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Credit Constraints, Idiosyncratic Risks, and Wealth Distribution in a Heterogeneous Agent Model
(2007)
This paper examines the effects of credit market imperfections and idiosyncratic risks on occupational choice, capital accumulation, as well as on the income and wealth distribution in a two sector heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model. Workers and firm owners are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Entrepreneurship is the riskier occupation. Compared to an economy with perfect capital markets, we find for the case of serially correlated shocks that more individuals choose the entrepreneurial profession in the presence of credit constraints, and that the fluctuation between occupations increases too. Workers and entrepreneurs with high individual productivity tend to remain in their present occupation, whereas low productivity individuals are more likely to switch between professions. Interestingly, these results reverse if we assume iid shocks, thus indicating that the nature of the underlying shocks plays an important role for the general equilibrium effects. In general, the likelihood of entrepreneurship increases with individual wealth.
This paper discusses the emergence of endogenous redistributive cycles in a stochastic growth model with incomplete asset markets and heterogeneous agents, where agents vote on the degree of progressivity in the taxñtransferñscheme. The model draws from BÈnabou (1996) and ties the bias in the distribution of political power to the degree of inequality in the society, thereby triggering redistributive cycles which then give rise to a nonlinear, cyclical pattern of savings rates, growth and inequality over time.
This paper investigates the redistributive effects of taxation on occupational choice and growth. We discuss a twoñsector economy in the spirit of Romer (1990). Agents engage in one of two alternative occupations: either selfñemployment in an intermediate goods sector characterized by monopolistic competition, or employment as an ordinary worker in this sector. Entrepreneurial pro_ts are stochastic. The occupational choice under risk endogenizes the number of _rms in the intermediate goods industry. While the presence of entrepreneurial risk results in a suboptimally low number of _rms and depresses growth, nonñlinear tax schemes are partly capable of compensating the negative by effects by ex post providing a social insurance.
This paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox is also given.
Abstract: A recent survey of 54 micro-econometric studies reveals that exporting firms are more productive than non-exporters. On the other hand, previous empirical studies show that exporting does not necessarily improve productivity. One possible reason for this result is that most previous studies are restricted to analysing the relationship between a firm’s export status and the growth of its labour productivity, using the firms’ export status as a binary treatment variable and comparing the performance of exporting and non-exporting firms. In this paper, we apply the newly developed generalised propensity score (GPS) methodology that allows for continuous treatment, that is, different levels of the firms’ export activities. Using the GPS method and a large panel data set for German manufacturing firms, we estimate the relationship between a firm’s export-sales ratio and its labour productivity growth rate. We find that there is a causal effect of firms’ export activities on labour productivity growth. However, exporting improves labour productivity growth only within a sub-interval of the range of firms’ export-sales ratios.
During the nineties of the last century, several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry is shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this 'revised' contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany sections, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network only. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non contestable monopolistic networks.
Despite the scepticism raised by the German Monopoly Commission our analysis shows that the revised theory of contestable markets can be applied to the telecommunications market better than expected. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exits possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeds the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are complied with for potential competition to exist. We applied the 'revised' contestable market theory to the German telecommunication market and have been able to clearly identify the sections in which regulation is required. Under the present conditions local loops - which should be seen as natural monopolies - are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. Local loops can be identified as bottlenecks therefore. Regional and local connection networks should also be regulated because a high entry lag and a low price adjustment lag have to be expected as well as current competition does not exist today. The national connection network shows current competition between several network providers, hence regulation can be abolished in this field. Moreover, services can be supplied by several firms, and we predict strong potential competition.. There are no arguments favouring a natural monopoly in the section of terminals.
In the course of railway reforms at the end of the last century, European national governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of scope associated with vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of e±ciency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more e±cient we apply an innovative Data Envelopment Analysis super-e±ciency bootstrapping model which relates the e±ciency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology and which is applicable to other network industries as energy and telecommunication as well. Our ¯ndings are that for a majority of European Railway companies economies of scope exist.
In this paper, we conduct a pan-European efficiency analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies of scope and, thus, produce railway services with a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient, we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a reference set consisting of separated firms which use a different production technology. We find that for a majority of European railways economies of scope exist.
The paper demonstrates how the E–stability principle introduced by Evans and Honkapohja can be applied to models with heterogeneous and private information in order to assess the stability of rational expectations equilibria under learning. The paper extends already known stability results for the Grossman and Stiglitz model to a more general case with many differentially informed agents and to the case where information is endogenously acquired by optimizing agents. In both cases it turns out that the rational expectations equilibrium of the model is inherently E-stable and thus locally stable under recursive least squares learning.
Information technology and administrative reform : will the time after E-Government be different?
(2003)
Dieser Aufsatz wurde anlässlich eines Symposiums in einer Festschrift zu Ehren von Prof. Dr. Heinrich Reichmann veröffentlicht. Es geht um seine Verdienste im Bereich Electronic Government (E-Government) und Verwaltungsreform.
This paper discusses a model of vertical and horizontal product differentiation within the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition. Firms compete not only in prices and horizontal attributes of their products, but also in the quality that can be controlled by R&D activities. Based upon the results of a general equilibrium model, intra-sectoral trade and the welfare implications of public intervention in terms of research promotion are considered. The analysis involves a numerical application to ten basic European industries.
This paper discusses the interdependencies that exist between vertically-linked industries in the (Spence-)Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. The main objective is to develop a concept for quantifying the magnitude of sectoral coherence in models of the New Economic Geography. It is motivated by the suggestion, by Venables (1996), that 'strategic industries' be identi®ed in terms of their agglomeration potential. Using a partial-analytic approach, we focus on inter-industrial relations in a closed economy to draw conclusions regarding international trade. We ascertain that two factors have an impact upon the strength of industrial linkages: 1) the monopolistic scope of intermediate suppliers, in terms of (technical) substitution elasticity; and the share in downstream costs for intermediates. Within a simulation study, this paper applies this new theoretical concept to eight basic industries across ten European countries.
Converging institutions. Shaping the relationships between nanotechnologies, economy and society
(2006)
This paper develops the concept of converging institutions and applies it to nanotechnologies. Starting point are economic and sociological perspectives. We focus on the entire innovation process of nanotechnologies beginning with research and development over di_usion via downstream sectors until implementation in final goods. The concept is applied to the nano–cluster in the metropolitan region of Grenoble and a possible converging institution is identified.
This paper analyzes, within a regional growth model, the impact of productive governmental policy and integration on the spatial distribution of economic activity. Integration is understood as enhancing territorial cooperation between the regions, and it describes the extent to which one region may benefit from the other region’s public input, e.g. the extent to which regional road networks are connected. Both integration and the characteristics of the public input crucially affect whether agglomeration arises and if so to which extent economic activity is concentrated: As a consequence of enhanced integration, agglomeration is less likely to arise and concentration will be lower. Relative congestion reinforces agglomeration, thereby increasing equilibrium concentration. Due to the congestion externalities, the market outcome ends up in suboptimally high concentration.
This paper analyzes the growth impact of fiscal and institutional governmental policies in a regional context. The government provides a productive input that is complementary to private capital. Institutional policies include the decision about the type of public input as well as on the size of the region as determined by the number of firms. Fiscal policies decide on the extent of the public input. Private capital accumulation incurs adjustment costs that depend upon the ratio between private and public investment. After deriving the decentralized equilibrium, fiscal and institutional policies as well as their interdependencies and welfare implications are discussed. Due to the feedback effects both policies may not be determined independently. It is also shown that depending on the region’s size different types of the public input maximize growth.
Many public goods are characterized by rivalry and/or excludability. This paper introduces both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple endogenous growth model. We derive the equilibrium growth rate and design the optimal tax and user-cost structure. Our results emphasize the role of congestion in determining this optimal financing structure and the consequences this has in turn for the government’s budget. The latter consists of fee and tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public production input and that may or may not suffice to finance the entire public input, depending upon the degree of congestion. We extend the model to allow for monopoly pricing of the user fee by the government. Most of the analysis is conducted for general production functions consistent with endogenous growth, although the case of CES technology is also considered.
Do exporters really pay higher wages? First evidence from German linked employer-employee data
(2006)
Many plant-level studies find that average wages in exporting firms are higher than in non-exporting firms from the same industry and region. This paper uses a large set of linked employer-employee data from Germany to analyze this exporter wage premium. We show that the wage differential becomes smaller but does not completely vanish when observable and unobservable characteristics of the employees and of the work place are controlled for. For example, blue-collar (white-collar) employees working in a plant with an export-sales ratio of 60 percent earn about 1.8 (0.9) percent more than similar employees in otherwise identical non-exporting plants.
An empirical analysis of various waves of the ALLBUS social survey shows that union density fell substantially in western Germany from 1980 to 2004 and in eastern Germany from 1992 to 2004. Such a negative trend can be observed for men and women and for different groups of the workforce. Regression estimates indicate that the probability of union membership is related to a number of personal and occupational variables such as age, public sector employment and being a blue collar worker (significant in western Germany only). A decomposition analysis shows that differences in union density over time and between eastern and western Germany to a large degree cannot be explained by differences in the characteristics of employees. Contrary to wide-spread perceptions, changes in the composition of the workforce seem to have played a minor role in the fall in union density in western and eastern Germany.