Refine
Document Type
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
- Report (1)
- ResearchPaper (1)
Keywords
- Öffentliches Gut (3) (remove)
Institute
- Frühere Fachbereiche (2)
- Psychologie (1)
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden zwei etablierte soziale Dilemmata (Beitragsund Verteilungsdilemma) auf das Feld der Verhandlungsforschung übertragen. Die Parteien mussten entweder über die Verteilung von geteilten Ressourcen oder über den Beitrag zu geteilten Ressourcen in einem integrativen Verhandlungssetting verhandeln. Zusätzlich wurde die Valenz der verhandelten Ressourcen variiert (positive vs. negative Ressourcen). In insgesamt vier Studien wurde demonstriert, dass die Kombination aus Allokationskontext (Beitrag vs. Verteilung) und Ressourcenvalenz (Profite vs. Lasten) zu distinkten regulatorischen Foki führt, welche wiederum die Qualität der Verhandlungsergebnisse beeinflussen. Darüberhinaus wird der Einfluss der regulatorischen Passung in Verhandlungen um Gegenstände mit unterschiedlichen Ergebnisstrukturen gezeigt, sowie die Relevanz der vorliegenden Forschung für die Forschungsfelder der Allmende-, und Sozialen- Dilemma-Forschung diskutiert.
Abstract. The ecological literature suggests that biodiversity reduces the variance of ecosystem services. Thus, conservative biodiversity management has an insurance value to risk-averse users of ecosystem services. We analyze a conceptual ecological-economic model in which such management measures generate a private benefit and, via ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, a positive externality on other ecosystem users. We find that ecosystem management and environmental policy depend on the extent of uncertainty and risk-aversion as follows: (i) Individual effort to improve ecosystem quality unambiguously increases. The free-rider problem may decrease or increase, depending on the characteristics of the ecosystem and its management; in particular, (ii) the size of the externality may decrease or increase, depending on how individual and aggregate management effort influence biodiversity; and (iii) the welfare loss due to free-riding may decrease or increase, depending on how biodiversity influences ecosystem service provision.
Many public goods are characterized by rivalry and/or excludability. This paper introduces both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple endogenous growth model. We derive the equilibrium growth rate and design the optimal tax and user-cost structure. Our results emphasize the role of congestion in determining this optimal financing structure and the consequences this has in turn for the government’s budget. The latter consists of fee and tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public production input and that may or may not suffice to finance the entire public input, depending upon the degree of congestion. We extend the model to allow for monopoly pricing of the user fee by the government. Most of the analysis is conducted for general production functions consistent with endogenous growth, although the case of CES technology is also considered.
