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Increased international compliance with human rights and democracy standards is a core issue for both human rights and democratizing actors as well as for victims of human rights abuse. International human rights organizations (IHROs) are expected to make positive contributions to this end, even though they possess low levels of authority. This authority has been renegotiated multiple times in various reform processes. An oversimplified expectation would have us assume that democracies would want to strengthen IHROs, and that autocracies would seek to weaken them. As the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was reformed in 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2011, some autocracies strived to abolish parts of the UNHRC. Other autocracies aimed “merely” to weaken them. Democracies displayed an even larger variance. Indonesia and India predominantly favored weakening the UNHRC, whereas Ghana and Spain supported exclusively strengthening of the organization. Additionally, some attitudes towards the UNHRC changed from one year to the next. Autocracies diverge not only in their stances towards the UNHRC, but also across their domestic and international dimensions. Nigeria allows different levels of participation by societal actors than, say, Belarus. Cuba does not have the same domestic institutions as Russia. Iran enters international negotiations from a different position than Thailand. Democracies vary on the domestic and international dimensions as well. The Czech Republic is not the US, and Costa Rica is different from South Africa. The question that drives my research is how we can explain the broad variety of state preferences for strengthening or weakening IHROs. Previous research has mostly concentrated on democracies, leaving autocracies understudied. It also treated countries as black boxes. To account for such shortcomings, first, I systematically test the relationship between the UNHRC and its authoritarian and democratic members by means of inferential statistics. Second, I analyze a bottom-up process inherent to New Liberalism. It scrutinizes the role of domestic societal actors, domestic institutions, as well as pressures on the international stage. The results reveal that societal actors, along with the interplay of wealth and regime type in the international realm, figure as the most important predictors of delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies during the reform of the monitoring bureaucracy Special Procedures of the UNHRC. Societal actors play a more important role in democracies than in autocracies. Institutionalized domestic oversight mechanisms help societal actors to conduct effective lobbying at the domestic level. Oversight mechanisms are more important than the rule of law and electoral institutions. Regarding international coalition building, authoritarian regimes turn out to be better organized than democracies. I conclude that supporters of strong IHROs shall 1. empower domestic societal actors; 2. disrupt cohesive delegation preferences of authoritarian regimes; and 3. invest in independent domestic oversight mechanisms.
