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Die ökonomischen Implikationen einer verstärkten Migration deutscher Unternehmen nach Osteuropa und Asien werden derzeit intensiv diskutiert. Wichtige wirtschaftliche Akteure sind KMU des verarbeitenden Gewerbes, die zum einen Elemente komplexer Wertschöpfungsketten bilden, zum anderen häufig durch Produktdifferenzierung die Märkte jeder Lieferstufe gestalten. Das vorliegende Papier soll in dieser Diskussion einen Beitrag aus Sicht der Neuen Ökonomischen Geographie leisten. In einem partialanalytischen Modell wird untersucht, welchen Einfluss das Spannungsfeld von Produktions- und Transportkosten auf die Standortwahl der Unternehmen ausübt und welche Parameterkonstellationen industrielle Agglomeration fördern bzw. behindern. In diesem Zuge wird das Modell von Venables (1996) um standortdifferenzierte Technologien erweitert und im Rahmen einer Simulation auf Unternehmen des metallerzeugenden und -verarbeitenden Gewerbes übertragen.
This paper discusses the interdependencies that exist between vertically-linked industries in the (Spence-)Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. The main objective is to develop a concept for quantifying the magnitude of sectoral coherence in models of the New Economic Geography. It is motivated by the suggestion, by Venables (1996), that 'strategic industries' be identi®ed in terms of their agglomeration potential. Using a partial-analytic approach, we focus on inter-industrial relations in a closed economy to draw conclusions regarding international trade. We ascertain that two factors have an impact upon the strength of industrial linkages: 1) the monopolistic scope of intermediate suppliers, in terms of (technical) substitution elasticity; and the share in downstream costs for intermediates. Within a simulation study, this paper applies this new theoretical concept to eight basic industries across ten European countries.
In the course of railway reforms at the end of the last century, European national governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of scope associated with vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of e±ciency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more e±cient we apply an innovative Data Envelopment Analysis super-e±ciency bootstrapping model which relates the e±ciency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology and which is applicable to other network industries as energy and telecommunication as well. Our ¯ndings are that for a majority of European Railway companies economies of scope exist.
This paper analyzes the growth impact of fiscal and institutional governmental policies in a regional context. The government provides a productive input that is complementary to private capital. Institutional policies include the decision about the type of public input as well as on the size of the region as determined by the number of firms. Fiscal policies decide on the extent of the public input. Private capital accumulation incurs adjustment costs that depend upon the ratio between private and public investment. After deriving the decentralized equilibrium, fiscal and institutional policies as well as their interdependencies and welfare implications are discussed. Due to the feedback effects both policies may not be determined independently. It is also shown that depending on the region’s size different types of the public input maximize growth.
This paper develops the concept of converging institutions and applies it to nanotechnologies. Starting point are economic and sociological perspectives. We focus on the entire innovation process of nanotechnologies beginning with research and development over di_usion via downstream sectors until implementation in final goods. The concept is applied to the nano–cluster in the metropolitan region of Grenoble and a possible converging institution is identified.
In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model to analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse ecosystem managers who have access to financial insurance, and study the implications for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design. We show that while an improved access to financial insurance leads to lower ecosystem quality, the effect on the free-rider problem and on welfare is determined by ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which, if financial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation, increases or decreases.
Spitzenlastpreisbildung bei natürlichen Monopolen wurde bisher nur mit einer Produktionsstufe und konstanten Durchschnittskosten untersucht. Elektrischer Strom unterliegt jedoch einem mehrstufigen Produktionsprozeß, auf dem mindestens eine Stufe sinkende Durchschnittskosten aufweist. Ein privater, vertikal separierter Stromnetzbetreiber wird gewinnmaximale Spitzenlastpreise nehmen und aufgrund seiner Monopolstellung einen hohen Wohlfahrtsverlust verursachen. Das Papier untersucht in einem zweistufigen Modell mit sinkenden Durchschnittskosten auf der Transportstufe, wie sich das Verbot für den Netzmonopolisten, verschiedene Preise zu nehmen, auswirkt. In der beschriebenen Situation erhöht das Verbot, verschiedene Preise zu nehmen, die Wohlfahrt, wenn der Monopolist weiterhin beide Märkte (Peak und Off-Peak) bedient. Die untersuchte Regulierungsregel "nur ein Preis erlaubt" hat den Vorteil der einfachen Anwendung und Überwachung; sie ist somit praxistauglich und sehr kostengünstig.