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This dissertation includes an introduction and five empirical papers focusing on the educational and career decision-making process of individuals in Germany. The five papers embrace different determinants of educational and career decisions including school performance, social background, leisure activities as well as professional expectations, and contribute to the existing literature in this research area. Chapter 2 of this dissertation (written jointly with Christian Pfeifer) begins by analysing the nexus between students’ time allocation and school performance in terms of grades and satisfaction with their own performance in mathematics, the German language and a first foreign language, as well as overall achievement. While previous studies have primarily focused on isolated activities, this chapter looks at the heterogeneity of three important extracurricular activities: student jobs, sports and participation in music. Moreover, the heterogeneity of each activity is addressed by accounting for different types of the particular activity and differences in the number of years the activity has been pursued. For this purpose, data from the German SOEP, as a representative panel survey of private households and people in Germany, in particular cross-sectional survey data of 3388 students who are about 17 years old and enrolled in a German secondary school, were used. The main findings are that having a job as a student is negatively correlated with school performance, whereas participation in sports and music is positively correlated. However, the results reveal heterogeneity in each activity, especially with respect to intensity. Chapter 3 addresses the concrete post-school decision of school students, in particular whether to study or to enter the German VET system. It focuses on individual risk preferences and the social background of individuals and how these determinants affect the ultimate decision to enrol in university or to start an apprenticeship given the same level of qualification. For the empirical approach data from the German SOEP were used, in particular information on individuals’ educational decisions between 2007 and 2013. The results indicate that (i) individual risk preferences do not have an overall effect on the real transition; (ii) privileged individuals are more likely to take up higher education; and (iii) compared to highly educated parents, parents without an academic background are less likely to guide their children into tertiary education, regardless of how much they support their children with their school work. Chapter 4 deals with the reconsideration of educational decisions in terms of early contract cancellations in VET (Vocational Education and Training). In particular, the effects of a second job on the intention to cancel a VET contract early are analysed for apprentices in Germany. To date, the literature in this research area mainly focuses on income as a determinant of early contract cancellation in VET, but is lacking in investigations of the consequences of low income during an apprenticeship, such as the need for a second job. For the empirical approach the representative German firm-level study ‘BIBB Survey Vocational Training from the Trainee’s Point of View 2008’, conducted by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB), is used. The survey contains 5901 apprentices that were interviewed during their second year of apprenticeship (205 schools, 340 classes, and 15 common occupations). Furthermore, it includes the design, procedures, basic conditions, and quality criteria of apprenticeships. The applied probit regressions show a higher intention to quit if apprentices require a secondary job to cover their living costs. In Chapter 5, new data on 191 apprentices from a vocational school, located in a northern German federal state, are used to validate the empirical results of Chapter 4. This chapter presents new insights into secondary-job-related burdens during apprenticeship. Due to limitations in the data, the applied empirical approach in Chapter 4 lacks to analyse how holding multiple jobs increases the intention to leave an apprenticeship early. Therefore, Chapter 5 includes the investigations of burdens related to the second job. The results indicate a lower intention to quit the apprenticeship if an apprentice holds a second job to cover living costs. However, secondary jobs are linked to lower quality of training, which, on the other hand, increases the intention to leave the apprenticeship early. Furthermore, the probability of secondary-job-related burdens increases with the number of working hours. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by investigating subjective determinants of early contract cancellations in VET. It examines ten questions on what apprentices want to achieve and how unfulfilled expectations affect the intention to leave the apprenticeship early. To date, research on early contract cancellation in VET has concentrated on objective determinants, such as income, schooling level, age, gender, or migration background. Hence, the findings of this investigation contributes to the existing research on early contract cancellation. The questions considered include information on the performance, personal development, career development and prospects or position in society and their meaning to apprentices. For the research approach, the ‘BIBB Survey Vocational Training from the Trainee’s Point of View 2008’ is considered again. The probit and ordered probit regressions applied show significant effects of job characteristics that represent job security. The expectation of being retained after an apprenticeship and the encouragement to consistently train further decrease the intention to leave the apprenticeship early. Furthermore, women appear to be more affected by job security signals than men, but they also sort more often into occupations with lower retention probabilities. Consequently, this result may be an indication of occupational segregation rather than a sign of differences between sexes.

A characteristic of the German health care market is the high complexity, amongst others due to the plurality of actors and interest groups. With so many players involved, health care reforms necessarily are the outcome of a quest for influence reflecting the relative power of interest groups. However, in much of the health economics literature, this fact is neglected, with the consequence that public regulation fails to have the intended effect. The treatment of social (interest) groups is central to understand political economic processes. Basic models in this area are the models of Olson (1965), Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983). The objective of such model considerations in the health care market is to maximize efficiency and quality of care and thereby reduce expenditures. The section “The German health care market and its players: An overview from an economic perspective” analyses the structure of the health care market in Germany together with selected health challenges of the last decade. It questions to which extent the new political economy in contrast to welfare economy is able to explain health economic aspects. The section “Drug Prices and Pressure Group Activities in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Becker Model” analyses the shift of power and influence among the pharmaceutical industry, the pharmacies and the social health insurers (SHI). Since the health care reform in 2004, these interest groups have been negotiating the structure of surcharges and discounts among each other without any intervention from the government. This reflects the assumption of a passive government in the Becker (1983) model and makes this model to a good choice for application. The negotiations and the resulting amendments of this ordinance express the shift of power and influence among the involved interest groups in the German health care market after 2004. The first assumption is a closed system based on the theoretical work by Becker. The amount of total budget and the amount of total influence is constant and defined as 10. In such a standardized system, the influence by producers and pharmacies decreases about 0.007 units of political pressure to the value 9.989, whereas the influence by SHI increases about 0.007 units to the value 0.011 between 2008 and 2010. More realistic is the second assumption, the assumption of an open system where the amount of total budget and the amount of total influence can change over the years. With this assumption a trend becomes apparent which shows an increase in political pressure by SHI about 0.015 units to the value 0.036 and a decrease of political pressure by pharmacies and producers about 18.326 units to the value 34.022 between 2008 and 2010. This reflects the cost control trend in combination with the empowerment incentives for SHI. Noteworthy is the high pressure level of producers compared to the other interest groups. As a conclusion one can say that the last years show a movement to more competition between the interest groups. This leads to more balanced power relations. But nevertheless, the most powerful group is still the producer group and the influence of the SHI is still very low. However, the government does not always behave passively. On sensitive issues for voters such as co-payments, the government tries to maximize votes. So, in the section “Drug Prices, Rents, and Votes in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Peltzman Model”, the reaction of consumers (insured persons) and producers (pharmaceutical industry) based on electoral behavior and relating to drug prices and co-payments imposed on drugs is analyzed, using the health care reform of 2004 as an experience. The changes in prices and medications after this reform make it to a natural choice. For the analysis, the interest group model by Peltzman (1976) is applied to the German health care market. The vote-maximizing government has to find the optimal combination of rent and price of regulation. For the optimum solution, the variation of votes on the part of pharmaceutical industry has to equal the variation of votes on the part of consumers. Reflecting different power structures leads to drug prices ranging from 5 to 50 Euros, associated with a co-payment of 5 Euros. Prices between 50 and 100 Euros are possible as well, reflecting a balance of power facing the pharmaceutical industry. These prices are associated with a co-payment of 10% of the selling price. Concerning the transition from 1989 reference price regime to the 2004 reform one can say that producers who had accepted the reference price had an incentive to increase their price while lowering their sales volume.