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- executive compensation (1) (remove)
Essays on Say-on-Pay: theoretical analysis, literature review and empirical evidence from Germany
(2019)
The dissertation contains four journal articles together with a framework manuscript. The overall subject is the so-called Say-on-Pay (SOP) vote. SOP is a law that enables shareholders to vote on the appropriateness of executive compensation during the firms’ annual general meeting. The dissertation investigates SOP votes from different angles. While the framework provides a background for the relevance of the work, outlines existing research gaps, covers an in-depth discussion and concludes relevant research questions, the four articles present the essence of the dissertation. Each of the articles stands alone, but the overall subject and the insights are connected. The first article titled ‘Mutualistic Symbioses? Combining theories of agency and stewardship through behavioural characteristics’ is a theoretical paper on the recent advances of behavioural agency theory. It serves as a theoretical foundation for the empirical work of the dissertation. Although principal-agent theory has gained a prominent place in research, its negative image of self-serving managers is frequently criticized. Consequently, scholars advocate the utilization of positive management theories, such as stewardship theory. This paper reviews the literature of both theoretical concepts and describes how behavioural characteristics allow for a mutually beneficial symbiosis of the two theories. The second article titled ‘Determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and Say-on-Pay Votes’ establishes the foundation of the scholarly knowledge in the field by systematically reviewing the empirical literature. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. The implications are analysed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions. Building on the research gaps defined in the literature review, the third article ‘Can management-sponsored non-binding remuneration votes shape the executive compensation structure? Evidence from Say-on-Pay votes in Germany’ is an empirical manuscript. In this paper, a hand-selected sample of 1,676 annual general meetings with 268 management-sponsored SOP votes in 164 different companies between 2010 and 2015 in Germany is analysed. The analysis focused on the structure, rather than the level, of executive compensation by applying a sample-selection model and panel data regression. Finally, the fourth paper ‘Let’s talk about money! Assessing the link between firm performance and voluntary Say-on-Pay votes’ investigates the rare setting of voluntary SOP votes. Using 1,841 annual general meetings of listed firms in Germany between 2010 and 2016, the effects of financial and non-financial (sustainable) performance on SOP voting likelihood and voting results are tested.