Open Access

Due to the financial markets disturbances of 2007/2008, a considerable number of financial intermediaries such as banks, credit institutions and asset management companies noticed substantial liquidity shortages, difficulties to refinance their operations as a result of a drying out of appropriate refinancing sources, and withdrawals of deposits by consumers. These turbulences in the financial markets forced governments and central banks to increase liquidity provisions to ensure a sufficient aggregate liquidity of the financial industry. Furthermore, policy-makers decided on bailouts of banks or on supporting financial intermediaries by governmental warranties or liquidity provisions to avoid a substantial number of insolvencies of banks and other financial institutions that may have rapidly deteriorated the global financial industry. In the aftermath of the crisis, politicians and economists discussed these decisions controversially because interventions by governments and central banks appear to have a deep impact on the global economy particularly in the financial industry. Moreover, legislative and regulatory authorities decided on increasing their vigilance, particularly with focus on principal-agent problems within certain sectors of the financial industry. A considerable amount of recent research papers has focused on the dynamics of liquidity shortages that suggest the recent crisis being related to both an increasing funding liquidity risk and an emerging market liquidity risk. Self-amplifying interdependencies appear to connect these two dimensions of liquidity risk that during the period 2007 to 2008 have led to the contagion effects in the global financial industry. Only little research work so far has provided evidence from the financial crisis in 2007/2008 while focusing on the German financial industry. Thus, my doctoral dissertation covers three research papers that address the occurrence of substantial liquidity risk and default probability within the German financial industry over the course of the financial crisis of 2007/2008. My first publication co-authored with Daniel Schmidt, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, entitled ‘Consumer reaction to tumbling funds - Evidence from retail fund outflows during the financial crisis 2007/2008’ focuses on funding liquidity risk of German retail funds. Contrary to the findings reported in some of the extant literature, our study indicates that over the past few years a change in investors’ behavior patterns means that investment decisions are made at short notice, and that shares are redeemed in a discriminatory manner when funds perform poorly. By using data assembled from 1672 retail funds in Germany over the period March 2008 to April 2010, we are able to show that in general, both the prior fund performance and prior net redemptions have a statistically significant influence on fund outflows. Moreover, there are indications that in recent crises situations that have resulted in the withdrawal of shares investors react fast to market signals. My second research paper entitled ‘Leveraging and risk-taking within the German banking system: Evidence from the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008’ examines the risk-taking attitudes of distinguishable German banking sectors. This study intends to examine whether the German banking system displays pro-cyclical behavior during 2000 to 2011, and to what extent specific sectors of the German banking system show significant balance sheet operations to increase their leverage during years of booming asset prices. The results of this study demonstrate that different sectors of the German banking system did operate their business more or less pro-cyclical. It also provides empirical evidence that certain banking sectors did favor refinancing their assets by short-term borrowing in the interbank market to increase their leverage during periods of extraordinary high returns in financial markets. Moreover, this study shows that banks, which operate above average leverages, tend to report a high volatility of return on assets and low distances-to-default. Finally, my third paper entitled ‘Are private banks the better banks? An insight into the ownership structure and risk-taking attitudes of German banks.’, and co-authored with Thomas Wein, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, tries to enlighten the influence of the different principal-agent relationships on the risk-taking attitudes of German banks. In this study, we propose our hypothesis that the distinguishable principal-agent relationships of German banks are significantly influencing the risk-taking attitudes of bank managers. Particularly, we intend to substantiate the theory that banks owned by dispersed shareholders or federal state authorities face a higher relevance of principal-agent problems than other banking sectors due to a missing ability to monitor bank managers. Our results underline that these problems appear to mislead bank managers showing an unreasonable risk-taking behavior. In a first stage, we rely on a theoretical model explaining that from the bank owners’ viewpoint three factors of the principal-agent relationships are determining the probability of choosing the optimal portfolio of risky assets. These factors cover the ability to control bank managers, the risk pooling capabilities of bank owners and bank managers, and the incentives of seeking high returns. To support our hypothesis we apply an empirical study to the distances-to-default of different German banking sectors. This demonstrates that risk-taking attitudes of banks are closely related to banks’ ownership. Consequently, our findings offer evidence, that legislative and regulatory authorities should increase their vigilance in terms of principal-agent problems within certain sectors of the banking industry.