andere Kompetenzen verfügen als noch vor einigen Jahren ...
This paper discusses the emergence of endogenous redistributive cycles in a stochastic growth model with incomplete asset markets and heterogeneous agents, where agents vote on the degree of progressivity in the taxñtransferñscheme. The model draws from BÈnabou (1996) and ties the bias in the distribution of political power to the degree of inequality in the society, thereby triggering redistributive cycles which then give rise to a nonlinear, cyclical pattern of savings rates, growth and inequality over time.
This paper investigates the redistributive effects of taxation on occupational choice and growth. We discuss a twoñsector economy in the spirit of Romer (1990). Agents engage in one of two alternative occupations: either selfñemployment in an intermediate goods sector characterized by monopolistic competition, or employment as an ordinary worker in this sector. Entrepreneurial pro_ts are stochastic. The occupational choice under risk endogenizes the number of _rms in the intermediate goods industry. While the presence of entrepreneurial risk results in a suboptimally low number of _rms and depresses growth, nonñlinear tax schemes are partly capable of compensating the negative by effects by ex post providing a social insurance.
This paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox is also given.