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Increased international compliance with human rights and democracy standards is a core issue for both human rights and democratizing actors as well as for victims of human rights abuse. International human rights organizations (IHROs) are expected to make positive contributions to this end, even though they possess low levels of authority. This authority has been renegotiated multiple times in various reform processes. An oversimplified expectation would have us assume that democracies would want to strengthen IHROs, and that autocracies would seek to weaken them. As the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was reformed in 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2011, some autocracies strived to abolish parts of the UNHRC. Other autocracies aimed “merely” to weaken them. Democracies displayed an even larger variance. Indonesia and India predominantly favored weakening the UNHRC, whereas Ghana and Spain supported exclusively strengthening of the organization. Additionally, some attitudes towards the UNHRC changed from one year to the next. Autocracies diverge not only in their stances towards the UNHRC, but also across their domestic and international dimensions. Nigeria allows different levels of participation by societal actors than, say, Belarus. Cuba does not have the same domestic institutions as Russia. Iran enters international negotiations from a different position than Thailand. Democracies vary on the domestic and international dimensions as well. The Czech Republic is not the US, and Costa Rica is different from South Africa. The question that drives my research is how we can explain the broad variety of state preferences for strengthening or weakening IHROs. Previous research has mostly concentrated on democracies, leaving autocracies understudied. It also treated countries as black boxes. To account for such shortcomings, first, I systematically test the relationship between the UNHRC and its authoritarian and democratic members by means of inferential statistics. Second, I analyze a bottom-up process inherent to New Liberalism. It scrutinizes the role of domestic societal actors, domestic institutions, as well as pressures on the international stage. The results reveal that societal actors, along with the interplay of wealth and regime type in the international realm, figure as the most important predictors of delegation preferences voiced by autocracies and democracies during the reform of the monitoring bureaucracy Special Procedures of the UNHRC. Societal actors play a more important role in democracies than in autocracies. Institutionalized domestic oversight mechanisms help societal actors to conduct effective lobbying at the domestic level. Oversight mechanisms are more important than the rule of law and electoral institutions. Regarding international coalition building, authoritarian regimes turn out to be better organized than democracies. I conclude that supporters of strong IHROs shall 1. empower domestic societal actors; 2. disrupt cohesive delegation preferences of authoritarian regimes; and 3. invest in independent domestic oversight mechanisms.
Considering the recent success of right-wing populist candidates and parties in the United States and across Europe, there has for some years now been talk among scholars (and the wider public) about a worldwide democratic recession. Levitsky and Ziblatt paint a very gloomy picture when they write that democracy is at risk of dying. Others are not as pessimistic, but they still argue that democracy is in a state of serious disrepair. The younger generations appear to be especially unsupportive of democracy’s liberal principles and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives. What these authors overlook, however, is that the publics of advanced industrial societies have experienced an intergenerational value shift. In fact, populations in industrial democracies have become more liberal overall, but not everyone’s mindset is changing at the same speed. It is mainly – but not exclusively – the members of the lower classes that do not keep up. While societies have generally become more liberal, there is increasing alienation between the social classes over these liberal values. Drawing on a more recent trend in social class research with a social cognitive approach, this dissertation contributes to the study of growing anti-democratic tendencies around the world by analyzing the interplay between inequality dynamics and value orientations. The focus lies on investigating the effect socio-cultural polarization (i.e., ideological polarization between social classes) has on civic culture in the mature democracies of the West. The findings suggest that it is not ideological polarization between the social classes that has the greatest negative effect on civic culture, or general civic attitudes and behavior, for that matter. It is the increasing dissent in society about whether the country’s elites are still to be trusted with making the right decisions to increase the average citizen’s quality of life. This difference in opinion manifests itself in a decline in some civic attitudes.
This dissertation includes six articles tied together by the overarching question of how changes in public opinion, economics and public policy co-evolve in mature democracies, with a focus on redistributive (in seven European democracies) and secessionist preferences (in Catalonia and Scotland).
The theoretical inspiration derives from three sources: 1. the Macro Polity model by Erikson, MacKuen/Stimson, 2. the Thermostatic Responsiveness model by Soroka and Wlezien, and 3. the literature on representation gap models by Gilens, Elsaesser and others. The Macro Polity and Thermostatic Responsiveness models come with an optimistic undertone, emphasizing that public policies adapt to public opinion, producing the policy-opinion congruence that defines responsive government. The Representation Gap model, by contrast, is more pessimistic in highlighting that the preferences of low-income groups are generally worse represented in public policies than the preferences of middle-income and especially high-income groups. While there is evidence in favor of these models for the majoritarian political systems in the US, Canada and the UK, less is known about the validity of these models in proportional democracies of continental Europe. The contributions in this dissertation address this research gap by integrating the three models and combining nearly 500 surveys to study the evolution of European public opinion at the national and subnational level.
When presidents try to expand their tenure in office, are protesting social movements, or even youth movements, able to stop them from candidating unconstitutionally and thus to prevent a democratic backslide? So far, the literature on term bids by presidents tends to focus on the institutional arrangements to hinder such term bids in the first place, on presidential strategies to circumvent the constitutional law, or on counteractions of political elites. Mobilizations against such attempts by presidents to run for office again, after reaching the end of their last allowed term, are often solely included as “pressures from below”. To address these shortcomings, this dissertation explores the issue of term amendment struggles through the lenses of contentious politics systematically combined with insights of revolution theories and democratization studies. Its conceptual perspective therefore lies on the interactions of actors and their constellations to each other as well as to institutions. The author deduces three diverse pathways to promote institutional change and prevent democratic backslidings – through political elites, (political) allies, and security forces. By selecting two cases that are most similar in terms of institutions and youth movements at the forefront, Senegal (2011-12) and Burkina Faso (2013-14), this analysis offers insight in the divergence of the struggles and their outcome. Because in both cases, the announcement of the presidents to run for another term in office led to broad mobilization led by youth movements against such tenure amendments, the political system in general and socioeconomic inequalities - but with diverging results. In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré eventually resigned while Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal candidated again, legitimized by the Constitutional Court. Based on extensive fieldwork, including interviews with movement leaders and their allies, as well as a comprehensive media analysis and the SCAD databank for the analysis of protest events, the author differentiates and reconstructs the various phases of the conflict. The results of the dissertation point at two dimensions most relevant to comprehend the dissimilar pathways the struggles took – the reach of mobilization and, closely interlinked to the first, the refusal of soldiers to obey orders. It shows further that these differences go back to the respective history of each country, its former protest waves, and political culture. Although both presidents faced mass mobilization against their unconstitutional candidature, only in Burkina Faso it eventually led to an ungovernable situation. The dissertation concludes by reflecting on lessons learned for future democratic backslidings by presidents to come and avenues for future research – and thus offers fruitful insights not only for academics but for those who aim to save democratic norms and institutions.
Corruption in Europe in Comparative Perspective
Corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2013) is detrimental to economic, social and political development. It intensively violates the fundamental principles of democracy such as equality, fairness, transparency and accountability (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). Europe exhibits a wide spectrum of corrupt activities and is characterized by large differences as to the extent and dynamics of corruption. Thus, it is astonishing that there is still little knowledge about the region-specific factors that determine corruption. Considering corruption as a multilevel phenomenon that takes place at the country level and is often measured by certain aggregated indices, this project examines corruption also at the individual level with data from the World Values Survey. The study includes 37 European countries at the macro level and 20 countries at the micro level (1995-2010). For comparative purposes and in order to uncover specific European determinants of corruption, all statistical calculations are run with an additional sample (“non-European country sample”), including countries world-wide. The results of the panel and multilevel analysis indicate that a country’s rate of inflation, international integration, the degree and duration of democracy, anti-corruption policy, the percentage of women in parliaments, religion, society’s history of corruption strongly influence the extent and dynamics of corruption at the country-level. At the individual level, an individual’s employment status, satisfaction with the financial situation, emancipative values, interpersonal trust and the justification of bribery are significant causes of corruption across and within European countries. A comparison of these results with the findings of the “world sample” clearly demonstrates that there are regional differences.
Entwicklungen und Potenziale der Kultur- und Kreativwirtschaft im ländlichen Raum - Der Kreis Höxter
(2014)
In der vorliegenden Thesis wird ein interdisziplinäres, exploratives und handlungsorientiertes Problemgerüst durchleuchtet. Als übergeordneter Forschungsgegenstand wird zum einen der Stadt-Land-Unterschied im Rahmen kultur- und kreativwirtschaftlicher Strukturentwicklung betrachtet. Zum anderen werden konkrete Handlungsoptionen zur Förderung der Wirtschaftsbranche für regionalpolitisch Verantwortliche in ländlichen Räumen entworfen und aufgezeigt. Folgende Leitfragen werden herangezogen: Welche standortfaktoriellen Vorteile bezüglich der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Rahmenbedingungen bieten ländliche Räume für die Kultur- und Kreativwirtschaft (im Gegensatz zu städtischen Räumen)? Welche Handlungsspielräume haben regional- und wirtschaftspolitisch Verantwortliche im Hinblick auf die kulturelle Entwicklung von ländlichen Räumen? Wie lässt sich konkret eine im Sinne der Standortattraktivität agierende Wirtschaftsförderung mit einer Stärkung der Kulturlandschaft vereinbaren?