Open Access

This paper develops the concept of converging institutions and applies it to nanotechnologies. Starting point are economic and sociological perspectives. We focus on the entire innovation process of nanotechnologies beginning with research and development over di_usion via downstream sectors until implementation in final goods. The concept is applied to the nano–cluster in the metropolitan region of Grenoble and a possible converging institution is identified.

This paper analyzes the growth impact of fiscal and institutional governmental policies in a regional context. The government provides a productive input that is complementary to private capital. Institutional policies include the decision about the type of public input as well as on the size of the region as determined by the number of firms. Fiscal policies decide on the extent of the public input. Private capital accumulation incurs adjustment costs that depend upon the ratio between private and public investment. After deriving the decentralized equilibrium, fiscal and institutional policies as well as their interdependencies and welfare implications are discussed. Due to the feedback effects both policies may not be determined independently. It is also shown that depending on the region’s size different types of the public input maximize growth.

This paper discusses the interdependencies that exist between vertically-linked industries in the (Spence-)Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. The main objective is to develop a concept for quantifying the magnitude of sectoral coherence in models of the New Economic Geography. It is motivated by the suggestion, by Venables (1996), that 'strategic industries' be identi®ed in terms of their agglomeration potential. Using a partial-analytic approach, we focus on inter-industrial relations in a closed economy to draw conclusions regarding international trade. We ascertain that two factors have an impact upon the strength of industrial linkages: 1) the monopolistic scope of intermediate suppliers, in terms of (technical) substitution elasticity; and the share in downstream costs for intermediates. Within a simulation study, this paper applies this new theoretical concept to eight basic industries across ten European countries.

Many plant-level studies find that average wages in exporting firms are higher than in non-exporting firms from the same industry and region. This paper uses a large set of linked employer-employee data from Germany to analyze this exporter wage premium. We show that the wage differential becomes smaller but does not completely vanish when observable and unobservable characteristics of the employees and of the work place are controlled for. For example, blue-collar (white-collar) employees working in a plant with an export-sales ratio of 60 percent earn about 1.8 (0.9) percent more than similar employees in otherwise identical non-exporting plants.

This paper traces the profound decline in German unionism over the course of the last three decades. Today just one in five workers is a union member, and it is now moot whether this degree of penetration is consistent with a corporatist model built on encompassing unions. The decline in union membership and density is attributable to external forces that have confronted unions in many countries (such as globalization and compositional changes in the workforce) and to some specifically German considerations (such as the transition process in postcommunist Eastern Germany) and sustained intervals of classic insider behavior on the part of German unions. The ‘correctives’ have included mergers between unions, decentralization, and wages that are more responsive to unemployment. At issue is the success of these innovations. For instance, the trend toward decentralization in collective bargaining hinges in part on the health of that other pillar of the dual system of industrial relations, the works council. But works council coverage has also declined, leading some observers to equate decentralization with deregulation. While this conclusion is likely too radical, German unions are at the cross roads. It is argued here that if they fail to define what they stand for, are unable to increase their presence at the workplace, and continue to lack convincing strategies to deal with contemporary economic and political trends working against them, then their decline may become a rout.