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Many public goods are characterized by rivalry and/or excludability. This paper introduces both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple endogenous growth model. We derive the equilibrium growth rate and design the optimal tax and user-cost structure. Our results emphasize the role of congestion in determining this optimal financing structure and the consequences this has in turn for the government’s budget. The latter consists of fee and tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public production input and that may or may not suffice to finance the entire public input, depending upon the degree of congestion. We extend the model to allow for monopoly pricing of the user fee by the government. Most of the analysis is conducted for general production functions consistent with endogenous growth, although the case of CES technology is also considered.
This paper discusses the emergence of endogenous redistributive cycles in a stochastic growth model with incomplete asset markets and heterogeneous agents, where agents vote on the degree of progressivity in the taxñtransferñscheme. The model draws from BÈnabou (1996) and ties the bias in the distribution of political power to the degree of inequality in the society, thereby triggering redistributive cycles which then give rise to a nonlinear, cyclical pattern of savings rates, growth and inequality over time.
Using a large recent representative sample of the adult German population this paper demonstrates that nascent necessity and nascent opportunity entrepreneurs are different with respect to some of the characteristics and attitudes considered to be important for becoming a nascent entrepreneur, and that they behave differently. Given the lack of longitudinal data, however, we have no information about the performance of entrepreneurs from both groups in the longer run.
The EU electricity directive (96/92/EC) established the right of the member states to choose between Regulated and Negotiated Third Party Access (RTPA and NTPA). The interest group theory is able to explain whether the introduction of NTPA in Germany had been an interest group equilibrium under the restriction of EU-directive. Using the NTPA associations of electricity power suppliers, network monopolists and industrial consumers negotiated three agreements. The last one (AA VVII+) in December 2001 introduced a market comparison scheme with three structural features: “East-/West-Germany”, “consumption/population density”, and “cable rate”. These features are variables which are supposed to reflect cost differences between network suppliers. The theoretical analysis will derive the hypothesis that this conception allows to introduce a cost irrelevant factor and therefore to increase prices without harming firms which do not hold this factor. This hypothesis could be tested by analyzing the German low and medium voltage network suppliers in 2002 and 2003. Our estimations show that the use of structural feature “East-/West Germany” and “consumption/population density” could be explained by this hypothesis. But because we have no firm specific information about cost differences other explanations could not be excluded: Monopoly prices differ with marginal costs, and regulation could reflect real cost differences. The third structural feature “cable rate” has no influence in low voltage networks, but has an impact on access charges levied in medium voltage networks. This relationship is only given if we use the borderlines given by AA VVII+. Hence, we are not able to reject the interest group theory: The feature “cable rate” was introduced successfully to increase access charges for medium network suppliers which have high cable rates without having higher costs.
In dieser Arbeit werden mögliche Auswirkungen des deutschen Schwerbehindertengesetzes auf die Arbeitsplatzdynamik anhand von Daten einer Vollerhebung davon betroffener Arbeitgeber durch die Bundesagentur für Arbeit und von Daten des IAB-Betriebspanels empirisch überprüft. Dabei wird aus Gründen der Verfügbarkeit geeigneter Daten die zweite Schwelle des Gesetzes von 25 Beschäftigten untersucht, bei deren Überschreiten die Betriebe im Untersuchungszeitraum 1999/2000 zwei Arbeitsplätze mit Schwerbehinderten besetzen oder eine Ausgleichsabgabe zahlen mussten. Sowohl deskriptive als auch multivariate Analysen deuten darauf hin, dass das Beschäftigungswachstum leicht gebremst wird, wenn Betriebe kurz vor dieser Schwelle stehen und nicht ausreichend Schwerbehinderte beschäftigen (also beim Überschreiten der Schwelle eine Ausgleichsabgabe zahlen müssten). Allerdings gibt es keine Anzeichen dafür, dass Betriebe in einer entsprechenden Situation hinter der Schwelle stärker Beschäftigung abbauen, um diese zu unterschreiten und damit die Abgabe zu vermeiden.