When presidents try to expand their tenure in office, are protesting social movements, or even youth movements, able to stop them from candidating unconstitutionally and thus to prevent a democratic backslide? So far, the literature on term bids by presidents tends to focus on the institutional arrangements to hinder such term bids in the first place, on presidential strategies to circumvent the constitutional law, or on counteractions of political elites. Mobilizations against such attempts by presidents to run for office again, after reaching the end of their last allowed term, are often solely included as “pressures from below”. To address these shortcomings, this dissertation explores the issue of term amendment struggles through the lenses of contentious politics systematically combined with insights of revolution theories and democratization studies. Its conceptual perspective therefore lies on the interactions of actors and their constellations to each other as well as to institutions. The author deduces three diverse pathways to promote institutional change and prevent democratic backslidings – through political elites, (political) allies, and security forces. By selecting two cases that are most similar in terms of institutions and youth movements at the forefront, Senegal (2011-12) and Burkina Faso (2013-14), this analysis offers insight in the divergence of the struggles and their outcome. Because in both cases, the announcement of the presidents to run for another term in office led to broad mobilization led by youth movements against such tenure amendments, the political system in general and socioeconomic inequalities - but with diverging results. In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré eventually resigned while Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal candidated again, legitimized by the Constitutional Court. Based on extensive fieldwork, including interviews with movement leaders and their allies, as well as a comprehensive media analysis and the SCAD databank for the analysis of protest events, the author differentiates and reconstructs the various phases of the conflict. The results of the dissertation point at two dimensions most relevant to comprehend the dissimilar pathways the struggles took – the reach of mobilization and, closely interlinked to the first, the refusal of soldiers to obey orders. It shows further that these differences go back to the respective history of each country, its former protest waves, and political culture. Although both presidents faced mass mobilization against their unconstitutional candidature, only in Burkina Faso it eventually led to an ungovernable situation. The dissertation concludes by reflecting on lessons learned for future democratic backslidings by presidents to come and avenues for future research – and thus offers fruitful insights not only for academics but for those who aim to save democratic norms and institutions.
This dissertation includes six articles tied together by the overarching question of how changes in public opinion, economics and public policy co-evolve in mature democracies, with a focus on redistributive (in seven European democracies) and secessionist preferences (in Catalonia and Scotland).
The theoretical inspiration derives from three sources: 1. the Macro Polity model by Erikson, MacKuen/Stimson, 2. the Thermostatic Responsiveness model by Soroka and Wlezien, and 3. the literature on representation gap models by Gilens, Elsaesser and others. The Macro Polity and Thermostatic Responsiveness models come with an optimistic undertone, emphasizing that public policies adapt to public opinion, producing the policy-opinion congruence that defines responsive government. The Representation Gap model, by contrast, is more pessimistic in highlighting that the preferences of low-income groups are generally worse represented in public policies than the preferences of middle-income and especially high-income groups. While there is evidence in favor of these models for the majoritarian political systems in the US, Canada and the UK, less is known about the validity of these models in proportional democracies of continental Europe. The contributions in this dissertation address this research gap by integrating the three models and combining nearly 500 surveys to study the evolution of European public opinion at the national and subnational level.
Corruption in Europe in Comparative Perspective
Corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2013) is detrimental to economic, social and political development. It intensively violates the fundamental principles of democracy such as equality, fairness, transparency and accountability (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). Europe exhibits a wide spectrum of corrupt activities and is characterized by large differences as to the extent and dynamics of corruption. Thus, it is astonishing that there is still little knowledge about the region-specific factors that determine corruption. Considering corruption as a multilevel phenomenon that takes place at the country level and is often measured by certain aggregated indices, this project examines corruption also at the individual level with data from the World Values Survey. The study includes 37 European countries at the macro level and 20 countries at the micro level (1995-2010). For comparative purposes and in order to uncover specific European determinants of corruption, all statistical calculations are run with an additional sample (“non-European country sample”), including countries world-wide. The results of the panel and multilevel analysis indicate that a country’s rate of inflation, international integration, the degree and duration of democracy, anti-corruption policy, the percentage of women in parliaments, religion, society’s history of corruption strongly influence the extent and dynamics of corruption at the country-level. At the individual level, an individual’s employment status, satisfaction with the financial situation, emancipative values, interpersonal trust and the justification of bribery are significant causes of corruption across and within European countries. A comparison of these results with the findings of the “world sample” clearly demonstrates that there are regional differences.
