Social movements as safeguards against democratic backslidings in Africa?
A comparison of term amendment struggles
in Burkina Faso and Senegal

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- Dr. rer. pol. -

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Social movements as safeguards against democratic backslidings in Africa?  
A comparison of term amendment struggles 
in Burkina Faso and Senegal  

by  
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- Dr. rer. pol. -
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF-RDA</td>
<td>Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADJ</td>
<td>Alternance-Démocratie et Justice (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Alliance des Forces de Progress (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJB</td>
<td>Association des Journalistes Burkinabés (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANEB</td>
<td>Association Nationale des Étudiants Burkinabè (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>Alliance pour la République (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>Alliance Sopi pour Toujours (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEVF</td>
<td>Association des Étudiants Voltaïques en France</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBS</td>
<td>Benno Siggi Senegaal (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BONI</td>
<td>Burkina Open Data Initiative (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Collectif Anti-Référendum (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASC</td>
<td>Cadre de l’Action de la Société Civile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Comités contre le référendum (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCVC</td>
<td>Coalition Contre la Vie Chère (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progress (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CÉDÉAO</td>
<td>Communauté Économique Des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENI</td>
<td>Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Conventions des Forces Républicaines (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFOP</td>
<td>Chef de File de l’Opposition (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGD</td>
<td>Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confédération Générale du Travail (France)</td>
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<td>CGT-B</td>
<td>Confédération Générale du Travail du Burkina (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<td>CNR</td>
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<td>CNT</td>
<td>Conseil National de la Transition (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<td>CNTS</td>
<td>Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODESIRA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
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CODMPP  Collectif des organisations démocratiques de masse et de partis politiques (shortly “Collectif” / “Collective”; Burkina Faso)
COFEDEC  Collectif des Femmes pour la Défense de la Constitution (Burkina Faso)
COS-M23  Commission d’Orientation et Stratégies de M23 (Senegal)
CPS  Convention Panafricaine Sankariste (Burkina Faso)
CSA  Confédération des Syndicats Autonomes (Senegal)
CSR  Comité de soutien au referendum (Burkina Faso)
EU  European Union
FAL2012  Forces Alliées 2012 (Senegal)
FEDAP-BC  Fédération des Associations pour la Paix et le Progrès avec Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso)
FES  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FNCL  Fédération Nationale des Cadres libéraux (Senegal)
FP  Front Populaire (Burkina Faso)
FRC  Front de Résistance Citoyenne (Burkina Faso)
IFAN  Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire
JEP  Je m’engage pour mon patrie / Jeunesse engagée pour la patrie (Burkina Faso)
LSDH  Ligue Sénégalaise des Droits Humains (Senegal)
LUCHA  Lutte pour le Changement (DR Congo)
M23  Mouvement du 23 Juin (Senegal)
MBDHP  Mouvement Burkinabé pour des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples (Burkina Faso)
MEEL  Mouvement des élèves et étudiants libéraux (Senegal)
MNFV  Mouvement nationales des forces vives (Senegal)
MPP  Mouvement du peuple pour le progress (Burkina Faso)
NTS  Nouveau type de Sénégalais (Senegal)
NGO  Non-governmental organization
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
ODJ  Organisation Démocratique de la Jeunesse du Burkina Faso (Burkina Faso)
OSIWA  Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PCRV  Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire Voltaïque (Burkina Faso)
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>Parti pour le développement et le changement (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<td>PDS</td>
<td>Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegal)</td>
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<td>PIT</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Parti Socialiste (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADDHO</td>
<td>Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>REN-LAC</td>
<td>Réseau national de lutte anti-corruption (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSP</td>
<td>Régiment de sécurité présidentielle (Burkina Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTB</td>
<td>Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTS</td>
<td>Radiodiffusion Télévision Sénégalaise (Senegal)</td>
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<td>SAES</td>
<td>Syndicat autonome des enseignants du supérieur (Senegal)</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>SENELEC</td>
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<td>SUDES</td>
<td>Syndicat Unique et Démocratique des Enseignants du Sénégal (Senegal)</td>
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<td>UAS</td>
<td>Unité d’action syndicale (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<td>UGBE</td>
<td>Union générale des étudiants burkinabè (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<td>UJTL</td>
<td>Union des jeunesse travaillistes liberals (Senegal)</td>
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<td>UNIR-MS</td>
<td>Union for Rebirth-Sankarist Movement (Burkina Faso)</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
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<td>UPC</td>
<td>Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (Burkina Faso)</td>
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Acknowledgements

Similar to the pathways towards democratization, the process of pursuing a PhD has its ups and downs, academically and personally speaking. Without the support of supervisors, colleagues, friends, and family, the completion of this thesis would not have been possible.

First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Sebastian Elischer for his scholarly and moral support throughout this journey that we started together following an informal conversation on ethnicity, religion, and politics in Africa. I always felt your support was there behind me when I needed it, even from across the Atlantic. It is not an easy task to guide on the one hand, but to allow the researcher find their own path on the other, a balancing act you excelled at! I owe you my greatest gratitude for giving me directions when needed them, but simultaneously allowing me to spread my wings to fly. Second, I wish to thank Christian Welzel for his academic advice and personal support. Whenever I shared any of my initial thoughts or findings with you, you empowered me to dive deeper into the story and encouraged me with your own lively curiosity. Beyond academic insights, I cherished the feeling of being able to speak with you as a colleague despite me not yet having a PhD, as well as your overall manner and the team spirit you displayed. Third, I am thankful to Donatella della Porta who contributed to this work far more than many external advisors usually do. I was fortunate that you agreed to my first informal coffee invitation which then led to the many more conversations over coffee in Florence. Thanks again for your over-spilling excitement and impressive conceptual thinking, and also for the two amazing stays at the SNS.

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Hamburg, October 2020
To Daddy –
and all the other critical minds
1. Introduction

“We follow the rules. We are not outlaws. But if a president is not finishing his term, it’s not democratic.”
(Movement leader of Y’en a marre)¹

In June 2011, when the President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade attempted to extend his time in power for longer than was constitutionally authorized, mass mobilizations broke out in protest, and this new social movement began to attract the attention of journalists and scholars. In contrast to well-established civil society groups, the leaders of Y’en a marre had emerged from the music and media scene of the capital. Soon, these rappers who represented the movement publicly came to be the reference point in a debate centered on the role civic activism in general, and such new movements in particular, play in reminding overpowered rulers of democratic norms. Only two years later, in the summer of 2013, another Sahel state experienced protests on a large-scale with similar groups in the front row. Musicians were appearing on the center stages of a newly formed movement, Balai Citoyen, which resembled Y’en a marre in many regards. Again, the trigger was the announcement of Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré to run as a candidate again, despite having reached his constitutional tenure limit. Eventually, the Burkina Faso incumbent was unseated from office and his candidature prevented, while the Senegalese president was able to push his rerunning in elections through. Regardless of the outcome, soon these two incidents of large-scale protests were labeled as pro-democracy protests and celebrated as signs for hope against the “president-for-life syndrome” (Premph 2008: 120).

These occurrences of mass mobilizations in West Africa are far from being exceptions. As well as the hotly debated ‘Arab Spring’ in North Africa, we have witnessed a tremendous increase of protest events across the whole continent (Raleigh et al. 2010; Manji 2012; de Waal/Ibreck 2013; Branch/Mampilly 2015; Cho/Logan 2014), which led to the enthusiastic proclamations of an “African Awakening” (Manji 2013) or “African Spring in the making” (Harsch 2012; see also Haefliger).² Within the literature, scholars distinguish up to four waves of protests for the African continent. The first wave goes back to anti-colonial

¹ Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, June 20, 2016, Berlin. All anonymized interview transcripts are available upon request.
² Nonetheless, diachronical studies have accentuated long histories of contention since pre-colonial times (Eckert 2017; Mamdani/Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995).
struggles of students and intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s (Bianchini 2014; Luescher 2016). This was followed by anti-austerity protests in the 1980s and early 1990s, which were against the structural adjustment programs of the Bretton Woods Institutions and in favor of increased political (prioritized over economic) liberation (Walton/Ragin 1990; Harrison 2002; Bratton/van de Walle 1992; Zeilig 2009). In the beginning of the 2000s, rising food prices led to another eruption of protests, in which riots became the dominant protest form (Dwyer/Zeilig 2012; see also Maccatory 2010). Since 2011, researchers remark on yet another rise in protests, which are often described as “popular protests” (Mueller 2018) or even “pro-democracy uprisings” (Branch/Mampilly 2015; Bond 2014), referring to the predominant framing of these protests (Dionne 2015). But the critical question remains, are these apparently large-scale protests able to achieve institutional changes and push towards further democracy? Can these social movements or in general mobilized social actors be the new safeguards against democratic backsliding, a trend we notice throughout the continent?  

Protests in general and particular social movements are often fiercely debated with regard to their potential for bringing about increased democratization. In principle, we can say that democratization processes are commonly accompanied by the occurrence of (mass) protests (Bermejero 1997; Casper/Taylor 1996; Collier/Mahoney 1999), so that it is not surprising that mobilized social actors are frequently characterized as watchdogs for governments that try to undermine democracy and thus as democratizing forces for change. These decades-old considerations increased over the last number of years with regard to the so-called “new civic era” (Youngs 2019), referring to the tremendous growth of mass protests and the decline of political participation in its conventions forms (Norris 2002). The comprehensive work of Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007), however, has already shown that social movements do not necessarily contribute linearly to democratization, understood as any

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3 Waves of protests or contention refer to a limited time period, in which contention expanded across the society and sectors while being itself in terms of strategies and alliances among others; see Ruud Koopmans (2004).

4 I discuss the term social movement within my case selection in details, see 3.2.3. For now, I refer to social movements as a particular form of contentious collective actors (see for definition chapter two), whereas labels such as ‘mobilized social actors’ shall include also those who do not belong to one particular organization but engaged in contentious collective actions. I borrowed the term from Federico M. Rossi and Donatella della Porta (2019) and use it whenever I do not know who actually is involved within the contentious collective actions.

move towards broad, equal, and protected binding agreements. Instead, the action of social movements may result in de-democratization. So which role do social movements or protests play in pushing reluctant elites into making democratic changes or preventing their revision?

One example where these questions manifest are term limits and the bids to bypass them by African presidents. Since 1997, nineteen times has a president in Africa attempted to prolong his period in office when he reached the maximum limitation of time in power permitted constitutionally (see 3.1). Most of them, surprisingly, adopted the tenure restrictions during their own rule. In roughly every second case, when an African president tried to overthrow, amend, or circumvent term regulations, mass protests erupted. However, only four times was the enforcement of another candidature successfully prevented. In the majority of cases, in turn, the mass mobilization resulted in confrontations but eventually ended with the renewed candidacy of the incumbent, often for the third time. There is also the risk of lifelong-presidencies, as in the cases of Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéra and Gabonese President Omar Bongo, whose ruling continued until their deaths after overturning tenure restrictions (Massamba 2016). Since the turnover of heads of government is a basic principle of democratic rule, tenure restrictions were supposed to serve as a tool to end the personal rule seen on the continent (Cheeseman 2010, 2015), and move towards “a more rule-bound institutionalized political order” (Posner/Young 2018: 261; see also Posner/Young 2007). That is why these term bids are called the “new African foreign policy challenge” (Hengari 2015). However, obviously some African leaders are more able or willing to push an unconstitutional candidature through than others. Interestingly enough, there is not one single case where a president who initially announced his plan to run beyond term limitations, took the attempt back without facing counter-mobilizations on a large scale (see Figure 3.2). Simply put, it seems that only if civic activism is unleashed in the public arenas, do presidents seem willing or forced to withdraw their candidature or constitutional

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6 Term limit means a “legal restriction on the number of terms that an individual may serve as president” (see Cheeseman et al. 2019 under ‘term limit’). Presidents that had altered the constitution to repeal term limits exist not only in African countries but all over the world ranging from the Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos to the mayor of New York in the early 2000s. My focus, however, lies on the African continent due to its high frequency of term bids and the debate that primarily concentrates on this world region.

7 I only use the masculine form here because so far only male presidents tried such a term bid.

8 I will define mass protests or protests at large scale, terms that I use interchangeable, in my third chapter (see 3.1).

9 Personal rule is a “form of government in which power is vested in an individual rather than a political party, as in one-man rule. It is characterized by few checks and balances and is often associated with dictatorship and neopatrimonial politics” (see Cheeseman et al. 2019 under ‘personal rule’).
amendment. However, it is completely unknown in which manner these observable mass protests relate to considerations of presidents to change course.

These mixed outcomes bring attention to three research questions I would like to address in my study: (1) how term amendment struggles are fought (differently), (2) which role social movements play, and (3) why they proceed and thus result in dissimilar outcomes of presidents rerunning or resigning. The first two questions thus relate to the exploration of the two term amendment struggles in Senegal and Burkina Faso guided by theory while the third one aims at understanding the causal chains that led to the divergence. These questions are interrelated since I assume that the divergence of outcomes relates to the divergent pathways these confrontations between incumbent-supporters and bid-opponents took, in line with my understanding of democratization as sequences of struggles (see chapter two).

We cannot understand why Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré decided to flee the country over night while Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade saw no need to do so, despite the similar initial conditions when the struggles took off (see 3.2.2). Although heads of state such as those in Burundi or the Democratic Republic of Congo react to mass mobilizations against their unconstitutional candidature as if their impact has been proven (Yarwood 2016), we actually do not know how the visible civic activism causally links to, or is interlinked with, the choices of political elites. In recent years term bids in Africa have been highly topical and thus broadly discussed, but they have often been studied with a unilateral focus. Most of the available studies that I present below are concerned with either case-specific determinants, or the decision of presidents to try to prolong their term in the first place. Consequently these cross-case studies are largely based around the question, ‘under which conditions term bids happen?’, and thus compare incidents where incumbents tried and where they did not try for an extra term bid. Anti-term protests are often included in these studies with reference to their effects on the decisions of members of parliament, and are thus conceptualized mostly as pressure ‘from below’ on the ‘above’ governing elites. Their research designs tend to corresponding with or mirror their background of democratization theories, so that mobilized social actors are treated as one homogenous entity who act in common and merely on the street level. From this it follows that the

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10 The concept of arenas acknowledges that these actors are embedded and constrained by arenas that vary in their formalization degrees, which, in turn, they shape alike, but which not only refer to the national level of political systems (Goodwin/Jasper 2003: 28; Jasper 2014: 15-16; see also Goodwin/Jasper 1999).

11 Bid-opponents subsume those that openly resist term amendments or unconstitutional candidatures (see VonDoepp/Villalon 2005; Reijndjens 2016; Yarwood 2016).
interactions of term-opponents – more or less formalized civil society groups, social movements, trade unions, and mobilized citizens – vis-à-vis state representatives – politicians, police officers, and soldiers – are not yet covered by research in their plurality, interrelations, contradictions, or changes over time.\(^\text{12}\) This study thus differs from existing research on term bids, since it takes a horizontal-interactive perspective and thus follows contentious politics approaches in order to work out the complexity of term amendment struggles.\(^\text{13}\)

In the following, I will briefly shed light on prior studies of term bids in Africa. Since these works don’t have a lot to offer with regard to the potential causal link between presidential tenure and protests, I will consider mainly the work of democratization, social movement and civil resistance scholars, whose arguments I will present at length in my second chapter. How these theoretical frameworks guide my research will be explained in the subsequent section on research cases and design. Thereafter, I outline and discuss the data collection on which my research is based. Shortly after, I illustrate my main study objectives, while I conclude my introduction with an overview of my thesis.

1.1 Literature review and gaps

Until today, scholarly debates on term bids in Africa are dominated by area specialists who mainly concentrate on two interrelated questions – under which circumstances do presidents try to enforce a prolonged candidature, and in which manner they do so (Posner/Young 2018; Posner/Young 2007; Armstrong 2011; Dulani 2015, 2011; Omotola 2011; Tull/Simons 2017; Tull/Simons 2015, 2017; Tangiri 2005; Batro 2010; Maltz 2007). For instance, Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young (2018), based on their cross-case study, reason that older incumbents whose state budget depend more on development aid and less on oil revenues, seem more likely to resign voluntarily (Posner/Young 2018: 270-273). Denis M.

\(^{12}\) I subsume all actors engaged in collective contentious actions under the header of contentious collective actors (for details see chapter two). I use civil society groups for all collectively organized actors, more or less formalized, that mediate between society and state as well as between political and non-political arenas. I list trade unions and social movements additionally to emphasize their specific role to which I come back within my study.

\(^{13}\) Contentious politics is „a covert term encompassing collective political struggle that is „episodic‘ in the sense of not being regularly scheduled on the political docket, ‚public‘ in the sense of excluding claim-making that occurs entirely within-well bounded organizations, and ‚manifestly political‘ in the sense that a government is involved as a claimant, target, or mediator“ (McAdam et al. 2001: 5; Tilly/Tarrow 2007).
Tull and Claudia Simons (2017) picture the diverse pathways presidents take to bypass term limits to give an answer instead to the second question. Interestingly enough, most incumbents confronted with a time limitation on their reign used institutional channels pursue further terms, so that their extension of rule was given parliamentary, popular, or legal approval (Tull/Simons 2017: 87). However, these extended candidatures seldom pass without rigging electoral outcomes, or controlling dissidents in the streets by violent means, for which the Burundian case stands as an extreme example that resulted into long-term unrest (Daley/Popplewell 2016).

Regarding the cases in which the term bid failed, authors come to different and yet somewhat resembling conclusions. Boniface Dulani (2011b) credits the majority in parliament that vote against the exceptional rule with hindering prolonged tenure attempts. He highlights in parallel the supportive effects of a united anti-amendment fronts that function as “bulwarks against the usurpation and personalization of power” (Dulani 2011b: 118). Ben Armstrong (2011), the author of the only other extensive cross-case analysis until today, draws a similar conclusion that the outcome depends heavily on opposition parties or even their respective leaders, who can sometimes get support from legal institutions that rule against any enlargement of presidential rule. In the same vein, Claudia Simons and Denis M. Tull (2015) argue the combining force of opposition parties and civil society are crucial for the success or failure of term bids, but add the aspect of supportive media to their equation (Tull/Simons 2015: 17). Daniel Vencovsky (2007) in his quantitative study also lists independent media and a ‘loud opposition’ of civil society groups as relevant determining factors. Additionally, he highlights the role of pressure from donors and supportive popular attitudes towards term limits. Janette Yarwood (2016) in contrast stresses the popularity of presidents, rather than constitutional provisions. One of the few studies that digs deeper into the actors’ interrelations is the work by Adrienne LeBas (2016) who holds dense networks of opponents as being the most relevant factor in preventing an unconstitutional candidature. Nonetheless, we observe that barely any systematic analysis of the role of protests exists, and that rather vague hypotheses and the mere listing off of explanatory factors dominate the field.

Altogether, these studies leave four gaps behind that I intend to start filling with my suggested research design and follow-up cross-case study. Firstly, guided by an elitist perspective, they conceptually integrate collective contentious actors as homogenous entities; for instance, labelling them “popular pressure” or “the masses” (Armstrong 2011;
Dulani 2011a), who they position below the political arena. As a result, they fail to conceptualize and depict them as diverse (groups of) actors who adapt to changing circumstances and state responses – just as strategically as state actors do. Secondly, firmly grounded in the tradition of democratization studies, their results primarily highlight supportive preconditions such as the composition of parliaments or presidential popularity, but the divergence of the two cases that I examine cannot be explained by static characteristics such as these, as I will elaborate in my case selection (see 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). Thirdly, the empirical coverage when I started my research project in 2014 was unequally distributed and privileged Southern African examples (Dwyer/Zeilig 2012: 14). This is worrying in view of the personalization of power in francophone presidential systems. Particularly worth noticing is that all in-depth cross-case studies analyzed Zambia in 2011 as the representative case for the prevention of a candidature, yet such an outcome has also been reached in Malawi in 2002, Nigeria in 2006, as well as in Burkina Faso in 2014. This over-reliance on the Zambian example means that their conclusions are all drawn from the same case. This empirical bias changed recently due to the events that followed the term bid in Burkina Faso, but nonetheless holds true for cross-case comparisons available to us today.14 Fourthly, so far, most of these insights that have been developed have not found their way back into theories and debates surrounding the role of social movements or protests for democratization.

With regard to the fourth research gap mentioned, I employ a theory-guided approach. For this purpose, I combine the frameworks of three literature strands – transitology studies within democratization theories, contentious politics approaches of social movement scholars, and civil resistance studies concerned with non-violent revolutions.15 These different approaches complement each other since all of these strands provide insights into the relationship between social movements or protests in general and (institutional) changes, with various emphases. I will briefly present their main contributions to my research objective, and then present their arguments in greater length in my second chapter.


15 Sometimes these authors identify themselves more as scholars studying non-violent revolutions while others study not necessarily ‘full revolutions’ (Chenoweth/Cunningham 2013).
Scholars of regime changes have developed a comprehensive set of conditions influencing democratization, but for a long time failed to account for agency. Transitology approaches within the democratization literature responded to this gap and included agency for regime transitions (a concept of agency that was, however, biased towards political elites). The famous work of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) studying Latin American transitions prepared the ground to understand when elites are ready to give in and allow democratic reforms. They identified the split between hardliners and moderates within governing elites as the core element for democratization, whose choices they considered to be guided by rational-choice and power-seeking considerations. Their main contribution was the expansion of the predominant structuralist and linear model to include aspects of choices and the integration of mobilizations. They show that political elites make decisions strategically and their power is relative to other actors. However, for the most part in these studies, protests, which mostly come in the form of labor movements, function as a pushing force for the advancement of more (or consolidation of existing) democracy, because they enable the loosening of constraints and can thus bring about a critical juncture (see also Bermeo 1997; Collier 1999; Collier/Mahoney 1999). The reasoning in these approaches is still based on an imagined line from authoritarianism to democracy (Geddes 1999) and politics is considered “entirely an elite game” (Welzel 2013: 215). These researchers expect the influence of mobilized social actors merely in the initial stage that “help[s] transitions get started” (Linz/Stepan 1996: 9), but fear that anti-regime mobilization can endanger transitions if they are not channeled into the more moderate forms of institutionalized politics such as political party participation. Mobilization thus functions like a trigger that provides an opportunity for parts of politically relevant elites to openly break rank, while the actual transition takes place in the arena of elites and so is consequently a top-down process (Linz/Stepan 1996a, 2013; Diamond/Plattner 2009; for African states see Bratton/van de Walle 1994). Such an elite-centric paradigm still dominates and consequently such approaches "lack the means to conceptualize the role of social opposition adequately, even when they clearly want to acknowledge its importance“ (Collier/Mahoney 1999: 115). Subsumed often under “popular mobilization” (Bermeo 1997) among other names, collective non-elite actors are integrated as a secondary factor which may play some role in the outcome dynamic, but whose agency and heterogeneity is overlooked, since political elites are seen to control the democratization process as well as its outcome (for an overview of this research area see Grimm 2013). One reason for this elite bias is the focus on critical junctures understood as complete regime overthrows.
Social movement scholars in the tradition of contentious politics approaches also have an answer to this agency gap. In cross-case comparative studies, these scholars have illustrated that contentious politics collective actors make their decisions as strategically as political elites do (Taylor/Van Dyke 2004; see for example McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly/Tarrow 2007; della Porta 2013, 2014). Charles Tilly (1999) was one of the first to show that the effects of social movements can take various forms and are related to their strategies, opponents, or aims. Social movements thus respond to political opportunities of which splits of governing elites are just one example (Bosi/Uba 2009: 412-415). Another aspect they point out is that social movements constantly build and break alliances with other government-challengers (Zald/McCarty 1979; Hathaway/Meyer 1994; Diani/Bison 2004). To explore such dynamics adequately Jan W. Duyvendak and James M. Jasper (2015) suggest we analyze players as mutually interacting and relational to the arenas in which they act (Jasper 2014). In this manner we respond to a gap left behind by the social movement literature when scholars failed to account for horizontally-occurring interrelations (Duyvendak/Fillieule 2014; Giugni 1998; Amenta/Young 1999). While these approaches influenced my research perspective immensely, they also have their pitfalls. Most of their theories are derived from the analysis of Western European or North American experiences and thus the social movement effects being studied are often limited to those in liberal representative democracies (Tilly 2004; Tarrow 2012). Specifications for countries outside of the Global North and beyond liberal-democratic borders are still largely absent (Osa/Schock 2007), so scholars working on the Global South debate their applicability (Ellis/van Kessel 2009; Fadaee 2016; Engels/Müller 2015). While “considering democracy as a sort of precondition for protest, social movement studies have not paid much attention to non-democratic regimes” (della Porta 2014: 295), although this has shifted progressively since the North African uprisings in 2011. Nevertheless, this regional bias resulted in a lack of contextualization when it comes to different regimes and forms of state security forces.

A recurrent criticism of research from the field of civil resistance is that “[m]any studies offer only a one-sided focus, emphasizing what movements do while largely ignoring dictators’ strategies” (Nepstad 2011: xiii). However, scholars of civil resistance do, contrary to some of these criticisms, engage compellingly with the side of the ruler(s) in terms of regime stability and the capabilities to repress (Nepstad 2011; Schock 2015b; Osa/Schock 2007; Stephan/Chenoweth 2008). This goes back to their research focus on large revolutions that overthrow regimes, through this work they added knowledge on less democratic regimes.
in which (mass) protests happen (Karatnycky/Ackerman 2005). These studies thus contribute insights to the efforts of understanding repressive threats or security forces in general, and seem competent and useful as research frameworks for understanding the two case study struggles of this paper, since both took place in partly democratic systems.

This overview illustrates the reasons why I position this work and deduce my theoretical guidance at the intersection of these three strands of literature, whose debates have primarily taken place in parallel, but more recently have been increasingly in communication with one another (Schock 2015a: 11; della Porta/Rossi 2013). Exemplary studies at the crossroads are the comparative study by Adrienne LeBas (2011) on party-building and democratization in Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Zambia, several works by Donatella della Porta (2014, 2016) comparing the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, and the cross-regional comparison of six civil resistance struggles by Sharon E. Nepstad (2011), to name just a few. My approach is new, insofar as I deduced systematically the cross-disciplinary links and mechanisms that have been identified between protestors and presidents, and applied them for the first time to the study of term amendment struggles in Africa. The manner in which I use their theories will be explained in the next section on my research design.

1.2 Research cases and design

The research agenda outlined here is primarily driven by an academic interest in first, understanding and thus deducing the differences between the two selected term amendment struggles, with a focus on figuring out the role social movements or respectively anti-term protests played, and second, making sense of the divergence in these struggles and outcomes. In the case of Burkina Faso, we observe an institutional compliance, while in Senegal the renewed candidacy of Wade has been enforced with the help of the Constitutional Council.

The study is based on the premise that the divergent outcomes relate back to the dissimilar paths of the term amendment struggles, since my selected confrontations took place within the contexts of approximately similar institutional arrangements, climates of public support, and social movements formations. Therefore, my cases are a good fit for my research

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16 For an overview and discussion of how the field emerged and key debates see Kurt Schock (2015b) or Erica Chenoweth and Kathleen G. Cunningham (2013).
purpose — to single out causal links between protests and presidential politics — since both struggles unfold in semi-presidential systems that are partially free with regard to political freedoms, and even the social movements at the forefront appeared strikingly similar (see 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). To compare cases that are most similar and seem to differ solely in certain identified ways allows us to specify causal mechanisms that are theoretically postulated underneath or beyond structural or institutional similarities (Gerring 2007: 133-135; Beach/Pedersen 2013; Waldner 2011).

In order to answer my two research questions, I follow a fourfold research design. First, I apply a theory-guided process-tracing approach combined with comparative methods, in line with Tulia G. Falleti (2016) who considers such a combination the most powerful. Tracing processes is the best choice when dealing with little-studied phenomena and cases that run counterintuitive to our expectations, both consistent with these two term amendment struggles and their related outcomes. Initially used to understand the decision-making processes of individuals, the major advantage of this approach is that researchers are able to uncover causal relations while taking into account the complexity of social realities. This stands in contrast to any clear-cut explanation, list of supportive conditions, or statistical analysis that insufficiently reflects or captures the interactions of actors (Tarrow 2010: 252).

The systematic process tracing in reference to Tulia G. Falleti (2016) merges aspects of theory-testing research design variants (see for example Beach/Pedersen 2013) with more explorative approaches (see Checkel 2005; George/Bennett 2005), and thus offers the possibility to link to preexisting studies and simultaneously to detect new dimensions (see for details 2.4). In concrete terms, this means that I will deduce links between anti-term protests, among others organized by social movements, and presidents changing course, through cross-disciplinary combinations of these three different literature strands.

Second, guided by theory, I will explore the protest-government interactions for each contentious episode. An episode of contention refers here to “a stream of confrontations” (McAdam et al. 2001: 28-29) that marks a breaking point with routinized politics, usually characterized by new political actors or identities. One dominant feature is a rather high protest frequency with high levels of participation (McAdam et al. 2001: 309-311). Similar to Boniface Dulani (2011a) I start my in-depth investigation with these initial mass mobilizations that bring attention to the issue. I include, however, the founding of the broader dominant social movements, which expands the period of investigation a little further in the
case of Senegal. In Burkina Faso, the first mass rallies happened in June 2013, parallel to the creation of several new protest movements, including *Balai Citoyen*, and continued until the president resigned on 31 October 2014.\footnote{A new cycle of protest from the same social movements and other actors involved emerged afterwards within the transition period and especially when the military took power who tried, from the perspective of activists, to ‘steal the revolution by the people’. I consider this a new wave of protest since nearly one year lied in-between and partly other actors were presently involved.} Similarly, the Senegalese uprising lasted roughly fifteen months, starting with the official formation of *Y’en a marre* on 18 January 2011, several months before the Senegalese president announced to run anew, and ranging until the candidature of Abdoulaye Wade in February 2012. This means that I demark the end of the contentious episode when the president resigns (Burkina Faso), or runs for the upcoming elections (Senegal). Following James M. Jaspers’ (2014) concepts of players (that I label actors) and arenas, my main concern for the in-depth description of events and actors are “time, interaction, and process, all of which are obscured in more structural models” (Jasper 2014: 22; Jasper 2011). This means that the primary units of my analysis are newsworthy protest and political events, which I then relate back to the perceptions of key players involved, in order to make sense of the divergent strategies and dynamics across and within the two cases.

Third, I compare the episodes of contention in order to figure out points of divergence that are causally relevant to the dissimilar outcomes. This action-focused and actors-oriented approach enables me to answer both research questions concerned with the divergence within the contentious episode, namely how term amendment struggles are fought (differently) and which role social movements play. Due to my selection of approximate most-similar cases with regard to institutional settings and prominent social movements, I am able to unveil relevant turning points that led to divergent pathways and thus, outcomes. With this comparative analysis of contentious episodes, I answer the calls of contentious politics scholars who suggest exploring processes over time, and comparing across cases and actors (see, among others, della Porta 2008; della Porta/Keating 2008; Tilly/Tarrow 2007; Giugni 1999; Bosi/Uba 2009).

Fourth, I place the episodes of contention back in their historical context following Jeffrey T. Checkel’s advice “not to lose sight of the bigger picture” (Checkel 2005: 19).\footnote{Under critical juncture I understand not only these historical episodes where institutional change actually happens, but rather “periods in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases into divergent long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory that diverges significantly from the old” (Slater/Simmons 2010: 888). From this I subsequently followed}
contention never happens in a vacuum but rather is connected to the past and present (Giugni 1999: xxvi), this broader perspective allows me to answer my third research question — why they proceeded and thus resulted in dissimilar outcomes of presidents rerunning or resigning — since critical antecedents ‘prepared’ the later choices of political elites and non-elite actors, and because even “arenas embody past decisions, invested resources, and cultural meanings” (Jasper 2014: 17). In order to deduce the case-specific and afterwards more generalized causal mechanisms, I make use of more recent developments within the field of comparative studies. The approaches of Dan Slater and Erica Simmons (2010) on critical antecedents, and of Hillel D. Soifer (2012) who distinguishes between productive and permissive conditions within critical junctures, were of especially great help to this endeavor (for a more in-depth discussion, see my methodology 2.4). Therefore, besides familiarity with prior studies, this cross-case research design requires profound knowledge of each case, all the more since both cases have been under-studied in a systematic manner. For that reason, I will comprehensively describe my data collection in the next section.

1.3 Data collection

This study is based on a source triangulation of the analysis of primary sources such as interviews, protest calls, or declarations that I collected during my fieldwork, secondary sources which encompass mostly scientific literature, and so-called grey literature such as human rights reporting. Additionally, I used data from the Social Conflict Database for Africa (SCAD) of the Strauss Center at the University of Texas at Austin (Salehyan et al. 2012) to identify the rise and fall of protest events, their durations, and the numbers of participants within the contentious episodes (see chapter four). Further, the information on legal documents was provided by the database of the constitutions of Sub-Saharan Africa (DCSSA) by the University of Konstanz, and the texts were analyzed qualitatively. Such a combination of numerous sources is in line with recommendations by Christine Tampusch and Bruno Pailier (2016: 442) for process-tracing in order to reduce selectivity bias.

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19 I use the SCAD Databank, even though I am aware that the data is not sufficient as they merely coded international media reporting. However, international media attention is highly related to newsworthy protest events and above all it is so far the only databank that offers information on protest events, duration, participants, frames, and actors involved.

20 Anonymized interview transcripts, notes and further original documents that I collected in Senegal or Burkina Faso are available upon request.
In view of the profound lack of prior information, fieldwork was critical to gathering information, but also to developing a more nuanced understanding of incumbent-opponent relations. Following Diana Kapiszewski and colleagues (2015), I have prepared my field research and chosen a medium-length stay that allows insights for predefined research questions, to collect and ‘test’, as well as to further develop our understanding (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 100). Based on my preliminary knowledge, I stayed at institutions during my fieldwork that best served my research interests and offered access to gatekeepers to the actors that I expected to be difficult to reach. As I could hardly find any information on Senegalese trade unions, I applied for a research stay at the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation / Bureau Sénégal in Dakar that is well known for its contacts in this scene. My prior knowledge of the Burkinabe context led me to look for an institute that was well-respected locally, and that was attached, but not directly related to the university, and so I became associated with the Institut général Tiémoko Marc Garango pour la gouvernance et le développement (IGD).

During the field research, I conducted semi-structured interviews following the approach of Gabriele Rosenthal (2011), since I was keen to gain knowledge on the strategies, expectations, and perceptions of key actors. The advantage of qualitative interviews is the ability to discover actor-specific interpretations of contexts, events, and other actors that allows the figuring out of the motives behind actors’ behavior (Hopf 2012: 350-352). This type of half-open and guided questioning allowed me to organize my interviews based on my prior theoretical knowledge deduced from former studies, and at the same time leave interviewees the necessary space to put forward new aspects that they perceive as essential, that I may not have foreseen. For my interview guidelines that I prepared in advance but which I adjusted accordingly during the course of my research, I distinguished three main groups – protest leaders, protest participants or coordinators, and experts (see Appendix A, B and C for interview guidelines). Protest leaders are the most relevant group since they usually decide on the strategies that their constituency follows (Jasper 2014: 11-13; see also Hardt/Negri 2017), the major framing of the protests (Mueller 2018: 80-82), and often act as the representatives of the protests vis-à-vis the public and politicians (Diani et al. 2003).21 Because of these processes, the individual narratives of these protest leaders usually “reflect collective patterns of interpretation” (Zamponi/Daphi 2014: 199). Many social movements

21 A protest leader is considered “a decision-maker who spends significant amounts of time organizing collective action and representing rank-and-file protestors outside the movement” (Mueller 2018: 79-80).
or other civil society groups contain second row positions, the occupants of which often mobilize supporters directly or coordinate protest events and networks. Therefore, whenever possible, I spoke with both: one leader/representative/spokesperson (whatever they self-identified as), and one active participant or coordinator. Due to my expectations that the social movements engaged with many opponents on different frontlines, I interviewed members of several civil society groups such as human rights organizations and youth or student associations involved in the struggles. Interviews with selected experts allow me to position actors in a broader picture. Such interview forms attempt to explore their perspectives only with regard to their (former) job position, in order to gain background knowledge that is otherwise inaccessible (Meuser/Nagel 2009). This external perspective of local observers is all the more relevant when we talk to protest leaders, who tend to overemphasize the success of their own mobilization attempts. Additionally, local experts “help researchers to identify which actors to interview” (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 211). For the side of state actors, governing elites or security forces, I used the media reporting of government newspapers that represent the government’s voice as a proxy.

Beyond the words of their leaders, civil society groups express themselves through written documents such as press releases, declarations, calls to protest, and websites (Johnston 2002). My data thus also consists of supplementary documents that interview partners personally handed to me. For the document analysis, I carried out an interpretive discourse analysis of text data, which is consistent with my interpretive-constructivist approach. An even smaller part was played by visual impressions of the uprisings provided by documentary films about the events. They were helpful in two regards: first, I was able to ask my interview partners about specific moments in time after they had happened; and second, these impressions allowed me to counteract a certain bias that develops automatically with time, given the interviews were carried out after the uprisings happened, and hence actors’ perceptions might change, whereas the films documented perceptions and events during the struggles to which I could critically refer to in my interviews.

In total, my field stay lasted from January until April 2017. I conducted fourteen semi-structured Interviews with representatives of human rights organizations, trade unions, and

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22 For this collection, I have been inspired by the extensive and impressive list of Diana Kapiszewski and colleagues (2015: 155).

23 For the Senegalese case, this involves “The Revolution won’t be televised” by Rama Thiaw (2016) and “Boy Saloum” by Audrey Gallet (2013); for the uprisings in Burkina Faso, I watched the “Barfußrevolution” by Deutsche Welle (2015) and “Burkinabé Rising. The Art of Resistance in Burkina Faso” by Iara Lee (2018).
movement leaders of *Y’en a marre* in Senegal, and carried out fifteen semi-structured interviews with representatives of trade unions, youth associations and movement leaders of *Balai Citoyen* in Burkina Faso. I selected them based on my knowledge of the (historically) relevant groups of actors in protest movements, and followed the suggestions and information gained from interviewees in a snowballing manner (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 212). I also followed hints concerning the fractioning and splitting-up of coalitions, and refusals to take part. Concerning the choice of experts, I chose them in accordance with the topics I expected to be of relevance in each case, which in Senegal meant gathering information on trade unions, the role of women movements, and the Constitutional Council, whereas in Burkina Faso it was on the military and repressive threats. An abstract in English served as an information leaflet on the purpose of my study to make my objectives transparent to my respondents (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 185; see Appendix D for handout on research project).

On top of these aforementioned data sources, I also collected media articles, leaflets, declarations, and where available, state documents from archives, libraries, newspapers or interviewees. For the analysis of media articles, my aim was to evaluate three daily newspapers with regard to their political distance from the government at the time of the initial mobilizations – one that can be seen as the government voice, one that is mostly perceived as investigative and thus balanced concerning state officials and opponents, and one which actors judged to be pro-opposition and largely supportive of the protests. In Senegal, I collected articles from *Le Soleil* (pro-government), *L’Observateur* (investigative), and *Sud Quotidien* (close to activists), which I found majority of filed at the Faculty of Journalism at the University Cheickh Anta Diop in Dakar. In Burkina Faso, I analyzed the reporting of *Sidwaya* (pro-government), *L’Observateur paalga* (investigative), and *L’Indépendant* (close to activists). Unfortunately, for these, I only gained access to newspapers from around the time of the last sequence of the struggle, in October 2014. I tried to compensate with further online research as well as with informal talks with my Burkinabe colleagues. From these media sources, I mainly gathered information on protest events. However, researchers have to be aware of a media bias towards more spectacular events or events related to their own involvements as actors (Rucht 2017). Interviews and regular casual talks helped me to develop an instinct of the relationship between journalists

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24 Anonymized interview transcripts, notes and further original documents that I collected in Senegal or Burkina Faso are available upon request.
and activists (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 159) and thus see the reporting from a critical perspective.

1.4 Study objectives

The narrow objective of this study is to examine term amendment struggles in West Africa closely, in order to review and revise existing evidence at the interface of democratization, social movement, and non-violent revolution studies. Empirically, my aim is to explain the varying proceedings over time that led to a different presidential decision in Senegal than in Burkina Faso. Concerning the frequently called ‘third term debate’, the objective of this research project is to provide new insights into the interactions between mobilized social actors and governing elites during term amendment struggles, and the impact that the former have on the process. At best, this study contributes further insights to our understanding of the complex interplay of movement-institutions interactions, particularly in the research field of comparative politics that ignored these questions for too long (Helmke/Levitsky 2004). Elites are commonly seen as the primary determining actors related to various outcomes in African democracies, and so unsurprisingly the focus often centers on the question of how political elites affect institutions and shape national politics (Kohrs 2014). Putting it another way: how protests influence elite strategies and subsequently how state responses determine protest and social movement outcomes, allows us to see existing studies from a new perspective. Specifically, this study grants us the opportunity to gain new knowledge based on the fact that several dimensions that would be expected by previous research to determine the outcome are held constant in both the cases currently under study. Hence, research on term amendment struggles in general and my interactive actors-oriented research design in particular, allows us to reflect on broader questions of citizens-elites relations and the sustainability of democratic principles.

Besides the above, my goal is to theorize more rigorously when it comes to research on Africa south of the Sahara. I agree with Jacquelen van Stekelenburg and Bert Kandermannds (2009) who claim that, “Africa is the continent to observe contextualized contestation” (van Stekelenburg/Kandermannds 2009: 22) in regard to the diversity of regimes and actors involved. Another motive to deduce theoretical guidance from this cross-case study stems from critically reflecting upon our existing theories and concepts that are
mainly derived from historical developments in the Global North, but applied to various other regions, including Africa (Engels/Müller 2015: 14, 22). Applying these approaches to cases outside of the Global North allows us to critically reflect upon limitations of theories and methods likewise and, at best, uncover the imprint of (political) culture norms. Instead of underlining the exceptionality of African politics, I hope to provide fruitful insights for further cross-case and perhaps cross-regional studies. Because I agree with Michel Cahen and colleagues (2015) that “Africa is a tool like any other for considering generalities and for improving our understanding of realities that are very different and yet follow the same broad tendencies” (Cahen et al. 2015: 1; see also Chabal 2005 ; for social movements see Berger et al. 2017), I want to ensure that social movements and protests that take place on the African continent won’t be “underresearched, undertheorized, underhistorized” (Eckert 2017: 213) any longer.

1.5 Thesis overview

Chapter two is an exposition to my theoretical and methodological framework. With my ambitious aim of investigating the interactions of interest not solely exploratively, but also as embedded within the ongoing wider discussions on the power of protests, I singled out mechanisms from the broader fields of transitology studies, contentious politics approaches, and non-violent revolutions that I expect – guided again by my actors-arena considerations – to link protests to the change of course of presidents. Overall, I distinguished ten causal mechanisms based on former studies of various regions and varied contexts that informed my empirical analysis thereafter. Following this, I present and critically discuss my methodological approach that is above all actor and process oriented, while being simultaneously historically grounded.

My third chapter offers an overview first, of all states whose constitution contains tenure restrictions, and second, of all term bids that have happened until now. I then provide a comprehensive overview of the population of cases, and then outline according to which selection criteria I have chosen the two cases under study. Since the expectation emerging from previous scholarly work was for the level of political openness and degree of democratization to partly determine which mechanisms will be at work, I selected two struggles that took place in partially free semi-presidential systems, with comparable
institutional arrangements for constitutional changes, high popular support for term limits (another dimension theories expect to matter), and analogical social movements at the forefront. At the same time, the term-confrontations in Senegal and Burkina Faso are typical in regard to the manner in which presidents (mis)use institutional channels, but counterintuitive in that Senegal is usually considered as more democratic with regard to its trajectory than Burkina Faso, yet the protests there were sooner demobilized and seemingly unable to prevent a renewed candidature.

Chapter four is my first empirical chapter. In it, I zoom into the narrowly defined episodes of contention, which in my cases are these episodes of contention. This time span ranges in Senegal from January 2011 until March 2012, and in Burkina Faso from June 2013 until October 2014. The available statistical data on the major protest events enable me to identify five phases of the struggles for Senegal and four for Burkina Faso, all of which I will describe in detail, including the choices of key actors based on data triangulation. In addition to the social movements in the front row, my comprehensive descriptions encompass – guided by my theoretical and methodological framework – political elites, non-elite actors, security forces involved in the issue, and other relevant protest and political events related to the subject matter.

My fifth chapter then encompasses my comparative analysis, which will show that the actual divergence occurred in the last stage of the confrontations between presidential supporters and opponents. But why did actors – non-elite actors, political elites, and security forces – behave differently, perceive opportunities in a different manner, make different decisions on protest strategies, in the ways that then led to a demobilizing moment in Senegal, in contrast to enduring mass mobilization in Burkina Faso? The comparative analysis of the contentious episodes can provide answers to my questions regarding the manner in which the struggles were fought differently, and with a specific focus on mobilized social actors, but cannot adequately explain why, for instance, in Burkina Faso actors followed a now-or-never strategy while in Senegal they didn’t. In order to thus answer my second research question, why the struggles underwent divergent pathways that led to divergent results with regard to an enforced candidature, I examine more closely the perceptions of key players who seemed constrained by their own normative-cultural habits and past experiences. In this manner, I was able to deduce not only the relevant productive and permissive conditions within the contentious episodes that hindered the prevention of another candidature in Burkina Faso,
but also the critical antecedents responsible for the differences. Ultimately, I build an abstract account of how large-scale protests are able to prevent short-term democratic backslidings. In the conclusion I first summarize the major findings in relation to the initial theoretical expectations, and then explicitly integrate my empirical findings into the contemporary debates within the three literature strands. I hope that my findings are thought-provoking and will lead to the attention of further researchers, spurring them to reexamine, redefine, and generally engage with my work. In view of the current tendencies of democratically-elected rulers to revise democratic norms, my research at best will enable practitioners, activists, and scholars to better understand processes of democratization, civic engagement, and (youth) empowerment in Africa and beyond. Besides contributing to the existing academic body of knowledge, the project aims to empower citizens to actively take part in politics and shape their own democratic future when they are facing threats to democratic norms.
2. How mobilized social actors push presidents to change course – Theoretical and methodological framework

Until today, most of the existing studies circulate around the question of under which conditions presidents may attempt such term bids in the first place but miss to ask how ‘democracy can be saved’ once the initial decision is made.25 This means, that we often focus more on the threats to democracy rather than its correctives. But once democratic institutions and norms are in place, the key question is rather how to save them. In particular the side of contentious collective actors to whom these researchers sloppily refer to as ‘popular pressure’, ‘pro-democracy movements’, or the stand-up of ‘ordinary citizens’ is rarely well researched, still considering activists not to act as strategically as political elites do.26 Searching instead in the broader field of transitology studies within democratization theories, contentious politics approaches of social movement scholars, and civil resistance studies concerned with non-violent revolutions, we find assumed linkages in which manner (mass) protests in general or social movements in particular convince presidents to change course, which „is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities” (Tarrow 1998: 2).27 In line with my strategic-horizontal perspective, I consider protests as collectively planned and organized acts preceded by collective choices of actors’ groups (della Porta 2014: 45). Even though protest is not an exclusive repertoire of contention by social movements as other civil society groups more formalized, it is nonetheless the key feature of many social movements.28

Challengers of governments or regimes in place have diverse possibilities to influence politics by lobbying, legislating, and using disruptive or moderate, violent or non-violent protest tactics (Duyvendak/Jasper 2015).29 But also governing elites have more than one way

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25 I use the wording in reference to the book by Donatella della Porta (2013) in order to take up the debate who asked the question with regard to recent developments in Europe and North Africa.

26 Under contentious collective actors I subsume those engaged in collective action that is contentious if „it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities” (Tarrow 1998).

27 Social movement scholars refer to social movements while studies of democratizations and civil resistance largely talk of mass mobilizations or protests. This is why I pick up both terms here.

28 Repertoire of contention refer to repetitive and thus foreseeable tools of specific protest tactics that become over time recognizable and learned protest forms (Tilly 1995: 42-44).

29 Non-violent resistance can take up a wide range of forms such as persuasion or protest, noncooperation, or intervention (Sharp 2005). Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2013) illustrates how the research field developed over time to todays’ emphasis on non-violent movements and their strategic interactions.
to respond to anti-government protests, ranging from repressive counter actions to political concessions, from widening to closing arenas for further mobilizations (Boudreau 2004; Slater 2005).\textsuperscript{30} I presume, based on insights of numerous studies over the last decades, that opponents who engage among others in contentious collective actions do not act irrationally or chaotically, but rather intentionally in order to realize certain aims – and thus choose equally strategically like politicians (della Porta et al. 2010: 16).\textsuperscript{31} I understand strategy in reference to Nepstad as “actors’ choices about targets, timing, and tactics” (Nepstad 2011: 7) which are shaped by other actors’ actions, the arenas social movements act in, their (contentious) collective identity and their available repertoire of contention (Jasper 2014). They make “their strategic choices on the basis of their appreciation of the specific chances of reform and threat, and the specific risks of repression and facilitation they face” (Kriesi 2004: 78). In turn, collective contentious actions change calculations of elites (Tilly 1999). This means that strategic choices are relational on both sides. From this realization it follows for researchers to move away from the structure-versus-agency or below-versus-above perspectives, towards a relational actors-oriented approach that I suggest below in theoretical and methodological terms. I have already shown in my introduction how the linkage of these approaches from the fields of democratization, social movement, and civil resistance studies offer a more comprehensive guidance than term-bid-studies provide, however, their combination and transfer to term amendment struggles brings challenges. First of all, the authors refer to slightly varying degrees of changes: While social movement scholars include gradual changes and thus short-term outcomes, contrarily civil resistance and democratization researchers are concerned with complete regime changes. I initially argue that we are still able to make those approaches fruitful for term bids, although their prevention is only a short-term outcome. However, the enforcement of an extended candidature by incumbents puts legislative and normative-social practices in question and thus exemplifies institutional changes towards less democracy. The non-compliance or overturn of limited terms for heads of state reduces institutional checks-and-balances mechanisms. Therefore, I categorize such

\textsuperscript{30} See Ericka A. Albaugh (2011) for an overview on autocratic toolkits, exemplified by Cameroon case study, see also James M. Jasper (2014) for contentious collective actors, since he offers a comprehensive list of the diversity of social movement strategies, including those concerning the organization that they implement, resources that they raise, among others.

\textsuperscript{31} Collective action is contentious if „it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities.” (Tarrow 1998: 3).
an outcome as part of institutional changes in line with Lorenzo Bosi and colleagues (2016), who classify outcomes pushed forward by social movements in three groups of personal, institutional, and policy changes. Under institutional changes they subsume any consequences for state structure and regime type, but include as well legislative or normative practical changes that modify the rules of the game. Constitutions are first and foremost written rules for a society that only prevail as normative guidelines, if they are respected by the rulers and controlled by the ruled (Linz/Stepan 1996b), so that the struggles over their adherence affect legislation and norms in tandem. If we consider democratization as an “inherently long-run chain of linked episodes of struggles and negotiations over institutional change“ (Capoccia/Zieblatt 2010: 957), term amendment struggles are one example of such episodes in which actors push for and against a core democratic principle, namely leadership changes (Moehler/Lindberg 2009).

The second obstacle to merge these approaches is their diverging conceptualization of mobilized social actors. I will recur to this point in a moment: While researchers engaging with regime changes speak merely of mass mobilizations, referring to observable people rallying in public arenas to voice their demands, and integrate them as a rather homogenous unit of organized citizens, protestors, or activists, social movement scholars unravel collective contentious actors, although in some instances merely refer to outcomes of social movements more densely. In the following, I will primarily employ the term contentious collective actors, only if for instance the authors reason certain interrelations solely for social movements (social movement scholars) or mass mobilizations (non-violent revolutions and transitology researchers). Such a broader understanding based on the general idea of contentious politics that “includes social movements, but it also includes less sustained forms of contention – like riots and strike waves – and more extensive ones – like civil wars, revolutions, and episodes of democratization – and it intersects with routine political processes – like elections and interest group politics” (Tarrow 2013). Some may ask in return if those definitions integrate accordingly to forms of politics, but on the contrary, they

32 An overview of different conceptualizations for social movement outcomes as well as the arguments for and against them provide Marco Giugni (1998, 1999), Edwin Amenta and Michael P. Young (1999). The first elaborated categorizations of social movement outcomes go back to Paul D. Schumaker (1975) and William A. Gamson (1990).

33 Verta Taylor and Nella Van Dyke (2004) illustrated that riots can be equally part of the tactical repertoires of social movements and conclude “[e]ven participants in seemingly spontaneous uprisings such as urban riots may be acting strategically with conscious intention to produce or prevent change” (Taylor/Van Dyke 2004: 269)
exclude many bureaucratic and overall more formalized political routines and aim at grouping all potentially subversive actions challenging existing modes of actions.

Despite their controversies, all of the approaches quoted below tell us either when mobilized social actors or their actions are powerful, or when regimes or governments are weakening. With regard to my actors-arenas-approach, all of those preexisting (primarily comparative) studies offer preliminary knowledge on the links between protests or social movements to institutional changes that I group along three types of collective actors – political elites, non-elite allies, and security forces. Although these groups are, of course, internally diverse, I distinguish them based on external ascription and self-attribution due to their apparently different positions to or within the political arena – political elites belong to the parliamentarian or often called political arena with an easy access to power and the incumbent, non-elite actors encompass all potential allies for social movements or respectively contentious collective actors, some acting in/others outside of the public or political arena, and security forces who play a specific role as the prolonged arm of the ruling political elites.

Due to my research aim in understanding the positively framed outcome in a president taking back the enforced candidature, I only reconstruct those linkages that are theoretically led in a rather straightforward manner from anti-term- or respectively anti-government-protests or respectively social movements to (institutional) changes. In other words, although I account in my empirical investigation for the interrelations, I construct there the effects from protests against the term bid to its withdrawal.34 Feedback loops such as moments of demobilization, counter-mobilization by state agents, or repression, which can of course happen any time, will be traced back in the empirical analysis but are left out here for the purpose of theoretical and conceptual clarity, following Peter A. Hall’s concept of theoretical patterns (Hall 2008: 27; see also Beach/Pedersen 2013). The following theoretical insights provide the framework to let me “know where to focus [my] analytical attention, which actors to study and interview and what historical sequences of events to analyze” (Trampusch/Palier 2016: 450). The recreation of these apparently most likely relevant interplays of forces navigate my “decisions about what aspects of context are likely to be relevant to causal explanation” (Falleti/Lynch 2009: 1161). Following James Mahoney and Cary Goertz (2006), the

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34 I use here the broad notions of ‘anti-government protest’ and ‘institutional change’ on purpose, since these studies use diverse denominations but commonly refer to these phenomena.
The objective here is not to present every plausible option existing in the three literature strands – transitologist, contentious politics or non-violent revolutions studies – as this would expand the length of any work, since we are confronted in these broader debates with a lively and rich research scene, but rather to focus on some selected studies and relations that regularly appear in at least two disciplines. The objective is not to provide a general theoretical model. Instead, I aim to deduce selected mechanisms, which scholars expect for actors’ constellations to be of foremost relevance in reference to (pro-democratic) changes.

Therefore, my focal point are relational mechanisms, “those that shape or alter relations between actors or groups” (Tarrow 2015). In contrast to literature reviews that scan each field, I interlink the findings directly in regard to the respective groups of actors rather than to point at gaps they leave behind. In this manner I make transparent which expectations guided my following empirical analysis, an aspect that many works on causal relations or rather processes in general are lacking, although most of them seemed clearly guided by theory.

The time span ranges from the initial mobilization to the prevention of an enforced candidature by the incumbent – be that the direct resignation of the president or his renounce of his candidature. The explanation of initial mobilization success is not at my center of attention and thus excluded in the following. The starting point, virtually the point in time $t_0$, is thus (mass) protests against the government or term bid respectively once the incumbent has attempted or at least announced such term bid ($t_{-1}$). I set the demarcation point in relation to the first occurrence of mass mobilizations directed against the announced term extension, although activists may denounce other protest frames likewise. Because I presume that this moment in time marks usually the beginning of the confrontations between president-supporters or –opponents. The outcome and thus named $t_1$, in turn, refers to the rather short-term political outcome, which equals the withdrawal of the candidature by the apparently power-hungry ruler. In-between these two moments, actors engage in mutual relations, predominantly responsive to each other. But despite the emphasis on actors, such an agency-

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35 I concentrate on the meso-level of analysis between local events and national politics but exclude transnational dimensions, even though I acknowledge the impact of potential influential allies, transnational opportunities, or international interdependences. To study such transnational pathways profoundly, I would have needed yet other literature strands and insights to draw empirically profound conclusions. Nonetheless, if I come across such statements referring to transnational dimensions within my data collection, I include them empirically but my overall impression is their minor importance for the cross-case divergence.

36 Protest frames refer to “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford/Snow 2000: 614, see also Benford 1993).
based modelling does not neglect the importance of institutions, on the contrary: The following reveals that institutional settings constrain actors’ behavior, often provide opportunities once they shift, and consequently affect tactics and strategies of mobilized social actors and responses of governments. In total, I deduce ten patterns of interactions that are apparently supportive for contentious collective actors engaged in protest events to convince presidents into changes, on which I will shed light in greater detail in the next sections, followed by the discussion and presentation of my complementary methodological approach – both guiding the follow-up empirical observations and analysis.

2.1 Divided they change – Political elites

The division of a previous united political elite is frequently named as one of the key moments for social movements to affect routinized politics. The notion of ‘political elites’ usually refer to those, who occupy key positions as ministers or members of parliament within the political arena, often narrowly understood as internal to institutionalized system. In different manners, their behavior influences the opportunities for challengers and the limitations for ruling heads of state to follow their plans. Because in particular the backing of ‘politically relevant elites’, a term recommended by Volker Perthes (2004) to differentiate those with and without power, is necessary to govern. If such a support weakens, presidents may have to handle a different situation compared to the moment they initially followed their pathway of personal ruling. When political settlements between elites, referring to established agreements of elites that stabilize their power, shake, this opens up an opportunity for opponents. Therefore, the capacity to control or even repress dissidents weakens. Such interplays between governing or at least politically relevant elites and contentious collective actors are illustrated to an extent not previously known in social movement studies by the groundbreaking work of Doug McAdam and colleagues (2001). In their book on ‘contentious politics’ they illustrate how the break of elite-alliance gives incentives to activists in the streets and thus empowers them to stay on track towards change, which seems more feasible. However, political elites and contentious collective actors are not necessarily on two different sides, they rather constantly interact with each other and hence benefit from each other’s support. So that a review of existing studies, mainly on democratic transitions and contentious politics, allows the deduction of four patterns: (i)

37 For an overview of the plurality of elites see Geraint Parry’s work on political elites (2005).
Contentious collective actors protesting on the street potentially serve as opportunities for political elites to break with the government, which then bargains into change. Or, protestors may benefit from political elites that left the ruling party – (ii) either operating as signs for decreasing support of the incumbent, empowering the challengers and at best pushing the rulers into change in tandem, or (iii) directly joining the protests as political allies. Another pattern of influence are (iv) elites who left the government arrangement and start coordinating their actions towards change jointly with contentious collective actors or respectively protest leaders, who eventually decide on strategies and serve as contact persons (see Figure 2.1: i-iv).38

For the first part of the hypothetical link between contentious collective actions and splitting elites, initial repressive state responses to non-violent protest forms seem to function as opportunities for divisions. In abandoning any form of violence, contentious collective actors disclose the violent ruling of the regime, once state forces repress them abusively, and thus put the legitimacy into question overall (Lemarchand 1992). As a result, the sympathy for opponents rise in the public but alike among political elites, a phenomenon comparative studies on democratizations have singled out, for instance, Donatella della Porta (2014) has shown these relations for pro-democracy movements in Central Eastern Europe in 1989 and North African states in 2011 (see also Beissinger 2002; Brunce/Wolchik 2011).39 For the major part such a link from violent repressions of non-violent protests to becoming opportunities for elitist moderate forces to openly split is merely expected in “less-than-democratic regimes” (Tarrow 1998: 78) – a reason why I integrate this precondition as some sort of relevant scope condition, although I talk of ‘context’ rather than systems as it shall encompass not only authoritarian regimes at the one end of the spectrum but also authoritarian ruling environments (see Figure 2.1: i and ii).

38 The following figures illustrate the logical sequence of steps in a simplified manner. Following examples of Dan Slater and Erica Simmons (2010), Katrin Uba (2007), and Derek Beach and Rasmus B. Pedersen (2013), my theoretical framework serves illustrative clarity and thus only includes the positively framed patterns of influential interactions. Empirically, these steps may happen parallel and may be hindered by feedback loops or backfire mechanisms.

39 Of course, this does not mean that this is the key or only reason why political elites may split, but since I account only for those links related to protests, I do not list all potential reasons for divisions within political elites.
Figure 2.1: Explaining how protest leads to institutional changes through political elites

Source: Author’s own compilation.
But once divided, one optional course is that elites take the lead and negotiate change. These results derive merely from cross-case studies on regime changes, which often conclude that mass mobilizations may function as an occasion for elites to openly switch ranks, but lose their power once elites separated (Linz/Stepan 1996b; Linz 1990a; Diamond 2012; Luong 2002). In this pattern, researchers assume that once collective contentious actors helped to transform power relations within the political arena, the influence of them decreases rapidly after. So that change is reached through bargaining between soft- and hardliners within the enclosed political arena (see Figure 2.1: i). One of the most cited works, which demonstrated this process profoundly, is the cross-national study of democratic transitions in Latin America by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986). They illustrate how collective contentious actions were relevant for moderate elites to leave at first, while in the aftermath those elitist change agents negotiate a new political pact that brings democratic opening but in which collective contentious actors do not have a say. Although this work has been a milestone in scientific literature to expand institutional-centered models by agency and set the ground for transitologist approaches, Donatella della Porta and Federico M. Rossi (2013) rightly subsume that in general “transitology tends to consider movements as manipulated by elites” (della Porta/Rossi 2013: 3) and consequently lacks to account for the agency of elites. Elites, in turn, are conceptualized as power-seeking actors who misuse activists when needed, so that for long, democratization scholars considered regime transformation an elite-based change from above – mirrored in this first pattern. Studies of non-violent revolutions portray that this may be even true for cases when literally masses take to the street: For instance, Kurt Schock (2005) points at this role of revolutions which trigger the separations of established political alliances, whose process of negotiation and persuasion then determines the actual outcome. Collective contentious actions thus have an indirect effect, since the key actors are elites, while mobilizations and protest events serve at the most as a reflection of public opinion.

Again, this link is merely expected to take place in rather authoritarian settings, similar to an empowerment of collective contentious actors, the second mechanism I learned from existing studies: Here, scholars, primarily of contentious politics and revolutions, ascertained that collective contentious actors receive positive incentives to keep the mobilization at high levels when elites split which previously held together (McAdam 1996; Tilly 2004; Tarrow 1998, 2012). The division within their own ranks thus reflects a growing weakness of an authoritarian regime and opponents interpret their segregation as responses to their collective
frames and actions (Johnston 2011: 128-9). Consequently, the split plays out as an empowerment of contentious collective actors, which then translates in form of more power into changes (see Figure 2.1: ii). Those linkages seemed to occur rather under authoritarian governance since only in those regimes, we lack routinized competition and internal resources of opponents, so that divisions are first of all less likely without any initial mobilization (first part of the mechanism), and secondly, usually authoritarian governments act as one voice, so that the occurrence of confrontations among elite fractions acts as strong signal of growing instability. For this reason, I integrate both parts in a rather authoritarian environment within my theoretical framework (see Figure 2.1: ii).

This illustrates that the extent to which contentious collective actors are able to exploit these splits for their own cause differ. Beyond this empowerment-mechanism, Nancy Bermeo (1997) pictures the exploitation of such moments by contentious collective actors with strong labor movements for Latin America, which then succeeded in pushing transitions in parallel with reform forces in the political arena, while Sidney Tarrow (1996) similarly illustrates for protest cycles in Italy how such instabilities within elite circles resulted repeatedly into successful outcomes of contentious collective actions when both groups of actors seem to pull together (see for example also Klandermans 2015 for South Africa). In this scenario, both opponents at best act in concert with the government from the political and public arena through some sort of coordinated action (see Figure 2.1: iv). I use the labeling proposed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007: 13) of their reference work on contentious politics. Because following their insights, the coordination of actions refers to the situation that both groups stay in their corner but synchronize their next steps either through informal channels or in mutual response to each other’s actions (see also Tarrow 1998). For a rather similar mechanism Katrin Uba (2007) exploring policy changes talks about a ‘threatening process’ as rulers are forced into change from the streets and the parliamentarian seats hand in hand (Uba 2007: 20). However, aims, motives, ideologies and thus frames may vary between elites and non-elites actors, since what they have in common is predominantly their conviction that the government or its current course should be stopped or reversed. The expected causal relation of this second mechanism from contentious collective actors to political changes is thus direct instead of mediated through the agency of supportive elites but functions merely in tandem (see Figure 2.1: iv). In this pattern, the role of divided political elites is not that of direct supporters; both actors rather respond mutually through coordinated actions in the political and public arena and thus drive change.
Another option to reach changes for contentious collective actors more directly through splits of elites is shown by contentious politics approaches within social movement studies. Summarizing, these scholars demonstrate that political elites, once divided, are not only ready to take up protest frames but eventually enter into an alliance (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1995; Piccio 2015). I label such a process political alignment, since often those splintered elites do not formally enter coalitions but rather side visibly with the activists in one way or another (see Figure 2.1: iii). One of the first and most influential studies on this causal link derived from a quantitative study of challenging groups influencing American politics between 1800 and 1945 by William A. Gamson (1990). He comes to the conclusion that the role of allies from the institutional arenas goes beyond empowerment and portrays elites frequently aligning with contentious collective actors. Such an alignment is expected to be powerful with regard to the insights of the resource mobilization approach of social movement scholars, who basically say that more allies equal more resources and thus more power for social movements, an argument that I present at length in the following section on non-elite allies (see 2.2). Political elites as allies in such a process of political alignment occupy a specific role compared to non-elite actors: Their privileged access to power, knowledge, and ultimately finances transfer into unusual resources availabilities for social movements and potential exceptional power, reason Federico M. Rossi and Donatella della Porta (2015). This means that contentious collective actors gain access to supplementary arenas, potentially even on different levels of institutional politics: “Challengers are encouraged to take collective action when they have allies who can act as friends in court, as guarantors against repression, or as acceptable negotiators on their behalf.” (Tarrow 1998: 79) For numerous revolts in the Middle East, Ellen Lust-Okar (2005) comes to the conclusion that the quitting of so called ‘moderates’ to join the anti-regime-forces was a key component to overthrow authoritarian governments. Thus, we explore such a mechanism in less or more democratic states. However, such an alignment process is particularly common, following Doug McAdam and colleagues (2001), in the context of the polarization of society, understood in reference to Charles Tilly (2004) that within politically relevant bargaining arenas actors position themselves either for or against the government (McAdam et al. 2001: 322).40 In other words, the line between those supporting and those opposing the ruler(s) is more and more noticeable across the respective society. Since I am convinced by their

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40 Such a polarization can be movement-induced but may result alike from various dynamics, so that I leave open from which developments the polarization comes from.
argument of polarization proceeding political alignments, I include this process as supportive conditions in my theoretical framework (see Figure 2.1: iii). To sum up, within the alignment-mechanism the relation of contentious collective actions to presidential decisions or even regime changes is thus direct, if divided elites side with the challengers and thus function as lobbying channels into the political arena and eventually into changes.

For all of these mechanisms, quantitative studies of transitions such as the comprehensive study of Christian Welzel (2007) on democratization processes worldwide, add the impact of public opinion and conclude that “where pro-democratic activists and reformers can rely on broader mass support, they have greater power to succeed in their efforts to achieve more democracy” (Welzel 2007: 399; see also Welzel et al. 2005). In their wording, the likelihood for contentious collective actors to reach their goals rises, if the public supports their frames, a reason why I insert this aspect in the framework (see Figure 2.1 and 2.2).

2.2 Together they rock – Non-elite allies

Apart from politically relevant elites, various non-elite actors are potential allies for social movements, since scholars working on alliances demonstrated that “[m]ovements always and by definition consist of alliances and mobilization is always cross-movement” (Zajak 2017). Under non-elite allies, I subsume all actors who are not part of the elitist establishment and thus not control resources or institutions. These include other social movements, youth associations, trade unions, or non-governmental organizations, to name just a few. In their edited volume, Nella van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon (2010) comprehensively illustrate the amount of alliances and coalitions social movements engage in. Their study depicts that they vary with regard to duration and stability. Although they place social movement organizations at the core, I assume that those insights hold true for other contentious collective actors alike. Nevertheless, it fits insofar perfectly as my study encompasses two struggles with dominant social movements.

The underlying presupposition that unifies the following approaches is that “combined effect [of various movements] might be more important than the impact of a single challenging group” (Giugni 1998: 383; see also McAdam/Tarrow 2010; Goldstone 2003). In other words, the authors expect that the layering of resources by diverse group of opponents results into more power. Originally this conviction derived from studies of interest groups, which
brought forward that those outside of the formalized system are in need of acquiring resources in order to advocate their interests to the ones in power (McCarthy/Zald 2001). At first such approaches highlighted merely organizational capacity in terms of money, facilities, and labor (McCarthy/Zald 1977: 1216, 1220), but soon the concept of resources expanded due to the recognition that not only material resources count to which groups such as political elites have easy access to, but that as well socio-organizational or even moral and cultural resources contribute to the power of challengers (Edwards/McCarthy 2004). Due to the fact that social movements in contrast to interest groups use various channels besides lobbying for their claim making. So that social movements that lack financial resources not seldom balance them by cultural or personal resources (McAdam et al. 2001: 59), which holds especially true for social movements in the Global South (Engels/Müller 2015). Following Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007) in their processual understanding, I integrate this dimension named coalition formation, which covers the “creation of new, visible, and direct coordination of claims between two or more previously distinct actors” (Tilly/Tarrow 2007: 216), thus offers an encompassing conceptualization that I use here for the different mechanisms concerning allies (see Figure 2.2).

However, there is no agreement which form of coalitions or alliances are most powerful to opt for changes. The degree of (formal) organization, the need of unity, and the independence among allies is controversially discussed. We find nonetheless a certain agreement that the form of governance or regime shapes the nature of effectively functioning coalitions: In more authoritarian contexts, allies who are bound together rather loosely by network structures or merely ideology, apparently more often reach their goals, while coalitions in democratic systems, which establish joint organizational bases are more effective in obtaining their aims (Kriesi 1996; see also Tarrow 1994; McAdam et al. 2001; Neidhardt/Rucht 2001). Why is that the case? For relatively democratic states, Marco Giugni (1998) demonstrates that highly united, centralized, and bureaucratic alliances of social movements have a bigger chance of reaching their envisioned outcome. Because their organizational foundation enables a better

41 Since the cultural turn in 1960s and the growing studies of social movements in countries outside of the Global North that had less finances at hand, resources encompasses all forms of collective actions that are inscribed in the political culture (Tarrow 1998:20), such as nonmaterial resources encompass authority, moral engagement, faith, and friendship to list a few (della Porta/Diani 1999: 15), which lead to a wide defined and blurry term of analysis.

42 To form such protest coalitions, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007: 215) identify several mechanisms such as brokerage or boundary shifts. I leave them out, as my research interest lies more on the outcome-related processes than on internal social movement coalitions. In other words, I am less concerned of how coalitions form but rather how they play out.
coordination of strategies, when they use channels of influences that democratic states provide (see also Burstein 1999). For less democratic states, Dieter Rucht (1996) highlights instead that contentious collective actors are often better off not to be too well organized and rather act collectively on an informal network base, repeatedly tied by ideologies, since they are surpassingly endangered of being repressed, intimidated, or coopted (Rucht 1996: 48-50; see also Osa 2003). This is backed by studies of revolutions: Jeff Goodwin’s comparative study (2001) comes to the conclusion that the so-called “revolutionary alliances” (Goodwin 2001: 27) are mostly influential when they share an ideology instead of an organizational body. Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman (2005) even reason based on a cross-case study of sixty-seven transitions that such an alliance of diverse civil society groups only allows effective civil resistance, if they share ideological beliefs. Other authors such as April Carter (2012) stress the importance of unity for what he calls “strong civic coalitions” (Carter 2012: 141) alike. All of them stress the significance of building coalitions – either on organizational substructures in democracies or on ideological foundations and/or interpersonal networks in autocracies (see Figure 2.2: vi). So independently of governance systems we expect in one way or another that coalition-building leads to one united anti-government front that prevents splits, intimidation, or cooptation (Tilly 1999: 262-264). I thus label the linkage to governmental changes similarly cohesive campaigning, pointing at the significance to convince the government of their united voice that Federico M. Rossi and Donatella della Porta (2009) highlight for pro-democratic change (see Figure 2.2: vi).
Figure 2.2: Explaining how protest leads to institutional changes through political allies

Source: Author’s own compilation.
The second assumed mechanism concerning allies relates not so much to the unity of challengers, but rather to their broadness: Exemplarily, Ruth Collier and James Mahoney (1999) exploring transitions in South American and South European countries point at the role cross-class mobilizations played for regime overthrows, which mirrored the plurality of society in both terms of size and scope. Following their reasoning, the mobilization at best travels across classes through *scale shift*, meaning an “increase in the number of actors and/or geographic range of coordinated claims” (Tilly/Tarrow 2007: 217; see also Tarrow/McAdam 2005). Many scholars working on civil resistance argue in a quite similar vein. Referring to Dan Slater (2010), cross-class urban movements with the willingness for challenging repression in the political center were essential to push against authoritarian leaders in Southeast Asia. Referring to him, such coalitions are more difficult, or are at least perceived as such by rulers, to appease through patronage. To attain such broad coalitions in the first place, the in-depth analysis by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan (2011) that asks ‘why civil resistance works’ illustrates that the commitment to non-violence reduces barriers to participate in the struggles, since risks are lower for participants, while the legitimacy of the actions and the moral persuasion is higher – so that I incorporate this dimension as some kind of positive trigger (see Figure 2.2: v). Besides, during such struggles so-called moral shocks of governments repressing non-violently protesting citizens may function as centrifugal forces for further engagement, portrayed by Donatella della Porta (2014) for eventful democratizations. With regard to the outcome, the key finding is that the sheer amount of people, who mainly use non-violent means, put the government under pressure and, complementary, lead to the fear of losing mainly governability in relatively authoritarian states (Skocpol 1999; Schock 2005; Karatnycky/Ackermann 2005). In other words, masses on the streets equal masses disagreeing with the government and thus picture the amount of dissidents by a simple “logic of the number” (della Porta/Diani 1999: 171). Referring to insights by Doug McAdam and Yan Su (2002), they confirm that protest size matters even more than protest frequency, the latter referring to the protest events being held. The direct effect of contentious collective actions is thus twofold – on the one hand, “large protests may be more likely to succeed because they prompt regime supporters, including members of the ruling party, economic elites, as well as the military, to turn against the government” (Brancati 2016: 180), on the other hand, mass mobilizations are by far more

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43 “In a political context, patronage refers to the distribution of jobs and positions in return for support.” (Cheeseman et al. 2019) In such a context it is often a subcategory of clientelistic strategies and a key concept of neopatrimonialism, which describes political practices in Africa after colonial times.
difficult to repress, so that “an increase of the number of participants decreases the risk of repression” (della Porta 2016: 351) and thus relationally affects the regime stability. April Carter (2012) therefore suggests the denomination ‘people power’, understood as large-scale resistance that spreads nationwide, thus underlining here the spatial scope rather than the representativeness, but also expects such coalitions solely in non-democratic regimes (Carter 2012: 11). Following her findings, I set the mechanism that I call *popular coercion* into an authoritarian setting (see Figure 2.2: v).

Under the section of non-elite alliances I further integrate one mechanism that is based on the participation of one particular group, namely trade unions. They occupy a special role in literature since they are the only ones able to call for and organize strikes (Berger 2017). For African states, again Adrianne LeBas (2011) confirms the meaningfulness of coalitions including unions for reaching (regime) changes through coercion. In particular, if strikes occur in key sectors of a society such as energy or transportation, which the overall state-functioning based on, the ability to rule weakens for governments (see also Kraus 2007; for Africa see for example Maree 2012). Ruth Collier (1999) demonstrates the importance of such an economic coercive situation in tandem with street protests for the democratic transitions in Spain, Brazil, and Portugal, illustrating the role of labor movements and economic crisis (see also Collier/Mahoney 1999; see for Africa also Matombo/Sachikonye 2010). Thus, the specific advantage of allying with unions is that political and economic pressures converge by disrupting the necessary production circle on which the state is financially based on and ideally leading to *socioeconomic coercion* (Figure 2.2: viii). Of course, this group of actors is usually included in the above dimension of cross-class movements as unions have “been central to many recent people power movements” (Carter 2012: 17), but I nonetheless list them separately with the aim to mark their peculiar power.

2.3 Defected they support – Security forces

The outcome of a confrontation between the government and an anti-government front depends not only on those supporting, but also on those opposing challengers. In other words, the disposition of regimes to make use of its coercive apparatus has to be taken into account, since the capacity and the will to repress relates to both, hindering or enabling changes (Gerschewski 2013). This can be done either by incorporating determinants such as
the overall repressiveness of regimes, or, in an actors-oriented manner by shedding light on those, who actually carry out repressions – be it the army in less democratic states or the (riot) police in relatively democratic or often both in hybrid regimes. Their choices and actions are insofar related to protest outcomes that repressive countermoves constrain “the ability of challengers to organize, communicate, mobilize, and engage in collective action” (Schock 2003: 706) which may result in a higher risk for political engagement. However, security forces not only constrain or control spaces for opponents, but may also serve as opportunities or even allies. Although regime instability or capability of repressiveness is usually measured over a longer period, scholars working on non-violent revolutions demonstrated that stability in view of capacity to repress may even shift within critical juncture or episodes of contention – also in a rather favorable manner for activists. Due to my conceptualization, I here address the behavior of security forces solely with regard to supportive mechanism for contentious collective actors to reach the outcome. I am nonetheless aware of the opposite, repressive countermoves that demobilize challengers, for which I account in my empirical in-depth description and following analysis. One of the main studies that point at the significance of the reactions by state security personal is Sharon E. Nepstad’s (2011) cross-case-study of civil resistance in various times and regions. In her book, she convincingly pictures that nonviolent struggles play out as a chess game. This means that not so much the state’s overall capacity to repress is relevant, but rather the strategic choices made during the struggles proved to be decisive for the outcomes (Nepstad 2011: 126-128). The underlying principle of all mechanisms outlined in the following is that governments weight in a cost-benefit-ratio, if repressive responses might be able to stop potential change agents.

But when are security forces willing to resist orders, an institution well known for their hierarchical order? One reason for security forces to defect is most of all repressive counter actions against non-violent protests. If their extent is perceived as inappropriate, this might fuel doubts within the armed (or police) forces about the legitimacy of the government in place and eventually result into disloyalty and consequently proclaimed defected state security forces (see also Schock 2003, 2005). Again, all of these scholars have shown this

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44 Hybrid regimes is a cover term repeatedly used for those states swinging between democracy and autocracy. The term thus covers a diverse grey zone between the two ideal poles. I will take up again the debate on hybrid regimes in my conclusion, especially with regard to future research agendas and refer for now to two major works which discuss the concept comprehensively, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way (2002) and Larry J. Diamond (2013, 2002).
phenomenon merely for authoritarian regimes, so that most of them talk about the regular army. Empirical evidence enlightens that troops are unwilling to shoot, when masses protest in front of them and contest in a non-violent manner, often framed as the ‘shooting of innocent people’ (Nepstad 2011:131). Such a refusal to follow the given order to repress by all means, serves, in turn, as a signal for growing regime instability in the eyes of contentious collective actors and thus results in empowerment of opponents (see Figure 2.3: viii).\(^{45}\) However, this mechanism functions differently to the empowerment-mechanism that split of elites’ trigger, since “governments ultimately rely on troops to suppress popular unrest” (Schock 2003: 17), so that the refusal will not only strengthen regime challengers but put additional pressure on the ruling elites. Following this reasoning, I believe that this creates a serious threat for those in power (see Figure 2.3: viii-x). Because comparative works on regime changes illustrate that such signals from the armed forces do not only lead to perceived decreasing support of the regime, but a de facto decreasing capability to repress if incumbents are willing to do so (della Porta 2014; Beckman/Sachikonye 2010; Bermeo 1997). This is backed by further studies, for instance, by Dawn Brancati’s (2016) quantitative study of popular protests, which shows that the majority of authoritarian regimes facing defected militaries democratized within one year. Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth (2008) therefore conclude that if the loyalty of state armed forces is affected, even the most powerful ruler is vulnerable to political opponents.

\(^{45}\) In the literature on defected security forces, public opinion is less named, so that I decided to exclude this aspect in my theoretical framework.
Figure 2.3: Explaining how protest leads to institutional changes through security forces

Source: Author's own compilation.
Beyond refusing orders, another option are mutinies that break out parallel or even partly aligned to contentious collective actors, but which are only expected to take place under authoritarian governance (Schock 2003: 16-18; Dwyer 2018). Maggie Dwyer (2018) analyzed profoundly ‘soldiers in revolts’ and illustrates that these are frequently related to civic protests, either as opportunities but often as informal allies in a perceived shared struggle.\(^{46}\) Since their reasons are often not that different to motives of activists. Primarily main motives for mutinies are their collective identity, working or living conditions, all aspects that might share with their civilian peers, or career opportunities after an envisioned change motivated the revolts (Dwyer 2018).\(^{47}\) This differs from the first mechanism insofar as researchers presume that revolting soldiers put a threat on the regime on its own and thus overshadow any former events (see Figure 2.3: x). This is why I understand them as yet another mechanism, although such refusal of commands usually precedes them, so that I add an additional line from refusals to mutinies (see Figure 2.3: x). For both mechanisms, however, the question stays partly open in how far the contentious collective actors and actions still matter for the outcome. Or if they rather function as an opportunity in the first place, but then security forces are the crucial change agents, so to speak, who push for transitions, perhaps even in their own interests. I depict this special shape by several arrows that lead to the outcome of interest (see Figure 2.3: viii-ix).

Related to this concern, we can distinguish a last mechanism that is less explicitly related to security forces but intertwined to the argument of repression capacities of governments – the role of disruptive tactics used by collective contentious actors. Disruptive tactics are characterized by the disruption of the normal course of events and governance practices, examples are boycotts, riots, or spatial occupations (Tarrow 1994: 103-105). For most of these cross-case studies on revolutions, the choice to apply disruptive means resonates with an increase of power for the opponents as often the capacity to repress, and thus even to govern, decreases tremendously (Gamson 1990; Collier/Mahoney 1999; Tarrow 1994; Nepstad 2011). Therefore, I group this mechanism to security forces since the means of disruptive protest forms led, if effectively used, to declining capacity to repress. Therefore,

\(^{46}\) Of cause, this does not mean that mutinies happens only under the condition of civilian mobilizations, but since my interest lies only in those cases where protest occurs, I leave the other reasons out here.

\(^{47}\) In particular, the aspect of economic motives is highlighted by other studies alike, because if the state is not able – for example as a consequence of an economic crisis – to pay salaries to armed forces, the potential that they join the anti-government front is most likely, because “[i]f they [troops] do not derive any direct benefits from the regime, they have less reason to protect it.” (Nepstad 2011: 131) This is backed by findings of Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1994) for neopatrimonial states in Africa.
security forces which are considered as the actors executing repression, face obstacle to regain control (Piven/Cloward 1977). For hybrid regimes, Adrienne LeBas (2011) supports the disruption-arguments that movements “are often most effective in encouraging collective action where they abandon the politics of moderation and compromise” (LeBas 2011: 15) so that we expect this linkage not only to happen under authoritarian governance (see Figure 2.3: x). Others, in turn, argue that this link depends on different conditions: For instance, Marco Giugni (1999) reasons that only if regimes are vulnerable to challenges, for instance due to liberalization processes on the macro-level, disruption follows pro-democratic changes, whereas when they are not, disruption follows repressions. Nancy Bermeo (1997) instead highlights the strategic combination of moderate and disruptive tactics in response to governmental strategies and tactics in line with findings from contentious politics scholars (McAdam et al. 2001). This points to the importance of exploring those interrelations of strategies and tactics on both sides and relational to countermoves – a principle my methodological approach is guided upon and thus perfectly bridges to the next section, in which I will elaborate how the above deduced theoretical frames will fit my methodological design and be researched in practice.

2.4 Synergy of comparative politics, process-tracing and contentious politics approaches – Methodology

This review of existing approaches to relate changes – merely backwards looking – to contentious collective actions in relation to other (collectively organized) actors reveals remain imprecise of how this ‘pressure’ actually works. Overwhelmingly these studies rather stress dimensions to be present for a critical juncture to open up. In other words, what connects the variables or dimensions, the arrows so to speak in the language of process tracer, remains vague, although much has been written on the significance of deducing such causal linkages. The reason for this lasting weakness is that most of the scholars working in the field originally derive from the historical-institutionalist school of thought. For a long while the focus lay on institutional long-term pathways, so that we still observe a tendency that activists are conceptualized as a sort of “strangers at the gates” (Tarrow 2012), outside of the political arena. Political elites are considered vis-à-vis contentious collective actors – one acting as insiders and the other as outsiders, one from below and one from above, so that causal links between their choices are rather assumed by temporarily or a priori connections,
following rational-choice-models of weighting costs and benefits. Therefore, one of a frequently named downside is the methodological sloppiness when it comes to rigorously deducing complex causal relations (Mahoney 2001a).

In the following, I will suggest a methodological framework that combines the deduction of actors’ interrelations and process events with a historical perspective. For the purpose of reasoning more adequately when it comes to causality in qualitative research, I draw on latest findings in the field of comparative historical analysis (CHA), which offer tools to distinguish elements of causal chains by paying more attention to their interrelations and thus already proved to be convenient for the study of revolutions (Goldstone 2003). Although very diverse in their manner of theoretical reasoning and applied methods, they are united by three features – “concern with causal analysis, an emphasize on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison” (Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003: 10). In contrast to strict historical institutionalism, these approaches do not necessarily explore the institutional path dependancies of regimes types over decades (Erdmann et al. 2011). Instead, those rather narrow historical comparative analysis approaches are especially useful for less studied phenomenon and those which are discussed through rival explanations (Skocpol 2003) – both characteristics that apply for the study of term amendment struggles in general and for my cases in particular.

Starting from the presupposition that critical junctures are “periods in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases into divergent long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory that diverges significantly from the old” (Slater/Simmons 2010: 888), I advocate to encompass cases in which a critical juncture apparently opens up but does not result in changes and therefore are best described as contentious episodes. This differs insofar from earlier studies on critical junctures as they tend to merely look on those cases, where such historical turning points result in lasting changes (see for example Mahoney/Thelen 2010b; Moore 1999; Skocpol 1999; Collier/Collier 1991; Mahoney 2001b), while overlooking moments of disruption for a long while that somehow led to minor or no changes. In line with scholars of the contentious politics approach, I understand “considering mobilizations for democracy as critical junctures does not imply the expectation that movements’ victories are either straightforward or durable. […] Critical junctures transform some things, but they do not change everything, and they are not irreversible” (della Porta 2016: 20). This means that
episodes of contention are likewise to be studied in the manner complete regime changes are, as it is often the case in democratization and revolutions studies. From this it follows to explore likewise those periods in which such changes are perceived as optional and in which uncertainty dominates the political arenas (Pierson 2000: 262-264). In other words, the opportunity of an open-ended process towards feasible change distinguishes such a period from ‘normal times’. With regard to confrontations concerning term bids, such periods of frequent large-scale mobilizations can be equalized insofar as episodes of contention as they represent “distinctive breaking points with the previous context” (Falleti/Lynch 2009: 1155) and actors narrate them as crucial turning points in their national historical narrative. Additionally, the extent of the mobilization in terms of number and duration exceeded expectations thus can be classified as unpredictable events. However, due to the outcome in each case of institutional compliance in Burkina Faso and overthrow in Senegal, both episodes do not qualify as critical junctures. Nevertheless, the Burkinabe case in its further development may be classified as such in historical perspective with regard to the events happening after the time of my investigation.

To study these episodes adequately, I draw on key concepts of sequencing, comparing episodes, and causal chains from CHA (Mahoney 2003; Mahoney/Thelen 2010a; Coppedge et al. 2012; Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003; Moore 1999; Collier/Collier 1991) and merge them with insights of more actors oriented contentious politics approaches (Jasper 2014; McAdam et al. 2001; della Porta 2014, 2016) – similar and complementary to my theoretical frameworks. Suggesting a comparative research design that grasps both, recurrent institutional settings and breaking points, I start the investigation from the contentious episode that I examine closely with an emphasize on political and protest events and equally on agency – the perception of those who actually choose within the respective period to answer to certain incentives, create new ones, and ignore others. The first step consequently is a thorough description of the government-opponent-interactions during the narrowly defined investigation period. This ranges from the term bid or initial anti-term-mobilization to the actual candidature of the president. Such a research approach that investigates rather closely the struggles once a juncture point is reached answers to Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt who called for “a focus on episodes of struggle over institutional change” (Capoccia/Ziblatt 2010: 957) – pointing at episodes of contention instead of ‘full’ regime changes.
To study such interactions over time, I apply a theory-guided process-tracing in order to uncover traceable links between mass protests and presidential candidature enforcement. Coming from the tradition of analyzing historical narratives, the difference to historical research is that the social science process-tracing is more theory-driven, even though it varies among process tracer which role they allocate theories (for an overview see Trampusch/Palier 2016).48 The approach that I adopt follows a rather systematic process analysis conducted by Peter A. Hall (2012; 2008) and Tulia G. Falleti (2016, 2010, 2005; see also Falleti/Lynch 2009). The major advantage of such an approach instructed by theoretical reasoning is that it accounts for illustrating, generating, and – if used in a comparative manner – reviewing theories. Contrarily to other variants of process tracing, causal mechanisms are deduced in an inductive but still theoretically guided manner. In other words, I carry out my analysis as a dialectic back-and-forth process between empirics and theory (see Falleti/Mahoney 2015; Gerring 2008; Bennett/George 1997; Beach/Pedersen 2013; Bennett/Checkel 2014). The above illustrated evidence guided my research process in various ways: The assumed relevancy of choices made by political elites led to the broadening beyond protest events on the local level and questions to protest leaders about perceived stability of elite-coalitions. Following the insights on coalition formation, I interviewed besides dominant movement leaders those actors that allied for an anti-government-front as well as those historically known protest leaders that refused to take part in such an anti-term-coalition. The issue of security forces further results in yet another block of questions on their behavior and civil-military-relations. The purpose of such a theory-driven variant is on one side to make presupposition more explicit and thus my choices more transparent, while on the other to explicitly attach my findings to broader debates on protest-elite-interactions, which is so far lacking for the issue of term bids, whose debates take place almost without exception within African regional studies.

Viewing protest as a multi-stage process, the focus lies on “actions and relations and how they unfold over time” (Hedström/Ylikoski 2010: 64), so that I “follow actors’ positions and actions” (Trampusch/Palier 2016: 451) to figure out which actors’ constellations and confrontations lead to which proceeding. Since process tracing requires breaking up the

48 In literature, inductive types of process tracing have been labelled in a variety of ways such as ‘explaining outcome process tracing’, ‘process induction’, ‘analytical explanation’, ‘process analysis’, ‘causal process tracing’, ‘theory-building process tracing’ (Trampusch/Palier 2016: 443-444).
original explanation-seeking question into parts that help to uncover the underlying causal processes (Heström/Ylikoski 2010: 51), the following research questions guide the conduct of each case analysis: How do contentious collective actors try to influence the presidential attempt to rule longer than foreseen in each case? How do state forces (re-)act? Such an actors-oriented approach, that my theoretical frameworks already picture, signifies a focus on actors who engage in strategic interaction. Following James M. Jasper and colleagues (2015), this includes any attempt to influence other actors, in both conflict and cooperation situations, and serves as an analytical perspective to overcome the dichotomy between cultural and structural approaches (see also Jasper 2014; Duyvendak/Jasper 2015).

So the great advantage of such an approach is to add the perceptions of actors relational to others and their surroundings. Since “[t]racing interactions over time will address the goals of the players, the rules of the arenas, the meanings players attach to those arenas, as well as the resources and skills the players bring with them or acquire in the arenas.” (Jasper 2014: 23) Strategies are options of actions or sequences of action that one actor has at his/her disposal and that are interdependent of other actors’ strategies and actions (Scharpf 2000: 27). The core concepts derived from insights of the actors-oriented institutional approaches (Mayntz/Scharpf 1975), based on the underlying assumption that actors who act in the same arenas or playing fields react to each other in terms of anticipating the next steps of the opponent or as a direct response to actions of the other (Scharpf 2000: 24). Peter VonDoepp and Leonardo A. Villalón (2005) have demonstrated such strategic reasoning for political elites for democratization processes in African states while Lisa Mueller (2018) did for protest leaders. Indeed, habits and norms referring to political culture constitute these strategies equally as rational-choice-weighting do (Jasper 2014: 13). While Scharpf uses a game theory approach derived from mathematics, the common approach in social movement studies and the one I follow is to use various sources in order to reconstruct the interactive actors’ constellations and their changes. Because instead of assuming a certain paradigm for actors to behave, I collected their very own perceptions through interviews and informal talks as well as media discourse and protest calls. My takes thus joins the ranks of political

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49 For inherent cultural approaches that systematically research, for instance, the culture within social movements or their cultural outcome, see for example Britta Baumgarten and colleagues (2014). I left out their insights due to my focus on political outcomes.

50 Under actors’ constellation, I consider the positioning of numerous actors to each other in various and changing arenas. In accordance to my theoretical guidance, I group them related to their collective identities, while accounting for contradictions and internal conflicts in my empirical analysis, if my sources of information lead to such inconsistences.
process approaches that engage compellingly with collective interpretations and decisions (Rucht 2017: 51). In this way, I detect their own logic of choices instead of presuming their implicit cost-benefit-calculations. This enables me to understand how protest leaders actually ‘read’ the other levels and to reconstruct at least partly the bargaining and decision-making processes between challengers and state authorities.

The encompassing description of the episodes of contention following focal points follows the search for causal linkages that poses yet several obstacles. First of all, there is little agreement on the epistemological understanding of causal mechanisms and rather a huge variance of understandings, a reason why Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005: 2) talk about a “buzzword problem”.\(^{51}\) I consider causal mechanisms in line with Tulia G. Falleti and Julia Lynch (2009) as “portable concepts distinct from the variables attached to particular cases” (Falleti/Lynch 2009: 1147) and acknowledge that a number of different mechanisms can produce similar effects (Hedström/Ylikoski 2010: 52). Accordingly I expect to discover “multiple causality, feedback loops, path dependencies, tipping points, and complex interaction effects” (Falleti 2006: 7; see also George/Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007). Because studies by Charles Tilly (2001) or James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010) among others have illustrated that social movements or protest occurrence are usually rather a necessary but not sufficient condition as diverse pathways lead to an outcome (King et al. 1994: 228-230; see also Amenta/Young 1999). Because “causal mechanisms by themselves do not cause outcomes to occur; rather, the interaction between causal mechanisms and context does” (Falleti/Lynch 2009: 1161). This means that besides the selection criteria that I have chosen my cases upon, my empirical insights determine the degree of abstraction and generalization, on which I will reflect in the conclusion. From this it follows that I am not able to ‘measure’ attributes in their degree, but rather uncover underlying processes. Accordingly, the aim of this study is not to build a bulletproof correlation between popular protest and presidential candidature but rather to deduce how mass protests are causally related to enforced candidatures by presidents. Because “how can we be sure that an observed change is the result of a social movement’s mobilization?” (Giugni 1999: xxiv). The main test, so to speak, is based on plausibility rather than strict causal inference, which “turns a possible mechanism into a plausible” (Hedström/Yilikoski 2010: 52; see for an example Richards 2010) and that at best derived from multiple

\(^{51}\) The major difference is that mechanisms are either understood in a deterministic or probabilistic way. A deterministic view expects the same mechanism to produce the same outcome, whereas a probabilistic perspective on social reality expects that the outcome is not predictable a priori due to contextual interactions (Falleti/Lynch 2009: 1147).
observations and cross-case comparisons (King et al. 1994). Therefore, the validity relies on
data triangulation and congruence testing, which means to expand the generalization
gradually through more observations and further research (Goldstone 2003; George/Bennett
2005; Geddes 1999; Blatter/Blume 2008).
But once we deduce causal relevant dimensions based on my comparative analysis of the
ccontentious episodes, the central questions circulates around the causal chains or rather
causal order. This is when insights of comparative studies come into play. The
conceptualization by Hillel D. Soifer (2012), who differentiates between productive
conditions that “shape the initial outcome that diverge across cases” and permissive
conditions, which “change the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or
contingency and thus prospects for divergence” (Soifer 2012: 1574-1575) is of great benefit.
He calls to disentangle productive conditions that affect the variation of the outcome in a
straightforward manner, and permissive conditions, which imprint the links between
productive conditions and outcome (Soifer 2012: 1576-1577). In turn, only productive
conditions are connected back to antecedent conditions through permissive conditions – a
conceptual distinction that enables me to unravel and order the causal links. Often in those
cases in which the envisioned changes failed to happen, permissive conditions as
opportunities are present but the productive conditions are absent (Soifer 2012: 1579). In the
wording of scholars that uses the terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, permissive
conditions represent the necessary conditions that need to be present but whose presence is
not enough to explain the (divergent) outcome, the dependent variable so to speak. Only if
the productive conditions are present too, the outcome of an institutional compliance and
thus the prevention of an enforced candidature can be expected.
In accordance with my research interest, I thus selected two cases in which mass protests are
present and thus seem to function as a permissive condition, opening up a critical juncture,
but only in the case of Burkina Faso resulted in the prevention of the candidature. Therefore,
I expect dissimilar or simply missing productive conditions as well as differences in the
degree of permissive conditions. Besides, other permissive conditions related to the deduced
causal mechanisms might occur through inductive reasoning. The differences of the
permissive conditions, for which we already know that mass protests are one component, we
expect that they are shaped by critical antecedents. Because previous developments shape
causally critical junctures or episodes of contention for whose deduction I take the
considerations from Dan Slater and Erica Simmons (2012) who complement Hillel D.
Soifer’s work. Critical antecedents represent those aspects that are relevant of path-dependent consequences (Slater/Simmons 2010: 894-895): “Critical antecedents can thus be defined as factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in outcomes” (Slater/Simmons 2010: 889). This goes back to the recognition that “political choices do not take place in a social or historical vacuum” (Slater/Simmons 2010: 908) and thus convincingly expand the strategic-interaction approaches. As a result, I suggest a methodological framework that looks beyond the original investigation period, proposed by the above outlined theoretical guidance that starts from the first anti-term-protests. By placing the contentious episodes back into their national histories and guided by my empirical findings, I deduce the critical antecedents that “refine our understanding of the mechanisms through which it operates and the conditions under which it can be tested” (Slater/Simmons 2010: 907). This is in line with findings of social movement scholars for ‘eventful times’ who pay equally attention to dynamics within such (missed or completed) critical junctures while accounting for previous, causally related events (Ritter 2014). How these methodological research steps interrelate illustrates Figure 2.4.

**Figure 2.4: Methodological approach**

![Diagram](source: Author’s own compilation.)
To sum up, combining process-tracing with insights of comparative historical analysis enables the researcher to understand dynamics of contentious episodes and to explain their differences by relating them back to case-specific political culture and history. Theoretical expectations that guide the conduct of each analysis of contentious episode, in turn, make sure that findings on term amendment struggles travel back to the respective research fields concerned with the power of protest(er)s.

2.5 Summary

In this chapter, I elaborate my methodological approach in combination with the deduction of theoretical patterns that guide, as frameworks, both the following empirical analysis. This selective sample of frequently discussed mechanisms reveals how the interplay of contentious collective actors and actions with political elites, non-elite allies, and security forces led to constellations conducive or obstructive to change. This highlights that neither social movements are per se either powerful or not, nor governmental forces. In a nutshell, their strength and power position relates to their ability to change initial calculations, in terms of term amendment struggles referring to the perceived ability to enforce another candidature, by fueling divisions or rendering governability at risk through processes of scale shift or coalition formation. Overall relevant for contentious collective actors to push for democratic changes are shifts in power relations, following the doctrine that “one side’s mistake is the other’s opportunity” (Goodwin/Jasper 2011: 2).

These theoretical insights resonate with my suggested methodological procedure of tracing back interrelations and events first and then set them in relation to prior developments of causal relevance. Such an approach acknowledges that institutions imprint, limit, and open opportunities for actors to choose and act but without the deterministic understanding that institutional settings determine actions, they rather determine a selection of actions yet to choose. However, institutional arrangements still matter: How mechanisms play out relates to the political context they operate in. The major distinction drawn is between authoritarian and democratic governance: The violent repression of non-violently protests fuels doubt in authoritarian regimes as they function as a reflection of violence ruling more generally. The decisive role of security forces that refuse orders or even revolt themselves is so far detected
merely for non-democratic states, where the army became involved in repressions of mobilized citizens. Finally, the type of coalition formation depends in their shaping on the regime type – while organization ties prove successful in democracies in order to use existing channels of influence effectively, more informal bounds based on networks and ideology are crucial for authoritarian regimes for the purpose to be better protected against cooptation attempts and repressions. Whereas many scholars talk about the openness of the political system as such, I use the term ‘governance’ in replacement to make them fruitful for regimes swinging between the two poles as most of the states do. Along with the style of government, public support is another aspect named that affects especially alliance-building or the broadness of mobilization. Not explicitly named but still a static characteristic of significance are available resources for contentious collective actors. We would expect those social movements to be more successful in reaching changes that have already more resources for mobilization in the beginning. That is why I have selected my cases not only with regard to the openness of the political system and public support of tenure restrictions, but likewise on the features of the social movements at the forefront – aspects on which I will elaborate in the next chapter that covers the population of cases and my case selection.

52 Patrick Köllner (2012) makes a similar point on the concepts of democratic and authoritarian regimes whose practices (often informal) are way more complex than the two poles illustrate.
3. Term bids in Africa – Population of cases and case selection

Compared to former decades of military changeovers, power holders have seemed to learn as half of the changes of governments in Africa have happened through the ballot box based on constitutional procedures since the late 1990s (Carbone/Pellegata 2017; Lynch/Crawford 2011). Back then and following the example of the United States, term limits have been introduced together with (re-) introduction of multiparty elections. However, solely ten years after the adoption of many constitutions, presidents tried to overcome this constitutional norm of temporally limited leadership the first time in the beginning of the 2000s. The second time, term threats culminated has been between 2011 and today. In this chapter, I will first give an overview of all term bids and classify them not along waves of term bids but rather along two major criteria, protest occurrence and outcome of presidential attempt. In view of my research interests, I will suggest a typology that is, in contrast to other studies, not based on the presidential strategies to prolong the tenure, but rather on the emergence of anti-term-mobilization related to the enforced candidature. In this manner, I will be able to put forward the puzzle that my research intent is based on, namely how those mass protests relate to presidential decisions. To single out these mechanisms, I argue that the term amendment struggles in West Africa are most telling cases as they differ in outcome while being similar on the initial institutional arrangements and main social movements. As the guiding framework is based on theoretically driven deduction and not on case specific knowledge, the case selection is theory-driven. My case selection criteria thus derived on the one hand from the research puzzle that I will line out in the second part of this chapter, and on the other from insights of my theoretical and methodological framework. The latter clearly illustrates that political opportunity structures as well as the characteristics of social movements matter for certain mechanisms, for instance the building of coalitions. By this manner of selecting cases along several dimensions that have been “explanatory variables of potential theoretical importance for the research question“ (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 88), I exclude these analytical dimensions in order to uncover new ones.
3.1 Typology of Africa’s term amendment struggles

In total, thirty-seven out of forty-eight constitutions in Africa, excluding Northern Africa, contain term limits either by restricting the age of the ruling president or the term in office (see Table 3.1). In other words, in twelve states south of the Sahara, the president has the permission to contest unlimitedly, although the time in office varies (see Table 3.1, first column). In those cases, the duration of the term itself is limited but not the number of terms one president is authorized to run. The time span of the term itself predominantly ranges from four to seven years. By grouping the states along the duration of each allowed term, a striking feature of those constitutions restricting the allowed rerun for office comes to the surface: In the majority of states, the term is limited to two subsequent terms, a reason why academics and journalists discuss the issue of prolonged terms as a ‘third term problem’ (see Table 3. 1, third column). Merely the constitution of the Seychelles and, since 2015, the constitution of Congo-Brazzaville foresee three terms while on the Comoros, the president is only allowed to rule for one term.

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53 I exclude Northern African states due to the geographical focus of the databank and the term bid debate that circulates on ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’.
Table 3.1: Term limits in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration (per term)</th>
<th>States without term limited number of terms</th>
<th>States with term limits</th>
<th>One term limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Three term limit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 years</td>
<td>South Sudan (2011)</td>
<td>Ghana (1992)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlimited</td>
<td>Lesotho (2009), Swaziland (2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation, following Filip Reyntjens (2016). The year in the brackets indicates constitution’s implementation date. Somalia is not included as the current constitution is provisional and thus has not yet reached the same status. Eritrea is missing as the constitution that was drafted in 1993 has still not been adopted.

* Until 2016, the presidential term limitation in Senegal was seven years according to the constitution of 2008, but the ruling President Macky Sall changed the constitution in 2016. The new limit of only five years applies for the next president.

** In Ethiopia, the term limits exist for presidents whereas the executive power is mainly concentrated on the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers.

To date, thirty-six presidents have completed their maximal allowed tenure, of which nineteen tried to expand their term until 2018 (Posner/Young 2018: 261). This means that the number of attempted overstays is even higher than the amount of ‘voluntary’ leavings. As I intend to relate the outcomes of the struggles back to role protests played, I categorize these presidential attempts based on two dimensions – the enforcement of candidature
(protest outcome) and observable large-scale protest (protest emergence) (see Table 3.2).\textsuperscript{54} Since the categorization of successful and failed movements is highly subjective depending on the definition by outsiders (Giugni 1999), I understand the outcome of term amendment struggles in a short-term manner of a political outcome in terms of the presidential compliance of tenure limitation. From my perspective, such a compliance is indicated by the candidature of the president, regardless whether the incumbent wins the upcoming elections.\textsuperscript{55} Hereby, an enforcement of an unconstitutional candidature is feasible in four ways – (i) the general removal of term limits (indefinite reelection), (ii) an increased maximum of another term (extended term limit), (iii) the classification of one term as falling outside of the limitation (personal exception), or (iv) an enlarged length of presidential terms (extended term). Thus, I exclude the so-called ‘successor-strategy’ that other authors list in some instances under the header of term bids. Such a strategy means that the former president prolongs his ruling by preparing a “handpicked successor” (LeBas 2016: 172) who functions as a puppet ruler for the purpose of control and often to avoid future prosecution. I leave aside those cases because previous studies have shown that such strategies do not always emerge as planned (Dulani 2011a).

\textsuperscript{54} This overview includes all presidential attempts either to change the constitution or to run for an unconstitutional candidature. States where either the constitution does not regulate a presidential tenure limitation or the president stood down without seeking an extension are not listed.

\textsuperscript{55} This is the reason why I categorize the Senegal case as an enforced candidature because the incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, was able to push through his renewed candidacy, even though he lost the elections.
Table 3.2: Typology of term amendment struggles in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large-scale protest</th>
<th>Enforcement of candidature</th>
<th>President run for office</th>
<th>President withdrew amendment/ resigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Burkina Faso (Compaoré, 1997), Namibia (Nujoma, 1999), Guinea (Conté, 2001), Togo (Eyadéma, 2002), Gabon (Bongo, 2003), Chad (Déby, 2005), Uganda (Museveni, 2005), Congo-Brazzaville (Sassou-Nguesso, 2015), Rwanda (Kagame, 2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The information in brackets contains the last name of the president and the year of the term bid. * Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja ran for a third term and was reelected but the military arrested him only a few months later. For that reason, Daniel M. Posner and Daniel J. Young (2018) consider the attempt as failed. But due to my research focus on the short-term outcome of an enforced candidature, I categorize the case in this manner, although I will briefly come back to the role of the military in my conclusion.

This categorization of cases illustrates that until 2008, in none of those cases, mass protests against the term bid took place or, more precisely, have been noticed. Because one should consider this a difference to former struggles, the triggered mass protests have received more visibility and transnational attention after 2011 due to increasing media attention on popular protest in Africa since the uprisings in the North (de Waal/Ibreck 2013: 303) and higher awareness on the issue. Such a pre-selection includes all mass protests that occurred in the context of the term bid and directed their contentious collective action framing against

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56 Despite those direct attacks on term limitations, there are even more cases where term limit debates dominated the headlines and discourses. For instance, in Benin the issue has been widely discussed due to expectations that Beninese President Yayi will remove the restricted term (Stroh 2015). Recently, in autumn 2017, protestors gathered on the streets of Togo to demand term limits along with other socioeconomic and democratic claims.
another presidential term or rather candidature, even if those actors address other, often socioeconomic claims alike. Indeed, I argue that those claims do not exclude each other since, in reference to Sidney Tarrow (2012), “resonate collective action frames” merely link immediate material concerns with the demand for political change. Regularly, people have high expectations of social mobility, so that terms of political freedom and a better life are extremely intertwined and bridged with demands of more democracy (Brancati 2016; Schmitter/Karl 2009: 3-5; della Porta 2014, 2016). As political liberalization has been jointly pushed with economic liberalization and thus democracy sold with capitalist adjectives, the dissatisfaction of citizens rises if democratic statehood does not fulfill the promises of a better economic future (Welzel/Inglehart 2006; for Europe see Kubbe 2017) and thus triggers protests, recently visible in anti-austerity protests in Southern Europe (della Porta 2015) or protests against the structural adjustment programs in African states in the 1980s (Sylla 2014; Manji/ Ekine 2012). I agree that those socioeconomic frames by protesters should not be ignored but still, from my point of view, should go hand in hand with expectation regarding the satisfaction with the president and the question of tenure restrictions.57 For instance, former studies of African states illustrate how labor movements triggered or even pushed through more political freedom and democratic rights (see for example Beckman/Sachikonye 2010; Kraus 2007). The in-depth description of the protest events of my selected cases in chapter four points to this argument and displays the close relation between those demands. Besides, “people in a crowd sometimes care little about the supposed goal of the protest they have joined” (Mueller 2018: 23). Indeed, even if those activists only use the term bid as a political opportunity due to rising attention of media and politics, it is nonetheless worth knowing who is protesting with whom and, regardless of the answers, which role these protests play for the resistance against prolonged presidential ruling.

In regard of my case selection, I consider only those cases where protestors took to the streets in rather large numbers to oppose the term bid. The qualitative threshold to categorize the cases is thus large-scale protest in terms of number of participants (see Table 3.2; rows above). Classifying these cases along a line of large-scale protest and short-term-outcome

57 Lisa Mueller illustrates the enclosed interwoven relation between socioeconomic concerns and an ant-term-coalition for Niger in 2009 (Mueller 2013) and depicts the interrelated demands for economic and political changes in her new book (Mueller 2018). Sebastian Elischer (2010) points to a similar interrelation of dissatisfaction due to corruption that is articulated through political dissatisfaction for the case of Cameroon’s term amendment struggle.
enables me to uncover a rather striking feature: In none of the expanded-term-attempts, presidents withdrew their candidature once they had announced their plans without facing visible mass protests (see Table 3.2; on the bottom right). However, this is no proof of a direct correlation or causality. Despite extensive media reporting that pretends causal links mass mobilizations on the streets to presidential strategies, we actually do not really know how the pressure ‘from below’ effects term candidature decisions ‘from above’ once they are announced in the first place. In the following, I will deconstruct this clear-cut distinction of the omnipresent debate of below against above pressures that marks democratization studies until today. Since I understand those actors as rather horizontally related actors that interact in diverse manners in arenas and thus not necessarily in a vertical power relation in line with James M. Jasper (2014). This argument points at my procedural understanding of democratization in accord with Doug McAdam and colleagues’ understanding as “any net shift toward citizenship, breadth of citizenship, equality of citizenship, binding consultation or protection” (McAdam et al. 2001: 266). This means that democratization is understood as the result of political struggles of actors – some supporting and some opposing democracy – rather than being a result of implementation from above or forces from below (see also Collier 1999; Tilly 2004; della Porta 2014). Therefore, it is most interesting to compare two cases of successful anti-term-mobilization in terms of successful mass mobilization, but in which the outcome varied.

3.2 The puzzle of Senegal and Burkina Faso

The selection of struggles in Senegal in 2011/12 and in Burkina Faso in 2013/14 is based on a number of key reasons relevant to better understand how protest movements affect the proceedings and results of those confrontations through their tactics, actors, and timing. They are insofar very similar cases as my case selection is guided mainly by the outcome variation, therefore I selected one case of mass mobilization but enforced candidature (Table 3.2; top left) and one case of mass mobilization and resignation by the incumbent (Table 3.2; top right). Because a closer look reveals that of those four cases, namely Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia, in which large-scale protest occurred and presidents resigned, Burkina Faso in 2014 is the only recent case, in which the incumbent resigned without being able to enforce his candidature. Besides, Burkina Faso was the only case that had not been explored by researchers at the start of my research project in 2014. For the other three cases, Nic
Cheeseman (2016) reasons that the incumbents were unable to reach the legislative benchmark going back to a strong anti-term-alliance, confirming the significant role of alliances that have been integrated in chapter two for my theoretical guidance.

Secondly, I have chosen those two cases due to their similar institutional settings. Relatively similar in terms of media freedom, civil liberties, and constitutionally guaranteed rights for citizens, opponents acted in comparable conditions but took contrasting routes. Third, despite acting in comparable political arenas from a structural point of view, even the newly initiated youth movements, that seemed to occupy the first row of the anti-term-front, resemble each other and have been labelled as ‘social movements’ by other researchers before me (Frère/Englebert 2015: 305; Touré 2017; for Y’en a marre see Prause 2013; for Balai Citoyen see Kupper 2017; Engels 2015). Their repertoire of contention, resources for mobilization, internal organization structure, and even their leaders are ‘comparable’, again from a static point of view before having a closer look on relational shifts, allies, and opponents. This is insofar relevant, since social movement scholars studying the power of movement have illustrated the significance to gather resources that either happen through allies (see 2.2) or their own features and facilities (Edwards/McCarthy 2004). Additionally, reactions by the opponents, for instance state actors, often correspond to social movement features. For instance, police repression is more likely to occur against groups with poor material resources (della Porta 2014: 242) – so that if social movements are compared with similar initial resources, such endogenous dimensions of the respective movements can be thus excluded from cross-case explanation likewise. However, given the exploratory nature of the research question and the multidimensional interrelations that I examine, many dimensions influencing the outcome are unknown. Therefore the case selection is only oriented to the logic of a most similar design (Gerring 2007; George/Bennett 2005). Both social movements were covered exhaustively by media reporting but are not prominent cases in the existing cross-case studies. Minor considerations have been my language expertise, access to the research field and preliminary knowledge. Aspects that too often exclusively guide the case selection but researcher very rarely name as pragmatic reflections according to John Gerring (2007).

Beyond those selection criteria based on theoretical and methodological considerations, I expect the comparative study of the two term amendment struggles in West Africa as most interesting as their divergent outcome runs counterintuitive to scholarly expectations.
Looking at the contrasting routes of democratization, one might expect that constitutionalism, understood as the commitment of citizens and rulers to be governed by the constitution (Lutz 2000), to be better established in Senegal than in Burkina Faso (Levitsky/Way 2010: 306-308; Welzel 2013: 261). This means accordingly that potential checks-and-balances mechanisms are better established. However, their ratings in terms of political freedom have continued to align, so that at the time of the initial mobilizations both states were considered comparable in an institutional understanding of democratic opening. In the following, I will first shed light on the divergent outcome and position of my cases within the population of cases, followed by the description of these similarities in terms of institutional-democratic context and common features of the social movements involved.

3.2.1 Typical but counterintuitive – Outcome variation

Within this population of cases, these two struggles stand for most telling cases referring to their counterintuitive outcome and surprisingly strong protest while being typical concerning the term bid strategies by the president, as the following-up discussion of key examples will picture. Based on my fourfold table, I position my cases within the broader picture of term bids and amendment struggles on the continent. In the cases of protest occurrence but enforced candidature (see Table 3.2; first column above), of which I have selected Senegal, these cases are marked in general by similar presidential strategies. Incumbents used institutional channels to legitimize their extended ruling while repressing protests before and after their announced governing plans. This use of institutional arenas by presidents marks a major shift in historical perspective as nearly all of them “operate through rather than around the constitution” (Posner/Young 2018: 261). This means that there is at least the option to block such attempts as the outcome-related categorization discovers. The well-studied cases of Burundi and Cameroon exemplify the range of how presidents execute their third term ambitions within legislative arenas. Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza expanded his power within the formalized system over one decade, so that Julia Grauvogel and Claudia Simons (2015) judged the executive power as uncontrollable in 2015 when he postponed elections indefinitely. In January 2015, when Congolese President Joseph Kabila tried to pass an electoral reform, that would help him to stay in power, at first more spontaneous protests spread until two youth movements became one of the loudest voices aiming for a leadership change. Subsequently, the repression of state-opponents increased, founding members of the movement were imprisoned, and Kabila suspended the elections and thus rules currently by fiat until this day (Riedl 2015a, 2015b).

58 Only the case of the Congolese president stands out as an outliner concerning the presidential strategy as Kabila postponed elections indefinitely. In January 2015, when Congolese President Joseph Kabila tried to pass an electoral reform, that would help him to stay in power, at first more spontaneous protests spread until two youth movements became one of the loudest voices aiming for a leadership change. Subsequently, the repression of state-opponents increased, founding members of the movement were imprisoned, and Kabila suspended the elections and thus rules currently by fiat until this day (Riedl 2015a, 2015b).
tried the tenure prolongation. Despite massive mobilization, he pushed his candidature through the Constitutional Council while a heavy armed security force controlled dissidents in the streets (Van de Ginst 2016; Posner/Young 2018: 265). While Burundi provides perhaps the case that turned most violent, the presidential argumentation is nonetheless indicative for a tendency of presidents to use constitutional bodies as legitimizers for their unconstitutional candidature. Former Cameroonian President Biya, in turn, changed the constitutional term limits and the prosecution rules for previous presidencies in 2008 by a parliamentary bill that removed any tenure limitations despite a united anti-term-front of opposition parties and unions (Elischer 2010).\textsuperscript{59} Large-scale police and military violence repressed those who protested against the term attempt (Le Bas 2016: 171) and Biya seems to have become a president for life.

In contrast to the above-mentioned cases of an enforced candidature despite protest occurrence, the course of events in Senegal took many by surprise. Although Senegal was considered the role model of democracy for Western Africa due to early-on leadership changes and believed to have a strong civic society (Eberlei 2014b), those activists were apparently not able or willing to hinder the candidature of Abdoulaye Wade in 2012. However, the term bid itself was insofar typical as Wade tried first to amend the constitution through parliamentarian vote and then handed over the issue to the Constitutional Council. Eventually, Wade succeeded in running for elections in 2012. To study the Senegalese term struggle will be of special interest considering that the presidential strategies were typical while the proceeding and the outcome were rather unexpected.

Out of the few cases, in which the respective incumbent was unable to enforce his candidature after reaching his last constitutionally allowed term, the eruption of large-scale protest opposing the presidential plans is observable. Interestingly enough, the Burkinabe struggle is the only recent example of such an outcome and is insofar the most telling case

\textsuperscript{59} In Niger, President Mamadou Tandja, who had ruled the country since the late 1990s, declared “to remain in office beyond his constitutionally prescribed second term in office” in May 2009 (Elischer 2013: 17). Tandja launched a public campaign in 2009 to mobilize supporters for an extension of his term and eventually enforced his candidature, despite opposition and international actors condemning the elections due to reported frauds (Mueller 2013: 402f.). Immediately, anti-government protestors rallied on the streets and trade unions went on strike. However, key actors such as student unions were unable to mobilize as many followers as in earlier periods (Elischer 2013: 18). Eventually, a coup by the military ended his power some months later and thus the confrontation followed a very different path (Baudais/Chauzal 2011). The involvement of the military in Niger and in Burkina Faso, an actor and its role that I will shed light on in my following empirical section, led to comparisons of those two cases (Posner/Young 2018: 267). I will come back to this perspective and related questions in my conclusion.
as the proceeding has been very different to the other three cases. Because in Malawi, Zambia, and Nigeria, the constitutional amendment lacked the necessary majoritarian vote in the parliament, since parts of the political elites supported the anti-amendment campaign, pointing at the relevancy of divided elites. In the case of Burkina Faso, in turn, the necessary threshold in parliament could have been reached potentially but protestors hindered the voting. The incumbent tried to amend the constitution again via the parliamentarian arena but this time the struggle took a very different path, resulting into the resignation of the president. This outcome of the struggle in Burkina Faso compared to Senegal is rather counterintuitive in regard of the country’s history. Burkinabe President Compaoré has been well known for his semi-authoritarian style of government, and the country’s history with a high number of military takeovers for its late turn to democracy (Hilgers/Loada 2013). Since so far “in these nations [where term bids failed], authoritarian control is weaker and there is a better infrastructure and more space for popular protest” (LeBas 2016: 171). So that the expectation would be rather that Compaoré’s regime and repression capacity was well installed after such a long period as head of state. Therefore, it is all the more surprising that Compaoré was literally ousted from office and fled the country and thus stands for an outlier case.

3.2.2 Political opportunity structures

External opportunities influence actors to act in a certain way and thus imprint actors’ behavior and interactions – in other words, “actors create institutions, and institutions, in turn, structure actors’ behavior through the incentives that they provide” (Erdmann et al. 2011: 7). Earlier works by Charles Tilly (1964) that are polity-centered expected such a causal relation to function in a rather deterministic manner but recent work have widely demonstrated that this interaction context is constantly negotiated (McAdam et al. 2007) and offer thus ‘opportunities’ for protest actors (Meyer 2004). Nevertheless, some political opportunity structures are less prone to quick change than others (see Kitschelt 1986; Opp 1996; for constitutional arrangements see for example Lijphart 2009). The episode of contention in both cases ranges roughly between one and half a year and thus is not long enough to change certain institutional arrangements profoundly. I refer here to, in the words of Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, “[t]hese are long-run rules of the game or physical attributes of an arena, as distinct from short-run windows of opportunity within an arena.”
Those political-institutional preconditions determine how power is separated, executed, and negotiated, and in turn influence strategies not only of those opposing but also of those supporting the government. Peter VonDoepp and Leonardo A. Villalón (2005) for example demonstrated that decisions of political elites are closely linked to the political system alike. Primarily democratic openness and the capacity to rule by state agents set the boundaries and opportunities (McAdam et al. 2007). Both dimensions are the core elements of parliamentary arenas, which determine the institutional access for activists (Kriesi 2004: 70; Kriesi/Wisler 1999). Subsumed as national political opportunity structures, those approaches estimate a greater influence of contentious collective actors if institutional and discursive accessibility is higher (Kriesi 2004: 72). Consequently, it is their expectation that democratic states provide more access points for opponents to express their demands and to effect politics (Koopmans/Statham 1999), as do proportional systems compared to majoritarian systems and parliamentary in contrast to presidential systems. Vice versa, presidential systems enable elites to govern less-controlled. Closely related to this argument of democratic governance is the fact that more democracy means more media freedom and plurality, which again facilitates mobilization and impact of social movements. This based on the notion of the media as a disseminator of protest frames to gain the attention of a wider public, which in turn increases the pressure for elites to respond and the costs to repress (see; della Porta/Diani 1999: 166-168; for social movements in Africa see Obadare 2016; Ekine 2012). For that reason, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007) argue that it is crucial to differentiate between (partly) democratic and (partly) authoritarian political systems, when researching social movement outcomes. In a nutshell, the type of regime, consisting of the democratic status and political system as well as applied rules, is expected to effect the manner of how struggles between government-supporters and –opponents are fought and outcomes are reached by governmental opponents. Those findings are in line with research on term bids: Denis-M. Tull and Claudia Simons (2015) as well as Boniface Dulani (2015; 2011b) come to the conclusion that the degree of political openness is relevant for movements to be noticed within term struggles and that the removal or violation of term limits are less likely in more democratic states. Filip Reyntjens argues in the same vein that “existing democratic quality has a determining impact on whether or not term limits are maintained” (Reyntjens 2016: 65).

60 This broad understanding of political opportunities is a central point of criticism as it leads to a certain “definitional sloppiness” (Kriesi 2004: 68; see also McAdam 1996: 27; Opp/Gern 1993). So that recently “[t]he concept runs the risk of becoming a ‘dustbin’ for any and every variable relevant to the development of social movements” (della Porta/Diani 1999: 17).
Due to their colonial past, the two West African states remain heavily imprinted by the liberal democratic model of the French system. Both political systems share the same institutional setup of semi-presidentialism with presidential supremacy (Wu 2011: 23; Elgie 2011: 10; Elgie/ Schleiter 2011; see also Table 3.3).\(^61\) Different to parliamentary systems, presidential systems do not contain the position of a prime minister as a control force and lack mechanisms to restrict the personalization of ruling by the incumbent (Linz 1990b; see for West Africa Olowu et al. 1999). The significance of limited terms for the head of state thus applies all the more as they are often one of the last obstacles for personal rule. Secondly, democratic openness and status were ranked rather similarly when the term amendment struggles started. Following ratings by the US-based think tank Freedom House, Senegal in 2011 and Burkina Faso in 2013 have guaranteed civil liberties and political rights but with constraints, so that both are marked by being partly free (see Table 3.3). This means that certain democratic rights are adopted, but that often these rules are under threat. Only the status of political rights is graded worse in Burkina Faso, which is striking in regard to the continuity of mass mobilizations. Moreover, in both countries the political system is marked by relatively functioning state institutions. The high ratings by the Bertelsmann Transformation index (2012, 2014) on performance of institutions and the use of force indicate that in principle state actors are able to execute their power, for instance if they aim at repressing protests by force.

Another dimension relevant for the case selection in terms of political opportunity structures is a dimension put forward by Boniface Dulani (2011a) that is particularly related to the issue of term bids. Namely, he reasons that the constitutional provisions that regulate how rulers can modify constitutional rights matter for the result of term amendment struggles. In both cases, institutional arrangements to remove term limits are comparable because in both states a two-thirds majority in the national assembly was required at the time of investigation (see Table 3.3).\(^62\) The Burkinabe constitution adopted in 1991 foresees two options to amend constitutional articles, either by a popular referendum or by a ¾-majority of the parliamentary votes. The Senegalese constitution has limited the presidential term to two

\(^{61}\) The difference, however, is that Senegal was classed semi-presidential from 1970 until 1983 and then again has been since 1991, while Burkina Faso has been classified irregularly before 1991. From 1970 until 1974 and from 1978 until 1983 and then after 1991, the Burkinabe political system has been considered semi-presidential.

\(^{62}\) For instance in contrast to Togo and Niger where a three-fourth majority and in Cameroon only a simple majority is needed for the president to change the constitution. In Guinea, Gabon and Chad, there is even the possibility to hold a national referendum, so that those cases would be inadequate to compare.
subsequent periods of five years in 2011. To amend constitutional law, the amendment equally requires \( \frac{3}{4} \) votes by the members of the National Assembly to pass. If the amendment fails, the second possibility is to hand over the issue to the Constitutional Council. Ironically, both tenure limitations passed under the rule of the president that later attempted to circumvent the law.

Table 3.3: Institutional arrangements of Senegal (2011) and Burkina Faso (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Political System</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Civil Libert.</th>
<th>Pol. Rights</th>
<th>Perf. Institutions</th>
<th>Use of force</th>
<th>Constitutional changes</th>
<th>Public support of two-subsequent-terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (2011)</td>
<td>Semi-presidential</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>National Assembly by majority vote (2/3) / Constitutional Council</td>
<td>77% of the population prefer term limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso (2013)</td>
<td>Semi-presidential</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>National Assembly by majority vote (2/3) / Popular referendum</td>
<td>65% of the population prefer term limits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom.
** The scale ranges from 10 (best) to 1 (worst).
* See Boniface Dulani (2015).

Concurrently, the support for temporarily restricted terms rose referring to public opinion polls and peaked in the years of the respective term bids. This is insofar relevant as the support by public opinion is, besides media reporting, named crucial for facilitating the outcomes social movements reach for (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In the selected cases, more than 60% of the respondents of Afrobarometer surveys (2013, 2014) are for two-term-
limitations to be uphold (see Table 3.3).\(^{63}\) Again, the two cases are not explainable by static means as the support of the population has been even higher in Senegal than in Burkina Faso. To conclude, structural or institutional opportunities as static explanations are not enough to explain why in one case sustained mobilizations against the term did occur and did not in the other. Senegalese and Burkinabe mobilized social actors found comparable political opportunity structures in regard to the institutional setting and rule of laws, this is why I expect that the sociopolitical context certainly shaped the struggles but did not determine them.

### 3.2.3 Movement-centered characteristics

Another reason to select these two cases is the striking feature of one particular comparable collectively organized actor that I – and other authors before me – categorize as social movement. For each struggle, journalists and academics identified one prominent social movement as the key actor that animated the anti-term-campaigns: *Y’en a marre* in the Senegalese case and *Balai Citoyen* in the case of Burkina Faso. I will briefly shed light on the major characteristic features at the time of their creation while accounting for changes in my empirical analysis. Indeed, the Senegalese movement *Y’en a marre* shares diverse characteristics with the Burkinabe movement *Balai Citoyen*. Their likeness have resulted in ongoing comparisons and the same categorization by several authors as “youth activists” (Honwana 2015: 61) or “republican movements” (Sylla 2014). As Janette Yarwood subsumes, “both are prodemocratic and nonviolent; both call for mass participation to create change through protests; and the founders of both movements have stated firmly that they are uninterested in political careers.” (Yarwood 2016: 54) This statement already points at two aspects that I will show in the following – first their similarities and second their distinct characterization as social movements.

Although the public announcement of Wade to rerun for another term in June 2011 led to a wide range of mobilized actors such as oppositional parties, civil society organizations, and media entrepreneurs, the leaders of the media and music scene of *Y’en a marre* became the

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main faces of the anti-government-front (Hartmann 2012). *Y’en a marre* was started on January 16, 2011 by a group of rappers and journalists who make up the leadership of the movement until today (Honwanda 2015). In reference to their name, they stated in public to ‘have had enough’ of the bad governance under Abdoulaye Wade, which at this moment in time had been especially feasible due to ongoing blackouts. Founding members were the journalist Fadel Barro as well as two rappers, Thiat and Kilifeu, of the famous hip-hop group *Keur Gui*.64 A new and strikingly similar movement stood at the forefront of the struggle in Burkina Faso. As a reaction to Compaorés’ plans announced in 2013, two popular artists, Smockey and Sams’K le Jah, initiated, together with journalists keeping on the sidelines, the movement *Balai Citoyen*.65 To sweep away the corrupt clan of Compaoré, they called their movement ‘citizens’ broom’ in reference to former Burkinabe President and long-term youth hero Thomas Sankara who had established weekly cleaning actions of the public space. The movement rapidly gained popularity among the urban youth and dominated the media discourse at certain moments. Many more established protest groups and coalitions got involved in the development of the uprising from 2013 till 2014, but *Balai Citoyen* explicitly concentrated their actions against the constitutional changes and became known as the “principale organisation engagée contre le projet de révision constitutionelle” (Bonnecase 2016: 8). Leo Zeilig, a well-known expert on social movements in Africa, even concludes that “[t]he huge protests that unseated Compaoré’s regime in 2014 were to a large extent led by *Balai Citoyen*” (Zeilig 2016: 8).

At first glance, the similarity of the protest leaders is clearly visible. The most present leaders are musicians, whose skills to communicate, network and thus recruit, as well as organize followers and members point at the necessary “entrepreneurial skills” for protest leaders (Mueller 2018: 79). In the case of *Y’en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* one may assume that such popular singers are even more able to mobilize due to their pre-existing networks, knowledge, access to media, and popularity. Besides their leaders, these movements share several key characteristics as *Y’en a marre* inspired *Balai Citoyen* and vice versa, Burkinabe former President and revolutionary thinker Thomas Sankara inspired *Y’en a marre*, for instance in their local-units-structure that took inspiration from Sankara’s revolutionary

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64 *Keur Gui* means “house” in Wolof. Later, other popular Senegalese rappers joined them Among others, the two famous rappers Simon and *Fou Malade* became part of the coordination group. The latter is now officially named “artistic director” and responsible for the creative performances, slogans, and protest melodies.

65 English: Citizens’ broom.
councils (Kupper 2017: 32). They met and exchanged strategies in June 2013 when the cofounders Thiat and Kilifeu had been invited as a music act to the annual film festival Ciné Droit Libre in Burkina’s capital. Once on stage, they also mobilized the Burkinabe crowd to take on responsibility as they had done in Senegal, but pointed to the national revolutionary past (Yarwood 2016: 54).  

Therefore, it is not surprising but still striking that many movement-centered dimensions are comparable, in terms of their internal organization, the resources they possessed and used to mobilize initially, and their repertoire of contention (see Table 3.4). These aspects are insofar relevant as, for instance, the aggregation of resources is key to reach the outcome (see 2.2). Since both movements had established themselves just before the respective episode of contention, I expect their resources not to change extensively during the investigation period. Both movements had very limited financial resources when they officially launched the movement. Referring to their statements, they based their mobilization campaigns on private contributions such as privately owned cars and ultimately on helping hands of friends and relatives, what John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald would call “constituencies”, that provide resources based on social or rather personal ties (McCarthy/Zald 1977: 1221). At a later stage, official participation required small amounts of annual membership fees in order to print flyers, t-shirts and paying transportation costs. Additionally, individuals supported the movements with donations and loans, but predominantly after the uprisings. Official donations of other organizations or even political parties are unknown and only later after the uprisings became an issue of public debates. Consequently, their resources were based not on their financial power. According to insights of former studies, Y’en a marre utilized more cultural (Bryson 2014) or “moral

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66 For comparative research designs, cases should be independent from each other for long. However, studies have shown the role of neighbor diffusion for democratizations (Huntington 1991) or likewise uprisings (Whittier 2004; della Porta 2013). Due to my research interest, these transnational effects stand not in the center of my attention, but I pick up this aspect for future research.

67 I exclude analytically collective action frames because in my relational understanding, protest frames constantly mediate between mobilized activists on one side and those they oppose and speak to on the other and are thus responsive to events and discourse (see for an example Harders 2011). That is why I consider collective action frames as dynamic that interactively form in bargaining procedures and change within episodes of contention (Benford/Snow 2000: 614; Snow 2004: 393). Therefore, I will not take them into account as a previous static selection criterion. Nonetheless, Louisa Prause and I have shown elsewhere that they use an analogical “citizenship-framing” to bridge convincingly socioeconomic and political demands – and thus even in this dimension resemble each other (Prause/Wienkoop 2017).

68 Y’en a marre asked between 200 and 500 CFA of each member, whereas members of Balai Citoyen pay 500 CFA per year.

69 Within the protest alliance of M23, Y’en a marre received financial support between June 2011 and January 2012. Balai Citoyen reports several donations of individuals after the insurrection (Wirtz 2017: 72).
resources” how Louisa Prause (2013) calls them, while Balai Citoyen benefited from existing socio-organizational resources of Burkinabe civil society networks (Ouédraogo 2017; Engels 2015c). The first refers to the use of their music skills and songs, in which the Senegalese movement leaders articulate their moral beliefs and mobilize their followers with (Gueye 2013; Niang 2013). Amy Niang (2015) reasons even for both movements that each was able to build up a collective “youth counter culture” which was based on the use of creative protest forms that, in turn, are closely related to the capacities of the movement leaders as artists. Whereas the Burkinabe movement additional profit from overlapping organizational memberships of their followers, who have been usually engaged in other organizations beforehand.70

Not only concerning their leadership and concerning resources, also their seemingly analogical network structure distinguished them from more formalized non-governmental organizations. Network understood in reference to Dieter Rucht (2017: 44-45) is either a network of individuals, groups or/and organizations but has no formalized center which controls all activities. Although the headquarters within each movement function as coordinating entities for the local organizations, press inquiries, national and transnational representation, as well as nationwide campaigns, local issues are debated and solved by local units. Organized in networks of esprits that refer to the new mindset of the movement, Y’en a marre contain numerous local groups – the leaders of the movement mentions over 300 active esprits71 while Louisa Prause (2012) estimates around 100 due to media reporting.72 The esprits function as the eyes and ears of the noyau dur73, the leading management committee that includes all founding members, to report about local needs, for which they suggest local solutions (Kupper 2017: 31). Decisions concerning the whole movement are discussed in a broader noyau dur (Kupper 2017: 34), whose members have to be “apolitique et reste équidistant des partis politiques. Le coordonateur, le porte-parole, comme les membres du bureau, ne doivent appartenir à aucun parti politique.” (Kupper 2017: 31). This means that none of them who have a position within the movement is able to be part of a political party at the same time. The structure within Balai Citoyen is quiet similar. The

70 I come back to this point in my empirical analysis, since this is a crucial characteristic not only for Balai Citoyen but for opponents in Burkina Faso more general.
71 Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, June 20, 2016, Berlin.
72 One esprit consists at minimum of twenty-five persons and has at least ten women. Such esprits exist abroad as well – in France in Paris and Bordeaux (Kupper 2017: 32); in Germany in Cologne and Berlin; and in the US in Washington.
73 This means in Wolof “core”.

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equivalent to the *esprits* are the *cibals* and *cibelles*, an abbreviation of “citoyens et citoyennes balayeurs” (civic brooms) which represent the smallest units and contact points for mobilization. According to *Jeune Afrique* (2013) and the movement leaders, the movement contained local clubs in all major cities, talking about roughly twenty clubs, especially in every district of Burkina’s capital Ouagadougou. Those local unites function as platforms for debates, meeting points for members, and mobilizing entities for collective activities. Spokespersons and coordinators of *Balai Citoyen* emphasize that every member has the right to speak and that decisions are made in consensus. Those units are coordinated by a national coordination that consists of roughly twenty persons of which none of them is allowed to be member of a political party. Above this coordinating body stands the general assembly whose members are elected, nonetheless, the two artists occupy the special role of the public representatives. Despite this horizontal network structure, I explored a rather strong leadership in terms of a leadership cult. Even though the leaders constantly refer to the autonomy of the clubs, the spokespersons at the top occupy, to a certain extent, the public arena and political negotiations.

It is insofar still horizontal as the organizational structure is built likewise, but especially the artists function as popular leading figures. Both movements do not only share these characteristics but also demark them from formalized civil society actors, pointing at their categorization as a social movement. Another empirical evidence suggests their movement-characteristic: People are able to get involved easily by stating to take part in these movements without paying high membership fees, overcoming institutional hurdles, or having preexisting connections to the intellectual scene. Indeed, claiming yourself a *y’en a marrist* or a *cabal* or rather *cibelle*, you automatically became part of the struggle without a formalized procedure or association body.

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75 *Jeune Afrique*, September 13, 2013; such clubs exist not only in the respective countries. In Cologne, Brussels, Paris, Washington, and New York, to name just a few which seem mostly active, Burkinabe diaspora supports the work by *Balai Citoyen* and understand themself as part of the movement (Representative of the European diaspora of *Balai Citoyen/Germany*, November 5, 2016, Berlin). See an interview with Sams’K Le Jah in *Le Soir* as well, November 7-9, p. 6-7.
77 Interview with leader of *Balai Citoyen*, November 17, 2016, Berlin.
78 Interview with leader of *Balai Citoyen*, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
80 This control from above is similarly visible at a later stage of the movement when they ‘sanctioned’ the Bobo-Dioulasso branch because they refused to apply national decisions and aimed, referring to the spokespersons in Ouagadougou, at executive positions in the post-Compaoré period; see movement leader of *Balai Citoyen*, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou Open debates in the social media sphere and methods that are more revolutionary are named as disagreements.
Table 3.4: Movement characteristics of Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Y’en a marre
(Senegal) | January 2011 - April 2012 | Network-structure with local unities/Leadership cult | Music and media scene | Cultural resources; Media ties; Personal networks; Popularity of leaders |
| Balai Citoyen
(Burkina Faso) | July 2013 - October 2014 | Network-structure with local unities/Leadership cult | Music and media scene | Cultural and socio-organizational resources; Media ties; Personal networks; Popularity of leaders |

Source: Author’s own compilation.

This closer look at the respective protest movements at the forefront reveals not only how similar they are in terms of organization, leaders, and resources, but rather their distinct identities as social movements, although the definition of social movements varies greatly among social movement scholars. I regard five dimensions as crucial for social movements, especially relational to other actors within the political and public arenas. Following Mario Diani (1992; see also Diani/Bison 2004), social movement scholars name a distinct collective identity, which is based on an informal but dense network, and their engagement in conflictual relations with clearly defined opponents. They differ from a political party in the sense that their access to government is not political programs or participating in elections (Hutter et al. 2018), in contrast their main repertoire of contention of visible public protest (Rucht 2017: 45). Generally speaking, social movements are not that different from interest groups but position themselves differently in the political system and to the state (Snow 2004: 8). Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba (1995) from the Dakar-based think tank CODESIRA underline this distinction because social movements operate differently than other formalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are merely apolitical. Not seldom these actors’ groups rather act as executive agencies of

81 For a critical debate on the term broad category of non-governmental organization see for example Kerstin Martens (2002) and for an overview of the literature see Claire Mercer (2002).
national or international programs rather than voicing popular concerns and demands (Engels/Müller 2015: 15; de Waal/Ibreck 2013: 306).

*Balai Citoyen* and *Y’en a marre* differ insofar from other more institutionalized actors in- and outside the polity, since their leaders do not gain direct financial benefits from their position, nor do they aim at entering the formalized system. None of the leaders is able to make a living from their engagement for the movement, different to deputies of political parties or representatives of NGOs. All of them have their own profession of being musicians, journalists, or lawyers besides their political engagement, so that none of them has reached for any political position or candidate in elections until today. Besides, *Balai Citoyen* and *Y’en a marre* did not position themselves within a particular political camp despite opposing the incumbent president and his politics. On the contrary, a parallel membership of a political party is strictly forbidden and the collective identity underlined – an aspect that will become even more pronounced in regard to their numerous protest events they carried out which stipulates a collective identity by symbols, slogans, and shared actions. Such a collective we-feeling is central to social movements and often constructed and strengthened through “self-perceptions and external attributions” (Rucht 2017: 44) – the latter becomes visible in the omnipresent debate about *Balai Citoyen* and *Y’en a marre* as the same new protest phenomenon of the continent. In their protest calls, declarations, press communications, they position themselves outside of the formalized political spectrum and ground their work not within civil society programs, but rather as the voice of the people (Prause/Wienkoop 2017). Besides, their aim is to prevent socio-political changes, here authoritarian backslidings that highly effect the democratic ruling of the country in the long run. They use merely non-institutional means to achieve these goals. The following examination of their protest events and allies (among others) will allow to critically reflect upon this distinct collective identity and their independence from other actors, but it will clearly show that their main repertoire of contention during the investigation period is the mobilization of mass gatherings, marches, and other protest events.

In total, both predominant social movement organizations relied on cultural and personal resources for mobilizations and faced comparable constraints in terms of financial resources. Within *Balai Citoyen* as in *Y’en a marre*, decisions were prepared in local units and made in national bureaus while external representation lies in the hand of the leaders and currently still the founders. Again, we observe similarities between the two West African case studies
while expecting differences on the details. Additionally, this overview of their features reveals their characteristics as social movements. In my outlook, I will critically reflect on how far these social movements have been able to stay social movements in that sense after the eventful time.

3.3 Summary

While the Burkina Faso case provides an example of strong protest that eventually resulted in the resignation of the incumbent, Senegal represents a case in which protest occurred but in which the president enforced his candidature by legal means. This divergent and counterintuitive outcome is in need of explanation, especially in regard to their roughly similar political opportunities referring to the presidential power position, national democratic axis, and constitutional set-ups. These institutional arrangements, democratic openness, constitutional amendment procedures, or social movements at the forefront, are not able to explain this puzzling cross-case variation. In regard to the historical democratization pathways, the divergence is in particular need of further explaining dimensions, considering the reputation of Senegalese democracy being a forerunner of the continent. By selecting my cases along the criteria of institutional arrangements and movement characteristics, I exclude these dimensions as optional explanatory dimensions for the cross-case variation, to speak in the language of comparative politics. Hence, the unit of analysis – the processes of the struggles – happened in a comparable institutional framework and with two movements in the first row that appear prima facie comparable. However, in Burkina Faso, despite all those similarities, a very different dynamic came to pass. In this manner, I come closer to my objective of moving away from such static or one-sided approaches towards a relational perspective. For that purpose, I will closely trace back the proceedings – protest and political events – within each contentious episode in the next chapter.
4. West African Harmattan – The protest proceedings in Senegal 2011/12 and in Burkina Faso 2013/14

The following in-depth assessment of the episodes of contention reveals how protestors and state officials in Burkina Faso and Senegal fought term amendment struggles. Tracing the major events back, newsworthy protests and related political decisions, over time and linking these to the perceptions of main protest actors enable me to get a more comprehensive picture of the complexity of government-opponent-interactions. In various arenas ranging from public ones such as streets, squares, and stadiums, to negotiation tables in more formalized ones, these actor groups – who themselves vary – communicate, compete, and clash.

None of the two confrontations proceeded linearly. Based on my data analysis of interviews, protest calls and declarations, as well as media reporting on protest and other politically related events, I singled out different stages that seemed to be turning points, which led to (observable) shifts of actors’ constellations or arenas. I consider these events as protest events that are a “collective, public action of non-state actors that expresses resistance or critique and that is connected to the formulation of a social or political demand” (Rucht/Neidhardt 2001: 537; translated by Eberlei 2014a). My focus of attention lies on large events that are often more influential in triggering a response by opponents and consequently better covered (Biggs 2016), especially by media reporting internationally (quantitative database) and even nationally (qualitative media analysis). Geographically, I limit my research to urban areas as I expect that these events easier address governmental authorities (see for instance Collier 1999; Godehardt 2017) and besides, based on my preliminary knowledge, I am aware that these where the major protest spaces. Nonetheless, I unveil in how far the protests spread. For a first overview of mass protests, I use the data set of the SCAD databank that enables insights on how many participated in protest events, which actors’ group called for protest, at whom the protest is directed, which issues are put forward by the protestors and how the state reacts in terms of repression. The descriptive analysis of this available quantitative data in tandem with my own collected information enables me to put forward a sequencing of the struggle inductively based on empirically observable changes. Such shifts may be an increase of mobilization or demobilization, a change of strategies either as a radicalization or moderation on the side of the activists, or an in- or decrease of repression or concessions on the side of the state and its supporters, often in form of executive bodies such as security forces implementing these politics.
Such a detailed description and the following-up comparison of the episodes of contention reveal how opportunities constantly changed also during those struggles, even though institutional preconditions stayed rather similar (see 3.2.2). Decisions of institutional bodies such as the Council of Ministers in Burkina Faso or the Constitutional Council in Senegal resulted in new dynamics in both cases, leading to a short intensification of protest in Senegal and a more lasting one in Burkina Faso.

However, similar to both struggles is the increase of opponents over time from different angles of the society and their joint anti-term-front, even though it was mainly based on the same anti-government-frame instead of a joint organization or common ideological grounds. Next to the two social movements under study, human rights organizations, political parties, youth associations, other movements, and, in the case of Burkina Faso, trade unions called their followers to take to the streets. Starting with the respective youth movements, the analysis of the protest events asses their role and set them in relation to other players in the political and particular public arena. Especially in the Burkinabe case, these mass mobilizations relied on the mobilization of various groups, with *Balai Citoyen* in parts solely occupying the first row in the media reporting, while the Senegalese movement *Y’en a marre* apparently represents the main mobilizers for street activism. In both cases, these new movements allied with opposition parties temporarily and rather loosely due to pragmatic considerations, as I will shed light on in the following. Nevertheless, mobilized social actors differ in the two cases and mirror the differences within the political culture. While the Senegalese uprising consists foremost of political parties and formalized civil society organizations with *Y’en a marre* representing rather an exception, in Burkina Faso the protest spread across organized and non-organized actors, involving trade unions. The latter demonstrated against neoliberal politics at first but increasingly positioned themselves against another candidature. Here, we observe a divergence in the understanding and positioning of civil society and thus in their political or rather democratic culture.

In general, a closer look on the protest frames of these protests discovers that the issue of another term is only one among many. For instance, the envisioned establishment of a costly senate served as a reference to compare the everyday lives of elites and that of many Burkinabe facing poverty in Burkina Faso throughout the initial mobilization. In Senegal, on the other hand, the culmination of poor governance, especially the everyday live burdens due to lasting power cuts in Dakar, seemed essential for primal mobilizations before the
actual term bid. In other words, the public announcement that the incumbent was going to rerun for office served – comparable to election dates – as a political opportunity. Consequently, towards the run-up to those voting dates of amendments – the scheduled voting for the amendment in Burkina Faso or the decision of the Constitutional Council in Senegal – mobilization had been at its highest peak, reaching over ten thousands in Senegal and over hundreds of thousands in Burkina Faso. The presidential term ambitions united numerous opponents spatially, temporarily, and content-related, which resulted in eventful protests of several days. However, despite comparable mass protests, the struggles diverged into an intensification and follow-up clash in Burkina Faso while a split and demobilization took place in Senegal, followed by electoral campaigns. Eventually the Burkinabe head of state resigned by the end of October 2014 while the Senegalese president ran for office in the upcoming elections in March 2012.

4.1 Popular protest until resignation in Burkina Faso

After twenty-seven years in office, the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, officially announced his intention to establish a senate based on an amendment that passed in parliament one year earlier in 2013.\(^{82}\) Such a second chamber would have expanded his already extensive presidential powers since this legislative body would have been composed of handpicked sympathisers of the regime.\(^{83}\) His opponents interpreted this event as the first sign that Compaoré intended to candidate anew despite his promise to step back. The topic of an optional overrun of the constitution had not been new in public debates. Already in 2010, a public petition, filed by a former judge of the high court, who later becomes a member of \textit{Balai Citoyen}, together with a highly respected intellectual, brought together more than 30,000 signatures for an attempt to strengthen Art. 37 and its imperative.\(^{84}\) This article determined that the president of Burkina Faso should be elected for five years which would be renewable only once.\(^{85}\) But it was not until the public declaration to install a second

\(^{82}\) This step is a following-up step of the adoption of an organic law Art. 033/2012/AN, ratified on June 11, 2012. Since then the constitution includes the provision for a senate. This has been the initial step to have a senate and aim for an operational law. However, the political debates and preparations had already started in 2012 (Stroh 2012, 2013).

\(^{83}\) Such an upper house would have comprised of ninety-one members of which thirty-two persons would have been directly appointed by the president, thirty-nine members elected indirectly by regional councillors (three per region), twenty members designated by traditional authorities, religious authorities, trade unions, employers’ associations, and the diaspora (four for each category).

\(^{84}\) \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, June 1, 2010.

chamber that explicit anti-term-mobilization rose. The dataset on protest events of the SCAD databank reveals two peaks of mobilizations: one in the summer months of 2013 and a second in October (see Figure 4.1). These days were the last days before the voting on the amendment of the constitution within the National Assembly scheduled to take place on October 30, 2014, often referred to as the ‘insurrection period’.

**Figure 4.1: Duration of protest events in Burkina Faso from January 2013 until December 2014**

![Duration of protest events in Burkina Faso from January 2013 until December 2014](image)

**Source:** Author’s own analysis based on the database from the SCAD databank (see Salehyan et al. 2012).

This statistical overview illustrates that before the actual intense protest time in late October 2014, first mass protests had erupted more than one year earlier. According to the database, these protest events in the summer of 2013 were directed at the government but concentrated on bad governance in general. The main protest actor, identified here by international media, was the leader of the parliamentarian opposition, Zéphirin Diabré. This early uprising in June characterized the first stage of the episode of contention, which spread nationwide and had already gathered several thousand protestors by then, referring to the data. In regard to

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86 For the research period, the data set consists of nine counted protest events based on the coding of two international news agencies, Agence France-Presse and Associated Press.
the dataset, the issue of an extended term became a frame of protestors at a rather late stage. The subsequent qualitative database illustrates, however, that the term-issue was not completely absent, but rather gained more and more attention, although merely related to the presidential plan to establish a senate, interpreted as the first step to an enforced candidature (see 4.1.1). In this initial phase, the government answered by non-lethal repressive means such as tear gas against or arrests of activists. After these mass mobilizations, a phase of two calm months followed. A certain demobilization and first political concessions by Compaoré marked the following months, so that I distinguish them from the first period of mass mobilization (see 4.1.2). Thereafter protest rose constantly in terms of number of participants: From around 10,000 counted activists in the beginning of 2014 to roughly 35,000 people taking to the streets in May up to nearly 100,000 participants in August. That is why I consider the time span from January onwards as a new stage of the struggle. For this phase, journalists identified the incumbent as the main target of protests and the term bid as the main issue. Key figures of the opposition dominated the mobilization calls on both sides, illustrating the typical phenomenon of mobilization and counter-mobilization between governmental supporters and opponents, a reason why I title this section marked by political confrontations (see 4.1.3). Despite the increase in size, these protest events lasted only one day. This was about to change in October 2014, when we detect a major rise in numbers of participants, duration of event, and actors involved. On October 21, 2014 the decision on the submission of a constitutional amendment draft at the national assembly set in motion the final stage to the run-up of the vote, shaped by large-scale protests of several hundred thousand protestors and disruptive means as the dominant protest form (see 4.1.4). The protest seemed to have spread across opponents, who were now the dominant actors coded as ‘protestors’, which means they did not belong to one identifiable organization or answered to one particular leader or group. Moreover, the protest event lasted thirteen days, and, for the first time, trade unions were involved, provoking a general strike. In view of the rise of repressive threats and the result of thirty-four deaths reported, I use the term ‘escalation’ to highlight the increase of violence as an emergent phenomenon triggered by actions-reactions as studies of political violence have shown.87 This categorization allows me to explore how actions-reactions unfold without preliminary blame one side responsible to provoke the violent outbreak as a strategy. These persistent large-scale-protests of nearly two weeks seem crucial to understand the outcome of the struggles between term supporters and opponents.

87 I use this term similar to Elisabeth J. Wood (2000, 2007) who underlines with the labeling that through the interactions confrontations escalate.
The detailed analysis will shed light on the events, which ended when on October 31, 2014 Compaoré resigned from office.

4.1.1 Rising awareness of term limits (May - August 2013)

On May 21, 2013, the parliament adopted a law regarding the implementation and functioning of the senate, which first sparked sporadic protest marches, then public debates followed around the necessity of such a financially expansive institution (see Table 4.1 for an overview of political and protest events).\(^88\) Many interpreted this step as the first sign for an upcoming term bid, since such a second chamber would create a back door to bypass the parliamentary voting necessary for a constitutional amendment for which the ruling party, the Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP), lacked the required majority vote of three-quarters at this point in time. On June 29, 2013, the first mass anti-government-demonstration took place, built upon a call by Zéphirin Diabré, who was head of the Union pour le progrès et le changement (UPC)\(^89\), the biggest opposition party in terms of number of seats in parliament, and Chef de file de l’opposition politique (CFOP)\(^90\). The initial motives for these protests were rising food prices of basic needs, in particular of rice and sugar, but soon became likewise a protest against the senate and for the protection of Art. 37, highlighted by their protest slogans of “non au Sénat”, and “non à la révision de l’article 37 de la Constitution”\(^91\). More people than he himself had expected followed his call, reaching once an impressive predicted number of over 50,000 on the Place de la Nation in Ouagadougou (Harsch 2017: 196).\(^92\) At that rally and before the official creation of Balai

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\(^89\) Zéphirin Diabré, a former minister of Compaoré, created the UPC in 2010 and instantly won nineteen seats in the elections in 2012, thus became the largest opposition party. This success is attributed to Diabré’s personal resources and charismatic appearance. Since then, Diabré has been the leader of the CFOP (see next footnote), following longtime opposition leader Bénéwendé Sankara from the Union pour la Renaissance-Parti Sankariste (UNIR-PS), a fusion of the former Union for Rebirth-Sankarist Movement (UNIR-MS) and the smaller Convention Panafricaine Sankariste (CPS).

\(^90\) From 2009 onwards, the various opposition parties regrouped themselves behind the main opposition leader in order to create one oppositional voice. For an excellent study and debate on the role of such an institutionalized opposition, see Eloise Bertrand (2018).

\(^91\) Document, MBDHP, „Situation des Droits humains au Burkina depuis l’Insurrection populaire“, Octobre 2014 - Avril 2015, p. 12. The MBDHP is a non-governmental organization with a focus on human rights violations and protection, judged merely as less revolutionary compared to the trade unions.

\(^92\) Today, this place has been renamed *Place de la Révolution*. Originally called *Place du 3-Janvier* in reference to the popular insurrection in 1966 that overthrew the first President Maurice Yaméogo and afterwards became the *Place de la Révolution* when Thomas Sankara took power in 1983 (Bonnecase 2016: 89
Citoyen, Smockey and Sams’K Le Jah took the microphone while holding brooms in their hands and gave a speech cheered by the crowd. Referring to statements by one of the movement leaders, this participation in an opposition-led protest was based on regular meetings of numerous opposition forces since 2010 in order to prepare an anti-Compaoré alliance. However, despite the mobilization success, this first marche-meeting on the well-known roundabout in Ouagadougou was soon dispersed by security forces who repressed the activists violently, according to human rights observers. The group of security forces was composed of the regular police, the Burkinabe army, the gendarmerie, as well as the privileged presidential unit, the Régiment de sécurité présidentielle (RSP).

One week later, the ruling party answered with their own call for an apparently similar protest march for the establishment of a senate and the modification of the constitution in general. As a response, anti-senate-demonstrations expanded to other cities, mainly mobilized by opposition parties, but supported by the Catholic Church, which spoke on the senate-matter and announced their refusal to take part in any meeting concerning its creation (Harsch 2017: 197).

5). Eventually, Place de la Nation became the new title in 2010 in order to underline the end of exceptional rule and the beginning of national stability (see LeFaso, September 1, 2010, available under http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article38289 (accessed on September 20, 2018). Within my investigation period, the name was Place de la Nation that is why I use this denomination.

93 Interview with the editor of Mutations and expert on media reporting, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou.
94 Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
95 The term marche-meeting is often used by Burkinabe activists. This form of protest is part of the usual repertoire of contention and consists of an organized march based on the right to strike and of an assembly at the end where different speakers voice their demands and discuss following steps. This differs from general assemblies insofar that they are usually held in enclosed, non-public spaces. Every participant has the right to speak and vote. It often contains the handover of a written document, called note de protestation, to the opponent. Often trade unions or civil society organizations use this form of protest.
97 The RSP is the presidential guard established in 1995 by Compaoré as an elite unit directly serving in the President’s interest. It has been composed of 1200 soldiers (in comparison, the regular army consists of 12,000 members) directly subordinated to the President and thus often labelled a ‘private army’ (Zeilig 2016: 1).
Table 4.1: Main political and protest events in Burkina Faso (May 2013 - November 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 21, 2013</td>
<td>Adoption of law draft to establish the senate as a second chamber by parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29, 2013</td>
<td>Protest march against bad governance and the senate called by CFOP; participation by leaders of <em>Balai Citoyen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 2013</td>
<td>Anti-neoliberal protest march organized by CCVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28, 2013</td>
<td>Voting of potential senate members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protest march against senate organized by the CFOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12, 2013</td>
<td>Suspension of senate until report of commission; Campaign launch by <em>Balai Citoyen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 30, 2013</td>
<td>Approval of senate by commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 14, 2013</td>
<td>Meeting of ruling and opposition party on the installation of the senate; no consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 15, 2013</td>
<td>Protests on memorial day of Thomas Sankara by various civil society groups and opposition parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 13, 2013</td>
<td>Protests on memorial day of Norbert Zongo by various civil society groups and opposition parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 8 &amp; 11, 2013</td>
<td>Public declaration of Compaoré to candidate in the upcoming elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 5, 2014</td>
<td>Withdrawal of members of the ruling party CDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 18, 2014</td>
<td>Mass protests across actors, initially called by the CFOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 25, 2014</td>
<td>Formation of the MPP by former ruling party members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2014</td>
<td>Strike of trade unions called by the CGT-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April/ May 2014</td>
<td>First party meeting of MPP; Several party congress of republican front headed by CDP in stadiums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 2014</td>
<td>Day trade unions’ contestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 23, 2014</td>
<td>Demonstration against constitutional revision organized by CFOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25, 2014</td>
<td>Protest rally by activists of <em>Balai Citoyen</em> against constitutional revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 2014</td>
<td>End of negotiation between ruling and opposing parties on procedures to change the constitution; no consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21, 2014</td>
<td>Official announcement of the voting date in parliament concerning the constitutional amendments by the Council of Ministers; Spread of riots and spontaneous protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 22, 2014</td>
<td>Protest organized by the FRC, including <em>Balai Citoyen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 23, 2014</td>
<td>Approval of drafts for the constitutional amendments by parliament; Spreading of disruptive protests and riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 24, 2014</td>
<td>Strike of students and teachers of secondary schools and universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 25, 2014</td>
<td>Announcement by the head of ADF-RDA to vote in favor of the constitutional amendment; Public confirmation of constitutional changes by Compaoré</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 26, 2014</td>
<td>Official closure of schools and universities for one week</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 27, 2014</td>
<td>Women’s march against constitutional revisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 28, 2014</td>
<td>National contestation day, originally organized by the CFOP</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 29, 2014</td>
<td>Strike called by the CCVC; Spontaneous protests triggered by news of shielded deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 30, 2014</td>
<td>Annulation of the scheduled voting in parliament due to its occupation and burning; Spread of disruptive protests and escalation; Refusals of soldiers to shoot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31, 2014</td>
<td>Resignation of Compaoré</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Press conference by military officer Zida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 18, 2014</td>
<td>Takeover as interim president by former diplomat Kafando</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation.
Parallel to these explicit term- or senate-related protest events, on July 20, 2013, trade unions held their own demonstration against the neoliberal course of the government which for them was part of a “système capitaliste-impérialiste” that needed to be fought in an organized way by the Coalition contre la vie chère (CCVC). In their speeches, they warned against other actors that presented themselves as political alternatives, but who were eventually as neoliberal as the ruling ones, referring to opposition politicians. Their major demands referred to the cuttings in the social sector, ongoing impunity and corruption as well as the exploitation of resources in view of the recent mining boom. Nonetheless, the representatives of the CCVC denounced the violent crackdown of the opposition rally from June 29, 2013 as unacceptable. This was followed by another protest march of the CFOP to declare the constitutional revisions as non-democratic on July 28, 2013. They mobilized on the occasion of preliminary elections of thirty-nine senators representing the collectivités locales in a soon-to-be Senate. The opposition boycotted the vote and the CDP received thirty-six seats, the other three seats went to smaller parties. The government reacted to these first protest events with attempts to control the media coverage. An answer that backfired due to sit-ins and rallies of state-media workers organized by their union which is part of the Confédération Générale du Travail du Burkina (CGT-B). Soon after, on July 31, 2013, the same union confederation released a public statement jointly with other union confederations, in which they declared to follow the debates surrounding Article 37 and the creation of a senate with accuracy without calling for protest.

98 Document analysis, Press release, CCVC, Message à l’occasion de la journée nationale de protestation du 20 juillet 2013, July 20, 2013. The CCVC started their activities in 2008 as a reaction to rising food prices (see for more details Engels 2015a).
104 Le Pays, July 15, 2013.
105 Press release, Collectif Syndical CGT-B, Communiqué, July 31, 2013. CGT-B was founded in 1988 from the trade-union front of 1985, based on the French CGT and described by its values of a “syndicalisme révolutionnaire, anti-impérialiste et anticapitaliste” (Loada 1999: 147) who fight well beyond workers’ rights.
During the same time span, many new self-declared ‘movements’ were created, so that it is rather difficult to judge which organizations have been initiated first and thereafter.\textsuperscript{106} Two should be named here as examples and groups that my interviewees referred to: Rather sooner than later, \textit{ça suffit} had been formed whose main slogan came after their name that it is enough now and time for change. They met with \textit{Balai Citoyen} at several occasions but, in reference to one leader, the founders of \textit{Balai Citoyen} had been skeptical to cooperate more closely with them due to close links of their movement leaders with the formalized opposition.\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Je m’Engage pour ma Patrie (JEP)}, in turn, exemplifies one of the numerous new youth initiative, whose potential as change agents are controversially debated.\textsuperscript{108} Members of the JEP can be part of a political party as long as they are privately active within this movement and do not represent party interests, referring to the statements by the regional coordinator.\textsuperscript{109} The high rate of party members of one Sankarist party fueled public debates surrounding their independence.\textsuperscript{110}

Simultaneously to these first mass protests, individual persons – predominantly an urban young constituency – called Compaoré to leave office online under the hashtag #BlaiseDégage, or #Lwily in reference to the Mooré wording for bird in reference to the logo of Twitter.\textsuperscript{111} During that stage, Compaoré and his opponents increasingly used their Twitter accounts. Besides, opponents used Facebook-groups in order to debate the current situation, but, according to one leader of \textit{Balai Citoyen}, such media channels did not serve the purpose of street mobilization.\textsuperscript{112} In his opinion, such online tools rather demobilize people who consider themselves as active without actively supporting the protest offline.\textsuperscript{113} Following an expert on Burkinabe politics, the social media platforms proved essential for the reporting by external media as those tools allow activists to easily upload their protest images and share them transnationally but had little local impact.\textsuperscript{114} This view is supported by the fact

\textsuperscript{106} I use the term movement in brackets as these civil society groups declare themselves movements but often do not fulfill the characteristics of my own understanding of social movements (see 3.2.3).

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with leader of \textit{Balai Citoyen}, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou. The statement refers to the leader, Aziz Sono, who later ran for elections.

\textsuperscript{108} English: I am engaged for my homeland.

\textsuperscript{109} Interview with regional coordinator of JEP, March 7, 2017, Ouagadougou. According to the coordinator, within one year the movement contained twenty-five local clubs with around 1000 members, identifiable by their membership card that is free of charge.

\textsuperscript{110} Interview with national coordinator of \textit{Balai Citoyen}, March 16, 2017, Ouagadougou. See also Marie-Soleil Frère (2014).

\textsuperscript{111} Frère (2014) has showed this among others.

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with leader of \textit{Balai Citoyen}, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.

\textsuperscript{113} Interview with expert on political activism, conflict and security in Burkina Faso, February 1, 2017, Dakar.
that less than 4.4% of all Burkinabe had access to the Internet in these years (ICT 2015). Referring to my respondents, _Balai Citoyen_ received inappropriately strong media attention internationally, which may go back to their transnational spreading of protest through digital platforms.\(^{115}\)

In sum, the debate on the usefulness of a second chamber and the democratic legitimacy of the envisioned constitutional changes was omnipresent in the public and political arena offline by the end of July 2013. First mass protests organized merely by opposition leaders characterized this first phase.

### 4.1.2 Demobilization and negotiation attempts (August - December 2013)

On August 12, 2013, Compaoré announced to suspend the senate until the commission would finalize a new report on its utility. On the same day, the founders of _Balai Citoyen_ launched their initial campaign to call the Burkinabe people to “unite in a civic action for democracy, freedom and good governance”.\(^{116}\) This happened only one month after their initial press conference at which they had announced the movement creation on July 18, 2013. Their speeches predominantly addressed the Burkinabe youth, whose collective identity they portrayed as based on their consciousness due to the revolutionary history of the country, to gather on the streets in high numbers after their slogan “Notre nombre est notre force”.\(^{117}\) Predominantly, journalist colleagues, university students, and representatives of opposition parties attended this first public reunion.\(^{118}\) In the aftermath, _Balai Citoyen_ organized concerts and film screenings in order to distribute their information leaflets on the Senate project and Article 37.\(^{119}\)

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\(^{115}\) Interview with regional coordinator of JEP, March 7, 2017, Ouagadougou. Interview with deputy Secretary General of AJB, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou. Interview with former Secretary General of CGTB and president of CCVC, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou.


Only two weeks later, on August 30, the governmental commission published the prefigured report that unsurprisingly concluded to be in favor of the implementation of a senate. This followed an invitation of Compaoré to the CFOP in avoidance of any further escalation on November 14. Afterwards, the opposition parties jointly declared the creation of a senate as unnecessary and highlighted the financial burden for the state budget as well as the potential for conflict to divide Burkinabe society in regard to the mass demonstrations – and thus left the negotiation table. In addition, they clearly stated that in their republican understanding of democracy, presidential mandates should be restricted.

Smaller protest gatherings happened in October and December 2013 on the annual memorial days of the assassination of Thomas Sankara (October 15, 1987) and Norbert Zongo (December 13, 1998). Routinely, civil society groups unite on these days to request justice for these assassinations for which they hold Compaoré accountable (Frère/Englebert 2015). On Sankara’s day of death a ninety-six hours tribute is paid to him, traditionally including a march-meeting to his grave where Sankarist leaders hold speeches, often reading a message of his widow, while on Zongo’s death anniversary a public commemoration of his assassination is organized. Compared to previous years, much more people attended, although not to such an extent that external media noticed them significantly (see Figure 4.1). Protest leaders connected these annual commemorations to ongoing grievances through a broader injustice frame, pointing at the political, juridical, and socioeconomic injustices under Compaoré.

However, on December 8, 2013, Compaoré told journalists that he would present himself as a candidate for the next presidential election and confirmed the rumors on December 11, the national day of independence celebrations, that his terms in office would not count, so that independent from any constitutional amendment, he would be able to campaign. This public statement triggered the creation of a crisis committee few days later by thirty-eight opposition parties that now used the same wording as civil society actors, talking about a ‘constitutional coup’ (Harsch 2017: 1999).

\[120\] Although independence had been reached on August 4, 1959, which is the official national holiday, celebrations take place in December to avoid the rainy season where outside events are difficult to have.
In the second phase, protest still took place, in particular around the annual protest routines of October 15 and December 13, but rather on a small-scale level. The transfer of the confrontation to the institutional arena, however, did not succeed as opposition forces regrouped behind the leader of the CFOP and pulled out of the talks.

4.1.3 Political confrontations (January - October 21, 2014)

On January 5, 2014, after a meeting with Compaoré in which they were unable to agree on a consensus regarding the constitutional changes, well known members of the CDP collectively left the party’s headquarter. Roch Marc, Christian Kaboré, Salif Diallo, and Simon Compaoré, who occupied high-ranking positions and belonged to the inner circle of Compaoré, were the first who pulled out of the CDP and between seventy-five and one hundred members followed them (Frère/Englebert 2015: 300; Engels 2015a: 3). Shortly after, on January 25, 2014, they formed a new party, the Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP).

On January 18, 2014, several thousands of people convened on central squares in cities in order to protest an enforced candidature, resulting in the second mass protest (see Figure 4.1). Originally, the call to protest derived anew from the CFOP, however, various groups participated including members of the MPP. The participation of the latter triggered the media coverage according to one expert on journalism, for which he gives credit to the engagement of these previous CDP-deputies. Again, Smockey and Sams’K Le Jah of Balai Citoyen spoke on one of these rallies (Stepan 2017: 19). This day marked the beginning of coordinated action between Balai Citoyen and four political parties, including former members of the ruling party without building an alliance due to the lack of a trustful relationship.

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122 Roch Marc Christian Kaboré previously was president of the National Assembly and Compaoré’s one-time heir apparent. Salif Diallo was a former minister, special advisor to the president and had a strong effect on the ideology of the CDP. Simon Compaoré was the former mayor of Ouagadougou (no family relation to Blaise Compaoré). All of them had already experienced a decreasing support from Compaoré during the party congress in 2012. Compaoré started to build his own support base at the sidelines, the Fédération des associations pour la paix et le progrès avec Blaise Compaoré (FEDAP-BC).


124 Interview with deputy Secretary General of AJB, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou.
relationship. In order to prevent unilateral domination, leaders of Balai Citoyen followed a strategy of bilateral unions with different parties. Besides, other movements emerged such as Collectif anti-référendum (CAR), Mouvement en rouge, Faso kunko, and Collectif des femmes pour la défense de la constitution (COFEDEC), a women’s collective created in 2012 by foremost female opposition members of parliament. Under the protest alliance of CAR, over 350 associations came together to protest against the upholding of the national polling to change Art. 37, including Balai Citoyen and JEP. Simultaneously, unions held a nationwide strike in the beginning of February, organized under a new header of Unité d’action syndicale (UAS) with the intent to bridge former splits between the labor movements while distancing themselves from political parties, whose closeness to these new civil society groups displeased them.

Two months later, the MPP held its official founding assembly in one of the main stadiums, packed with more than 25,000 people, leading to an atmosphere that Harsch even classifies as a „protest meeting“ (Harsch 2017: 201). This time, the government reacted not by political concessions or repression but rather by counter-mobilization. Later in April, a Republican front of roughly forty political parties, created on January 23, 2014 to keep Compaoré in power, held a huge meeting in the main stadium in Bobo-Dioulasso, the second largest city of Burkina Faso. In the meantime, the anti-referendum forces themselves held another convention some weeks later, on the May 31, 2014, in the biggest stadium of Burkina Faso, the Stade du 4 août in Ouagadougou that is composed of 50,000 seats.

125 Interview with spokesperson of Balai Citoyen, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou.
127 English: Movement in Red, for the Nation’s Cause.
128 Interview with regional coordinator of JEP, March 7, 2017, Ouagadougou.
Meanwhile, Balai Citoyen held their first Assemblée générale constitutive on April 13, 2014, which gained the attention of more journalists than activists.\(^{130}\) This was followed by a public conference of Balai Citoyen on June 2, 2014 in order to discuss the prospects of youth movements at Centre de Presse Norbert Zongo in Ouagadougou.\(^{131}\)

July 20, 2014 marked the next protest event, when trade unions anew protested collectively.\(^{132}\) One month later, on August 23, the CFOP organized a protest against the revision of article 37 that led to the last mass protests before October (see Figure 4.1).\(^{133}\) Two days later, Balai Citoyen mobilized their members for a similar protest march with the major header saying “hands off my constitution” (Frère/Englebert 2015: 301) for which organizations in favor of the movement such as JEP and AJB informally called their members to take part in but never published any official protest call.\(^{134}\) Similar to the long-running student trade union, Union générale des étudiants burkinabè (UGEB), who raised attention on the issue among their members and motivated them to protest, but officially launched no protest call.\(^{135}\)

The government reacted by creating an open dialogue platform to calm down the contestation. For this purpose Compaoré invited all political parties to discuss the constitutional modifications and his candidature in public. However, these assemblies came to an abrupt end on October 6, 2014 when the two sides were unable to agree on the issue of how the amendment should pass, since the government favored a parliamentary while the opposition supported a popular vote.

To sum up, the official statement of Compaoré to follow his term ambitions triggered renewed mobilization while also triggering a split within the CDP in the end, thus energizing not only the civic but also the political opposition. Until the beginning of October, politicians


\(^{131}\) Title: Les résistances populaires face au tripatouillage constitutionnel en Afrique place et rôle des mouvements citoyens; English: Popular resistance to constitution tampering in Africa: the space and role available to citizens’ movements.

\(^{132}\) Message à l’occasion de la journée nationale de protestation du 20 juillet 2013, CCVC, July 20, 2013.


\(^{134}\) Interview with regional coordinator of JEP, March 7, 2017, Ouagadougou. Interview with Deputy Secretary General of AJB, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou.

\(^{135}\) UGEB understand itself as a revolutionary trade union of students and part of the overall class struggle, not as promoting exclusively student rights. Interview with deputy coordinator of UGEB, March 24, 2017, Ouagadougou.
and civil society or movement leaders positioned themselves in relation to the issue of another term in office by Compaoré.

4.1.4 Escalation (October 21 - 31, 2014)

On October 21, 2014, the Council of Ministers, whose members are appointed by the president, held an extraordinary reunion on top of their weekly meetings to debate the envisioned term amendment. The same day, they officially announced that the actual parliamentary vote concerning the constitutional amendments would take place on October 30, 2014. Content-related the major changes concerned Art. 37 of the Burkinabe constitution and aimed at expanding the reelection regulations, so that a president could be reelected two times instead of one. Secondly, the government proposed to add the presidential term limitation to Art. 165, so that any modification would be more difficult in the future. Until then this article had regulated the republican nature of the state, the multiparty system, and the territorial integrity. Through the suggestion to subjoin the tenure restriction under Art. 165, the government signaled that these ongoing alterations were the last ones concerning the presidential mandate, hinting at a minor concession towards the opponents. Juridically these changes still left many questions unanswered in regard of the renewed candidature of Compaoré. However, the author concludes that other examples in the past as well as in regions such as Wade in Senegal illustrate that everything is possible to pave the way for a lifelong presidency. Such expectations of a “présidence à vie” are named repeatedly in newspaper articles, underlining that this is against the Charte Africaine de la Démocratie, des Elections et de la Gouvernance and thus should result into international sanctions against the government.

Beyond these public discussions, the first reactions in terms of mobilization break off were spontaneous riots in the night after the proclamation, which blocked the central roads in Ouagadougou. Police officers immediately and strongly tried to repress these protests,

136 L’Observateur paalga, October 22, 2014, p. 4.
137 L’Observateur paalga, October 23, 2014, p. 3.
138 In 2005, the Constitutional Council decided that legal changes were not applicable retrospectively. If the same principle applied again, the new changes would not account for his term in office at all and thus would enable him yet again to candidate twice, argued a law expert in one newspaper during the debate. L’Observateur paalga, October 28, 2014, p. 19.
140 L’Observateur paalga, October 23, 2014, p. 2.
which the media described as a “cycle de violence-répression”.\textsuperscript{141} The day after, on October 22, the first organized protests derived from \textit{Front de résistance citoyenne} (FRC), which was composed of twenty-one civil society groups, including CAR and \textit{Balai Citoyen}. It was created in August 2013 for the purpose of offering a platform for all civilian opponents to resist against the senate and the revision of Art. 37 as well as to demand better governance.\textsuperscript{142} The three spokespersons were an executive director and esteemed intellectual of the Ouagadougou-based \textit{Centre pour la Gouvernance Democratique}, a lawyer and member of \textit{Balai Citoyen}, who later became one of the spokesperson, together with one representative of CAR.\textsuperscript{143} The latter stated in public that “‘s’il y a une action anticonstitutionelle, il faut la contrecarrer par des actions anticonstitutionelles”, thus pronouncing the need for more disruptive tactics.\textsuperscript{144} At the same time, the CFOP announced a national contestation day for October 28 at the \textit{Place de la Nation}, consisting of one protest march followed by a spatial occupation of the square.\textsuperscript{145} Additionally, the CFOP started to install regional committees called \textit{Comités contre le referendum} (CCR) in all thirteen administrative regions of Burkina Faso in order to inform citizens about the consequences of such constitutional changes.\textsuperscript{146} Many other governmental opponents followed this example, for instance, the \textit{collectif antiréférendum de Koudougou}, a regional branch of CAR, held a press conference at the national office of the MPP to call for protest on October 28.\textsuperscript{147}

On October 23, ninety-eight deputies voted in favor of introducing the bill, finding its way on the official agenda of the parliament.\textsuperscript{148} This outcome revealed that more politicians than only those belonging to the ruling coalition of the CDP and the \textit{Conventions des Forces républicaines} (CFR)\textsuperscript{149} supported Compaoré’s bill.\textsuperscript{150} In the following, riots and spontaneous protests spread which led to first police-protestors-clashes. Shortly after, a collective consisting of seventeen self-proclaimed civil society groups in support of

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 23, 2014, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{142} Only accessible information through their Facebook-page: see https://www.facebook.com/pg/Front-de-R%C3%A9sistance-Citoyenne-Burkinab%C3%A8-671608862867083/ads/?ref=page_internal  (accessed on October 30, 2018). Since then, they have changed their name in 2015 and only their spokesperson appears in the media from time to time with declarations, see for example \textit{Burkina24}, October 30, 2017, available under https://burkina24.com/2017/10/30/an-iii-de-linsurrection-le-frc-pour-une-democratie-a-haute-intensite-citoyenne/ (accessed on October 31, 2018).
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 22, 2014, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 22, 2014, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 23, 2014, p. 4; 7.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 23, 2014, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 27, 2014, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 24, 2014, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{149} The CFR is a parliamentarian group made up of four smaller parties that rallied for the ruling majority.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 24 - 26, 2014, p. 5.
Compaoré, the Comité de soutien au referendum (CSR), argued that the constitutional amendment was a political problem that could only be solved in the political arena and thus called upon security forces to act in the republican spirit and reinstall security by repression. On the same day, other parliamentarian parties such as the Alternance-Démocratie et Justice (ADJ) and Union pour le progrès et le changement (UPC) denounced the envisioned changes as unacceptable, denominating the ongoing process as “un véritable coup d’État constitutionnel et un attentat contre la démocratie”, and consequently using the framing pushed forward by those protesting on the streets. This wording is now widely used by several journalists to refer to the illegitimacy of the term bid by Compaoré.

Only one day later, students from secondary schools and universities went on strike simultaneously and from October 26 onwards, the government had to close all schools and universities officially for one week. Although such strikes occurred frequently and led to the not uncommon closure of education institutions, it illustrates nonetheless the extent of the conflict (Engels 2015d).

When on October 25, 2014 the leader of the ADF-RDA, another opposition party, asked the members during their meeting in the main stadium in Ouagadougou to vote in favor of the amendment despite opposing it beforehand, this statement cemented rumors about secret talks between the CDP and ADF-RDA. This is insofar relevant as those votes represented the necessary swing votes that Compaoré needed to push through his anew candidacy by parliamentarian vote. The CDP counted on seventy members to vote in favor with the additional support by those of the CFR of ten parliamentarians. Together with the potential votes by deputies of the ADF-RDA who held eighteen seats in 2014, this would have meant ninety-eight votes in total. This would have led to a direct amendment of the constitution, bypassing a peoples’ poll. In reference to one representative of the main organization

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151 L’Observateur paalga, October 27, 2014, p. 4.
152 The ADJ is a parliamentarian group composed of several individual members of parliament. They only reached the necessary threshold of ten parliamentarians by lending one from the UPC.
155 L’Observateur paalga, October 27, 2014, p. 27.
156 L’Observateur paalga, October 27, 2014, p. 4.
157 Both parties have been part of the ruling coalition since 2009.
fighting against corruption, the Réseau national de Lutte anti-corruption (REN-LAC), the government either bribed or forced, though incriminating files, these deputies to back the term bid.\textsuperscript{159} Despite their governmental involvement, many perceived this support as highly unlikely until recently, and thus did not expect that Compaoré would take this pathway, since the ADF-RDF leadership had already publicly announced a to be against the modification in January and underlined this positioning during their congress in mid-March 2014.\textsuperscript{160} Besides, its leader had been associated with the protest against the constitutional amendment for months.\textsuperscript{161} Until this day in October, the ADF-RDA positioned themselves against the constitutional revision but for the establishment of a senate, but now clearly lined up with both. An article written and published by the youth association ODJ describes this change of position as “un virage spectaculaire”.\textsuperscript{162} However, others were less surprised as the ADF-RDA, since its creation in 2003, has systematically supported Compaoré. This day of the party meeting marks the moment Compaoré appeared back in public. He did not comment on the national situation over days and had chosen international channels to express his opinion; merely the BBC-Africa radio channel but local newspaper such as \textit{L'Observateur paalga} reprinted the whole interview.\textsuperscript{163} Compaoré underlined the legality of the process and that these amendments promoted democratic progress and not his own career.\textsuperscript{164} Meanwhile on the streets, protestors gathered outside of the party headquarters of ADF-RDA and CDP, singing the \textit{Ditanyè}, the national anthem of Burkina Faso that goes back to Thomas Sankara.\textsuperscript{165} Journalists described the protests as peaceful and spontaneous without any visible organization at the top.

These public announcements were followed by numerous press conferences on October, 26 which resembled a saber-rattling: During a meeting of the national bureau of the CDP,

\textsuperscript{159} Interview with deputy Secretary General of REN-LAC, 14 March 2017, Ouagadougou. REN-LAC has been created in 1997 among others by the CGT-B to fight corruption and thus to expand the fight to more fields of bad governance. After the secretary general, the second person responsible is a member of the CGT-B. REN-LAC consists of twenty-three organizations, including trade unions, the Protestant Church, and youth associations. Even state institutions such as the national Gendarmerie is part of REN-Lac to whom they give trainings to inform about corrupt practices.


\textsuperscript{161} Interview with an expert on political activism, conflict and security in Burkina Faso, February 1, 2017, Dakar.


\textsuperscript{163} \textit{L'Observateur paalga}, October 27, 2014, p. 9-11.

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{L'Observateur paalga}, October 27, 2014, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{L'Observateur paalga}, October 27, 2014, p. 11.
members emphasized that, if their houses would be set on fire, they were asked to return the gesture.\textsuperscript{166} In a precedent press conference, the leader of the CFOP proclaimed the situation as exceptional and argued that this justified exceptional actions.\textsuperscript{167} During this press briefing, female members of the party took the microphone, announcing their protest march for the next day at the central \textit{Rond-Point des Nation unies}. On October 27, this transnationally closely monitored rally by women took place with women holding wooden cooking spoons in their hands \cite{frere-englebert:2015:296}.\textsuperscript{168} Derived from the protest history of the country, holding cooking spoons translates into a crisis of large extent as the women refuse to cook and instead point the wooden spoons at the men who misbehave, in this case referring to Blaise Compaoré.\textsuperscript{169} Externally often portrayed as a grassroots-women mobilization, most of the female organizers were either part of opposition parties or of politically closely intertwined civil society organizations.\textsuperscript{170} The leading figures demanded to respect the constitutional and democratic rights and refused personified ruling.\textsuperscript{171} One of them was Saran Séremé, who belonged to the ruling party but initiated her own party for power-seeking reasons in March 2013 and now heads the \textit{Parti pour le développement et le changement} (PDC).\textsuperscript{172} The governmental answer to this women’s march were blockades by security forces at the \textit{Rond-point des États-Unies} based on the lacking authorization of this protest march that the mayor of Ouagadougou refused to hand out.\textsuperscript{173} Eventually, after a short exchange and accompanied by one leader of \textit{Balai Citoyen} and the spokesperson of the CFOP, the security forces let the women pass, ordered by governmental decree \cite{harsch:2017:204}.\textsuperscript{174} In general, external observers and activists perceived the women’s demonstration as less violently repressed.\textsuperscript{175}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{observer:2014:3} \textit{L’Observateur paalga}, October 27, 2014, p. 3.
\end{thebibliography}
The protests culminated on the proclaimed national day of contestation, originally initiated by the CFOP on October 28. The major demonstration took place at the Rond point des Nations Unies, where predominantly young people occupied the place. Various well-known Compaoré-opponents were present as speakers at these mass protests: the CFOP, representative of the MBDHP and CGT-B, student and youth associations, as well as recently created civil society groups such as COFEDEC, Balai Citoyen, CAR or ca suffit. Protest slogans were among others “Non au pouvoir à vie”, “C’est le peuple qui décide”, “Écoute ton peuple”, “Ne touchez pas à ma constitution” (Stepan 2017: 42, 43, 59). Sankarist slogans and symbols were omnipresent in form of t-shirt prints, claims, and citations (Engels 2018). Besides, young men held protest symbols of Balai Citoyen in forms of a balai and wore t-shirts printed with the representative enclosed fist. In view of these mass mobilizations, the leaders of Balai Citoyen proclaimed the whole week between October 24 until 30 “une semaine de désobéissance civile pacifique et citoyenne”, of which the last day marked the date of the envisioned vote and asked the people to occupy the space, holding their mattresses in their hands. In the evening, according to an article of ODF, “échauffourées entre manifestants et force de l’ordre” happened.

The following day, on October 29, the CCVC called a strike in order to pillory the current education system. Referring to the secretary general of REN-LAC, who participated in this strike, less people came since their protest call mainly tackled education policies, even if in the end many speakers referred to the constitutional changes. Thus, the protest marches of the CFOP and the CCVC happened simultaneously but separately, although the representative of the CFOP states that the opposition parties understood their protest as complementary to those of the CCVC. Beyond that, on the same day in the early morning hours, rumors circulated that the government shielded members of parliament at Hotel Azalaï. As the Burkinabe society is highly interconnected by personal ties, so that eventually

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180 Interview with deputy Secretary General of REN-LAC, March14, 2017, Ouagadougou.

somebody knows someone involved in party affairs, this information spread quickly,according to the deputy secretary general of REN-LAC: “Vous savez qu’au Burkina, on ne peut pas loger des députés dans un hôtel et puis les cacher. Puisqu’il y a des gens qui les connaissent personnellement.” 182 At noon, media reporting officially confirmed the hearsay. Activists interpreted this conduct as the definitive signal that Compaoré was willing to push through his amendment by all means. 183 Some protest leaders called their constituency informally to prepare themselves with groceries and handling child and elderly care as they expected the toughest confrontation the following days.

The 30th of October marks the day of the scheduled vote and the start of the escalation. 184 Overnight, protestors had gathered in front of the National Assembly in Ouagadougou, which in turn was highly guarded by various security forces, such as the RSP, gendarmerie, and the army. 185 The police used tear gas to disperse the crowd, military transportation cars blocked the main roads and utilized water cannons to deter the activists and, in some instances, units of the presidential guard fired rubber bullets as live ammunition. Initial rumors about first deaths triggered further mobilization. After running out of tear gas in the morning hours of October 30, young activists ran into the parliament and eventually the edifice was set on fire. 186 Subsequently, security forces were no longer visible surrounding the building, referring to informal talks of eyewitnesses and human rights observers. Shortly after, the spokesperson of the government released a communiqué that announced the annulment of the vote while leaving open the status of the constitutional amendments and candidature of Compaoré. 187 What followed protest leaders describe as a back-and-forth process between activists and security forces. 188 Once the army or police forces approached, they either went back or sat on the ground, holding their hands up high to demonstrate their peacefulness and that they were not armed. 189 People stormed into the Hotel Azalaï and

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182 Interview with deputy Secretary General of REN-LAC, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
184 See for one of the most comprehensive overviews of those last days Lefaso, October 30, 2014, available under http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article73943 (online accessed on March 14, 2019).
186 L’Observateur paalga, October 31, 2014, p. 3.
187 L’Observateur paalga, October 31, 2014, p. 3.
looted the building. Numerous buildings were set on fire and protestors ultimately occupied the state television building of Radio-diffusion Télévision du Burkina (RTB), taking it off air. Security forces responded with live bullets. The leader of the CFOP called upon Compaoré to resign but nobody knew where the president actually was, lacking any communication from his side. Protestors, merely young men, filled the main public squares, especially in Ouagadougou, Kedougou, a town known for its rebellious reputation, and Bobo-Dioulasso, the second largest city of Burkina Faso. The latter city became famous for protestors torching the many representative buildings and the early-on resignation of its mayor. Soon journalists described the scenes as “incroyable, imaginable, surréaliste” and thus as an unprecedented extent of protest intensification. Later on the same day, parts of the rank-and-file soldiers no longer seemed to listen to the presidential orders and refused to cause a bloodshed due to the danger that parts of the army stood against each other heavily armed. The Africa Research Bulletin cites media sources that few soldiers joined demonstrators, an incident that the president of the only nationwide represented Sankarist party Union pour la Renaissance-Parti Sankaris (UNIR-PS) confirmed. Thereafter, numerous activists’ groups headed from the Place de la Nation in the center of Ouagadougou to the presidential Palace Kossyam situated in the south, in the prestigious area of Ouaga 2000. Simultaneously, some activists went to the traditional Mossi king, the Mogho Naaba, whose palace is situated in the heart of Ouagadougou, in order to ask him for his company. Meanwhile, activists in different places in various cities took over buildings related to the old regime such as the headquarters of the CDP and ADF-RDA. In front of the office of the CFOP, in turn, people shouted the name of Kouamé

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190 L’Observateur paalga, October 31, 2014, p. 3.
193 L’Observateur paalga, October 31, 2014, p. 4.
196 L’Observateur paalga, October 31, 2014, p. 2.
197 Interview with an expert on political activism, conflict and security in Burkina Faso, February 1, 2017, Dakar.
199 The Mogho Naba is the king of the Mossi, the largest ethnic group in terms of numbers in Burkina Faso whose capital is Ouagadougou. He occupies an influential position in Burkina society until today, especially as an Elder to ask to settle consensus among (religious) authorities, although one of my interviewees highlight his decreasing influence, see interview with an expert on political activism, conflict and security in Burkina Faso, February 1, 2017, Dakar.
Lougué, former Minister of Defense and retired general, to take the lead.\footnote{L’Observateur paalga, October 31, 2014, p. 8.} Instead, General Nabéré Traoré arrived and protestors seemed not satisfied with his involvement.\footnote{L’Observateur paalga, October 31, 2014, p. 8.} Later asked about his absence, Lougué claimed in a media interview that he had left the negotiations with the opposition parties due to a fear of losing his life: “J’étais oblige de partir parce que mon garde de corps m’a prévenu que si je restais dans la salle, c’est mon cadaver qu’on allait venir prendre.”\footnote{Citation of an interview statement with the BBC transcribed by L’Observateur paalga, November 3, 2014, p. 22.} Outside of Ouagadougou, lootings spread and reports of unrest were numerous. Journalists outlined activists as being “en colère” and the situation as “ungouvernable.”\footnote{See among others, Le Quotidien, October 31, 2014, p. 8.} The number of protestors that exceeded any former protest event backs this impression (see Figure 4.1).

Although several journalists highlighted the chaotic situation, the study of Vincent Bonnecasse (2016) points out that primarily representative buildings were the target of lootings such as the offices of the ruling party, and houses of family members of Blaise Compaoré.\footnote{Interview with regional coordinator of JEP, March 07, 2017, Ouagadougou.} His data illustrates the extent of disruptive tactics. According to which 278 buildings were plundered, predominantly in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, especially the private residences of his brother, François Compaoré, and of the often called “belle-mère nationale” Alizéta Ouédraogo, his mother in law and well-known wealthy businessperson who symbolized the nepotism of the regime, were hit particularly hard (Bonnecase 2016: 4; Stepan 2017: 84).\footnote{Document, MBDHP, „Situation des Droits humains au Burkina depuis l’Insurrection populaire“, Octobre 2014 - Avril 2015, p. 18. The data derived from surveys conducted by the Coordination des Associations pour l’Assistance et le Secours Populaire (CAASP).}

Despite signs from soldiers of refusals to shoot into the masses that carried no weapons, violent repressive counteractions led to countless causalities and the deaths of thirty-four people, of which nineteen died due to real bullets, according to reporting by the MBDHP.\footnote{See report by Amnesty International (2015a), “Just what were they thinking when they shot at people?” Crackdown on anti-government protests in Burkina Faso, p. 5-6.} Based on reports by Amnesty International (2015a), most notable the military, the RSP and gendarmes were heavily armed while police forces had no firearms.\footnote{See L’Observer, October 31, 2014, p. 9, p. 30-32.} Following their evaluation, members of the RSP used live bullets predominantly on October 30, 2014 in the
surrounding of the house of Francois Compaoré and close to the presidential palace where activists clashed heavily with security forces, confirmed by media reporting. Concurrently to the street activisms, negotiations of Compaoré with opposition parties took place, in which apparently opposition members tried to convince him to resign by the end of his tenure that he vaguely agreed to. On this basis, Diabré called off protests and demanded the immediate hand over of power to the military. However, protests continued, so that he proclaimed shortly after that Compaoré had to resign immediately, citing the famous slogan imprinted by Sankara ‘la patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons’. This confirmed the impression of many that the activists on the ground no longer followed one protest leader or organization (Bonnecase 2016: 12). Referring to informal talks and interviews, the single strategy everyone followed was ‘tout le monde dehors’, everyone outside. However, activists mutually coordinated their activities by calling each other just thirty minutes before an event was supposed to take place and to exchange the concrete dates and strategies or hearing of occurrences. For the latter, protestors made use of radio channels, in particular self-run radio stations such as Oméga FM (Bonnecase 2016: 12). After security forces set the main radio station on fire, activists with the help of Burkinabe diaspora built up Radio Résistenc, an online radio, which can be listened to via mobile phones, at least in urban areas with net connections.

In these days of widespread unrest, external actors reacted. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon sent top diplomats in order to find a peaceful solution, while in parallel ECOWAS, the EU and the AU published statements to call for respect of the constitution and staying calm, underlining that they would not accept any non-constitutional regime change, pointing the finger at security forces.

210 L’Observateur paalga, October 31, 2014, p. 4.
214 Interview with editor of Mutations and expert on media reporting, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou. Interview with an expert on political activism, conflict and security in Burkina Faso, February 1, 2017, Dakar.
Later on the same day, two events coincided: In the late afternoon of October 30, Compaoré declared that the government was going to be dissolved and withdrew the offensive parliamentary bill as a reaction of the message he had received from the people. He announced to organize elections within ninety days, but stayed in power until a transitional government had completed the work in 2015. Nevertheless, for many, this came too late. The leaders of the CFOP demanded the president to resign and the people to resist, using civil disobedience when needed. In parallel, General Honoré Traoré, head of the regular Burkinabe army, restated the dissolution of the government. He pledged the establishment of an interim government within twelve months and a curfew between 7 pm and 6 am that soldiers should maintained.

The next day of October 31 at noon, Radio Oméga FM reported that Compaoré fled the country to Ivory Coast, accompanied by Burkinabe and French military, while other core members of his regime fled to Benin and France. Media sources described jubilation on the streets. Twenty minutes after that Compaoré officially announced his resignation in reference to the constitutional Art. 43, which states that the president should hand over power to the prime minister temporarily. Protest leaders explain this last minute decision of Compaoré by referring to his long-lasting power position that he himself perceived as unquestionable. The respondents paint a picture of a president that lost contact to his people, their needs, and their power altogether.

What followed was a limbo situation. For such a moment, when the president has left office, the Burkinabe constitution foresees that the president of the National Assembly takes over, but the person in charge had already left the country as he belonged to the old regime. A couple of people gathered outside of the army camp Guillaume Ouédraogo to demand the...
military to restore order, some of them shouting for Lougé who had been known for breaking his close ties to Compaoré (Stepan 2017: 50). Instead, a less known officer, Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida, held a press conference to proclaim the victory of the people, sitting beside members of Balai Citoyen. This incident was later explained in a press conference, stating that they had only accompanied him to hold his speech while his choice derived from inner military circles. According to one movement coordinator, the army was the only one capable of restoring order whereas opposition politicians had been unable to reach by phone and seemed disunited on the post-Compaoré-question. In the end, a reunion of opposition and civil society leaders under the lead of Zida resulted into the formation of the Conseil National de la Transition (CNT) composed of leaders from political opposition, military, and civil society. In mid-November, a former diplomat, Michel Kafando, became interim president, decided by the CNT.

Summarizing, the public announcement of the parliamentarian vote together with the distinct positioning of the ADF-RDA in favor of the incumbent triggered a sentiment of urgency and unavoidability that resulted into daily mobilization at a large-scale until Blaise Compaoré left office. Intense street activisms that culminated in these last October days characterize this last period.

4.1.5 Summary

A plurality of actors calling for protest, foremost newly created movements or opposition parties, the latters united under the CFOP, signifies the first period of the contentious episode in Burkina Faso. Here, Balai Citoyen occupied an outstanding role due to the early-on presence of their well-known movement leaders on opposition rallies. The government reacted to these first mass demonstrations with a two-sided strategy of repression and by calling their supporters for analogical ‘marches’ simultaneously. The issue of another candidature seemed to raise more and more attention over these first weeks, so that even the

227 Until this moment, Zida is described as someone in the shadow but as part of the old guard RSP loyal to Compaoré and representing his violent ruling arm. Document, MBDHP, „Situation des Droits humains au Burkina depuis l’Insurrection populaire“, Octobre 2014 - Avril 2015, p. 32.

228 Sidwaya, November 3, 2014, p. 5. Interview with movement leader in Le Soir, November 7 - 9, p. 6-7.

unions, whose main concern was the ongoing socioeconomic misrule, felt obliged to comment on the ongoing term-debate. Nevertheless, the actors who opposed the governmental plans were not united. We rather observe a division and distrust among them based on the perceived closeness to political parties of other civil society groups, be that ça suffit from the point of view of Balai Citoyen or themselves from the viewpoint of the CGT-B.

In the second phase, the strategy of Compaoré and his supporters refocused on political concessions and institutional channels to gain more legitimacy for the constitutional project. For instance, the report by a set-up commission seemed necessary as well as invitations to the negotiation table for opposition parties to calm the situation and downsize the conflict. The struggle thus shifted away from the public to the formalized political arena but the mass demonstrations served as an additional weight within the negotiations as the statement of the leader of the CFOP revealed when he referred to the threat of societal conflict. Although this time span overall was marked by demobilization, annual protest routines such as the memorial days nevertheless served as opportunities for voice their discontent.

One of the crucial events in the fourth period was the split of the ruling party and their alignment with the anti-Compaoré-protestors. Anew, the spokespersons of Balai Citoyen took part in a protest initiated by the CFOP. The CGT-B as the main trade union involved, instead held its own rally together with other unions. From the first party congress of the MPP onwards, stadiums became the major arena to speak out. Typically used for regular party congresses, public stadiums served as arenas to demonstrate the size of the community of followers and to effect the public discourse by their own framing. In the Burkinabe case, the dominant narrative became one of an illegitimate attempt. Another cycle of protests followed this ‘battle of the stadiums’, this time from opposition parties and Balai Citoyen separately. The last attempt by the government to solve the trouble at the negotiation table and to calm down the confrontations ended on October 6, 2014, when opposition deputies literally left the arena. The following announcement of the amendment bill changed the proceeding of the struggle profoundly.

Once this institutional body accepted the procedure put forward by Compaoré, the mobilization became more numerous in terms of people on the streets. Street confrontations and large-scale mass mobilization dominated the struggle at that point and these spectacular
images imprinted the general narrative of the Burkinabe uprising against the term bid. All participating actors positioned themselves on the issue by press statements, whose rhetoric radicalized. Eventually, the last two days of October seem exceptional concerning dynamics and actors’ interrelations since previous protest leaders were rather absent as organizers or leaders. The main interactions happened between protestors and security forces on the streets responsively to each other based on the opponent and their own breakthroughs. To what extent their spatial occupation and looting were not arbitrary but symbols of resistance mirrors which buildings actually became targets. Once again, Compaoré tried to appease by talks with opposition parties but failed to accomplish consensus or compromise.

4.2 Popular protest until candidature in Senegal

Only two years ahead of Compaoré’s term bid, in June 2011, Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal at that point in time, disclosed that he was not willing to step down by the end of his second term, which he would have reached in 2012. Once Wade had announced his plans, the issue was widely discussed in the public arena under the header “ticket présidentiel”, a name law experts criticized for covering up the profound thirteen changes. The substantial amendments refered to the presidential term, the establishment of a vice-president-position, and the electoral law: First, Wade claimed that Art. 27 of the Senegalese constitution from January 22, 2001, which allowed a president to rule for five years two times, did not apply to him as he had been elected one year before its adaptation and that his first election relied on the constitution of 1963 in which these regulations had been missing (for more details see Kelly 2012).

Already in 2000, the year Wade came to power, a constitutional council had accepted extra time for his first term that then lasted for seven years. This stood in sharp contrast to former promises of 2007 that he would only rule two subsequent terms. A former ally and member of the constitutional council explained this shift with the loss of elections of his son Karim Wade in 2009 who had tried unsuccessfully to become mayor of Dakar, which should have led him towards presidency. The second amendment confirmed this

231 For an interview in which he explains his argumentation see Le Soleil, March 11, 2011, p. 3.
232 Le Quotidien, June 21, 2011, p. 12. Before, the duration had varied between four to seven years since the adoption of the Constitution in 1960. In 2000, the constitutional commission decided to shorten the term in office of each president to limit the already extensive power of this post. See Interview with a former member of the constitutional council and expert on the constitutional law, February 3, 2017, Dakar.
233 Interview with a former member of the constitutional council and expert on the constitutional law, February 3, 2017, Dakar.
interpretation because of its relation to his son. Wade planned to establish a vice-presidency appointed by himself and widely considered as a handmade-position for Karim Wade. Third, the electoral modifications targeted the conditions for a second round in presidential elections. Because if a president is unable to get a simple majority of votes in the first round, he usually runs against the opposition candidate who received most of the votes for a second round. Such a second round is a common feature in Senegalese politics. Wade’s alteration suggested raising the threshold, so that only these candidates would be allowed to run in the second round, who were able to get at least 25% of the general votes. Since usually the incumbent acquires much more votes, the obstacle targets foremost the opposition candidate. The government justified this last revision in regard to these rather unholy alliances of opposition parties that regrouped behind one candidate independent of common grounds in order to win in the second run.

*Figure 4.2: Duration of protest events in Senegal from January 2011 until December 2012*

Source: Author’s own analysis based on the database from the SCAD databank (see Salehyan et al. 2012).  

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234 Loi no. 2009.22. See also *Sud Quotidien*, June 17, 2011, p. 3.  
237 For the research period, the data set consists of thirty-one counted protest events based on the coding of two international news agencies, Agence France-Presse and Associated Press.
However, anti-government protests had started earlier the same year on the grounds of ongoing power cuts and rising food prices. Since *Y’en a marre* and opposition parties, thus key protest leaders of the term amendment struggles primarily mobilized these initial protests, I include these events in my analysis. Therefore, I subdivide the episode of contention in Senegal into five stages. The first protests were rather against bad governance in the context of long lasting electricity cuts, but quickly turned into anti-government-mobilizations across various actors (see 4.2.1.). This time span encompassed the founding of *Y’en a marre* which became one of the leading voices and faces of the contention. The confrontation reached a new intensity when the Council of Ministers passed the above-listed amendments on June 23, 2011 and coincided with the first peak of mobilization (see Figure 4.2). According to the SCAD data set, these events took the form of organized demonstrations under the lead of *Y’en a marre* with other not-identified but organized protestors. Besides, the mobilization triggered riots and other protests nationwide with several thousand participants who kept going on the streets for two days. However, after these mass protests, the government took back the revisions, thus first escalation and a first ‘victory’ marks this period (see 4.2.2). This was followed by spontaneous protests limited to the capital only. Mass rallies, in turn, did not take place. Instead, concessions and coercion, for instance the ban of demonstrations, in regard to the governmental politics characterize this period, in which the struggle shifted away from the streets to the formalized political arena (see 4.2.3.). This demobilization lasted until January 2012 when the Constitutional Council allowed Wade to run in the upcoming elections, triggering the largest peak of protest events in terms of duration, attracting anew several thousands of people (see Figure 4.2). On the day of the decision, January 27, as well as on January 30, ‘citizens’ as well as the newly established protest alliance M23 called for protest marches that turned into riots against Wade, referring to the SCAD data. Based on press agencies, they resulted in violent clashes between mainly young protestors and police officers, who in turn used tear gas and water hoses to disperse the crowd. The repression scale increased from non-lethal repressions such as arrests or the use of tear gas to lethal repression with reported deaths. These events primarily happened in Dakar, Kaolack, a rather impoverished city in the southeast, and Thiès, the third largest city of Senegal. Eventually, one protest event against another term of Wade took place in the border town to Mauretania, in Podor. Until this moment, all of the protest events had ‘elections’, ‘human rights, and democracy’as their main themes, pointing at the term debate that combined these three. The first death of a student from the Dakar
University triggered further protests by students, M23 and *Y’en a marre*. As from 31 January onwards, all following protests did not escalate in regard to the SCAD coding, I thus consider the escalations in January a phase on its own (see 4.2.4.). In comparison to the statistical overview of protest events in Burkina Faso, both mobilization peaks lasted rather long despite attracting less participants (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Between February 5 and 16, several organized demonstrations against the candidature of Wade in Dakar took place in Dakar, mostly organized by ‘citizens’, *Y’en a marre* and/or M23, often jointly of the two. Only on February 8, spontaneous violent riots occurred in Thiès when the president visited the city with his electoral caravan and anti-government demonstrators attacked his truck. Overall, this last stage represents a turning point from which onwards the term amendment struggle was channeled into electoral campaigning (see 4.2.5). The investigation periods ended with the first election round by the end of February in which Wade candidate.

### 4.2.1 Cross-movement mobilization against governmental politics (January - May 2011)

On January 16, 2011, during a time of frequent electricity cuts lasting up to several days in the poor suburbs of Dakar, several well-known rappers such as the rap collective *Keur gui* united to form the movement *Y’en a marre* (see Table 4.2; an overview of political and protest events). Stating that it was time to go on the streets after solely rapping or writing against the government, the movement leaders called on the young people to gather on the *Place du Souvenir* in central Dakar two days later. Their main claim was to solve the ongoing power cuts within a deadline of fifteen days and to fight the rising costs for gas and basic nutrition. The incident of long-lasting outages was insofar closely related to the president as the Ministry of Energy was headed by his son Karim Wade who was unable to solve the debts of the state owned to *Société nationale d’électricité*, shortly called Senelec. At that time, Karim Wade was often called “ministre du Ciel et de la Terre” as he had presided the Ministries for International Cooperation, Regional Development, Air Transport,

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238 *Le Quotidien*, January 19, 2011, p. 3; see for more details 3.4.
239 Interview with leader of *Y’en a marre*, June 20, 2016, Berlin.
241 *Le Quotidien*, January 19, 2011, p. 3.
and Infrastructure as well as the Ministry of Energy since 2009. He quickly became unpopular due to merging private and state interests. Apart from those first visible uprisings of the youth, religious authorities called marabouts of the Muslim brotherhoods that regrouped the different creditors in Senegal and voiced their dissatisfaction in the media concerning the politics under Abdoulaye Wade due to his financial betrayal of the people. This is insofar relevant as Wade had relied on their support in the past and held beneficial relations to them, similar to other former heads of state (Gifford 2016). As a response, Wade visited Touba, a city with an immense symbolic value for the Senegalese Muslim community, to reestablish the relations on January 21.

On March 1, the best-known national human rights organization, Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO), held a press conference to voice their concerns referring to the increasing restrictions on democratic rights over the past years. They compared the situation of Burkina Faso to Senegal and called them both “démocraties de façade”. This was followed by a protest march on Place de l’Obélisque called by the leaders of Y’en a marre on March 5, where they handed over a letter to the government with ‘1000 complaints against the government of Senegal’ that several thousand had signed on- and offline. Their main demands referred to the worsening living conditions for the citizens and the clientelistic ruling by elites.

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242 Abdoulaye Wade handed over the Ministry of Energy to his son in 2010.
243 Sud Quotidien, June 26, 2011, p. 3.
245 Paul Gifford (2016) gives an overview of how politics and those Sufi brotherhoods are closely interwoven in Senegal but argues that their influence is decreasing and more implicit nowadays.
246 Le Quotidien, January 21, 2011, p. 5.
247 Le Quotidien, March 2, 2011, p. 4. RADDHO was established in 1990 as an independent human rights organization in the context of democratic liberations in several African states. Interview with (former) representative of RADDHO and (former) national coordinator of M23, February 13, 2017, Dakar.
249 Document, Y’en a marre, Plainte contre le gouvernement du Sénégal, March 5, 2011. Nic Cheeseman and colleagues (2019) in their newly published dictionary on African politics define clientelism as follows: “The exchange of goods and services for political support. A clientelistic relationship requires at least two individuals: the patron (or boss) and the client. In the way that clientelism is typically used today, almost anything can be given by the patron to the client in return for support, including cash, food, T-shirts, alcohol, and targeted services such as the paving of roads and the granting of land rights.”
Table 4.2: Main political and protest events in Senegal (January 2011 - March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 16, 2011</td>
<td>Formation of <em>Y’en a marre</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 18, 2011</td>
<td>First protest of <em>Y’en a marre</em> against electricity cuts and bad governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20, 2011</td>
<td>Public declaration of marabouts on bad governance under Wade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 21, 2011</td>
<td>Visit of Toubab by Wade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 2011</td>
<td>Press conference by RADDHO on democratic restrictions under Wade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 5, 2011</td>
<td>Protest campaign of <em>Y’en a marre</em> against bad governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 11, 2011</td>
<td>Start of mobilization campaign by UJTL and MEEL to support Wade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19, 2011</td>
<td><em>Alternance</em> celebrations of the government Numerous anti-government demonstrations, major protest events organized by media moguls, opposition leaders, and <em>Y’en a marre</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 2011</td>
<td>Campaign launch of <em>Y’en a marre</em> of voters’ registrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30, 2011</td>
<td>Meeting of opposition parties to choose joint candidate; no consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16, 2011</td>
<td>Adaptation of law draft by Council of Ministers; hand-over to the technical commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 21, 2011</td>
<td>Blockades of the youth of the opposition party APR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22, 2011</td>
<td>Meeting of anti-government groups under the lead of RADDHO to form the alliance MNFV; Spontaneous sit-in of <em>Y’en a marre</em> after leaving the meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 23, 2011</td>
<td>Parliamentarian voting on law adaptation; Spread of protests and riots; Call for dialogue of marabouts; Withdrawal of amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 25, 2011</td>
<td>Renaming of MNFV in M23 Ban of demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29, 2011</td>
<td>Formation of PDS-movement; Mobilization by UJTL in support of Wade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23, 2011</td>
<td>Spontaneous protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23, 2011</td>
<td>Spontaneous protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 23, 2011</td>
<td>Nomination of Wade as candidate for PDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 22, 2012</td>
<td>Public announcement of date of decision on candidatures (27 January); Release of protest song by <em>Y’en a marre</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 24, 2012</td>
<td>Governmental rally for peace; Mobilization in suburbs of UJTL and <em>Y’en a marre</em> simultaneously; no clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 26, 2012</td>
<td>Protests of M23 youth against ban on demonstrations and bad governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 27, 2012</td>
<td>Disclosure of presidential contenders by the Constitutional Council, including Wade’s candidature; Spread of (disruptive) protests and escalation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 30, 2012</td>
<td>Rejection of juridical appeal handed in by M23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31, 2012</td>
<td>Protest march by (parts of) M23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 5, 2012</td>
<td>Official start of election campaign; Start of Wade’s canvass; Protest march by parts of M23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 7, 2012</td>
<td>Start of voters’ registration campaign by <em>Y’en a marre</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10, 2012</td>
<td>Confirmation of M23 candidates to run for elections but starting campaigning after 16 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 12, 2012</td>
<td>Sit-in of <em>Y’en a marre</em>; Unsuccessful protest call by M23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 15, 2012</td>
<td>Ban on demonstrations; Unauthorized protest by M23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16, 2012</td>
<td>Occupation attempt of Y’en a marre; Detention of leaders of Y’en a marre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 17, 2012</td>
<td>Protest call by M23 but cancellation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 19, 2012</td>
<td>Spread of spontaneous protests and riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 22, 2012</td>
<td>Public confirmation by Wade to candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 23, 2012</td>
<td>Protest attempt by CSA but prohibition by state authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 24, 2012</td>
<td>Women’s march for peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 26, 2012</td>
<td>1st round of elections; Wade and Sall qualify for the 2nd round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25, 2012</td>
<td>2nd round of elections; Sall wins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own compilation.*

On March 11, the *Union des jeunesse travaillistes libérales* (UJTL) together with the *Mouvement des élèves et étudiants libéraux* (MEEL), the youth groups of the ruling *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS), discussed an action-oriented guideline to sensitize and mobilize the youth for the support of Wade.\(^{250}\) Beyond these counter-mobilization attempts, the government showed its force in announcing on March 17, that for the annual celebration of the *alternance*, which should take place two days later, several units of the gendarmerie, the regular police, and even fire brigades and soldiers were in operation.\(^{251}\) From that day onwards, roughly 1,800 police officers from the mobile task force started patrolling and established so-called checkpoints at the arterial roads of Dakar.\(^{252}\) This provoked criticism which the government answered on March 18 in *Le Soleil*. The government allowed all demonstrations based on Art. 8 of the constitution, but the Minister of the Interior announced at once that any violent disruptions would not be tolerated as seen in Tunisia and Egypt and that those who called for protest would be held responsible for any damage, printing the referred Art. 98-100 of the penal code.\(^{253}\) In the end, on March 19, the public holiday of the *alternance* and thus the 11\(^{th}\) anniversary of Wade’s electoral victory, carried on these prior mobilizations on both sides. Originally, this day commemorates the peaceful handover of

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\(^{250}\) *Le Soleil*, March 12-13, 2011, p. 3.

\(^{251}\) *Le Quotidien*, March 17, 2011, p. 4. *Alternance* represents a “French term that has become associated with the transfer of power from one party to another in parts of francophone West Africa, most notably Senegal” (Cheeseman et al. 2019).

\(^{252}\) *Le Soleil*, March 21, 2011, p. 2-3; 5.

presidency from Abdou Diouf of the socialist party, whose party had dominated Senegalese politics since its independence, to Wade from the liberal party in 2000 (Diop 2010). Since his takeover, Wade had put himself at the center of these festivities, apparently to demonstrate their political weight. According to estimations of the police, up to 100,000 participants followed the call by the government. Dressed in blue as the recognizable color of the Senegalese liberals and accompanied by the youza-dance, a popular dance style, they marched across the city center from the Médina, an area just before densely central Dakar starts, until the Presidential Palace.

Despite the restrictive policy towards activism, numerous protest events were held: Y’en a marre mobilized several thousand young people to gather at the Place de l’Obélisque in central Dakar to mark their opposition to a third term of Wade by commemorating the political commitment of the Senegalese citizens in 2000 instead of the alternation of power. They called for a Nouveau type de Sénégalais (NTS) that would be politically engaged in the fight against bad governance in terms of everyday activities and protests. One example of such a behavior was the cleaning of protest spaces once the rally had finished, which let them gain support even from intellectuals who often carried a rather poor image of the youth in general and rappers in particular (Prause 2013). When the number of participants extended all their expectations, opposition leaders and well-known musicians helped them out with microphones and other equipment. In the beginning of this protest, leaders sang the national anthem followed by a minute of silence for young Senegalese who died in the Mediterranean Sea when they had tried to reach Europe, ultimately to escape the hassles of daily life in the banlieues of Dakar. In support of them, one well-known marabout participated in their protests. At the same time, Benno Siggi Senegaal (BSS), a coalition of opposition parties formed in 2009 to end the rule of Wade, organized a protest
parade with caravans in central Dakar and its suburbs. Their main claim was to stop the renewed candidature but to ask Wade to finish his term nonetheless for the purpose of institutional stability. Their medial most-featured event was a sit-in at the central roundabout Jet d’Eau in view of the Place de l’Obélisque to expose the injustices under Wade, most notable media restrictions and growing obstacles of daily routines. Some of the leaders were wearing t-shirts with the slogan “y’en a marre”, while shouting rhythmically “na dem” in Wolof, which means literally “hit the road”. Therefore, an opposition daily newspaper, Le Quotidien, pictured this mobilization like an imitation of Y’en a marre. Simultaneously female members of the opposition coalition held a concert de casseroles in every state department and succeeded for instance in Rufisque, a town close to the capital where they reached several thousand participants. Concurrently, the director of the daily and independent press group Walfadjiri called for a sit-in on the Place de l’Indépendance in the aftermath of a tax affair he was facing and against decreasing press freedom under Wade. Just after noon, the security forces dispersed the protestors who refused to leave and used tactics of civil disobedience, while the others protest events on that day ended calmly. According to the pro-governmental newspaper Le Soleil that cited police records, this occupation represented – after the pro-government rallies – the second largest mobilization with between 2,000 and 3,000 protestors, while Y’en a marre mobilized up to 1,000 supporters, and the opposition march included only several hundred activists.

Besides these protests in the capital, the same dynamic of marches and counter marches of ruling and opposition party members happened in other cities. Additionally, majoritarian young men rallied against the bad governance under Wade in suburbs and surrounding cities.

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263 English: United to Boost Senegal.
264 Le Quotidien March, 21, 2011, p. 4.
265 Le Quotidien, March 5 - 6, 2011, p. 13.
268 English: Concert of pots. This protest form consists of banging different metal kitchen utensils such as pots to make their protest heard. In this protest form, supporters are able to join easily even from their home, for instance by making noise from their balcony. This repertoire of contention goes back to 19th century popular protest in France against the monarchy and is predominantly used in France, Algeria and several Latin American countries today.
270 Sud Quotidien, March 21, 2011, p. 6. Le Quotidien, March 15, 2011, p. 13. This phenomenon of one person owing (meinst du: owning??) a press group became normality under Wade’s regime and made the press more political and less professional due to media experts.
273 For example in St. Louis in the North see Le Quotidien, March 21, 2011, p. 4.
of Dakar while some opposition leaders or even mayors appeared at the front. Accordingly, the daily opposition newspaper *Le Quotidien* called the day of March 19 “Hit-parades des manifestations de l’an 11 de l’alternance” and titled “*Y’en a marre* prend le pouvoir” on their cover, giving the movement most of the credits for the widely considered successful mobilization of the Senegalese youth. An expert on Senegalese politics who shares this opinion and evaluates that “*y’en a marre*, c’était un peu la locomotive”. Most of my interview partners underline their presence in the media coverage, which they relate back to their newness in terms of leaders, protest events, and communication. Beyond that, journalists judged that these youth leaders had a specific role in not only mobilizing but also keeping the so-called ‘young and angry masses’ at bay on the *Place de l’Obélisque*, which ended without any police detention. From this moment onwards, protest leaders started to talk about a ‘constitutional coup’. Wade reacted to these initial mobilizations by initiating a commission of opposition and ruling party members to discuss issues put forward on the streets at the negotiation table and promised to hand over the most interesting positions to young people. Concurrently, leaders of *Y’en a marre* spoke of intimidations, corruption attempts and other coercive measurements from state authorities to hinder them continuing their activism. Nevertheless, on April 15, 2011, *Y’en a marre* launched their second campaign *Daas Fanaanal*, which translates into “my voter’s card is my weapon”, picturing electoral cards as the main weapons of citizens to fight Wade and to motivate the youth to register for the upcoming elections. For this campaign, besides public gatherings they used rap concerts as *concert pédagogiques* to inform and mobilize their constituency (Touré 2017: 71; see also

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274 For instance in Pikine, situated at the margins of Dakar, members of the *Parti socialiste* (PS) and in Rufisque the opposition coalition *Benno* appeared on the stages, see *Le Quotidien*, March 21, 2011, p. 3-4.


276 Interview with a former member of the constitutional council and expert on the constitutional law, February 3, 2017, Dakar.


279 *Le Quotidien*, March 21, 2011, p. 5. Repeated later at different occasions such as press conference of the opposition, see *Le Quotidien*, June 20, 2011, p. 13.


Gueye 2013). In regard to an approaching election, members of Benno met at the end of May, but were unable to agree on one joint candidate. 283

To sum up, in the first few months protests against tangible grievances transformed into broader mobilizations and eventually turned into anti-term-protests and -discourse. Majoritarian young protestors were visible on the streets. Especially, the annual commemoration of the changeover of government in March led to a battle of mobilization and counter-mobilizations between supporters and opponents of the incumbent, but so far missed to mobilize the masses.

4.2.2 First escalation and first ‘victory’ of the anti-term-front (June 1 - 23, 2011)

When the Council of Ministers met to discuss the simultaneous election of the president and the vice-president and ultimately adopted the law by 186 votes in favor out of 198 on 16 June 2011, a new dynamic was set in motion. 284 Referring to governmental information sources, thirty-five amendments were passed and over fifty members of parliament debated the law before its adoption. 285 This decision marked the first step towards law adaptation circumventing a popular referendum based on the constitutional Art. 103 and was insofar not surprising as the ruling party of Wade held a “majorité mécanique” within the committee. 286 Thus, parts of the ruling PDS started the voters’ campaign “Zéro voix contre Wade” for the upcoming presidential elections, illustrating their apparent anticipation that the law was going to pass. 287 However, before its entry into force, a technical law commission needed to prove the legal correctness and afterwards it traveled back to the parliament, which then finally decided on its implementation.

284 Sud Quotidien, June 17, 2011, p. 3. For the exact wording see Le Soleil, June 17, 2011, p. 2: „Le Conseil a examiné et adopté un Projet de loi constitutionelle instituant le ticket de l’élection simultanée, au suffrage universel du président et du vice-président de la République.”
286 Le Quotidien, June 17, 2011, p. 13.
287 Le Soleil, June 17, 2011, p. 3-4.
Governmental opponents responded first on June 21, 2011, when the youth of the opposition party Alliance pour la république (APR) blocked one of the main roads to central Dakar, but the police stopped them shortly after and arrested eight of them.\textsuperscript{288} One day later, various opponents of Wade met at the Centre Daniel Brottier to form an anti-government-alliance called Mouvement nationales des forces vives (MNFV) consisting of opposition parties from the Benno coalition, youth associations, and civil society groups, of which the recognized human rights organization RADDHO took the lead.\textsuperscript{289} Protest slogans refered to the departure of Wade, “Wade degage”, and the prevention of constitutional changes, “Touche pas à ma constitution”, in order to call for Wade to leave office to avoid being ousted out of office as it had happened in Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Libya.\textsuperscript{290} The secretary general of RADDHO called for protest on the next day in front of the parliamentarian building and for an enduring sit-in on the Place de l’Indépendance.\textsuperscript{291} Leaders of Y’en a marre participated but left the meeting immediately to occupy the Place de l’Indépendance and to overcome the experienced but passive manner of writing protest letters to the US or EU.\textsuperscript{292} The leaders of MNFV, in turn, stayed inside, a behavior younger members criticized.\textsuperscript{293} The young members more and more became the forces on the grounds, called by one of their representative “les bras armés de ce combat” that functioned as the engine for street contestations, while more established leaders of political parties or civil society groups utilized institutional platforms to voice their concerns.\textsuperscript{294} Numerically overrepresented, special units of the police clamped down the protests with the use of tear gas, insults, and forceful arrests of protestors.\textsuperscript{295} The police caught several rappers of Y’en a marre, together with numerous activists when they resisted those repressive counter actions, but they

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{285} The APR was founded by Macky Sall, at this time President of the National Assembly, after he had left the ruling party PDS in December 2008. \textit{Le Quotidien}, June 21, 2011, p. 8. \textit{Le Quotidien}, June 23, 2011, p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{286} \textit{Sud Quotidien}, June 23, 2011, p. 3. Interview with (former) coordinator of M23, February 2, 2017, Dakar. Interview with (former) representative of RADDHO and (former) national coordinator of M23, February 13, 2017, Dakar.
\item \textsuperscript{288} \textit{Sud Quotidien}, June 23, 2011, p. 3. \textit{Le Quotidien}, June 23, 2011, p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{289} Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, June 20, 2016, Berlin. \textit{Le Soleil}, June 23, 2011, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{290} \textit{Le Soleil}, June 23, 2011, p. 4. Interview with representative of COS-M23, February 16, 2017, Dakar. This growing division and later on the participation of many M23 members in Sall’s government resulted in the creation of their own youth branch called Commission d’Orientation et Stratégies de M23 (COS-M23).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
released them after forty-eight hours. Afterward numerous riots of young people spread over Dakar and its suburbs, some of them were young members of the opposition party APR while others could not be identified belonging to one specific organization. Soon security forces successfully dispersed the activists. In regard to these police-protestors-clashes, religious leaders consulted Wade to take back his law amendment.

On June 22, one day ahead of the actual parliamentarian vote on the law adaption, the Ministry of the Interior published a declaration that allowed all public gatherings but allocated separated spaces to the pro- and anti-government camps. As a consequence, on the actual voting day of June 23, activists surrounded the parliamentary building while the deputies were in session, representing the largest protest event in Dakar for which different anti-government forces converged, among them key figures of the opposition. These majoritarian young protests used disruptive tactics such as blocking central roads by burning tires and throwing stones at selected buildings. Besides the main thoroughfares towards the city center, agencies of Senelec and a hotel where deputies often resided became targets. The pro-governmental newspaper portrayed these protests as vandalism and thus criminal acts. The majority of participants were not distinctly organized by one actors’ group apart from two distinct protest marches of APR and Y’en a marre, both happened in a neighboring suburb known for its high youth unemployment rates. However, the media reports of activists rhythmically shouting ‘y’en a marre, y’en a marre’ were based on the rhythm of the famous national Wrestling song, created by one of the rappers of the movement who was later named artistic director. Students, in addition, held a peaceful protest march from the university towards the National Assembly but the police eventually broke their blockades. Although not aligned, activists coordinated their activities and repression occurrences via mobile phones, but also distributed the images of their protest events via social media. The main protest places were three central squares, Place Soweto, Place de

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298 Le Quotidien, June 24, 2011, p. 7.
299 Le Soleil, June 23, 2011, p. 3.
300 Le Soleil, June 24, 2011, p. 7.
301 Sud Quotidien, June 28, 2011, p. 7. For Mbour see Le Quotidien, June 28, 2011, p. 4.
302 Le Soleil, June 24, 2011, p. 7.
303 Le Soleil, June 24, 2011, p. 5.
304 Sud Quotidien, June 23, 2011, p. 2.
306 Le Quotidien, June 24, 2011, p. 5.
307 Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, March 1, 2017, Dakar.
After the police had used tear gas, protestors dispersed around the city center and eventually ended up in a cat-and-mouse game between the two. Journalists of all different newspapers described the presence of the police as massive in terms of numbers and, later on, the police even officially confirmed the use of real bullets. Both distinct protest marches in the suburbs ended with arrests of several activists, among them the coordinators of each group. The justification for the arrests was the lacking authorization of the protests but all of them, protest leaders and other participants, were liberated after twenty-four hours, a liberation for which religious authorities expressed their support. Overall, the media reported of over 100 causalities, among them the leader of RADDHO and out of them twelve police officers, and of one death of a young student, who was hit by a police car.

In other cities everywhere in Senegal, anti-government protests took place, merely mass demonstrations and sit-ins on central squares and roads. Besides, diaspora communities in Europe, the US, and Canada protested in support of the demonstrations at home as well. In total, the day stands for the largest mass protests since the pre-election protests in 2000 and the first mobilization peak (see Figure 4.2). Le Quotidien even titled “La loi du people” and later this mass mobilization was labeled the ‘revolt of the 23th June’. In particular, the youth and women, usually underrepresented in political participation, dominated the images of the protests. However, an expert on women’s rights and political participation judged their role as overemphasized in regard to the masses of young male

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308 For an overview and longer debate on the role of urban spaces, see Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop (2017c).
313 Le Quotidien, June 24, 2011, p. 6.
315 Le Quotidien, June 24, 2011, p. 4.
317 Interview with a professor of journalism and expert on media and political elites, February 15, 2017, Dakar. Sud Quotidien June, 24, 2011, p. 5. Le Quotidien, June 25 - 36, 2011, p. 7. Le Quotidien, June 24, 2011, p. 7; 10. Le Quotidien, June 27, 2011, p. 4. Le Soleil, June 24, 2011, p. 6. A few days later one of the headings was that the presidential ticket was thrown back by the streets, see Sud Quotidien, June 27, 2011, front page. Le Quotidien, June 24, 2011, p. 7.
protestors.\textsuperscript{318} While activist leaders pronounced that all different social classes were present, ruling politicians denounced the broadness of mobilization and pointed to the coordination by opposition parties.\textsuperscript{319} An internal document of opposition parties that Demarest (2016: 10) cites, reveals that opposition parties spent 25,500,000 CFA in total for transportation from the suburbs to the city center in Dakar during the summer in 2011.\textsuperscript{320}

After seven hours of heated debate between the pro-and-contra-side, the government eventually took back the proposal and thus interrupted the law adoption.\textsuperscript{321} Due to media reporting, the members of parliament reacted to this step by standing ovations, some of them belonging to the ruling PDS.\textsuperscript{322} In the aftermath, the loose alliance of MNFV changed its name to \textit{Mouvement du 23 juin} (M23) to store the memory of this mass mobilization and perceived victory into national history.\textsuperscript{323} From this moment onwards, more than twenty-five organizations ranging from well-known human rights organizations such as Raddho and \textit{Ligue sénégalaise des droits humains} (LSDH) to several opposition parties, as well as citizens’ movements, including \textit{Y’en a marre}, regrouped under M23 and thus enlarged the existing anti-government-alliance.\textsuperscript{324} According to one representative, this organizational form with no organization taking the lead had been new to Senegalese politics.\textsuperscript{325} Nevertheless, two spokespersons, one from a political party, and one from a civil society organization represented the alliance, even though practically, the civil society representative gave most of the interviews.\textsuperscript{326} Nonetheless, an outside observer describes this alliance limited to an urban middle class, whose main financial base derived primarily from contributions of political parties as well as external supporters.\textsuperscript{327}

\textsuperscript{318} Interview with expert on women’s rights and political participation, February 27, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{319} \textit{Le Quotidien}, June 27, 2011, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{320} Roughly 100,000 USD; see also \textit{Le Quotidien}, June 23, 2011, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{321} \textit{Sud Quotidien}, June 24, 2011, p. 5. For one example of such deputy of the ruling coalition, see his statements in \textit{Le Soleil}, June 24, 2011, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{324} \textit{Le Quotidien}, June 25 - 26, 2011, p. 7. One interviewee states that fifty-four political parties were involved but I was unable to confirm this statement by any other source; see interview with (former) coordinator of M23, February 2, 2017, Dakar. Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, June 20, 2016, Berlin.
\textsuperscript{325} Interview with (former) coordinator of M23, February 2, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{326} Interview with a professor of journalism and expert on media and political elites, February 15, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{327} Interview with representative of M23 and leading figure of women’s movement, February 20, 2017, Dakar. Interview with an expert on youth and politics, February 8, 2017, Dakar.
In contrast to this proclaimed people’s victory, Le Soleil pointed at the essential role religious authorities had played to convince Wade to withdraw his constitutional changes as well as “chefs d’État de pays amis” who underlined the crucial role of Senegal for regional stability. Religious authorities repeatedly urged both side to enter the dialogue to preserve the social peace during these street fights while members of parliament kept on discussing the draft law. Similarly, the European Union expressed their support for a consensual solution and criticized the changes of electoral laws several months before the actual vote. Concurrently, leaders of M23 reported first contacts with French and American representatives offering support. Beyond that, several national and international human rights organization denounced the cruel treatment of protestors by the security forces.

In sum, protests spread widely despite strong repression until mid-June. Wade’s attempt to change the constitution set the stage for the first mobilization peak and thus apparently functioned as the political opportunity for various opposition parties and civil society groups. When Wade took back his amendments, these actors (re-)united as counterpart to the government because of their self-declared first achievement.

4.2.3 Institutional channeling (June 23, 2011 - December 2011)

In the aftermath of these mass protests, the governmental council for national security met to debate the re-installment of the rule of law. Simultaneously, the media reported the disembarkation of mercenaries from Nigeria and Ghana of roughly 150 soldiers and the planned involvement of the French army, although Wade underlined that they functioned solely as protections for French citizens. Beyond that, constitutional experts stepped in on both sides either to criticize or to defend the attempt by Wade to run anew. Besides

328 Le Soleil, June 24, 2011, p. 3.
329 Le Soleil, June 23, 2011, p. 3.
331 Interview with representative of M23 and leading figure of women’s movement, February 20, 2017, Dakar.
332 Le Soleil, June 25 - 26, 2011, p. 3.
333 Sud Quotidien, June 27, 2011, p. 3. Sopi stands for change in Wolof and with the slogans “Sopi! Sopi!” Wade had won the election against the longtime ruling PS in 2000. Since then the coalition represented the government and consisted merely of Wade’s party, Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS), and smaller less known parties.
334 Le Quotidien, June 30, 2011, p. 9.

In this period, parts of the ruling PDS formed a new movement called fittingly \textit{Les Frustrés du Parti démocratique sénégalais}, pointing at their frustration with the party politics.\footnote{\textit{Le Quotidien}, June 29, 2011, p. 7. \textit{Sud Quotidien}, June 29, 2011, p. 3. \textit{Le Soleil}, June 28, 2011, p. 3.} In a public statement, their spokesperson called for Wade to take back his candidature and held him personally responsible for this troubled situation. From the side of the incumbent, in turn, there was no official statement and thus \textit{Sud Quotidien} titled “le silence du Palais”\footnote{See Articles 89-94 of Senegal’s 2011 Constitution. See also Annette Lohmann (2016). Interview with a former member of the constitutional council and expert on the constitutional law, February 3, 2017, Dakar.}. Solely a new mobilization attempt was started by young liberals of UJTL as well as by a committee installed by the PDS to create permanent agitation until elections to illustrate their support for the president.\footnote{\textit{Le Quotidien}, June 29, 2011, p. 8. \textit{Sud Quotidien}, June 28, 2011, p. 7. \textit{Le Quotidien}, June 29, 2011, p. 8. \textit{Le Soleil}, June 28, 2011, p. 3.}

From July to December, no mass mobilization happened during the ban on demonstrations, solely spontaneous protests of several hundred participants on July 23 and on September 23 to remind the government of the largest riots the country had just seen (Figure 4.2). On 23 December, the PDS members formally nominated Wade as their presidential candidate. This meant that his candidature had to pass the last obstacle, the Constitutional Council, a legal advisory board for which the president appoints five judges for a mandate of six years. This council decides on the legalization of all handed-in candidatures and is rather known to decide in favor of the ruler.\footnote{\textit{Le Quotidien}, June 29, 2011, p. 8. \textit{Le Soleil}, June 28, 2011, p. 3.} M23 among others arranged public assemblies to debate the
(un-) constitutionality of Wade’s run for election.\textsuperscript{343} Whereas rappers of \textit{Y’en a marre} produced their later well-known protest song “Faux! Pas Forcé!”\textsuperscript{344} in which they called for Wade not to enforce his candidature, and in this manner avoided conflicts with the ban on demonstrations.\textsuperscript{344} At first, radio channels refused to play the song, but soon it dispersed via mobile phones and eventually became a popular ring tone.\textsuperscript{345}

In summary, less street confrontations and a certain demobilization imprinted this third stage of the struggle. Although the debate on the legitimacy and legality of Wade’s candidature continued, the conflict seemed to be channeled institutionally.

\textbf{4.2.4 Escalation (January 2012)}

On January 22, the constitutional judges announced that they were going to pronounce their decision on all candidatures, which had never been so numerous in previous years, on January 27, 2012, setting the stage for a re-mobilization.\textsuperscript{346} On the same day, \textit{Y’en a marre} started to circulate their political music video of their protest song, although many national television channels refused to play it, and held concerts at which the sale of t-shirts served as a source of income.\textsuperscript{347} The successive weekend of the announcement, leaders of \textit{Y’en a marre} organized a sensational “Foire aux problems”, a marketplace to expose the main challenges of current Senegalese society in order to make aspects of bad governance under Wade more tangible.\textsuperscript{348} Between January 23 and 29, M23 planed to organize several mass protests but on January 22, the government refused to allow any demonstration until January 30, justified by the general security situation.\textsuperscript{349} Nonetheless, caravans organized by M23 toured the suburbs to inform the people on the illegitimacy of Wade’s candidature.\textsuperscript{350} On the other side, the government organized a march for peace on the \textit{Place de l’Obélisque} with

\textsuperscript{343} Interview with (former) representative of RADDHO and (former) national coordinator of M23, February 13, 2017, Dakar.

\textsuperscript{344} Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, March 1, 2017, Dakar.

\textsuperscript{345} Interview with a professor of journalism and expert on media and political elites, February 15, 2017, Dakar.

\textsuperscript{346} \textit{Le Soleil}, January 24, 2012, p. 3. Out of seventeen submissions, fourteen candidatures had been validated; see \textit{Le Soleil}, January 28 - 29, 2012, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{347} \textit{Le Quotidien}, January 18, 2012, p. 8. Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, June 20, 2016, Berlin. Their main income derived from individual donations of supporters and members as well as the sale of t-shirts, each one for 7.000 CFA (12 USD). Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, June 20, 2016, Berlin.

\textsuperscript{348} See interview with one of their leaders in \textit{Le Quotidien}, January 19, 2012, p. 9.


\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Le Soleil}, January 18, 2012, p. 2.
all participants dressed in white *boubous*, a traditional clothing of wide and light garment, or t-shirts with white caps and musicians animating the crowd that an external observer described as counter-mobilization.\footnote{Le Soleil, January 25, 2012, p. 3. Talk with an expert on democracy and trade unions, January 30, 2017, Dakar.} Additionally, the liberal youth in form of the UJTL allied in Guediawaye in order to underline their support of Wade. Parallel in the same spot, members of M23, including activists of *Y’en a marre*, held a protest against the candidature of Wade.\footnote{Le Soleil, January 24, 2012, p. 3.} The two protest events happened simultaneously without any clashes, but the national council for audio-visual regulations later condemned the unilateral coverage in favor of the government by several national broadcast stations.\footnote{Le Soleil, January 25, 2012, p. 3.}

Shortly after, on January 26, parts of the youth of M23 protested in front of the house of Karim Wade and at the *Place de l’Obélisque* against the ban on demonstrations by the Ministry of Interior.\footnote{Le Quotidien, January 27, 2012, p. 3.} Frustrated by lacking support of older members, they soon returned to the office of RADDHO, pointing at the growing divide within M23 between generations.\footnote{Interview with representative of COS-M23, February 16, 2017, Dakar. Interview with (former) coordinator of M23, February 2, 2017, Dakar.} The coordinator of M23 reiterated the protest call for the January 27 despite the prohibition, called upon the security forces to act in the people’s will, and warned the government that all repressive attempts would be documented and seen transnationally.\footnote{Le Quotidien, January 27, 2012, p. 12.} Eventually, in the late evening of January 27, the Senegalese Constitutional Council adjudged the third candidature of Wade as legal and thus validated his running for election.\footnote{Le Quotidien, January 5, 2012, p. 2. Le Soleil, January 28 - 29, 2012, p. 2.} In their explanation, they referred to the Senegalese Constitution of 2001 whose rules applied only for the second mandate of Wade and consequently did not consider his first.\footnote{Le Quotidien, January 27, 2012, p. 12. Le Quotidien, January 28 - 29, 2012, p. 2.} None of the protest leaders were surprised since even the president of the council was a member of the PDS and Wade himself appointed all others.\footnote{Interview with (former) coordinator of M23, February 2, 2017, Dakar. See also Le Quotidien, January 28, 2012, p. 14. Le Quotidien, February 1, 2012, p. 8.} Awaited in front of the building by numerous national and international press agencies, the gendarmerie controlled for any spontaneous protests in the streets but the situation staid rather calm.\footnote{Le Soleil, January 28 - 29, 2012, p. 2.} On the *Place de l’Obélisque*, in turn, thousands initiated a protest shortly after, some mobilized by leaders
of M23. Members of Y’en a marre deployed themselves in different places in Dakar to improvise a protest march towards the Place de l’Obélisque holding their arms high once the candidature was officially legalized. Their aim was to occupy the place permanently, thus they burned tires and waste materials to block the main roads. The well-equipped mobile intervention groups of the police, who were omnipresent stationed on pick-ups in the city center, answered with asphyxiate gases to disperse the crowd. Dakar quickly turned into a battlefield of protestors hiding from police officers whose aim seemed to clean the streets of opponents. The association of young journalists denounced the hindering of their work in reporting on these street confrontations, while protest leaders and human rights organizations observing the scenes accused the government of randomly shooting at protestors and violently repressing any attempt to manifest. The first who died in these confrontations was a police officer, for which the coordinator of M23 was held responsible, resulting in his detention. The police liberated him soon after on January 30. Another leading figure of M23 separately confirmed this incident. In total, the firing of ammunition in central Dakar resulted in at least six deaths and numerous causalities referring to an investigative report by Amnesty International (2012).

With regard to these confrontations, representatives of M23 called for their members to continue the resistance against the constitutional coup and additionally demanded trade unions and other professional organized groups to enter the struggle. In parallel, opposition parties of M23 handed in a juridical refusal, but on January 30, the Constitutional Council denied their rejection. Afterwards, on January 31, 2012, thousands followed the call by M23 and rallied on the streets against Wade’s candidature. Although the mobilization succeeded in terms of participants, the growing disunity of M23 came to the surface when older members of M23 shied away from confronting the security forces during the protest.

363 Le Soleil, January 28 - 29, 2012, p. 3.
364 Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, June 20, 2016, Berlin.
367 Interview with representative of M23 and leading figure of women’s movement, February 20, 2017, Dakar.
369 Le Soleil, January 30, 2012, p. 3.
while the youth saw more disruptive tactics such as blocking the streets and burning tires as an essential component of their fight.\textsuperscript{371} Representatives of \textit{Y’en a marre} moved away from the demonstration headed by M23, illustrating the break of these two groups.\textsuperscript{372} The police forces responded with strong repression, resulting in police-protestors-clashes during which several peoples were injured and one student died when a police car struck him.\textsuperscript{373} According to journalists, the struggle reached a new escalation level on that day.\textsuperscript{374} External actors reacted with great concern about the clashes in a country that had such a long democratic tradition.\textsuperscript{375} Later, the pro-governmental newspaper argued in several articles that the violence was enough and called for the opponents to return to a dialogue.\textsuperscript{376} Wade called civil society groups to stick to their role of mediators rather than becoming allies of political parties, what he labelled an “informal opposition”.\textsuperscript{377}

In the month of January, the run-up to the decision of the Constitutional Council remobilized the protests. When the council approved the incumbent’s run for elections, the mobilizations reached its second peak but faced an even stronger repression, so that the situation escalated anew.

\textbf{4.2.5 Demobilization and electoral campaigning (February - March 2012)}

The 5 February marked the day, when candidates were allowed to start campaigning for elections. Nine out of the fourteen legalized candidates gathered with other members of M23, mainly from student associations, at \textit{Place de l’Obélisique} to keep the resistance against Wade’s candidature going, instead of touring the countryside.\textsuperscript{378} This protest march attracted several hundred people but overall stayed limited to Dakar.\textsuperscript{379} After these repressive counteractions, \textit{Y’en a marre} set off their electoral campaign \textit{Doggali} to mobilize the (young) people to register for voting.\textsuperscript{380} M23, in turn, decided by a majority not to accept

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Le Quotidien, February 1, 2012, p. 9.
\item Le Quotidien, February 1, 2012, p. 8.
\item Le Soleil, February 2, 2012, p. 2.
\item Le Soleil, February 3, 2012, p. 3.
\item Le Soleil, February 17, 2012, p. 7.
\item Le Soleil, February 6, 2012, p. 10.
\item Le Quotidien, February 8, 2012.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the candidature of Wade and external observers judged this moment as a radicalization point of M23.\textsuperscript{381} Other civil society organizations such as \textit{Forum civil} accepted the decision of the Constitutional Council, underlining that this juridical body represented the law, and started campaigning against electoral fraud and thus opted out of M23.\textsuperscript{382} On the other side, the governmental newspaper dealt with the relation of Wade to religious authorities when he stated in an interview that he stopped responding to religious leaders.\textsuperscript{383} At the same time, several articles occurred pointing at Wade’s engagement within the religious communities.\textsuperscript{384} Transnationally, the pressure rose as well when governments of the US and France at a summit of the African Union warned Wade not to risk the democratic stability of Senegal at a summit of the African Union.\textsuperscript{385}

At the same time, Wade began his nationwide campaign in which he proclaimed women and the youth most relevant, while he met with religious authorities who in the following days pronounced their support.\textsuperscript{386} In particular, the \textit{banlieues} of Dakar were at the center of attention for voters’ mobilization because of their numerical weight of potential votes.\textsuperscript{387} Soon after, on February 10, 2012, candidates of M23 confirmed in public their running in elections but suspend their voters’ mobilization until February 16, only the candidate of APR, Macky Sall, started campaigning.\textsuperscript{388}

In mid-February, \textit{Y’en a marre} again organized a sit-in on the \textit{Place de l’Obélisque} to occupy the square until elections.\textsuperscript{389} Although several members of opposition parties participated, M23 called for their own protest on February 12, but unsuccessfully, so that they had to cancel the event.\textsuperscript{390} This followed one joint but unauthorized demonstration on February 15 called upon by members of M23, but which the police dispersed promptly.\textsuperscript{391} The Ministry of Interior refused to authorize any demonstration as this would endanger the

\textsuperscript{381} \textit{Le Quotidien}, February 4 - 5, 2012, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{383} \textit{Le Quotidien}, February 4 - 5, 2012, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{386} \textit{Le Soleil}, February 13, 2012, p. 5.
public.\textsuperscript{392} One day later, members of \textit{Y’en a marre} tried to occupy the \textit{Place de l’Obélisque} again through entering the square from different angles in smaller groups, but the police hindered them to access the ‘mystic’ square of mass mobilizations.\textsuperscript{393} After the arrest of two leaders of \textit{Y’en a marre}, activists used blockade-tactics while the police fired back with tear gas and water cannons.\textsuperscript{394}

On February 17, M23 strived anew to protest on the \textit{Place de l’Indépendance} but due to strong police repression, the leaders canceled the rally in order to avoid violent confrontations.\textsuperscript{395} During the following days, police forces and protestors clashed everywhere in the capital while only the \textit{Place de l’Indépendance} stayed impregnable.\textsuperscript{396} Afterwards, M23 published a communication to call for the international community to help them and announced to occupy the square for the next two days.\textsuperscript{397} On February 19, two students died, shot by police officers while demonstrating spontaneously in Rufisque, which is part of the \textit{banlieues} of Dakar where many young people live due to the immense rent prices of more centralized areas.\textsuperscript{398} In other parts of the country, members of \textit{Y’en a marre} blocked the governmental so-called \textit{marche bleue}.\textsuperscript{399} Wade reacted to these escalations in a public declaration on February 22, 2012 stating that this kind of agitations did not affect his decision to candidate.\textsuperscript{400}

On February 23, the \textit{Confédération des syndicats autonomes} (CSA) mobilized a protest march against rising costs for basic nutrition, electoral violence and the crisis of the educational sector but the Minister of the Interior eventually forbade the march with regard to the current context.\textsuperscript{401} On February 24, women collectives held a march for peace dressed in white but draped in red to draw attention to the growing rates of dead young protestors, at that time estimated at fifteen deaths.\textsuperscript{402} Despite a mobilization on short-term notice, they reached a high mobilization level.\textsuperscript{403} In parallel, \textit{Y’en a marre} underlined the individual

\textsuperscript{392} Loi 78-02. See also \textit{Le Soleil}, February 15, 2012, p. 3. \textit{Le Soleil}, February 20, 2012, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{394} \textit{Le Quotidien}, February 17, 2012, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{397} \textit{Le Quotidien}, February 18 - 19, 2012, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{399} \textit{Le Quotidien}, February 18 - 19, 2012, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{401} \textit{Le Quotidien}, February 18 - 19, 2012, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{402} \textit{Le Quotidien}, February 22, 2012, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{404} \textit{Le Quotidien}, February 22, 2012, p. 2.
responsibility of each voter to ignore the candidature of Wade at a press conference.\textsuperscript{404} Leaders of \textit{Y’en a marre} called for their followers to use white gloves when they took the image of Wade into the polling booth in order to demonstrate their resistance.\textsuperscript{405} Besides, local \textit{esprits} of \textit{Y’en a marre} organized election observation teams to report frauds, intimidation attempts, and other irregularities.\textsuperscript{406}

In the first electoral round, Wade won the elections with 34.9\% of all voters and Macky Sall, his former prime minister, came second (Sylla 2012). Wade accepted the results of the first round of voting while mobilizing his followers for his victory in a second round.\textsuperscript{407} Between the first and second round, protests continued due to a representative of M23 but less people attended and the media echo decreased tremendously once leaders of \textit{Y’en a marre} were less present.\textsuperscript{408} For the second round, the other opposition candidates regrouped behind Sall in the coalition \textit{Bennoo Bokk Yaakaar}, which translates into ‘united in hope’. M23 published a statement in support of Sall shortly after and Sall visited the headquarter of \textit{Y’en a marre} under massive media echo.\textsuperscript{409} On March 25, 2012, Sall won the election, which had been declared externally as fair, transparent, and regular, in the second round with 65\% of the votes and became president of Senegal.\textsuperscript{410} Asked about the miscalculations of Wade, why he had chosen to stick to his candidature, protest leaders pictured a president who had lost contact to his own citizens over time and thus had a false image of his national support.\textsuperscript{411} Another reading from a constitutional expert and former close ally of Wade is that his governance was based on a paternal and patronimial understanding, in which the president represents the “père de la nation” while being blind to the changes of growing political consciousness since 2009.\textsuperscript{412} An expert on media and political elites confirmed this reading with his description of a president that conceived himself as an ancestor of former presidents since independence.\textsuperscript{413}

\textsuperscript{405} Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, February 19, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{406} Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, June 20, 2016, Berlin.
\textsuperscript{407} \textit{Le Soleil}, February 28, 2012, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{408} Interview with (former) coordinator of M23, February 2, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{409} Interview with (former) representative of RADDHO and (former) national coordinator of M23, February 13, 2017, Dakar. Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, February 19, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{410} \textit{Le Soleil}, February 28, 2012, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{411} Interview with representative of M23 and leading figure of women’s movement, February 20, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{412} Interview with a former member of the constitutional council and expert on the constitutional law, February 3, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{413} Interview with a professor of journalism and expert on media and political elites, February 15, 2017, Dakar.
In total, less and less mass protests characterized this last time span. The anti-government front followed various strategies, apparently divided on the question of how to deal with the council’s legalization of Wade’s candidature. Most of the protest groups seemed less convinced to overthrow the incumbent but instead mobilized voters to register in order to cast Wade out of office through the ballot box.

4.2.6 Summary

Before the actual term bid by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade happened, anti-government protests had started months ahead in the beginning of 2011. Fueled by rampant power outages and increasing costs of living, especially young people followed protest calls of opposition parties, civil society groups and Y’en a marre. The latter became the most prominent voice in this first period of the struggle. At this point already, the main squares in central Dakar turned into the major protest spaces, while the majoritarian protestors, in turn, seemed to come rather from the suburbs or more affordable residential areas of Dakar. Content-related, the in-depth evaluation in contrast to the quantitative analysis based on external media coverage illustrates that already in March the debate soon focused on the potential candidature of Wade. The reason for the rapid increase of cross-movement mobilization was the public announcement of Wade in mid-June to change the constitution in his favor which faces strong criticism in- and outside of the parliament. The well-trained riot police repressed the protests, which at first backfired into more disruptive tactics. When the incumbent took back the proposed amendments, this self-proclaimed ‘popular victory’ grounded the way for a loose alliance of the involved government opponents across party lines and beyond organizational forms.

Afterwards the conflict transformed into more institutionalized channels where legal questions concerning another candidature and term of Wade stood at the center of attention. Demobilization marked the months that followed. As late as in December, the ruling party finally confirmed Wade as their candidate for the upcoming elections and thus cemented the expectations. The decision upon the correctness of the handed-in candidatures for the presidential elections by the Constitutional Council became the central turning and starting point of the fourth period. Tensions built up until the January 27, the day when the council scheduled the publication of the list of candidates and unsurprisingly legalized Wade’s
running for presidency. On the government side, this judgment functioned as the last needed prove for its rightness. This translates into an enforcement of the candidature, finalized through increasing repressive threats. This second escalation, that exceed any former police-protestors-clashes, soon resulted in a split of protestors following different strategies – some mobilizing for elections while others rallied against them. Overall, the mobilization decreased. Electoral campaigns of presidential contenders side-by-side the mobilizations against the upcoming elections in parallel to mobilization for the registration to vote became the characteristics of the last stage that ended with the actual presidential elections, in which Wade ran for office for his third time.

4.3 Summary

Term amendment struggles in West Africa were carried out on the streets and squares of urban areas, at the negotiation tables, through institutional channels, but eventually ended in a rather dense clash on the streets in which citizens faced security forces. Major protest spaces were central squares or roundabouts in the capitals Dakar and Ouagadougou, such as Place de l’Obélisque and Place de l’Indépendance in Dakar, or Place de la Nation in Ouagadougou. In both cases, scattered protest events transformed progressively into a broader anti-government-mobilization across heterogeneous groups of actors, in which the social movements under study emerged. Their ad-hoc-creation happened while the threat of power cuts or term bids had already started: Y’en a marre held their first protest event simultaneously with their official creation date while the leaders of Balai Citoyen were present on anti-term-bid-demonstrations but only held their constitutive assembly nine months after the term bid. Even though playing a crucial role, the closer diachronically look on the protest events reveals that these social movements were only one organized actors’ group among many. In newly emerging alliances that disappeared quickly after, Balai Citoyen and Y’en a marre united with other opponents, including opposition parties, although these alliances lacked more common grounds. In regard to their role, it seems that opposition parties primarily were the coordinators of the protest events while the youth leaders, in turn, served as powerful speakers to animate the masses. Civil society groups and trade unions mobilized across the society and nationwide, although they did not align politically all together. In Senegal, Y’en a marre occupied a more dominant place on their own, distinguishing themselves from others by protest that was more creative. The first
perceived win functioned as an opportunity to unify the actors in the post-June-alliance of M23. Although civil society representative took the lead in the public, opposition parties seemed to stay more in the background but still provided the necessary resources for mobilizations such as transport and finances. In general, opposition parties were active in both arenas, mobilizing in the streets while voicing their claims in negotiations with the government. These new movements, in return, enabled the mobilization of a new constituency such as the youth and apparently triggered further media reporting. Either way, journalists seemed supportive of the protests and occasionally mobilized themselves – media moguls calling for protest such as in Senegal or journalists striking due to restrictions on freedom of expression as in Burkina Faso.

In regard to the protest strategies and tactics, we find variety among the cases but foremost over time: Organized mass demonstrations or public rallies on central squares dominated the beginning of the struggles, while spontaneous protests or even riots appeared later on, opportunities triggered by institutional or governmental decisions. Although some analysts tend to portray both uprisings as spontaneous resistance of an angry youth, especially the first protest events seemed highly coordinated, either by new protest leaders such as the rappers of Y’en a marre in Senegal or more institutionalized ones such as the CFOP in Burkina Faso. In both case well-established opponents such as opposition or civil society leaders appeared prominently in protest calls and marches. However, political parties predominantly held protest marches and thus made use of methods of protest and persuasion, while new and less formalized civil society groups combined public demonstrations with non-violent interventions such as sit-ins and blockades. Only in the case of Burkina Faso, trade unions used non-cooperation tactics such as strikes, while disruptive tactics spread widely in both cases during the escalation phases. The latter tactics seemed to build up in the respective moment, often responsive to the opponents’ behavior or political decisions in formalized arenas. This illustrates further, how political opportunities with a minor involvement of any protest leaders trigger intense protest times: In the case of Senegal, the decision of the Constitutional Council resulted in spontaneous protests and riots that extended former mobilizations in numbers and radicalization. This was similar to the last days in October in Burkina Faso, when riots broke out and mass gatherings happened all over the capital, often leaderless.
Concerning the governmental responses, state authorities and challengers interacted within the public and political arena, explicitly in form of street confrontations or more implicit by bans on demonstrations or political concessions. Both movements reported cooptation efforts, attempts at intimidation, and violent suppression by different security forces. However, first repressive countermoves of the state resulted in a first increase of mobilization and public support and supportive media coverage. Other confrontations were more indirect such as the stadium-gatherings in the case of Burkina Faso that rather symbolically responded mutually to each other, or the mobilization of the liberal youth in support of Wade in Senegal. Contrarily to my own understanding of protest, state actors adopted the form of protest marches, underlining the significance of support from the streets. Through counter mobilization or repressive means, the governments apparently tried to counteract the visibility of challengers. The in-depth description of actors’ constellations and events illustrates a constant competition between pro- and anti-governmental forces in different arenas.

Despite some similarities of the episodes of contention, eventually the heads of government decided differently: Burkinabe incumbent Blaise Compaoré resigned from office when the situation seemed non-governable while Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade ran for office, although facing stiff political headwind. The following-up comparative analysis allows me to deduce the dissimilarities systematically that causally led to a divergent outcome. Turning points led to more and less mobilization and eventually in the case of Burkina Faso to the eventful protests in October and an institutional channeling in Senegal. I will deduce in the next chapter in which moments in time the two struggles took a divergent pathway and figure out which dimension causally led to the disparity. As already mentioned in the introduction, the results point at the significance of prior events under the incumbent’s rule as well as the historical imprint of protest and political culture and civil-military-relations well before the actual episode of contention took off.
5. The term amendment struggles in comparative perspective

Tracing back the term amendment struggles in Senegal and Burkina Faso in the last chapter illustrates the diversity of their proceeding over time. After describing them comprehensively, the following comparative analysis will allow us to answer my interrelated research questions of (1) how term amendment struggles are fought (differently), (2) which role social movements play, and (3) why they proceed and thus result in dissimilar outcomes of presidents rerunning or resigning. Singling out the crucial turning points at which the two struggles apparently diverged, we find that the last stage of the struggle proved significant. At that moment the anti-term-mobilization peaked a second time in both cases, yet only in Burkina Faso was a new scope and size in terms of the amount of mobilized social actors achieved, while in Senegal the mobilization soon decreased. The cross-case comparison shows that groups of actors reached comparable situations in these two West African states, but apparently decided differently: Senegalese protest leaders followed several strategies in parallel and protests became only one approach among many, while Burkinabe mobilized social actors wagered everything on street activism. Similarly, Senegalese police forces continued to strictly follow orders to repress violently non-violent protestors, while Burkinabe soldiers began to inform activists about repressive threats and to refuse commands. In the end, protestors in Senegal soon dispersed and most of the actors prepared for upcoming elections, whereas in Burkina Faso, the escalation reached a new level when protestors stormed the parliament and eventually set the building on fire. I will argue that mass protests together with the use of disruptive protest tactics indeed opened up an opportunity for change initially, but were not sufficient to explain the divergent outcome. From this follows that both dimensions – mass mobilization and the use of disruption – were necessary conditions for the outcome to occur but not sufficient to explain its divergence. Because these dimensions were detectable in both cases, only to divergent extents due to the dissimilar antecedent conditions. However, only the massive amount of protestors together with their disruptive tactics that we observe in Burkina Faso were not able to hinder Compaoré from running again. Only if we consider two other dimensions that set the two cases apart – the spread of protests and the disloyalty of security forces – can we understand how and why Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré lost the capability to assert his power. However, since both dimensions are absent in the Senegalese case, it is not possible to reason if they only jointly work as productive, or respective sufficient, conditions. Would the security forces be capable to repress such widespread mass protests? Or, in turn,
would the refusal of soldiers to shoot into the masses be enough for the resignation of Blaise Compaoré? Looking at the history of the country, we do find evidence that only these conditions together enabled the outcome, thus the prevention of another, unconstitutional candidature by Blaise Compaoré.

However, the narrowly focused analysis of the respective episodes of contention leaves open the question of why these actors apparently perceived their situations differently. Only if we consider the political legacy of the countries, we are able to make sense of the dissimilarities.

Protest experiences, changes of government, and the actual rule of the incumbent prior to the contentious episode were critical antecedents causing actors to choose differently in the two cases – and security forces to stay loyal and protest leaders to pursue other strategies than to engage in contentious collective actions in Senegal. This means that despite comparable ratings in terms of democratic openness, the two cases differed before the start of the episode of mass mobilizations due to their unequal (democratic) trajectories, which determined the respective political culture, networks of opponents, experiences with elections, or, respectively (popular and/or military) overthrows, civil-military- as well as civil-state relations, and the legitimacy of disruptive protest tactics. As opposed to Senegal, Burkina Faso has a strong history of regular popular uprisings, which go back to labor movement struggles and in which the army was repeatedly involved. Protest leaders (re-)constructed this revolutionary history within a unifying narrative, starting with the new self-consciousness under the rule of Thomas Sankara, even though numerous mass mobilizations had preceded him. This is in contrast to the historical trajectory Senegal followed and to the related narrative. One of the key reference points for Senegalese protest leaders to justify their choices was the initial peaceful government change in 1980 and the early introduction of a multiparty system. The manner democratic institutions came into place therefore strongly influence later strategies and tactics to uphold them. This means that not only the differentiation between different democratic systems are most relevant, but rather how they got established – from above or below. This offers an interesting point of departure for future debates on (external) democracy promotion.

However, not only were former regime changes and the involvement of mobilized social actors as well as the constructed narratives around them different, but the perception of the legitimacy of the takeover and of the rule of each incumbent also differed: Widely perceived as being involved in the deadly overthrow of his predecessor, Burkinabe president Blaise
Compaoré reigned by force from the beginning, and this force only intensified in the late 1990s. Abdoulaye Wade, in contrast, toppled the domination of the Socialist party by electoral means and only slowly began to govern in a more authoritarian way. In a nutshell, the government leadership of the presidents differed, as did previous episodes of democratization.

The following chapter will shed light on these dimensions and is structured as follows: First, I will work out in which manner the confrontations diverged during the episodes of contention. For this purpose, I will first establish the turning points (5.1.1), then set them in relation to the assessments of the involved or observing actors (5.1.2), and finally compare my findings to findings from other studies (see chapter two) in order to determine the causally significant conditions (5.1.3). In the second part, I will contextualize historically these periods of term amendment confrontations. For that purpose I will first outline briefly prior regime changes with a focus on the role of protests (5.2.1), and subsequently describe the governance of each president and their manner of dealing with opponents (5.2.2). In a last step, I will abstract my cross-case findings in order to render my results fruitful for further investigation (5.2.3).

5.1 How the struggles took different pathways – Permissive and productive conditions within the episode of contention

The eruption of mass protests that took place in both cases – in Senegal in 2011/12 and in Burkina Faso in 2013/14 – is alone not enough to explain the cross-case divergence, and neither are the new social movements or the institutional openness at the time of the term bid. The initial mass mobilizations opened up an opportunity for change in both cases, and thus marked the beginning of the contentious episode that lasted in Burkina Faso from June 2013 until October 2014, and in Senegal from January 2011 until March 2012. Since mass protests exceeded earlier mobilizations and expectations, they loosened existing constraints, so that I consider them part of the permissive conditions in reference to Hillel D. Soifer (2010). This means that mass protests and the use of disruptive tactics, dimensions both present in the two cases, only translate into presidents changing course when productive conditions are present as well. In other words, mass protests and the use of disruptive tactics represent necessary but not sufficient conditions for the outcome to occur. Based on my
comparative analyses, I will reason that the spread of protests in scope and size, and eventually the refusal of foot soldiers to oppress activists, account for the divergent outcome – and therefore stand for the sufficient conditions. These dimensions are of direct causal importance for the prevention of an unconstitutional candidature and thus for the compliance to the institutional norm of limited presidential tenures.

In the following, I will explore dis- and similarities of the processes during the episode of contention, with a focus on the first. Subsequently I will compare my findings with the theoretical expectations I presented in detail in chapter two. My in-depth analysis of the episode of contention will support the assumption that term amendment struggles manifest themselves as back-and-forth processes, since we are unable to find one distinct mechanism that explains the cross-case divergence. In contrast to ideally deduced causal links, we observe several phenomena taking place at once, but of which many do not (directly) transfer as causal forces. Several of the ten mechanisms that I singled out from previous studies in my theory chapter do take place in part, tandem, or parallel, while only a few are of causal significance.

5.1.1 Deduction of the point of divergence during the struggles

Tracing back the struggles and comparing their sequences, I will single out in this section the turning point when the conflicts diverged. I therefore return briefly to the in-depth descriptions of the respective episodes of contention from chapter four but emphasize here only the main characteristics that are relevant from a comparative perspective.

In Senegal as well as in Burkina Faso, a closer look at early protest events shows that protest leaders succeeded in bridging ongoing injustices – power cuts in Senegal and impunity and mismanagement of public goods in Burkina Faso – to questions of legitimate ruling. In each case, the constitutional question seemed to function as a political opportunity to rally against unpopular politics, or rather presidents. For many, the term bid was equal to the expansion of the regime, as several interviewees emphasize. For instance, one leader of the Burkinabe movement Balai Citoyen clearly states, “l’article 37 était un

414 For an in-depth framing analysis see Louisa Prause and Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop (2017).
prétexte. [...] Les gens avaient marre. Les gens voulaient des changements”.415 Leaders of opposition parties and movements conceived of and framed the moment of the term bid as the final straw – ‘trop, c’est trop’ was repeatedly stated in Burkina Faso, comparable to the omnipresent protest slogan ‘y’en a marre’ in Senegal.

Step by step the mobilization increased thereafter and reached initial peaks of large-scale protests with several thousand counted participants (see chapter four, Figures 4.1 and 4.2), which in Senegal led to the formation of the protest coalition M23. As a result, we witness the first political concessions in both cases: Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré postponed the intended establishment of a senate, while Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade withdrew the amendment draft on his extended presidency from the parliamentary session. Nonetheless, mobilized social actors in both countries faced the first repressive threats. These direct confrontations between state security forces and activists (mostly) in urban areas followed months of fewer protest events. In parallel, every incumbent strived to reach compromises with representatives of the political opposition, but each time opposition parties left the political and thus the bargaining arena. They justified their decision in both cases by pointing at the growing tensions within society mirrored by these first escalations. In contrast to Senegal, however, Burkinabe high-ranking members of the ruling party not only left these talks but at last also dropped out from the ruling party. Thereafter, they launched their own political party and appeared at anti-government rallies. Dissatisfied members of the governing elites in Senegal regrouped themselves within a self-declared movement to voice their frustration without actually leaving the party.416 Despite these first noticeable differences, the struggles followed rather comparable routes up to the institutional legitimation of the presidents’ candidatures, which triggered the second but more intense escalation between anti-government protestors and state security forces. I single out this second peak of mobilizations as the significant point of divergence.

In both cases, official announcements by institutions set the stage for the re-mobilization: In Senegal, the legalization of Wade’s candidature by the Constitutional Council on January 27, 2012 triggered mostly spontaneous protests. Similarly, the announcement of the Council of Ministers on October 21, 2014 in Burkina Faso, which scheduled the voting of the draft legislation by the parliament for the end of October, resulted into a re-mobilization. Each

415 Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
416 I refer here to the formation of Les Frustrés du Parti démocratique sénégalais (see 4.2.3).
moment represented the next step for the power-seeking president to push his renewed candidature through. As a result, these institutional proceedings paved the way for the prolongation of presidencies, but at the same time provoked a radicalization in the widespread use of disruptive tactics in both struggles. In contrast to the initial protest events, spontaneous protests and riots dominate now. Repressive countermoves of state security forces rose correspondingly in their intensity and frequency. Above all, the capitals turned into virtual battlegrounds between heavily armed state security forces and non-armed opponents. But only in the Burkinabe case did mass protests last and even reach a number of several hundred thousand participants – so that this point in time marks the significant divergence between the two cases.

In Senegal, the institutional confirmation of the constitutionality together with the following brutal crackdown executed by a well-equipped riot police led to an observable division of the anti-term protestors, and finally in their demobilization. Although the pro-government stance of the council was not surprising, considering that the five judges had been appointed exclusively by the president and were headed by a member of the ruling party, there was a disagreement on strategy. Several groups of actors previously engaged in protests, including Y’en a marre, started to mobilize voters to register for the upcoming presidential election and, in parallel, some opposition party leaders began to prepare electoral campaigns with themselves as candidates. Apparently, these actors acknowledged the court decision. Only young militants of the protest coalition M23 and a few long-term regime opponents kept protesting against the candidature of Abdoulaye Wade per se. At the same time, the representative of M23, who came from the civil society establishment, handed in a juridical complaint against the legitimation on behalf of the coalition. In the end, the mobilization decreased and the number of participants in protest events shrank from several thousand to a few hundred. The scope, size, and duration of protest events thus remained limited. From my perspective, this turnaround illustrates two aspects, first, that groups of actors were disunited concerning the adequate strategy and chose mostly to go through institutional

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417 Interview with a former member of the constitutional council and expert on the constitutional law, February 3, 2017, Dakar.
418 This generational divide became a full split between generations and the building of COS-M23 after the time of my investigation, and confirmed these impressions of growing divisions. Interview with representative of COS-M23, February 16, 2017, Dakar. Document, Y’en a marre, Communiqué 14 Août 2011, August 14, 2011. Interview with a former member of the constitutional council and expert on constitutional law, February 3, 2017, Dakar.
419 This is confirmed by an expert on youth politics and social movements, whom I interviewed on February 8, 2017 in Dakar and who underlined the limitations of the protests in terms of society and space.
channels, and secondly, in view of the massive repressions, that the escalation reached a point that at least some protest or opposition leaders were not willing or able to cross.

In Burkina Faso, on the contrary, mobilizations steadily increased after the public announcement of the scheduling of the parliamentarian vote by the Council of Ministers. From this moment onwards, protests spread widely and intensified through disruptive means, so that squatted attacks and riots became the dominant mode of action, which became rather leaderless, in contrast to the well-planned protest marches of previous phases. This was particularly evident when the leader of the CFOP negotiated Blaise Compaoré into his resignation by the end of his term, but then unsuccessfully tried to call off protests whose participants were clearly not following his orders (anymore). This illustrates the shrinking leadership of opposition parties and other prominent actors at this moment in time. A new dynamic began when the parliament building burned and thus hindered the actual voting on the amendment. It also prompted further protests. Another watershed event followed when parts of the military refused to shoot when faced with seeming masses of non-violent protestors. The mobilized social actors seemed not to represent any particular organization or protest coalition, but rather understood and positioned themselves as part of a struggle against the president. This last stage of the struggle in Burkina Faso accordingly resembled a so-called end game in the civil resistance literature, an apparent uprising of ‘the people’ against ‘the ruler’.

Although actors reached comparable stages when institutions legitimized the presidential plans to prolong their rule, Burkinabe mobilized social actors stayed literally on the streets, while in Senegal opponents split and pursued different strategies, which led to a tremendous decrease of protest events. As a result, the window of opportunity for (institutional) changes closed in Senegal soon after the legalization of the incumbent’s rerunning while protests continued and intensified in Burkina Faso until the regime was finally toppled. With regard to the involved groups of actors, we thus find that they – political elites, protest leaders, activists, and even security forces – decided differently at resembling turning points. To understand their choices and underlying reasons, I will explore the perceptions of actors themselves in the next section, which is based primarily on the interviews I conducted (see chapter one, 1.4).
5.1.2 Actors at the crossroads – Perceptions of actors for understanding the divergence

Regarding the judgment of the Constitutional Council in Senegal, protest leaders confirmed – some explicitly, others rather implicitly – that they indeed respected the decision by the Constitutional Council, although all of them agreed that this institution was an instrument of governmental power. Everyone apparently shared the opinion that the legalization of Wade’s candidature was illegitimate, and they emphasized that the approval of the judges was politically driven. This raises the following question, if the court verdict was actually justifiable in juridical terms? An expert on constitutional law in Senegal and former member of the Council denies this interpretation due to three critical points: First, the Council did not differentiate between mandates and years in office, both of which Wade’s candidature would have expanded. Secondly, the explanation of retrospective application as put forward by the Constitutional Council was rather weak since former constitutional changes were indeed concerned with Wade’s mandate. Third, the constitution contained the clear-cut norm that one president should rule no more than ten years, and so the expert in question also reaches the conclusion that the decision was politically grounded and cannot to be justified in juridical terms.\textsuperscript{420}

Another plausible explanation for the demobilization of Senegalese protestors in contrast to Burkinabé actors may be the extent of repressions or casualties. But human rights reports indicate that there were actually more fatalities in the Burkinabé case.\textsuperscript{421} One might also assume that the ostensible preference for electoral street campaigning is related to the assured win of the opposition candidate. This explanation, however, is not convincing insofar as the opposition parties were unable to agree on any one candidate for the first electoral round, and indeed none of my interviewees expressed a strong expectation of electoral victory.\textsuperscript{422} Again, the opposite applies to Burkina Faso, where opposition parties united as CFOP and gathered behind their leader, which can be seen in their joint withdrawal from talks with the government each time.\textsuperscript{423}

\textsuperscript{420} Interview with a former member of the Constitutional Council and expert on the constitutional law, February 3, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{421} According to human rights reporting, thirty-four people died in Burkina Faso whereas six deaths were reported in Senegal for the time under investigation; see chapter four.
\textsuperscript{422} Interview with (former) coordinator of M23, February 2, 2017, Dakar. Interview with leading figure of women movements and member of M23, February 20, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{423} I refer to the incidents of November 2013 and September 2014; see chapter four.
When we survey their individual justifications, we detect certain collective patterns that vary in the two cases. While Senegalese protest leaders predominantly accepted the court verdict, Senegalese respondents underline the lacking legitimation of the Constitutional Council and the necessity to respect its decision nonetheless. Repeatedly, respondents highlight the importance of the rule of law by referring to the democratic tradition of the country, although Abdoulaye Wade himself abused it. For example, one leader of Y’en a marre emphasizes that all judges, in addition to their government bias, are highly corrupt. This is all the more interesting as he mentions in the same breath the dysfunction and raging corruption within institutions in general, including the justice and electoral system. However, from his point of view – and this is consistent with statements by other protest leaders as well – institutions need to be respected for reasons of political stability. As a result and even though Y’en a marre became known for breaking with routinized repertoires of contention, one leader states clearly: “We have to fight in the legal way by voting cards. To kick a president out without democratic elections is not democracy.” Generally speaking, we find a strong emphasis on the democratic history of the country and the risk of endangering existing achievements. This leads to the conviction that even a president who misuses institutions for his personal gains needs to be defeated by elections.

This fits the picture of involved civil society organizations, which interviewees characterize as a sort of professionalized counter-elites that lack politicization and popular roots and whose leaders prefer moderation over contestation. An expert on civil society and democracy sums it up as follows: “Contrairement à certains pays, nous avons toujours eu une société civile qui se dis républicaine et qui va plus favoriser l’espace de dialogue, qui n’aime pas la confrontation.” This is backed by the statement of Abdoulaye Wade himself, who called upon civil society leaders to go back to their usual role as mediators between

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425 Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, June 20, 2016, Berlin.
426 Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, June 20, 2016, Berlin.
427 Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, June 20, 2016, Berlin. Repertoires of contention refer to repetitive and thus foreseeable tools of specific protest tactics that over time become recognizable, as well as learned protest forms (Tilly 1995: 42-44).
430 Interview with expert on civil society and democracy, February 21, 2017, Dakar.
citizens and the state during the struggle. Also the only engaged trade union, the CSA, called off their protest march when they received no authorization, illustrating again their compliance with state rules even if state actors mistreat their democratic rights (see 4.2.5). Similarly, M23 and Y’en a marre respected bans on demonstrations although all of them highlight that this has been undemocratic to forbid their protests in the first place (see 4.2.3). Besides, one coordinator of M23 mentions contacts with international organizations, which put pressure on them to accept the decision by the Constitutional Council.431 Religious authorities also called for an end to escalations, pointing at national stability and peace, with regular elections being held.432 This interference by marabouts occurred several times and mostly ended up in calls to enter upon dialogue instead of continuing the street fight.433 Although their actual effect on the conflict development remains vague, the main actors clearly acknowledge their influence in terms of societal rejection of disruptive tactics.

Equally often interviewees mention historical references to legitimate their choices, for instance the Assises Nationales, the national round tables organized by Wade-opponents that served as dialogue platforms for critical voices. The coordinator of M23 even states that these set the ground for their own coalition formation, which illustrates all the more that compromise and formalized rules influenced the protest coalition.434 This interpretation is backed by remarks on the internal organization of M23, which seemed (unintentionally) dominated by well-known and highly professionalized civil society leaders that could hardly be described by their grassroots connections.435 Yet another interpretation of events may be that mobilized social actors in Senegal were not only unwilling to protest further but also incapable of doing so. A statement by one leader of Y’en a marre hints at this assessment when he understands the judgment of the court as their own failure and incapacity to stop the rerunning of Abdoulaye Wade.436

Overall, the second escalation, in January 2012, is construed as exceptional in that it reached the limit of societal acceptance.437 Some refer to the outbreak of violence in Ivory Coast and

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433 I refer to such of their comments as on liberations of prisoners, situational escalations, and the use of civil disobedience; see chapter four.
434 I will elaborate in the upcoming section on critical antecedents the form and purpose of the Assises Nationales.
435 Interview with (former) coordinator of M23, February 2, 2017, Dakar.
436 Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, February 19, 2017, Dakar.
437 Interview with an expert on civil society, political activism, and security issues in Burkina Faso, February 1, 2017, Dakar.
Tunisia as something they wanted to avoid in Senegal.\textsuperscript{438} Repeatedly, they emphasize their status as one of the most solid democracies in Africa and their history of several turnovers as reasons to opt against further escalation, since „le Sénégal n’est pas le Côte d’Ivoire“\textsuperscript{439}, where violent outbreaks take place more regularly. This popular perception was widely known and Wade could have negotiated with activists who were shying away from more escalation. It seemed, in short, that the struggle had reached a line that most protest leaders were not willing to cross.\textsuperscript{440}

Perhaps they were also unable to cross it, since Senegalese actors describe a riot police that was well equipped, ready and able to suppress protests when needed. Police officers were perceived by most protest leaders as adamantly following orders from the government. Media reporting confirms the role of apparently well-prepared policemen, who were perceived as numerically superior (see chapter four). One journalist describes the ability of the police to disperse the activists as follows: “Des forces de sécurité armées jusqu’aux dents, prêtes à en découdre avec d’éventuels manifestants […].”\textsuperscript{441} They evidently turned up better equipped than usual, as external observers referred to them as “robocops”.\textsuperscript{442} These perceptions from activists and observers are backed by the fact that the police in May 2011 received 25 million CFA (roughly 43,000 USD) for renewal of their facilities and training, just before the first peak of mass protests in June 2011.\textsuperscript{443}

With regard to Burkina Faso, our interests thus circulate around the question of why Burkinabe actors seemed more united in confronting the president until his resignation – and why they were able to do so. One movement leader of \textit{Balai Citoyen} explains this disparity as follows “Les sénégalais ont fait confiance au système électoral […]. Nous, c’était notre dernière arme.”\textsuperscript{444} The lack of trust in elections as one explanation is confirmed by a leader of a major youth organization, who points out the low participation rates in recent

\textsuperscript{438} Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, March 1, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{439} Interview with leader of \textit{Y’en a marre}, February 19, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{440} Interview with an expert on media and democracy in Senegal, February 21, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{441} \textit{Sud Quotidien}, June 23, 2011, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{443} \textit{Sud Quotidien}, May 28-29, 2011, p. 3. This is backed by statements by interviewees, for example the (former) representative of RADDHO and (former) national coordinator of M23, February 13, 2017, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{444} Interview with leader of \textit{Balai Citoyen}, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
An expert on Burkinabe civil society endorses this viewpoint by stating that the general rule is that “when the incumbent runs [in elections], he wins”. And yet this aspect alone does not explain the widespread readiness and determination of Burkinabe activists to use disruptive tactics and to confront repression.

First and foremost, we witness that contrarily to the situation in Senegal, disruptive tactics are described as part of their usual repertoires of action. Burkinabe actors describe a political culture of contestation rather than one of compromise as in Senegal. This is also expressed in the apparent unified stance of Burkinabe actors to keep on protesting, which in the end resulted in broad, lasting, and widespread mobilization. One illustrative example of this shared one-sided strategy of contentious collective action was the national contestation day on October 28, 2014. It was originally initiated by the leader of the CFOP, but various civil society organizations and protest movements joined in. Only the main union confederation, the CGT-B, held their protest march the next day, but this time speakers referred to the constitutional amendments too. Beforehand, opposition parties already have taken over the frame of the social movements and talk from that point onwards about a constitutional coup (see 4.14). This reflected a growing polarization, so that actors felt obliged to position themselves on the issue. As a result, socioeconomic demands, advocated by trade unions earlier on, became less visible, even though interviewees emphasized them as the motives of participation for many young people. Although Burkinabe protest leaders could rely on former protest coalitions and even initiated a new one of over three hundred collectives, organizations, and parties, those eventful last days in October transpired in a rather leaderless way. All interviewees highlight flourishing personal networks for the coordination of protest tactics in lieu of any leading figure or organization. Friends, relatives, and comrades kept each other informed through cell phones. In particular in the main cities Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, and Koudougou, mobilized social actors benefited from

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445 Interview with deputy coordinator of UGEB, March 24, 2017, Ouagadougou.
446 Interview with expert on civil society, political activism, and security issues in Burkina Faso, February 1, 2017, Dakar.
447 I have debated that point with regard to obstacle of inter-group coalition formations in both cases; see Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop (2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/author/nina-kathrin-wienkoop/ (accessed on April 10, 2019).
449 I refer to the well-established protest coalitions of CCVC and CODMPP as well as the newly created CAR; see chapter four.
450 This aspect is reflected likewise in the continuous formation of even broader coalitions from CAR to FRC (see 4.1.4) and from prior protest coalitions such as CCVC to UAS (see 4.1.3).
personal overlapping across organizations and above all social groups.\textsuperscript{451} These predominantly urban networks provided them with the necessary means to coordinate their actions on the ground and thus to resist repressive threats – because before the first soldiers turned disloyal, activists faced massive repressive threats, reflected in the more than thirty deaths. Their manner of constantly adapting to changing circumstances on the ground proved to be a powerful tool.\textsuperscript{452} They proved to be able to adjust to changing circumstances.\textsuperscript{453} No concrete organization or leader seemed prominent in this last phase of the struggle, which rather appeared like “une insurrection non-dirigée”\textsuperscript{454}. It seems that even mutually antagonistic forces protested side by side.

In view of the extent of disruptive means protestors applied, most Burkinabe respondents consistently stated their willingness to sustain casualties among their own ranks. The demarcation point at which escalation is still deemed ‘acceptable’ thus seems to differ in the two cases. Indeed, one of the leaders of Balai Citoyen reasons that damages are collective burdens, so that losses are not “un sacrifice indivuel, mais que ça soit un sacrifice collectif.”\textsuperscript{455} The violent attacks on buildings are further justified as a reaction to the violence experienced under the rule of the incumbent: “Le gouvernement a appris la violence aux gens à travers les assassinats.”\textsuperscript{456} Additionally, the interviewees underline that the use of violence was only material violence on the activists’ side instead of physical violence against persons, a form of violence of which the government has made use against opponents, and the interviewees raise both historical incidents and ongoing repressive countermoves as examples.\textsuperscript{457} One protest leader of Balai Citoyen explains this difference between Burkina Faso and Senegal explicitly by their democratic experience in contrast to the authoritarian rule of Compaoré over more than two decades: “C’est une question de determination. […] Ils [the Senegalese people] ont l’expérience démocratique. Nous, ça fait 27 ans, avec tous les morts.”\textsuperscript{458}

\textsuperscript{451} In particular Koudougou is well known for its long history of revolts and the dense networks of anti-government forces (Hilgers 2010). Interview with (former) Secretary General of CGTB and national president of CCVC, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou. Interview with deputy Secretary General of REN-LAC, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
\textsuperscript{452} Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou. This illustrates as well the frequent breaking and building of coalitions as well as regional committees, for example, the CCR’s organized by the CFOP, see 4.1.4.
\textsuperscript{453} Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
\textsuperscript{454} Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou. Exemplarily is here to be named the protestors-police-clashes in the last phase of the struggle, see 4.1.4.
\textsuperscript{455} Interview with former president of CODMPP and founder of MBDHP, 8 March 2017, Ouagadougou.
\textsuperscript{456} Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, November 17, 2016, Berlin.
\textsuperscript{457} Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou.
\textsuperscript{458} Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
Apart from their determination based on preexisting struggles and political culture, all of my interviewees further agreed that only the actual overthrow of Blaise Compaoré would bring any changes. To put it in the words of one protest leader: “Pour que ça bouge, il fallait qu’il bouge aussi.” In particular with regard to the repeatedly named multiple injustices under Comaporé’s regime – for instance, physical violence against challengers, socioeconomic injustices, and lacking justice in the aftermath of political killings – in 2014 they reached a point, in their commonly shared opinion, where history proved that justice could not be reached otherwise than by his complete resignation. All of them seemed to share the view that, if the term removal had succeeded, Blaise Compaoré would have been reelected and, probably, would have served for a lifetime. Asked when they knew that an overthrow was feasible, most of them replied that it was when the state building was set on fire. One leader of Balai Citoyen portrays this incident as a ‘trophy’ for the power of the Burkinabe people. In a similar vein, a representative of the student union states that at this moment, people became confident that a complete overthrow was achievable. External observers and experts on Burkinabe politics have confirm this interpretation. By all accounts, the fire seemed to function as, in the words of social movement scholars, a momentous event that signified that Compaorés’ resignation was feasible.

For their actual perceived ‘success’, my interviewees referred, first, to the sheer numbers of activists, second, to their personal interrelations, and third, to soldiers informing them about their actions and orders. The latter signifies that soldiers became disloyal to the regime. Usually state security forces represent the long arm of the government, who execute repressive counter moves, so how can we make sense of their behavior in the Burkinabe case? First of all, asked about the army, respondents repeatedly emphasized that soldiers are

459 Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
460 Interview with president of CODMPP and MBDHP, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou.
461 Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, November 17, 2016, Berlin.
462 Interview with deputy coordinator of UGEB, March 24, 2017, Ouagadougou.
463 Interview with former president of CODMPP and founder of MBDHP, March 8, 2017, Ouagadougou.
465 I deliberately avoid the term ‘defected’, since I conceive of defection as normatively loaded. These soldiers were indeed ‘disloyal’ to their commanders and to the head of state, but actually behaved loyally, one can argue, to the people or the nation or even to democratic principles. So when I use the term disloyal, I do not refer to the negative connotation that the word often entails.
not killer troops shooting hundreds of Burkinabe.\textsuperscript{466} Given the fact that several hundred thousand people filled the streets and squares in urban centers, the survival of the regime would have entailed a widespread killing of protestors. Even though Burkina’s history is one of regular military coups, it does not have a history of civil wars, and coups have proceeded in a relatively non-violent way.\textsuperscript{467} As a result, protest leaders seemed confident that, “si il y a milles, dis milles personnes, l’armée va pas tirer”.\textsuperscript{468} Two dimensions are highly relevant for understanding the refusal – first, how protest spread in scope and size, so that a feeling arose that “c’était la ville entière qui était dans la rue”\textsuperscript{469}, and secondly, how rank-and-file soldiers were related to activists. Numerous activists communicated directly with regular soldiers they personally knew, who in turn informed them about repressive counterstrategies.\textsuperscript{470} One representative of a national youth association explained these solidarities not only through personal relationships but also their shared grievances.\textsuperscript{471} According to his point of view, young soldiers suffered from the same bad governance as other young people, from rising food prices, miserable living conditions, low wages, and a poor public health system. Whenever they mentioned these conditions, my interviewees pointed to the mutinies of 2011. It seems that it had been public knowledge since then that young soldiers in the regular army were dissatisfied with their living and working conditions, which apparently were caused by high-ranking officers embezzling money for themselves. Some interviewees’ remarks go even further, however. For instance, one activist and journalist who analyzed the events externally, situated both the regular army and the RSP as protectors of the people, with the latter being closer to the ruler: “Le militaire travaille pour la population, le RSP aussi travaille pour la population, mais sont plus proche du Président.”\textsuperscript{472} This means that he positioned the armed forced closer to the people than to the president.

To sum up, we have found different perceptions and interpretations of involved protest leaders and experts. In particular, the repertoires of contention and overall protest culture seemed divergent, as did the legitimacy of institutions and disruptive tactics. Therefore, despite similar formalized rights in terms of democracy, the historical experience with the

\textsuperscript{466} Interview with deputy Secretary General of REN-LAC, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
\textsuperscript{467} See for this argument also Maggie Dwyer (2018).
\textsuperscript{468} Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou.
\textsuperscript{469} Interview with deputy Secretary General of REN-LAC, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou
\textsuperscript{470} Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, November 17, 2016, Berlin. Also Ernest Harsch (2017: 206-208) provides information regarding this activist-soldier coordination that came about due to personal relations.
\textsuperscript{471} Interview with deputy coordinator of UGEB, March 24, 2017, Ouagadougou.
\textsuperscript{472} Representative of the European diaspora of Balai Citoyen/Germany, November 5, 2016, Berlin.
regimes differed – and thus the manner of how to oppose them. In what follows I will analyze particular interrelations of actors guided by my theoretical framework, and subsequently deduce the permissive and productive conditions that led in the Burkinabe case to the prevention of an enforced candidature.

5.1.3 Analysis of groups of actors and deduction of permissive and productive conditions within the episode of contention

In view of my theoretical framework derived from previous studies on democratization, contentious politics, and non-violent resistance (see chapter two), I will elaborate in the following which patterns we found in both cases, and which seemed relevant, in order to understand why the two term amendment struggles proceeded differently and thus resulted in the dissimilar outcomes of presidents rerunning or resigning. This section is structured similarly to my second chapter, along the major groups of actors – political elites, non-elite actors or rather coalition formations, and security forces. Afterwards, I will deduce the permissive and productive conditions I assume to be causally relevant for the outcome in Burkina Faso as the case in which the enforced candidature was hindered.

Concerning political elites, their split is assumed to be of extreme importance for protests to produce change. Burkina Faso is an example thereof. Primarily, the first mass mobilizations that preceded the split of elites by half a year definitely provided an opportunity for ruling party members to leave Compaoré’s power base. By an increasing polarization, as presumed theoretically, protests spread widely and eventually reached the political arena. Nevertheless, the announcement of Blaise Compaoré that he would run again for the ruling party in December 2013 was a contributing factor in the eventual split and appears most relevant. This stands in contrast to the theoretical expectation that the violent repression of non-violent protestors ultimately motivated political elites to split apart (see chapter two, Figure 2.1). In the Burkinabe case, it seems rather that members of the ruling party considered their prospects for future career advancement when they decided to leave the

473 The first mass mobilization took off in summer 2013, while the members of the CDP left the governing party in January 2014.
474 One example here is the initial protest march organized by the CFOP, which originally had rising food costs as the main grievance but soon turned into an anti-term protest. Later, in October 2014, this polarization became even more visible when an anti-neoliberal protest by the unions, who had been rather critical of the focus of other opponents on the term issue, referred mostly to that very question.
CPD once their leader publicly stated his re-candidature, which would have entailed the lack of leadership prospects for them. This interpretation is supported by the fact that repressive countermoves in former decades had never motivated governing elites to split.

Once divided, the splitting elites definitely gave signals to and thus empowered opponents of the government. In particular, the attention of media increased when these former confidantes of Compaoré turned up on protest marches. Such a division did not occur in Senegal within the period under investigation. Central figures close to Abdoulaye Wade left the ruling party already in 2009, a precedent that none of the involved protest leaders I interviewed mentioned, which suggests that this division did not impact their choices within the contentious episode. Yet this empowerment due to the weakening of Compaoré’s support base in Burkina Faso, the second mechanism of my theoretical framework, so to speak, does not seem that significant in explaining the divergent outcome. This is first and foremost because it took more than nine months for Blaise Comaporé to resign from office, which he did while facing a very different situation, with several hundred thousand mobilized social actors and insufficient numbers of loyal soldiers to rely upon. Further, none of my interviewees emphasized this moment of elite split as decisive for their shared determination to oust Blaise Compaoré out of office.

However, the division and the following support of protestors from these former governing elites surely provided protest leaders with additional resources in terms of finances and networks and thus contributed to the subsequent organized protests. Nevertheless, I do not consider this incident decisive for the divergence of the two cases, since opposition parties, as well as better equipped civil society groups, were in any case highly involved in the mobilizations in Senegal, and visibly within the M23 protest coalition. But despite their resources, they were not able to reach such a scope and size of mass protests as we have seen for Burkina Faso. Moreover, while these divided elites certainly helped with their resources and networks to broaden the scope of the following organized protest marches called by the formalized political opposition, the leader of the CFOP, they were mostly absent, as were other political party leaders, in those last eventful days of October that seemed to be the most relevant for the divergent outcome.

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475 This note points at civil society organizations such as RADDHO, whose degree of professionalization lets us assume better financial capacities. Additionally, several opposition parties participated in M23 and assisted with various tasks, such as providing transport services for youth activists from the suburbs.
On a side note, the mutual involvement of political elites, mainly opposition parties, with contentious collective actors was in both cases stronger than I had expected based on my previous knowledge and theoretical guidance. For instance, in Senegal, we witnessed an alignment of civic and political forces when they formed the protest alliance M23. In Burkina Faso, movement leaders of Balai Citoyen recurrently appeared as speakers on opposition rallies, and the newly created protest coalition CAR made use of a party office as a meeting spot.\footnote{I refer, first, to leaders of Balai Citoyen, who repeatedly spoke at protest marches called by the CFOP in June and July in 2013, and, secondly, to a local branch of CAR who used the office of the newly created MPP – and thus highlight the use of resources from these former elites who instantly established their own party.} These coalitions were differently shaped, however: First and foremost, Burkinabe civic forces officially did not align with opposition parties beyond the already existing ties within the protest coalition of CODMPP. Beyond that, the striking difference lies in the manner in which the coalitions formed: Senegalese actors were bound together by organizational ties, so that M23 resembled an umbrella organization that grouped together several subunits. Despite existing protest coalitions, Burkinabe actors underlined in interviews their mutual ties on personal and in some instances ideological grounds.\footnote{The argument of shared ideology involves mostly long-standing civilian opponents who frequently stated in interviews their shared socialist or even Sankarist ideals, such as the organizational members of CODMPP and CCVC or the various youth associations I talked to, such as ODJ and JEP.} This observation fits expectations concerning the formation of coalitions under different regime types. This means that despite similar degrees of democratic freedom the two states possessed when the struggles began, Burkinabe actors behaved just like opponents in authoritarian regimes whereas Senegalese actors created coalitions like challengers in democratic regimes – a point I will raise for further debate in my conclusion.

This dimension is nonetheless rather significant for the divergence, since Burkinabe actors who coordinated their actions interpersonally seemed better equipped to resist initial repressive threats. But in contrast to the theoretical simplified model, this aspect of a network-based coalition did not directly provoke the resignation because this characteristic of Burkinabe mobilized social actors was nothing new, and had nevertheless never been able to topple the regime (see 5.2 below). I argue instead that the \textit{scale shift} we witness is more significant since this clearly set the two struggles apart (see chapter two, Figure 2.2). Although in light of the high numbers of organized and non-organized actors involved I am not able to judge whether the mobilization in Burkina Faso took place across all classes, a
feature scholars of civil resistance consider the most powerful form of social mobilization, I assume that these observable mass protests resulted in the theoretically expected *popular coercion* in Burkina Faso. Trade unions with their strike contributed to the pressure when schools and universities were forced to close for a week. Nevertheless, I would not go so far as to argue that this on its own produced *socioeconomic coercion*, because more important sectors of the economy were not targeted. Nonetheless, the unions’ involvement definitely indicated a potential *cross-class* or at least a *broad mobilization*.

When it comes to state security forces as the last group of actors that scholars consider crucial for achieving change (see chapter two, Figure 2.3), we find completely different stories: Only in Burkina Faso did the *refusal of security forces* occurred. This seems integral to the process insofar as the soldiers communicated with protestors and thus facilitated the resistance to repressive threats. I also start from the premise that without such weakening of the armed forces, Burkinabe mobilized social actors would not have been able to enter, occupy, or destroy representative buildings to such an extent.\(^{478}\) Only due to these achievements, in particular the burning of the national state house, did the Burkinabe protestors at last become confident that an overthrow of the government was feasible. This aspect nonetheless only worked in tandem with two other aspects: the spread of mass mobilization and disruptive tactics. I argue that only this combination led to a declining capacity to repress and eventually to govern, and thus posed a serious threat to the government. In view of the closeness of soldiers and activists, one can raise the argument of an alignment between these two groups. Informal rumors and the joint presentation of leaders of *Balai Citoyen* with army officers, especially, gave rise to questions on the relation between the youth movement and the military. My reading of events, based on my interviews, would be rather that protest leaders felt as if they had no other option. Their statements reveal that they perceived no other institution as capable of restoring order. With regard to the ‘end-game scenes’ in urban centers I found this argument very plausible. Besides, the self-understanding and interconnectedness with the political culture – all historically grounded dimensions that I will deduce as critical antecedents in the next part of this chapter – paint rather a coherent picture of Burkinabe rank-and-file soldiers who identify with popular demands against an unjust regime.

\(^{478}\) This argument relates back to the study by Vincent Bonnecasse (2016), who has demonstrated that of the overall more than 200 buildings that became targets of the riots and protests, most were highly representative ones, or at least related to the former regime such as the private houses of the president’s family.
The two cases having been analyzed, it seems that specific conditions need to be met for presidents to lose their capability of pursuing their plans: Only if incumbents face (a) **mass protests** that (b) at least partly consist of **disruptive tactics**, which then (c) **spread in their size and scope** encounter (d) **disloyal soldiers** who refuse to follow orders, can an unconstitutional candidature of a power-seeking president be prevented. These phenomena merged in the Burkinabe case into a *serious threat* for the president and his regime. But with regard to causal mechanisms, how do we know which aspect conditioned which? As elaborated in my methodological framework (see chapter two, 2.4), I make use of recent insights from comparative studies that have engaged with casual mechanisms, in particular with causal reasoning. I thus follow the conceptualization by Hillel D. Soifer (2012), who differentiates between productive conditions, which are key for the divergent outcome, and permissive conditions, which imprint the productive conditions and are responsible for the loosening of constraints in the first place (Soifer 2012: 1574-1575, see also 2.4). This means that permissive conditions “act as the scope condition for the causal relationship between the productive conditions and the outcome” (Soifer 2012: 1575). Based on my cross-case findings, I infer that the initial occurrence of **mass protests** jointly with the use of **disruptive tactics** represented the permissive conditions that opened up the opportunity for institutional compliance of presidential terms in the first place, and this in both cases (see Figure 5.1, permissive and productive conditions).\(^{479}\) I consider the appearance of large-scale protests and disruptive tactics permissive, or respectively necessary, because they allowed a break with former episodes, since they exceeded all prior waves of protest and functioned as a political opportunity to question the routinized politics of two presidents who regularly exceeded their power. These protest events, which attracted massive amounts of people who then repeatedly employed disruptive means of protest, eased constraints in the sense that opponents conceived of change as possible. But only when productive, or rather sufficient conditions occur as well can protests force presidents to change. The Senegalese case is accordingly a case of missed opportunity.

\(^{479}\) I have defined both terms at length in previous chapters.
In other words, I presume that the mere occurrence of mass protests and/or disruptive tactics does not alone explain why Blaise Compaoré resigned, since he had shown in the past, as well as during this contentious episode, that he was ready to crack down violently on opponents: “he has always been able to defuse activists with a combination of repression and institutional reform” (Chouli 2014: 292). Only if we consider two other dimensions within the argument – the spread of disruptive protests in scope and size combined with declining military support for Compaoré – are we able to make sense of an ungovernable situation as the one observers describe during the last days of the struggle in Burkina Faso (see Figure 5.1, middle part). I argue that both dimensions are relevant since the in-depth analysis of the perceptions of actors has shown that they are highly interlinked. Only because soldiers were confronted by masses of people and repression thus would have entailed widespread killing did some refuse to execute the order to open fire. I am unable, however, to draw any conclusion on the conditionality of the disloyalty of soldiers, since it is difficult to assess whether the soldiers would have been capable in any case of suppressing such widespread riots and mass protests. There were rumors and a few media reports that indicated a lack of armed soldiers in the capital due to external missions and the mutinies of
2011.\textsuperscript{480} But my own collected data suggest only that the hesitation of soldiers to shoot, as well as their readiness to forward information on repressive counterstrategies, changed the capacity of protestors to resist repression and to keep on protesting. One can hardly imagine that the looting, occupation, or even destruction of eminently representative buildings such as the parliament, the private houses of the presidential family, and town halls would have taken place if the whole army had remained loyal, since I presume that their orders would have included the protection of such buildings by any means.

Conversely, I consider the power of protests and disloyal soldiers to have been shaped by the permissive conditions of massively mobilized social actors who utilized primarily disruptive means. These two dimensions act as scope conditions for the causal relation spreading of protest events and the soldiers’ refusal. Only if these protests that spread could attract massive numbers of followers who were ready and able to apply disruptive means, and jointly with disloyal armed forces, could a serious threat and some sort of popular coercion result. In other words, I expect mobilized social actors to be able to convince incumbents to change their plans with regard to an enforced unconstitutional candidature, if they reach a certain level of mass mobilization, apply disruptive protest tactics, and come across disloyal soldiers.\textsuperscript{481} Therefore, successful mass mobilizations and the use of disruptive tactics do not necessarily mean that opponents are able to prevent an enforced candidature; this, at least, is what I conclude from my cross-case comparison.

But why did Burkinabe activists seem more engaged on a massive scale, shared the conviction of the need for disruptive tactics, and come upon disloyal soldiers, while Senegalese protest leaders started to call off protests once the first casualties appeared? Their assessments of the situation indicated the relevance of political legacies, either self-experienced or orally transmitted. The next section will thus be dedicated to the critical antecedents that determined the dimensions within the episode of contention but usually took place much earlier.

\textsuperscript{480} Some media sources reported later about the lack of armed soldiers in urban areas. They connect this to operations planned for Mali and Sudan as well as to the revolts of soldiers in 2011 that led to the disbarment of regular army soldiers; see for instance https://www.jeuneafrique.com/39108/politique/burkina-le-r-cit-de-la-chute-de-compaor-heure-par-heure/ (accessed on April 10, 2019).

\textsuperscript{481} Due to my case selection I am unable to determine how likely, if one of these dimensions is absent, the prevention is to succeed. I shall return to this crucial point in my conclusion.
5.2 Why the struggles proceed differently – Antecedent conditions before the episodes of contention

Without a look at far earlier circumstances it is impossible to understand these individual and dissimilar perceptions, decisions, and strategies, since “too commonly [researchers] link crises to outcome without taking the sources of divergent responses seriously” (Soifer 2012: 1588). Following the insight by Dan Slater and Erica Simmons (2012) that “choices during critical junctures” are relevant but only within “preexisting conditions that influence those choices” (Slater/Simmons 2012: 910), I will shed light on the political developments that caused such cross-case differences as the ones we observe in 2011/12 in Senegal and in 2013/14 in Burkina Faso. For the purpose of bringing history back in, I will not only consider my own empirical insights and analysis of the respective episodes of contention, but also include former studies on the particular national history, often by researchers who have worked on these countries and societies for decades. By merging my insights from within and before the episodes of contention, I will be able to explain why choices of actors that resulted in the prevention of an enforced candidature in the case of Burkina Faso and the failure thereof in Senegal came about as they did.

The central challenge of such comparative historical approaches is how far a researcher should go back in time in searching for influences of a current or recent phenomenon. Most agree that critical antecedents are neither rival explanations nor mere background or context information. Instead, they represent preceding conditions to the critical juncture, or in my case, the episode of contention, of causal relevance that matter for the degree or value of the productive and/or permissive conditions (Slater/Simmons 2010; Soifer 2012). In our context, these critical antecedents consequently shaped the degree of mass mobilization, the extent of disruptive tactics, and the (dis-)loyalty of security forces, because the cross-case analysis has shown that, apart from the disloyal soldiers, most dimensions were present in the Senegalese case as well, but less strongly so. Mass mobilizations took place but never reached the same broadness in terms of groups of actors and number of participants. Similarly, protestors in Senegal exerted disruptive means of protest, such as riots or occupation of central squares, but not to the same extent as in Burkina Faso. Productive conditions – the spread of contention as the predominant mode of action and the refusal of security forces – did not occur in Senegal. On the contrary, Senegalese protest leaders
followed many different strategies, especially after the first repressive threats by the government in the night after the institutional validation of Wade’s candidature.

One cannot understand this divergence without taking into account how the involved actors were influenced – foremost by former regime changes and the narrative that had been constructed around them, as well as by the actual governance of the president. These two dimensions had an effect on later strategies, on the perceived societal legitimacy of disruption, and on the reactions of state (security) forces. I will describe first the patterns of regime changes that are marked by troubled transitions in Burkina Faso and elite-led leadership changes in Senegal that molded the civil-military-relations as well as trust in elections or in popular overthrows. I will argue that the recurrent changes of civilian governments in Senegal resulted in an emphasis on legal channels, with the mobilization of social actors being given only secondary importance, and that the capacities of opponents to resist repressive threats in 2011/12 were therefore insufficient. In Burkina Faso, repeated popular uprisings and military takeovers led to a very specific civil-military relationship, to highly interrelated actors, and to protest know-how. Even though the mobilization against the government had grown under Blaise Compaoré, repertoires of contention, such as protest-marches and disruptive tactics, harkened back to earlier labor and student movements. From this it follows that already when the respective incumbent took power – Blaise Compaoré in 1987 and Abdoulaye Wade in 2000 – the experiences of actors with governmental turnovers, and consequently their trust in elections and popular overthrows, differed, as did the actors themselves.

Nonetheless, also the takeover and rule of the incumbent determined interrelations of actors, especially the civil-state relations, and the legitimacy of disruptive protest tactics against him in relation to his own rule. The violent rule of the Burkinabe president provoked a revitalization of former anti-government struggles, and eventually the societal acceptance of disruptive means against the regime rose. Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal, on the other hand, succeeded in partly integrating and partly repressing civil society groups while expanding his power slowly through institutional channels, which resulted in a growing division among anti-government forces and in their preferences for the institutional mediation of conflicts. Additionally, both before and under the incumbent’s rule opponents of the government shared the protest experiences of various protest events and governmental reactions. These prior protest events or mobilization attempts seemed to shape the political or protest
culture, and was responsible for the manner in which networks of opponents were built or hindered. In the last part of this section I will return to these relevant dimensions in a more abstract manner.

5.2.1 Regime changes compared – Elite-led leadership changes in Senegal and troubled transitions in Burkina Faso

The political history of Burkina Faso can be retold in two ways – either by its regular military coups or by its frequent popular overthrows, but all too often these went hand in hand. Mass mobilizations accompanied, triggered, or started transitions in which the military became a crucial actor for change, although not necessarily as activists may have intended it. In contrast, Senegalese transitions became known for routinized and non-eventful changes of heads of government. While Senegalese history had seen several protest waves, none of them ever toppled a government, and apparently only the urban youth had ever engaged in protest tactics beyond moderate levels. In the following, I will briefly outline the changes of governments from formal independence until Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso took power in 1987 and Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal was elected in 2000.

Before Abdoulaye Wade took power in 2000, Senegal had undergone two regime changes since formal independence on April 4, 1960. The first happened when post-independence President Léopold Sédar Senghor stepped back voluntarily for his chosen successor Abdou Diouf from the same Parti Socialiste (PS) in December 1980, who afterwards ruled – as had his predecessor – roughly twenty years. These two presidents from the same dominant party were thus the only incumbents that preceded Wade. Together with the introduction early on of a multi-party system under Senghor, this turnover served for many as the beginning of the narrative of a solid foundation for democracy. A closer look, however, reveals that both demarcation points were not as democratic as retold: The right to form political parties introduced in 1976 eventually resulted in the establishment of three political parties, since most parties that had existed since 1960 were soon suppressed or coopted, so that Senegal was a de facto single-party state from 1966 onwards (Osei 2013: 90, 585). This single-party state continued when Léopold Séder Senghor passed the presidency to his handpicked successor Abdou Diouf. Despite the fact that both presidents after formal independence belonged to the same all-powerful Socialist party, the day of that succession marked the
beginning of an imaginary narrative of a long-lasting democracy with recurrent changes of governments.

A closer look reveals that above all Senegal’s political trajectory emphasized political stability. This began with Senghor who for many people embodied socio-political peace, since he soon established institutions to mediate any societal conflicts (Hesseling 2007; Croce 2018). In practice, regime dissidents, in particular journalists and students as the major groups of actors known for their critical government stance, were either repressed or integrated in an extensive patronage network based on reciprocal assimilations (Niang 2006). This divide-and-rule strategy was observable in all occurrences of protest. One of the first protest waves Léopold Sédar Senghor faced was the student protests in May 1968, when college students alongside workers revolted against restrictions of democratic rights (Diaw/Diouf 1998). By liberating the system on one side, but repressing his opponents on the other, Senghor was able to demobilize them with the help of the French army and the marabouts, Muslim authorities to whose political role I shall return in a moment. The next wave of protests at least brought about the leadership handover, although the governing elites did not change. In order to calm the mobilizations due to the growing economic crisis, Senghor handed over power to his Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, whose financial knowledge and technocratic approach he felt would solve the troubles, but without granting elections. Such conflict management from above would become the norm in Senegal.

Under Diouf’s presidency, strikes, riots, and protest marches continued and reached the highest level in the mid-1990s, with 171 annual strikes and protest marches per year (Ndiaye 2013: 465-467). Most of the mobilization was limited to Dakar and other urban areas, however, due to the efforts of Senghor and Diouf to divide the union and student movements, again through a mixture of repression and cooptation (Ndiaye 1997; Diop 1992). Over these four decades of Socialist party rule, trade unions were either incorporated into the dominant ruling party, often through the national umbrella organization, the Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal (CNTS), or heavily repressed (Beckman/Sachikonye 2010). “Autonomous trade unions were infiltrated by partisans of the regime, and when they could not be neutralized, the state attempted to destroy them with the complicity of employers.” (Ndiaye 2010: 28) Trade unions thus never established a broader membership base or political self-understanding, as in Burkina Faso, but instead stayed in their corner of contracted workers, similar to student activism, which remained limited to campuses and to
educational policies (Bianchini 2001). In his comparative study of student activism in Burkina Faso and Senegal, Pascal Bianchini (2016) demonstrates comprehensively how student movements in Senegal were unable to resist the divide-and-rule strategy and thus never established profound organizational backing or resistance knowledge. Senegalese student unions concentrated on the areas of education and cultural policies, whereas student and labor movements in Burkina Faso developed jointly as counterweights to the regime (see also Chouli 2018). Anti-government-protests in Senegal therefore never reached the same national scope as in Burkina Faso (Mueller 2018: 88).

The same purpose of an encompassing clientelist ruling system came to the surface when Abdou Diouf invited Abdoulaye Wade, long-term opposition candidate at that time, to join the ruling party in 1991 and 1995, with the aim of continuing the politics of national unity under one pivotal party (Osei 2013: 92; see also Osei 2012 on party-voter linkage). According to Ismaïla M. Fall (2007), this understanding of elite-led turnovers reflects all three constitutions adopted in Senegal primarily as “des manifestations de la volonté de l’homme fort du moment” (Fall 2007: 149). In other words, the objective of the adoption of constitutional rights was the preservation of power for the governing elites instead of its sharing (Fall 2007: 153). With regard to the armed forces, Senegalese state security forces played no crucial role in any regime change and, as an institution with a long tradition of professionalism, never showed any signs of internal splits (Vengroff/Magala 2001: 149). So they apparently played a non-political role, in contrast to the military in the troubled transitions in Burkina Faso.

The aforementioned marabouts, who continued in 2011 and 2012 to comment on politics, were also important players in the patronage-system. These religious authorities derive from the four Islamic Sufi brotherhoods – the Tijaniya, the Mouridiya, the Qadiriya, and the Layenne – who comprise the ninety-percent Muslim majority of the Senegalese population and who hold reciprocal relations with state authorities too. Already in colonial times, Muslim brotherhoods were one of the most salient and economically significant institutions, but it was only the French colonizers who turned them into mediators between the population and the state (Villalón 1995). Although Catholic, Léopold Sédar Senghor continued this approach and used their nationwide presence as a foundation for his state. Under Abdou Diouf, who belonged to the Tijaniya brotherhood, the marabouts were ultimately integrated into the enlarged clientelist networks (Gifford 2016: 695; Osmanovic 2016). This also
affected later democratization, as the marabouts often dictated to their followers their voting decision through the so-called ndigels, through which these Sufi leaders publicly announced their favorite candidates before elections, and their followers adhered to their recommendations. This was a mechanism used by politicians since Léopold Sédar Senghor to win voters through endorsements (Galvan 2001: 59).482 Even though their impact on elections decreased until 2011, according to the World Value Survey the majority of Senegalese citizens kept trusting these religious authorities and accorded them the right to speak out on political matters (Vengroff/Magala 2001: 149).483 This role is clearly visible in the term amendment struggles, influencing for instance the societal acceptance of escalations.

In contrast to these controlled changes of heads of government, the political legacy of Burkina Faso is far more turbulent. Since formal independence on August 5, 1960 until Compaoré’s takeover of power in 1987, Burkina Faso witnessed five changes of government, and in all of them broad mobilization played a central role, as did the military. As opposed to the situation in Senegal, the army intervened regularly in politics and turned its back against the ruler (Englebert 1996), so that Mathieu Hilgers and Augustin Loada (2013) call them the “sword of Damocles” for any government (Hilgers/Loada 2013: 192). The first time a president was forced out of office in Burkina Faso was only six years after formal independence. Despite successfully winning elections by large margins, the first post-independence President Maurice Yaméogo was ousted from office only one year later, when he limited workers’ rights in 1966. Allied trade unions called for a general strike and riots of young people led to prevailing unrest, backed by opposition parties, the Catholic Church, and the Mogho Naaba, whose previous mediation attempts had failed.484 In particular, teachers, professors, and students, already well-organized within the Syndicat national des enseignants africains de Haute-Volta (SNEAHV) and the Union syndicale des travailleurs voltaïques (USTV), were the main mobilized social actors calling for protest, and they

482 But Paul Gifford (2016) illustrates that this connection was not deterministic in the sense that one presidential candidate would be able to assure all votes of one faith community, since the system was rather complex and usually contained a spectrum of feasible outcomes.

483 Interview with expert on civil society and democracy, February 21, 2017, Dakar. Interview with expert on women’s rights and political participation, February 27, 2017, Dakar. Today, people still take money from Muslim brotherhoods for buying votes, but eventually vote for somebody else. The marabouts thus still have an important and symbolic role, but their influence has become even less deterministic.

484 See Ernest Harsch (2017) for an excellent summary of the historical events related to protest, revolution, and political power in general.
resisted all previous cooptation attempts (Harsch 2017: 25-27; Englebert 1996: 45). Their mobilization was so overwhelming that the incumbent even called the army to restore public order by violent means, but Lieutenant Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana refused to crack down on the protests and instead sided with the government’s opponents. Concurrently, the unionists themselves called the army to intervene on their behalf, which indicates a specific civil-military relationship that is observable even today (Ouedraogo 2015). Consequently, President Maurice Yaméogo withdrew the announced wage cuts. This concession came too late, however, and activists had already started to call for his departure and for the army to take power. Eventually, Sangoulé Lamizana became the second president, on January 3, 1966.

The soldiers based their backing of the protestors on their own disappointment in the first civilian government, and shared the unions’ dissatisfaction, with whom they acted in concert (Schmitz 1990). However, Pierre Englebert (1996) argues that when Sangoulé Lamizana took power, “union leaders were hoping the military would simply play a transitional role before elections would allow them to return to politics. They would have the next decades to learn that it is easier to bring the army into politics than it is to get it out” (Englebert 1996: 47). This highlights the already ambivalent relationship between civilian mobilizations and military takeovers, which spans the entire political trajectory of Burkina Faso.

The years that followed were marked by constant labor unrest of predominantly teachers’ and students’ unions, which called for protests and strikes every time Lamizana moved towards more authoritarian rule (Harsch 2017: 32). Similar to the later anti-term protests, mostly urban youth jointly with student and union organizations mobilized, so that Erich Schmitz (1990) attested for urban areas already in the 1970s a high mobilization potential referring to broad networks (Schmitz 1990: 310-11). Eventually, the first civilian constitution was adopted in 1970 under Lamizana’s military rule, a constitution in which accordingly the army gained a prominent place with extensive responsibilities, such as the promotion of socioeconomic development and cultural progress, and thus a role beyond national defense.486

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485 The right to form trade unions dates back to colonial times. Since 1937 it has been allowed to form trade unions (Kongo/Zeilig 2017: 25-26).
When several groups of actors felt sidelined under Lamizana, Colonel Saye Zerbo brought him down in another military coup, on November 25, 1980, after fourteen years of his regime. Zerbo was backed by the Mossi chiefs, the Catholic Church, and the unions, who all shared their dissatisfaction with Lamizana’s governance (Kandeh 2004: 123; Englebert 1996: 51-52). Over the years, these groups of actors remained the main political forces outside of the government (Loada 1999). The military junta headed by Saye Zerbo, Comité Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National (CMRPN), in turn, “was seen by many people as less inclusive, more corrupt, and, above all, more repressive” (Harsch 2017: 39) compared to any earlier military government. Due to the repetitive violation of labor and above all democratic rights, unions went on strikes again and again. Young soldiers joined the revolts against their corrupt leaders. When these foot soldiers occupied the major spaces of the capital on November 7, 1982, they put an end to the government by yet another military coup, which was tolerated and partly supported by trade unions.

This is followed by the installation of the first Conseil du Salut du Peuple (CSP) under Jean-Baptiste Philippe Ouédraogo, on November 9, 1982, whose rule lasted but several months until his Prime Minister Thomas Sankara overthrew him on August 4, 1983. His takeover was backed by young soldiers who belonged, together with Sankara, to a secret Communist group within the Burkinabé army. This went back to the military academies that spread knowledge of leftist theories. “[P]oliticization within the junior ranks of the army” (Kongo/Zeilig 2017: 34) increased, and young rank-and-file soldiers, influenced by Marxist ideology, grew increasingly independent-minded (Schmitz 1990: 298). Besides, “they [young soldiers] shared many of the attitudes of disillusionment and disgruntlement of their civilian peers. They were also relatively well-educated and politicized, some entering the military after direct contact with anti-imperialist and revolutionary ideas of the student movements” (Harsch 2017: 38-39). Older commissioned officers, on the other hand, belonged to the earlier generation of soldiers trained and having served in the French army, and thus for the youngsters appeared too close to French colonizers (Kongo/Zeilig 2017: 38). All of these young soldiers who toppled the regime in 1983 under the lead of Sankara were graduates of national military academies and thus did not come from higher ranks within the army, so that Jimmy D. Kandeh (2004) in his book on ‘coup from below’ in West Africa lists this military coup as one from ‘below’ rather than ‘above’.487 They were

487 These ‘subaltern coups’ are carried out by youngsters, in contrast to the usual coups by colonels, who revolt against patronage or clientelist rule by higher officers and by political elites beyond the armed forces. This
supported by left-wing political parties and trade unions yet again (Kongo/Zeilig 2017: 44-46).

In the following period, the politicization of the military deepened under Thomas Sankara, whose regime was based on the Conseil National de la Revolution (CNR), which pressed ahead with “the most radical transformative project attempted by a military regime” and “was the most ideologically motivated and committed” in Africa (Kandeh 2004: 119). In contrast to other military regimes, the aim was to build close ties with the peasantry. According to Sankara, an army should be “a politicized army” (Kandeh 2004: 203 quoting Sankara) for the people (Kongo/Zeilig 2017: 40). Under his rule, soldiers were obliged to take part in the transformation of Burkina’s economy, by growing food and raising livestock, and by being educated in the governmental Socialist and pan-Africanist ideology (Schmitz 1990: 287-88), so that eventually the army became a key player in societal and political arenas (Harsch 2017: 66-68). For instance, officers formed soccer teams or played in music groups together with civilians, and thus became increasingly a component of public life (Dwyer 2017: 221). Pierre Englebert (1996) suitably summarizes this as an “increased militarization of politics and politicization of the military” (Englebert 1996: 53) for this period.

Although his rule lasted only four years, numerous profound reform processes were launched in order to transform the sociopolitical system under Sankara. His engagement for the self-sufficiency of the country and reconquest of national pride still affect the national consciousness. Early on, he restored anti-imperial awareness in changing the name from the French Upper Volta (referring to the river Volta) to Burkina Faso, which means ‘country of the upright people’ in the local Mossi-language Mooré. Even today the country name embodies for many Burkinabe their pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist ideals, to which people constantly refer (Harsch 2018). Protest leaders frequently evoke their activism as

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**Note:**

488 For a critical and comprehensive discussion of the achievements of the CNR in regard to corruption, human rights, democratization, and economic development, see Jimmy D. Kandeh (2004).

489 For an excellent and critical discussion of his ideologies and politics, see Jean-Claude Kongo and Leo Zeilig (2017).

490 Jimmy D. Kandeh (2004) describes CNR’s populism convincingly as an “eclectic blend of nationalism, Marxism-Leninism, Pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism” (Kandeh 2004: 125). The major source upon which the ideological orientation was based was the Discours d’orientation politique, which clearly distinguishes between the people and their enemies, referring to traditional authorities, state bourgeoisie, and other privileged groups.

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related to this revolutionary thinker who is especially popular among younger generations (Zeilig 2016; for *Balai Citoyen* see Soré 2018). Considering that less than a fifth of the Burkinabe population was born when he took power, it is even more stunning how these historical references were voiced by all protest leaders I interviewed. All of them are aware of and understand themselves as part of this “history of power, protest and revolution”, as a recently published book on Burkina Faso’s political history by Ernest Harsch (2017) is subtitled.

Although his leadership was controversial given his autocratic rule and mistreatment of human rights, the dominant narrative in Burkina Faso is one of a revolutionary hero working in the interest of the people and national will (Murrey 2018; Zeilig 2018). During their sit-ins, activists of *Balai Citoyen* sang the national anthem and shouted the national motto during Sankara’s revolution ‘la patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons’ in reference to their idol to whose values they constantly referred (Soré 2018: 238). Scholars refer to this exceptional “heritage of revolt” (Harsch 2017: 1) to make sense of the readiness and determination that Burkinabe activists showed in 2014 (Frère/Englebert 2015; Zeilig 2016). “Symbolisms and memories of Sankara persist(ed) through expressions of popular culture, including slam poetry, hip-hop, clothing, graffiti, spoken word and painting” (Dragstra 2018: 335). The “Sankara imagery” (Frère/Englebert 2015: 295) was operating when people stated that they are “les enfants de Sankara” and underlined that “[n]ous sommes aussi grandis sous la révolution, sous Sankara”.

Fiona Dragstra (2018) thus reasons that these young mobilized social actors engaged in movements such as *Balai Citoyen* represent “a new conscious generation born through the use of memories as political weapons in their battle for sociopolitical change” (Dragstra 2018: 335) by “building up of collective energy in uprising after uprising” (Dragstra 2018: 341). However, as Jean-Claude Kongo (2017) in his essay on the remembrance of Thomas Sankara rightly concludes, these young people shouting Sankarist slogans were those “who knew of Sankara only what had been taught them by their parents” (Kongo 2017: 191), because despite its far-reaching impacts on sociopolitical life in Burkina Faso, the Sankara era above all fueled a national belonging and formed, together with earlier labor and student movements (Engels 2015d), a political culture of contestation that passed

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491 A famous and worldwide protest slogan that goes back to Fidel Castro and Che Guevara and that is part of the refrain of the national anthem, called *Ditanyè*, of Burkina Faso, rewritten by Thomas Sankara in 1984 with a new emphasis on empowerment due to the renaming of the country in the “land of honourable people”.

492 Representative of the European diaspora of *Balai Citoyen*/Germany, November 5, 2016, Berlin.

493 Interview with leader of *Balai Citoyen*, March 14, 2017, Ouagadougou.
from one generation to the next by written and oral memory (see for a comprehensive work on Thomas Sankara Harsch 2014).

In sum, in Burkina Faso political power flowed from the masses and the gun, while in Senegal it was handed over among elites. We detect a pattern of overlaps between mass demonstrations and military takeovers as well as politicized soldiers in Burkinabe history, while in Senegal the divide-and-rule strategy that served as political stabilizer for governing elites who led the changes is omnipresent. The armed forces, in turn, functioned in a top-down hierarchy in Senegal, while the Burkinabe armed forces were part of governments and participated in some governmental changeover. People in Burkina Faso therefore grew up under the legacy of broad mobilizations as well as revolutionary ideals from the previous Socialist president Thomas Sankara – and both these were coupled with the military. In the following, I will show how this specific civil-military relation and existing culture of contestation was revitalized under Compaoré, while the divide-and-rule strategy continued under Wade, who successfully channelled unrest, with the exception of student protests.

5.2.2 Coalition formations in Burkina Faso and cooptation in Senegal – Takeover and rule of the incumbent compared

In Burkina Faso, these historical experiences and ties among governmental opponents were revitalized under Blaise Compaoré, and became increasingly radicalized due to his violent rule. Abdoulaye Wade, on the other hand, symbolized the first alternance, which represented – surprisingly, given the strong democratic narrative – the first electoral changeover of government. Both incumbents’ takeover and rule exemplify the divergent political cultures – one of compromise in Senegal and one of contestation in Burkina Faso, by dint of a national narrative of democratic success in Senegal and of revolutionaries in Burkina Faso. In the following, I will briefly shed light on three demarcation points of the twenty-seven years of rule from 1987 until 2014: the uprising for justice in 1998, the food riots in 2008, and the deepest governmental crisis in 2011 when the anti-government mobilization spilled over to

494 This legacy of contestation is overwhelmingly present within the contentious episode. For example, when the mobilized social actors were singing the national anthem that goes back to Thomas Sankara in front of the opposition party offices that were about to vote in favor of the amendment, or when mobilized social actors were wearing Sankara-t-shirts, see 4.1.4. Another example is JEP, a youth association formed within the contentious episode but based on Sankarist ideals, see 4.1.1.
the army. These waves of protests shaped profoundly the revitalization and broadness of the mobilization as antecedent conditions. Afterwards I will illustrate the rule of Wade, who hindered broader coalitions of opponents while continuously removing democratic rule of law.

It is widely believed that from the very beginning his term in office was marked by political violence, as Blaise Compaoré overthrew his predecessor and former comrade-in-arms Thomas Sankara in 1987 (Jaffré 2018). Profound changes that Thomas Sankara had pushed through, sometimes by military force, came to an abrupt end under Compaoré’s rule. His newly formed Front Populaire (FP), a military junta of twenty-four members, soon became known for their oppression and execution of loyal Sankara followers (Kandeh 2004: 139-141). At the same time, Compaoré established a multiparty system, held regular elections, and extended democratic rights, so that soon his incumbency became known for authoritarian rule and democratic openings in parallel (Hilgers/Mazzocchetti 2010; Loada 2010). The 90% vote tally in favor of his reelection further backed his rule as legitimate. Throughout his rule, Compaoré used a mixture of coercion, corruption, and regular elections to establish his power – a reason why Sten Hagberg (2010) calls it “démocratie à double façade”. One example was the first overthrow of tenure restrictions for presidents in 1997, which he himself had established seven years earlier (see chapter three, Table 3.2).

I refer to the elections in 1991, 1998, 2005, and 2010; see Africa Elections database (2012) online available under http://africanelections.tripod.com/bf.html (accessed on November 10, 2016). This high reelection margin is not surprising given the fact that only parties with more than 3% of the votes receive support by state funds, so that the only party who held local delegations in each village of the country was the ruling CDP (Hilgers/Loada 2013: 194), while the others concentrated on urban areas as well as on the local networks where the party leaders came from (Stroh 2010b).

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495 It is popular knowledge, albeit unproven due to the lack of an investigation, that Blaise Compaoré had been involved in the violent overthrow on behalf of the French government, which fear losing influence due to Sankara’s post-colonial empowerment politics. The autopsy of Sankara’s body started one year after the uprising (Gänsler 2015).

496 Interestingly, this time only student protests erupted nationwide, which Pierre Englebert (1996), Erich Schmitz (1990), and Leo Zeilig (2017) – with different emphases – explain by the failure of Thomas Sankara to institutionalize his power locally. Especially traditional authorities and relevant trade unions at a certain point turned their back on him, since he tried to regroup the latter under one organization from above (Englebert 1996: 59), arrested union members in the May demonstrations in 1987 (Azad 1988), and reduced privileges for formally employed workers in urban areas for the benefit of Burkinabe farmers (Kandeh 2004; Schmitz 1990: 314-15).

497 I refer to the elections in 1991, 1998, 2005, and 2010; see Africa Elections database (2012) online available under http://africanelections.tripod.com/bf.html (accessed on November 10, 2016). This high reelection margin is not surprising given the fact that only parties with more than 3% of the votes receive support by state funds, so that the only party who held local delegations in each village of the country was the ruling CDP (Hilgers/Loada 2013: 194), while the others concentrated on urban areas as well as on the local networks where the party leaders came from (Stroh 2010b).

First, after the brutal killing of Norbert Zongo, an opposition journalist who investigated governmental affairs, for which the presidential guard has been widely held responsible, “large anti-government demonstrations and strikes swept Burkina, on a scale and with persistence never before experienced in the country’s history” (Harsch 2009: 274). This time, in addition to trade unions and students, other groups joined the protests, such as merchants, unorganized urban youth, and even parts of the establishment such as judges, who usually supported the government (Ouédraogo 1999). This is a reason why Augustin Loada (1999), one of the most known and respected experts on Burkinabé politics, traces back “l’origine de l’émergence d’un mouvement protestataire” (Loada 1999: 138) to that moment in time with regard to the formation of the first stable protest coalition Collectif des organisations démocratiques de masse et de partis politiques (CODMPP) (Hagberg 2002). The highly politicized union confederation CGT-B, whose demands went well beyond working conditions, and the oldest human rights organization, the MBDHP, initiated this coalition of roughly eighty organizations to demand justice for Norbert Zongo (Harsch 1999). Numerous opposition parties became involved as well in a supporting role. As a result, coordination between labor activists, student movements, leftist youth groups, and human rights organizations increased, and the polarization even reached journalists who became engaged in order to push for the reopening of the file on their colleague (Wise 1998).

In the end, the government solved this first profound political crisis in late 1990s, at least on the surface, through police violence and mild concessions, such as the reinstallation of term limits, as well as through political or material benefits for opposition parties, even to the point of naming opposition figures members of the Cabinet (Hilgers/Mazzocchetti 2006).

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499 The extent to which this demand for justice for Norbert Zongo is still a crucial issue was revealed when the prime minister of the transitional government promised on December 13, 2014 at the Place de la Révolution that justice would finally be reached. Document, MBDHP, “Situation des Droits humains au Burkina depuis l’Insurrection populaire”, octobre 2014 – avril 2015, p. 34.

500 Interview with (former) Secretary General of CGTB and national president of CCVC, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou.

501 Message conjoint CODMPP et CCVC au 16e anniversaire du journaliste Norbert Zongo et ses trois compagnons d’infortune, CODMPP/CVVC, December 13, 2014. Interview with president of CODMPP and of MBDHP, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou. Over time, opposition parties exited the alliance, so that the Collectif now consists only of civil society groups, even though they call upon the opposition members to join their protest events.

502 Interview with deputy Secretary General of AJB, March 10, 2017, Ouagadougou.

503 No. 3-2000, April 11, 2000. This was based on the recommendations of the newly established commission, the “collège des sages”. In August 1999, its final report asked for the reestablishment of term limits, and half a year later, in April 2000, the presidential mandate was restricted by constitutional law to two subsequent terms, but the last and ongoing mandates of Compaoré were excluded from the count. The
The second protest wave in our purview took place in the context of rising costs for basic nutrition, which led to the formation of the second lasting protest coalition, the *Coalition contre la vie chère* (CCVC) on March 13, 2008, which starting on that date held protest marches against the consequences of neoliberal politics (Engels 2015a). Mostly the same actors as in the CODMPP were involved, with representatives of the CGT-B and MBDHP serving as spokespersons, but with the major difference of unifying only civil society groups, excluding all political parties. Their priority became to rebuild a “unité d’action syndicale”, since many unions increasingly represented only formally employed workers of modernized urban sectors (see for instance Schmitz 1990: 294-5). In order to counteract this weakness, they aimed to revitalize links to students’ associations or unions (Schmitz 1990: 322-23). Bettina Engels (2015a) summarizes this connection as follows: “The fact that trade unions are embedded predominantly among the urban, well-educated middle-class, and that student organizations consider themselves to be trade unions, explains why alliances and joint protests by trade unions and students are relatively easy to organize and take place frequently.” (Engels 2015a: 2) Until today, most of the union confederations in Burkina Faso understand themselves more comprehensively as a counterforce to the government, who voices not only workers’ demands. Their self-understanding is thus of mass organizations beyond party lines, social classes, or professions. From their perspective, unions are supposed to inform, educate, represent, and reclaim workers and young peoples about politics. Hence, it is not surprising that also in 2008 the scope of their protests expanded, demanding apart from better living conditions also democratic improvements (Engels 2015b). These protests were characterized mainly by riots and other disruptive tactics (Engels 2015c), which young activists knew from their experience with regular school strikes (Chouli 2012a). At the same time, opposition parties bargained on behalf of protestors for better living conditions (Engels 2015b: 101-103). In parallel, students went on strike,

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505 Interview with former Secretary General of CGTB; and national president of CCVC, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou.
506 Interview with (former) Secretary General of CGTB and national president of CCVC, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou.
507 The former Secretary General of the CGT-B confirms this orientation, by underlining that the “CGT-B est une organisation syndicale à l’orientation révolutionnaire”. Interview with (former) Secretary General of CGTB and national president of CCVC, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou.
508 Interview with former Secretary General of CGTB; and national president of CCVC, March 9, 2017, Ouagadougou.
mobilized by ANEB, and thus put additional pressure on the government (Stroh 2008, 2009; see on the interrelation of student and worker movements Bianchini/Korbéogo 2008). In the end, the government was able again to calm the crisis due to the remarkable concessions of reduced payroll taxes and increased public salaries.

Third, Blaise Compaoré faced the last and most widespread civilian protests just two years prior to his second constitutional amendment attempt. The mobilizations started with teachers and students organized primarily in unions due to cuts in education policies and tax (Stroh 2010a). Triggered by the death of the student activist Justin Zongo on February 20, 2011, the anti-government-mobilization eventually spread to dozens of cities in Burkina Faso, and both schools and universities had to be shut down (Stroh 2011).\textsuperscript{509} Tens of thousands of union members, farmers, police officers, and students took to the streets, partly mobilized by the protest coalition CCVC.\textsuperscript{510} The initial “uprising of military youth” (Kongo 2017: 188) rapidly exceeded previous mobilizations in terms of number and use of disruptive tactics (Hilgers/Loada 2013).\textsuperscript{511} In order to calm tensions and to channel them moderately, Blaise Compaoré established a dialogue forum, but most of the mobilized social actors refused to take part (Chouli 2012b), so that Lila Chouli (2014) concludes that “[…] violent action seems to have become the preferred method for making one’s voice heard” (Chouli 2014: 269). When in March 2011 mutinies of rank-and-file soldiers began, it marked the lowest point for the regime.\textsuperscript{512} Maggie Dwyer (2017), exploring regular mutinies since the 1990s, finds that the 2011 ones exceeded all earlier ones and eventually even spread to the presidential guard, the RSP, usually perceived as the most loyal unit.\textsuperscript{513} Young soldiers repeatedly condemned corrupt higher officers in holding back their wages, living allowances, and mission subsidies, so that the main motives were above all issues of bad governance within the state security forces (Hilgers/Loada 2013). Additionally, the role of the military’s elite presidential guard as “une véritable armée dans l’armée” (Hilgers/Loada 2013: 193), and who is better treated, added to tensions between the base and the top. However, the young foot soldiers never officially aligned with the students or union

\textsuperscript{509} Not related to Norbert Zongo. Officially, Justin Zongo died due to meningitis, but his comrades denied this official statement and declared police officers responsible for having beaten him to death.


\textsuperscript{511} Interview with national coordinator of Balai Citoyen, Journalist, March 16, 2017, Ouagadougou.

\textsuperscript{512} I follow the definition of mutinies put forward by Dwyer as “act of collective insubordination for goals other than political power. They generally involve mostly rank-and-file soldiers expressing their grievances to senior hierarchy or political leadership” (Dwyer 2017: 221).

\textsuperscript{513} Members of the RSP alike suffered in 2011 from mismanagement of funds such as unpaid housing allowances, which already in 2007 had led to the protest of around 1000 soldiers; see Africa Research Bulletin, No. 18793, April 1st – 30th 2011. Africa Research Bulletin, No. 17271, October 1st – 31st 2007.
members, but Maggie Dwyer (2017) shows that the military hierarchy in Burkina Faso was unable to obscure the fact of shared interests, networks, and life obstacles between young activists and soldiers. Although their initial complaints were not the same – with students protesting harsh police repression and worsening education policies and soldiers demanding better equipment and payment – they related their mobilization jointly back to a malfunctioning justice system, clientelist networks, and overall corruption. To finally calm the escalation, Blaise Compaoré ordered payments of bonuses for soldiers and better accommodations (Dwyer 2017: 225-226). However, Lila Chouli (2012) argued in 2011 that “it would be premature for the regime to cry victory – maybe they can win over or at least control civil society groups but it is an entirely different ballgame with the bulk of protestors, who came out spontaneously and whose anger and determination was such that they were prepared to put their lives on the line.” Several studies point out that from this cycle of protests onwards, “a large population has come to the conclusion that the authorities only understand the language of force” (Chouli 2014: 298) and violence “seems to have become a common feature in political and social protests, regardless of the issues that precipitated the actions” (Harsch 2009: 278). In a nutshell, by the end of 2012, just one year before the mass mobilizations, Blaise Compaoré and his government had already survived several crises. In light of the increasing broadness of mass protests, however, and relating to the metaphor of a harmattan in 2014, gusts might be calmed but the storm was yet to come.

The outset of the rule of Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade differed tremendously from the takeover of Blaise Compaoré. As long-term opposition candidate, he was the one capable of ending the forty-year rule of the same Socialist party. Abdoulaye Wade had participated in elections since 1978, but it was, surprisingly with regard to the strong democratic narrative, the first time in Senegalese history that a president was voted out of office – and thus with his victory ended the “citadelle socialiste” (Niang 2011: 14). His successful electoral campaign was strongly backed by a mobilized youth for whom he represented the glimpse of a better life, so that his electoral victory in 2000 was consequently “perceived as a watershed moment by young people all over Senegal” (Prothmann 2017: 71; see also Gellar 2013). The use of simplistic language on his so-called “blue marches” was directed foremost at unemployed youth and unskilled workers (Resnick 2014: 18), social groups that had not been incorporated into the Socialist party patronage networks (Osei 2013: 102). He rallied a “jeunesse en euphorie” (Touré 2017: 61) and “promised them everything from job creation

to easier access to loans and housing” (Sy 2013: 12; Novicki 1991). Wade’s unusual inauguration ceremony, which took place in the stadium named after Senghor, was supposed to illustrate a break with former regimes, and many enthusiastically believed that from the day after the elections, Senegal would change (Niang 2004). Due to this enthusiasm and to Wade being the first president after the one-party domination, his first term served rather as a period marked by ‘wait and see’ for opponents. But he continued already at the outset the divide-and-rule strategy by offering jobs to powerful civil society leaders. Many took the offer, because they aimed at participating in the first alternance and often joined Wade’s Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) thereafter (Niang 2004: 27). This systematic favoritism resulted in recurrent government reshuffles as well as the creation of many new ministerial posts, with a total of more than seventy ministers under his rule (Gifford 2016: 690-691). Part of that strategy was social dialogue in order to avoid escalations of conflicts. One example here is the adaptation of the Charte nationale sur le dialogue social in 2002, which was based on negotiations among governmental members of parliament, employers’ associations, and workers’ unions. Wade met regularly with the latter and sought “to reproduce the model of state preference inherited from [his] predecessor, expecting leading trade unions to be affiliated to the ruling party” (Ndiaye 2010: 37), so that unions became more and more divided.\footnote{Interview with Secretary General of CSA, February 21, 2017, Dakar.} That these precedents affects later behavior and choices of trade unions picture their absence within the episode of contention. For instance, within the anti-Wade-alliance of M23, no unions take officially part, although individual members participated. One leader of Y’en a marre claims that they unsuccessfully tried to get them on board: “Nous, nous sommes allé voir les syndicats pour les demander d’aller dans notre combat mais ils ont refusé, ils ont dit qu’ils sont neutres.”\footnote{Interview with leader of Y’en a marre, February 19, 2017, Dakar.} The CSA is the only trade union who became presently active during the struggle, The Secretary General of the CSA explains this dissimilarity as follows: “C’est qui s’est passé au Burkina par example, on ne pourrait pas le réaliser au Sénégal. Il avait maintenant des dirigés syndicaux qui se sont ouvertement prononcé pour le régime de Wade et avec Wade. Au Burkina, il y avait un bloc de la société civile. […] Le bloc syndical est beaucoup plus solide. D’abord il y a moins de centrales syndicales. Et le bloc est beaucoup plus solide parce que les intérêts ne sont pas aussi divergents que chez nous. Chez nous, nous avons des gens qui ont une culture de proximité avec le pouvoir.”\footnote{Interview with former Secretary General of CSA, February 21, 2017, Dakar.} This refers to Wade’s policy towards unions of divide-and-rule, so that
they built up rather competitive relations. An expert on civil society argues that trade unions further lack greater visions thus stick to their particular demands for their constituency and at best can be classified corporatist unions. In total, they are perceived as closer to political parties than to the population and among each other mostly disunited. As a result, every trade union fights for better conditions in its own sector, not interlinking their fights across sectors nor building ties to popular struggles or, for instance, to the regular student protests, a huge difference to Burkina Faso.

Wade approached the Muslim brotherhoods in a similar manner. He established a broad network of favoritism and openly declared himself a Mouride, the economically most significant Islamic group. Throughout his rule, he supported them constantly, for instance by handing out more than 30,000 diplomatic passports to them and their families (Gifford 2016: 699), but at the same time he continued his rule of division by giving advantages to one particular regional segment (Mbow 2008: 160-161).

For those who remained in the civic or political opposition, Abdoulaye Wade interfered regularly in their affairs. For instance, he restricted party alliances and rejected elections of local representatives (Mbow 2008: 159-160). If mobilizations occurred nonetheless, the government used a mixture of strong police repression and clientelist cooptation (Mbow 2008: 163; see also Faye). In his comprehensive book on Wade’s rule, Momar-Coumba Diop (2013) describes an ever-growing power in the hands of the president who ruled through a network of henchmen, so that Senegal was turned into an “electoral authoritarianism” (Mbow 2008: 156). This resulted in decreasing trust in the government, especially among young people, according to Richard Vengroff and Michael Magala (2001), who evaluate data from the World Value Survey. According to Anja Osei (Osei 2013: 101), trust decreased even further in Wade’s second term. So it is not surprising that already seven years later Senegalese democracy was classified as only partly free by indices like Freedom House, the same rating as in Burkina Faso (see chapter three, Table 3.3). Nevertheless, “the Senegalese people appear to be deeply committed to democracy as the preferred form of governance” (Osei 2013: 104) while demanding more commitment of the political elites to the rule of law. The same findings were confirmed by the Afrobarometer survey (2002, 2008), which

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shows that the percentage of Senegalese preferring democracy over any other political system increased, while satisfaction with the actual democracy decreased (Bratton 2013). Similar to Compaoré, Wade was nonetheless able to gain the majority of voters and was thus reelected in 2007 for his second and thus, constitutionally, last term in office. All accusations by opponents against the electoral outcome were denied by judges who were essentially controlled by Wade and incorporated into his patronage system (Niang 2011). Similarly, Wade pushed growing restrictions of democratic rights through constitutional amendments, which the parliament regularly signed off on (Thiam 2007). At the same time, “Wade’s concentration on private-sector investment in infrastructure instead of in education and social programs, left the productive young population at the mercy of the neoliberal free market” (Prothmann 2017: 72). He seemed to have forgotten the young constituency mostly living in the suburbs who had voted him into office: “Many of Wade’s projects, such as the multilane Corniche highway along the Atlantic coast, were deemed to favor the city’s wealthy few rather than the poor majority, prompting observations that life in Dakar was operating à deux vitesses” (Resnick 2014: 16). In his book on “Lifeworlds of Young Men beyond Migration and Immobility in Pikine”, Sebastian Prothmann (2017) shows how this resulted in increasing frustration and anger under Wade, especially in the capital’s suburbs where the young people live due to unaffordable living costs in central Dakar (Resnick 2014). It is thus not surprising that mobilization increased again during his second term, from 2007 to 2012. When consumer prices increased in 2008, the banlieues of Dakar witnessed a series of food riots (Engels 2013; Foucher 2009), which continued to grow in 2010 when power cuts increased (Foucher 2010). The government responded repressively and cracked down on activists by all necessary means.

In particular, the escalations on university campuses routinized during Wade’s presidency became known for their disruptive protest tactics, and were visible, for instance, in the form of stones that lay ready to be used for blockades at the entrances of the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar (Zeilig/Ansell 2008). These escalations on campuses often led to cancelled school years, so-called année blanches, but the protests usually continued on

520 Wade was able to win the elections in 2007 due to weaknesses of opposition parties comparable to those in Burkina Faso. According to Anja Osei (2013), Abdoulaye Wade kept them powerless while he won the elections by his apparent charismatic appearance as speaker at electoral mobilization rallies (Osei 2013: 100-101). In addition, the tendency to confirm the incumbent helped him further (Foucher 2008).
According to Leo Zeilig (2004), the government faced these rising political engagements of students with a combination of cooptation and corruption. In the end, Wade succeeded in many cases to buy off leading figures of student movements and organizations, a fact that Leo Zeilig (2004, 2009) explains through the lack of ideological grounding and through disunity among the students.

Despite growing dissatisfaction, mobilization never spread widely until 2011. But opposition parties initiated with regard to growing discontent the Assises Nationales on June 1, 2008. These national roundtables “converged in a self-styled popular assembly” (Croce 2017: 109) whose aim was to discuss the state of affairs in a citizen-led manner, grouping more than sixty umbrella civil society groups together, as well as opposition parties. Abdoulaye Wade himself chose not to participate with his ruling party but was invited nonetheless. He replied that every organization that participated would be understood as an enemy. Some trade unions consequently left the Assises Nationales, which indicates the persistent closeness of some unions to the ruling party. The outcome of these regular public debates was a fifty-page charter of recommendations for the government to increase democracy, and the Assises thus resembled professionalized rather than popular assemblies. This view is confirmed by a recent V-Dem report, which concludes that civil society organizations diversified over time but “popular involvement is minimal even in recent years” (Cornejo et al. 2013: 17). This multiplicity of non-governmental organizations is backed by data from the World Value Survey, which reveals that already at the onset of Wade’s rule, nearly eighty percent of the respondents belonged to at least one organization (Vengroff/Magala 2001: 137). Under Wade, the establishment and use of deliberative channels increased while popular linkages decreased (Cornejo et al. 2013: 24).

To sum up, under the respective incumbent’s rule there was a revitalization of mass mobilization in Burkina Faso, whereas divisions grew between civil society groups and other potential opponents in Senegal. Abdoulaye Wade managed either to integrate regime challengers in his patronage system and institutional arenas or to suppress them, while Blaise Compaoré survived numerous waves of protests, which however led to increasing alliances among opponents.

523 Interview with Secretary General of CSA, February 21, 2017, Dakar.
5.3 From mass protests to the prevention of an unconstitutional candidature – Deduction of causal mechanisms

My comparative analysis in this chapter has encompassed first the episodes of contention based on my own data collection and in-depth description and secondly the political legacies that preceded them. For the latter, I focused only on select aspects that I assessed as relevant in order to answer my second research question, namely why the term amendment struggles of the two West African states proceeded differently and thus resulted in dissimilar outcomes for their presidents. The comparative episode analysis uncovers this up to the last protest stage. For the most part, the struggles were similar up to the point of divergence, when the term-bid occurred in each country. That is when actors decided differently based on disparate perceptions, which eventually resulted in the divergent outcomes: While mobilization in Burkina Faso spread across the country and society, mass protest events culminated in Senegal in specific areas of the capital, and actors were divided on the question of follow-up strategies. However, the simplified notion that points to mass mobilizations and the use of disruptive tactics, permissive conditions that I have found to be present and necessary in both cases, is not enough to understand how history brought about the situation we observe in 2014 in Burkina Faso: spreading protests by masses of seemingly determined people, who knew how to use disruptive tactics. These soon represented the unilateral mode of action in Burkina Faso, and finally soldiers refused to follow orders. Only if we consider preliminary variations in the respective political legacy we are truly able to understand this disparity, since they shaped the extent to which these conditions are present in both cases.

Based on my empirical findings, I will draw conclusions on the causal mechanisms between anti-term protests and the prevention of the candidature. I will subsequently single out the antecedent conditions that were crucial for the proceeding of the Burkinabe case. In my analysis, the historical moments of regime changes, as well as the rule of the incumbent, have proven to be most influential when it comes to term amendment struggles. Thus, the prevention of term bids is not simply the product of short-term calculations or events, although both played a role, but rather determined by three dimensions prior to the term amendment struggles: protest experience, changes of governments, and the actual rule of the incumbent. Although these dimensions are rather broad, they are on a higher abstraction level than the case-specific deduced causal chains (see Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: Causal mechanisms from mass protests to the prevention or enforcement of an unconstitutional candidature

Source: Author’s own compilation. The figure illustrates the logical sequence of causal mechanisms.

I account for protest experience on its own although in the Burkinabe case it is congruent with the regime changes. I presume, however, that such networks of opponents as well as political culture or protest cultures, dimensions determined by protest experiences, can also be established through recurrent waves of protests without actually overthrowing a regime.²⁵⁴ I list them separately from changes of governments or rule of the incumbent, because I expect that they matter independently of their timing.²⁵⁵ My historical review demonstrates that Burkinabe activists practiced contentious collective actions over several decades, which encompassed numerous groups of actors of Burkinabe society, which in turn led to the self-understanding of various civilian and military groups as parts of a broader struggle. Through these previous experiences, Burkinabe activists gained knowledge, built networks, and were thus ready to resist collectively. Indeed, especially the student and labor movements had a long tradition of political protest, whose fights were closely interwoven by personal and organizational ties. Since one episode of contention followed the next,

524 I cannot draw any conclusions because mobilizations increased in the Burkinabe case during former regime changes and under the rule of the incumbent.
525 I presume that more recent protest events potentially are easier to re-mobilize since the government opponents might still know each other personally. I am unable to draw conclusions on this matter, however, since I have not compared two cases of similar protest experience but with divergent timings.
opponents of the regime built up dense informal networks, which were visible in protest coalition formations such as CCVC or CODMPP, and likewise in the frequent spillover of mobilizations – from students to soldiers, from unions to students. As a result, Burkinabe protest leaders, even those who were new to the scene, such as the leaders of Balai Citoyen, did not have to mobilize from scratch, whereas Senegalese protest history illustrates periodic divisions among state-challengers due to successful cooptation. Only the youth at high school and university grounds seemed very active in regular mobilization and the use of disruptive means. This represents a huge divergence from Burkina Faso, also with regard to disruptive protest tactics that belong to the repertoire of contention. Generally speaking, Burkinabe protest leaders were determined to resist until the end despite individual costs and favored contestation over moderation or institutional channels, drawing on a culture of contestation, while Senegalese respondents shied away from further escalation and seem marked by a culture of compromise.

Yet, such a strong culture of contestation and such dense networks of opponents are not sufficient to make sense of the lacking trust in elections and of soldiers showing solidarity. My interviews disclose that the democratic trajectories and the narratives constructed around them are highly influential. National historic reference points serve as legitimations for strategies and motivate people to follow them – be they street activism or electoral campaigning. The way regimes and thus governments changed in the past therefore affects, in turn, what I label civil-military relations, and above all trust in elections or popular overthrows. For instance, elections, although having brought a change of government only once, in 2000, are perceived as an essential element of Senegal’s democracy. Despite the fact that rulers’ changeovers in Senegal were primarily guided by political elites, the activists and protest leaders involved in the struggles in 2011/2012 did get to experience the voting out of office of an incumbent. Popular uprisings, on the contrary, never led to a regime or even leadership change, although mobilizations did play a role when Léopold Sédar Senghor handed over power to Abdou Diouf. The opposite was the case in Burkina Faso, where no change of government until Compaoré took place through the ballot box, but only through a combination of mass mobilization and military takeovers, through disruptive means. As for soldiers, they were agents of change in Burkina Faso, while in Senegal they never revolted
or sided with protestors against presidents. 

The rule of the incumbent who actually tried to push an unconstitutional candidature through left its mark on civil-state relations, referring to the manner in which civil society groups positioned themselves vis-à-vis state institutions, and the legitimacy of disruptive protest tactics. Compared to the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, Compaoré’s rule was judged illegitimate by many from the very beginning, so that eventually labor and student movements, which had interlinked their anti-government mobilizations since post-independence, were revitalized under Compaoré’s rule. This resulted in several waves of protest, highly interconnected opponents, and eventually in a collective perception that their various struggles were mutually related against the same unjust regime. During the recurrent protests carried out between 1998 and 2013, lasting protest coalitions across society were established and led the way for constant cross-movement mobilization in 2014. Organizational and personal ties among actors often overlapped, so that joint mobilization became relatively easy to organize. Thus, the protest history and its revitalization under Compaoré provided necessary resources such as organizational and personal ties, knowledge of activism, and protest coalitions, and gave rise to a generation of skilled and experienced activists. By the outbreak of the term struggle,Senegalese civil society, in contrast, was marked by its professionalization. Unlike their Burkina Faso counterparts, Senegalese protest leaders framed the mobilizations and each escalation in 2011/2012 like exceptions. Opponents shied away from confronting institutions despite their unreliability as democratic safeguards, since history and the national narrative told them to rely on routinized politics. In Burkina Faso, actors were unable to build trust for democratic institutions such as elections, since none of them had hindered Compaoré in his violent rule, a fact that, in turn, legitimized disruptive means even further.

In the end, we witness in Burkina Faso a situation of dissatisfied soldiers confronted by the mass mobilization of various actors who are connected through informal personal ties and who are determined to resist until the end – and who are capable of doing so. With regard to

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526 I agree with Maggie Dwyer (2017) that it is wrong and too simplified to argue that there is a strong civil-military relation in Burkina Faso, since we find during transitions as well as during mutinies a rather ambivalent and complex interrelation, to which I shall return in my conclusion.

527 The fact that Burkinabe society is marked by dense personal networks in general seemed to be helpful in this regard. My interpretation is that state institutions are not reliable, so that everyday lives are organized, rather, around personal relationships and self-help groups. Since this interpretation is based on personal observations for which I have not found references in the literature, further investigation would be needed to clarify the role of this potential underlying precondition.
the perceptions of actors and the political history of Burkina Faso, I hold three characteristics responsible for the extent of the mass protests and disruptive tactics (permissive conditions), and for the presence of spreading protests and disloyal soldiers (productive conditions): the interconnectedness of challengers, the culture of contestation, and overlapping military revolts and popular protests (see Figure 5.1). I will return to these insights in the conclusion and position them in regard to the relevant literature.

5.4 Summary

In both cases, mass protests characterized by disruptive tactics opened up a window of opportunity to pressure presidents to change course. However, the Senegalese mass protests never reached such an extent in terms of number of participants and duration of protest events, as well as degree of disruption, as did the Burkinabe ones. Only in Burkina Faso did disruptive protests spread widely across society, where eventually soldiers confronted by non-armed masses refused to open fire. These dimensions in tandem resulted in a situation of weakening governability for the Burkinabe president, who finally fled the country and thus left office without an enforcement of his candidature. Therefore, both conditions – the spreading of mass protests and the refusal of soldiers to shoot – are sufficient. They are hence not rival explanations but rather congruent. Both the presidency itself and prior changes of government proved significant for the actors as they shaped their expectations, perceptions of societal legitimacy, and reliance on past experiences. A history of military and popular overthrows, a broad interconnectedness of challengers, and a strong culture of contestation led Burkinabe protest leaders, activists, and soldiers to the conviction that change would only be possible if Blaise Compaoré left office, and made them able and willing to force him out. The Senegalese political culture, in contrast, is based on a culture of compromise, preferring institutional channels to contentious collective actions. Influenced by the experience of elite-led leadership changes, protest leaders followed a double strategy and (at least partly) accepted the Constitutional Council’s decision. A well-equipped and trained police consequently repressed the few lasting protests easily. From this it follows that not only the governance of the term-seeking incumbent affected collective memories and narratives, but so did the type of previous transitions and mobilizations. Through these prior protest and turnover experiences – and the respective causal (oral) narrative that came with it – only Burkinabe activists were able to coordinate their actions in response to each other
and to resist repressive countermoves, especially due to urban networks that built up over decades and spread even to the armed forces. What these insights implicate for theories, further research, and, last but not least, for activists and democracy promotion in preventing democratic backsliding, will be answered in my concluding remarks.
6. Conclusion

“C’était une des dernières chances que le peuple burkinabè avait de pouvoir réagir à la tentative de Blaise Compaoré de se maintenir encore cinq ans au pouvoir. [...] c’est une dynastie qui se prépare”.
(Movement leader of Balai Citoyen)528

Departing from the puzzling observation that the term bids of some incumbents end with the withdrawal of the amendment or candidature, while others result in the successful renewal of their position or even lifelong presidencies in some cases, my objective was to understand in what ways protests or social movements contribute to these divergent outcomes. In contrast to former studies on extended term bids in Africa, I addressed the issue in a broader manner by focusing on term amendment struggles through the lenses of contentious politics. For this purpose, I proposed and carried out a systematic and comparative analysis of the various episodes of contention by tracing back over events, actors’ perceptions and the historical roots of these episodes in a theory-guided manner in two similar cases (similar in regard to their institutional settings, key social movements, and public support of tenure restrictions), Senegal (2011/12) and Burkina Faso (2013/14). Until now, the research in this field has been primarily based around concerns with institutional settings, the status of the rule of law, and post-presidency prospects to prevent term extension attempts in the first place. My research interest, however, focused on that period of time when the head of state has already announced the attempt to prolong their ruling, and thus on the related questions of (1) how term amendment struggles are fought (differently), (2) which role mobilized social actors play in them, and (3) why they proceed in certain manners and thus result in dissimilar outcomes of presidents rerunning or resigning. Collective contentious actions and actors stood at the forefront of my analysis, which was another expansion of the ground covered by preexisting studies, since they are usually treated as one coherent unity that put additional pressure from below on the power-seeking rulers, but not as integral parts of the struggle in themselves. In this conclusion, I will summarize my key findings and relate them back to the existing studies on term bids in Africa in order to develop the debate and research field further. Following this, I will critically reflect upon the limitations, blind spots, and caveats of my study. The second part of the conclusion will be an extensive outlook: First, I will suggest an agenda for future research on term amendment struggles in accordance with

528 Interview with leader of Balai Citoyen, November 17, 2016, Berlin.
my own approach, but also in view of its limitations. Second, I will briefly shed light on the
more recent developments that followed these episodes of contention in the West African
states. I finish with a policy perspective on the power of protests against presidential power,
and thus aspiringly aim to contribute to real struggles against democratic backsliding.

6.1 Key findings from the study of term amendment struggles

Since the literature review revealed that most of the existing works on term amendment
struggles concentrated on case-specific knowledge or the question of how to initially prevent
the term bids of presidents on the African continent, most of the findings are rather detached
from broader debates on democratization, civil resistance, and social movements. Some
insights do find their way back into discussions on democratization in Africa, but there tends
to be a focus on power-sharing arrangements and the functioning of institutions
(Posner/Young 2018). The impact of protests and social movements is often integrated at
the peripheries of explanatory frameworks, usually noting their power to exert pressure, but
remaining blurry overall in terms of their interactions, plurality of (contentious collective)
actors, and mechanisms. Several scholars still „lack the means to conceptualize the role of
social opposition adequately, even when they clearly want to acknowledge its importance“
(Collier/Mahoney 1999: 115). For this reason, I followed the alternative approach of theory-
guided process-tracing which combined insights of transitology, contentious politics, and
non-violent revolution studies. Following this approach, I built an explanatory system by
merging ten actor-oriented mechanisms that depict how protests are linked to the decisions
of presidents or governments to change course (see chapter two for details). I overcame the
above-below distinction that has dominated scholarly debates on term bids that positioned
term-opponents as being underneath the national political arena, and attributed to them a
lesser role, one as agents whose only role is to exert some sort of usually undefined pressure
(see 1.2). My research design on the other hand not only acknowledges the diversity of so-
called ‘popular protest’, but understands them as strategical actors, who respond to and
follow incentives just as political elites do. Following contentious politics approaches, I
positioned contentious collective actors as strategically-acting players operating in the some
of the same (as well as in other) arenas as governing elites with whom they horizontally
interact, although through different means and often with more disparate access to the
political arena.
In line with these fields of literature, I employed a methodological framework that encompassed the in-depth analysis of the respective episodes of contention and their comparisons, with the purpose of singling out how term amendment struggles are fought (differently), and which roles mobilized social actors play in them. In order to answer my last question, why they proceed the ways they do and thus result in dissimilar outcomes of presidents rerunning or resigning, I placed the struggles back in their historical context in order to deduce the prior developments that explain the divergences. For that reason, I included insights from the field of comparative politics, namely those of Hillel D. Soifer (2010) on productive and permissive conditions, as well as those of Dan Slater and Erica Simmons (2012) on critical antecedents, who illustrate how to reason more thoughtfully when it comes to qualitative research on causal mechanisms and thus overcome the tendency to simply list relevant dimensions. Such a research design thus required on one side “profound knowledge of competing theories”, and on the other “deep familiarity with the analyzed cases” (Falleti 2016: 460). For the latter requirement, I used a wide range of sources including secondary and grey literature, such as human rights reports, as well as primary data of calls to protest, media reporting, and internal documents that I collected during my fieldwork and analyzed thereafter.

6.1.1 Novel research approach and design

The development and application of such an actor and process-oriented approach is itself a contribution to the study of extensions of presidential terms in Africa, since my research design went beyond preexisting work. So far, numerous scholars have pronounced the need for more comparative and process-oriented work, but have often failed to offer methodological solutions in order to study processes and actor relations appropriately. As a result, we often see a lack of clarification on causation, path dependency, or mechanisms. My approach thus opens up a new perspective on the topic. Usually, so-called ‘third term bids’ are mainly conceptualized as exceptional phenomenon that may be prevented through institutional barriers preventing incumbents from attempting them in the first place (see 1.2). I understand them, in contrast, as entry points, or in the words of social movement scholars, the political opportunity for mobilization, for struggles of diverse actors, some supporting and some opposing the unconstitutional candidature. This means that I see term bids neither as merely procedural questions in view of the institutional set-up of regimes, nor as
exceptions to the general rule of law. In turn, I conceptualized them as one of many episodes of democratization in which actors contest in which direction the regime in place moves, towards democratic backsliding or unseating. Such a reading opens up the opportunity for the scholarly community to reflect on term bids in a much broader sense — as struggles for more or less democracy.

This approach is in line with the insights of democratization studies. The departure from a powerful position and thus its temporal limitation is often judged, more or less explicitly, as the central criteria for distinguishing democratically-responsible ruling from autocratic personalized leadership, and as the core feature of any democracy (Linz/Stepan 1996b). My deduced theoretical framework, based on cross-regional comparisons and systematized according to the groups of actors involved, may thus serve future studies that are interested in understanding how such democratic reversions, can be prevented by protests of, among others, social movements. Although this theoretical structure guided my analysis of term amendment struggles, its underpinnings are derived from much broader studies on institutional change and so I hope that some benefits can be earned from my work for studies of democratization, protests or social movements in Africa. This theoretical framework might be equally applicable to other world regions as long as we are studying regimes that are not considered fully authoritarian or democratic, since in other ‘hybrid regimes’ we may find similar patterns (see for instance Robertson 2011 on Russia). These advancements add conceptual clarity to ongoing debates about how protests impact governmental decisions or changes. Beyond the innovative research design that I contribute to the field, the focus on two West African cases that have not been included in any preexisting cross-case studies adds knowledge to the term bid and case-specific country literatures. Guided by theory but not strictly ‘testing’ it, I was able to inductively explore additional aspects of the topic, some of which I pick up in this conclusion, while others are to be elaborated in future studies yet to be developed.
6.1.2 Theoretical framework and empirical evidence – The scope of disruptive protests and the importance of disloyal soldiers

With regard to my first research question, in what manner did these two term amendment struggles proceed differently, I traced back the major political and protest events, outlining the back-and-forth processes these confrontations went through. In both cases we find some courses of action that closely resemble each other: initial mass mobilizations that led to first escalations, followed by more demobilized months in which each incumbent tried to handle the issue within the political arena and thus attempted to bargain for change, and then in both cases the opposition parties ending any negotiation attempt of the incumbent (for details see chapter four). A more minor observation, but one that is nonetheless interesting for further studies, is that the actual announcement of the amendment of tenure restrictions functions similarly to election dates. Both provide opportunities for government-opponents to mobilize for protests. The protests are often framed in ways that also address other grievances with the government or even the larger system that’s in place. This means that the in-depth analysis of such mobilizations, for instance with a focus on the protests’ framing, enables us to find out more about the current demands of African citizens, to which the governing elites may not be responding or even be accused of actively causing.\footnote{Together with my colleague Louisa Prause, I already applied the framing approach to these two cases studied, which illustrates how protest leaders bridge through a citizenship framing diverse demands for better governance, see Louisa Prause and Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop (2017).}

However, the crucial point of divergence within the episodes of contention that I was examining took place in the final stage of protests. First, the escalation peaked in both states after institutions paved the way for a renewed candidature (in Burkina Faso the Council of Ministers and in Senegal the Constitutional Council), but then decreasing mobilization and a split of the opponents following dispersal strategies characterized the next phase in Senegal, while in Burkina Faso the mobilization reached a new level in terms of scope and disruption, and eventually resulted in the disloyalty of state security forces to the president.

Guided by my theoretical framework, I followed three groups of actors involved in the struggles – political elites, non-elite actors, and security forces – and deduced ten causal mechanisms from the existing literature that could potentially link anti-term protests to presidents changing course (see chapter two, Figures 2.1-2.3): The splitting of political elites may result in changes through bargaining among elites in the political arena, empowerment
of anti-term-mobilizations, the political alignment of these split elites with the term-opponents, or coordinated action across the non-elite and elitist term-opponents. Coalition formations with non-elite actors, based on either organizational grounds in democratic contexts or on ideological and more forms of loose bonds in authoritarian contexts, can lead to changes via cohesive campaigning, popular coercion if the mobilization shifts in scale and thus in scope, or socioeconomic coercion if trade unions are involved. The refusal of security forces to repress non-violent protests results in the empowerment of the anti-term-mobilizations and thus a serious threat for the ruler, sometimes even mutinies. Related to this last group of actors, their use of disruptive tactics can also be effective at spurring change. I will now briefly discuss which links I found to be present in the two analyzed cases following the structure of my second chapter, ordered by the different groups of actors – political elites, non-elite actors, and security forces.

Concerning the primarily role of political elites, a full split of elites, where members actually leave the ruling party, happened only in Burkina Faso. Here, polarization proved to be relevant for the split and former companions of Blaise Compaoré aligned politically with the anti-term front of mobilized social actors and opposition parties. Although this incident clearly empowered the mobilizations further, for the bigger picture it did not prove to be causally relevant enough explain the divergent outcomes (see chapter five for in-depth reasoning). These findings on political elites thus challenge commonly held assumptions among policy makers and researchers that such divided elites are key for change. Additionally, they differ from the results of the cross-case study by Ben Armstrong (2011) who gave most of the credit for the prevention of another term in Zambia in 2011 to a split of political elites.

With regard to the coalition formations, an analytical dimension I conceptualized separately from political elites, focusing instead on non-elite actors, opponents did enter coalitions but they played out very differently across the two cases. So we saw that a loosely organized movement based largely on interpersonal urban networks was able to successfully prevent the president from holding onto power, while the more organized movement did not achieve its aims. In Senegal, rather early on actors formed an organizational body, the Mouvement du 23 Juin (M23), that operated similarly to other umbrella organizations, featuring a defined board of members and formalized procedures. Burkinabe actors, in contrast, loosely aligned in terms of a broad anti-term front called Collectif anti-référendum (CAR). At first, their
mobilizations were based around preexisting coalitions (the institutionalized unified opposition of the CFOP or the well-recognized protest alliance of CCVC), but later coordinated their actions and thus tactics primarily through dense interpersonal urban networks. This finding is most interesting since such a distinction would be expected based on former studies between authoritarian or democratic states. At the points in time when the respective incumbent attempted his term bid, Senegal in 2011 and Burkina Faso in 2013, both states were externally rated quite similarly in terms of their democratic openness (see 3.2.2). Furthermore, institutional settings resembled each other in these two semi-presidential states whose constitutions were modeled after the French system. Despite these institutional similarities, actors nonetheless behaved as if they perceived themselves to be operating in different systems – in a democratic surrounding in Senegal, and in an authoritarian context in Burkina Faso. It appears to be not so much the actual political system or restrictions of political rights that mattered, but rather how those who decided on strategies (such as protest leaders) perceived the system.

This finding supports the political opportunity approach that has come to understand shifting political opportunities as being related not only to institutional determinants, but also to actors’ assessments of situations (for example Jasper 2011). This difference concerning the choices of actors points to historical precedents as shaping actors more than the actual existing political rights do. Since both cases featured extended periods of repression, the closing of spaces for opposition (such as bans on demonstrations), and institutions legitimizing the presidential plans, the political context did not differ massively at the take-off of the term amendment struggles, but had in the past. Consequently, my comparative analysis demonstrates that neither democratic performance measurement, nor institutional arrangements — both aspects my case selection criteria controlled for (see 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) — account for the proceeding of term amendment struggles, but rather the socio-cultural and political imprint of the countries’ democratic trajectories were the deciding factors. These findings contradict the tendency of many democratization and social movement scholars to expect different mechanisms based solely on states being non-democratic or democratic (see chapter two). I will come back to this point when I shed light on the divergence of the two struggles.

What in turn did appear to be causally relevant for the question of why the cases ended differently was the scale shift of the anti-term-mobilizations in Burkina Faso that then
resulted in broad mobilizations across various societal and political actors. This was in contrast to Senegal, where mobilizations remained limited to the capital and its surrounding area, as well as to certain societal groups such as the urban youth and highly professional civil society groups. One area where we see this distinction clearly are trade unions, who in Burkina Faso called for protest marches and strikes in tandem with the broader movement and thus mobilized yet further segments of society, while the Senegalese unions decided for the most part to stay out of the struggle. However, the involvement of trade unions that scholars usually expect to transfer into socioeconomic coercion seemed to be insignificant for the outcome in Burkina Faso, since schools and universities were the major locations of strikes, rather than institutions that block routinized politics such as the transport sector or public administration. Nevertheless, the involvement of trade unions was decisive for the scale of the mobilization, especially in regard to the specific links between the student and labor movements in Burkina Faso. In view of the scope of mobilization, its duration, and spatial spread which all proved causally relevant in my examples, my research is in line with discoveries from previous studies on civil resistance (Nepstad 2011) and supports those social movement studies that highlight the importance of the size (Biggs 2016) and cross-actor dimensions of social movements (Geene 1974). For instance, Daniel Vencovsky (2007: 18) stresses the spectrum of mobilizations across society for anti-term protests, and thus argues for the importance of broad or cross-class mobilization for state opponents in achieving change. For my cross-case analysis, this doesn’t mean that the unity among mobilized social actors was of the utmost significance, but rather it was their ability to spread protests through their interconnections and to use disruptive tactics when needed. Burkinabe protest leaders and activists seemed to agree on this strategy of using disruptive methods, but the agreement was not based primarily on the choice of one organizational unit. First and foremost, the interviews revealed that sharing a certain, what I call ‘culture of contestation’, and being part of highly connected interpersonal networks proved more relevant than the levels of cohesion or unity. The spread and eventual scope of the disruptive protest events is one part of the explanation of the cross-case divergence, however the resignation of Blaise Compaoré only resulted after the soldiers refused orders. Which leads us to the last group of actors my theoretical framework includes: the state security forces. As my theoretical model assumed the disloyalty of soldiers should not only empower contentious collective actors but also lead to a serious threat, my study confirms the findings of the scholarly community.

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530 I refer here to the formation of CAR that encompassed over 350 associations but stayed loosely organized and overall did not appear as one strong united voice in the public or political arena, see chapter four.
working on non-violent revolutions that highlight the importance of the behavior and choices of the armed forced (for example Carter 2012).

These observations on the relevance of the broadness of mobilization, as well as of disruptive tactics and disloyal soldiers, contradict at least partly the findings of Boniface Dulani (2011a, 2011b, 2015) who studied two other cases in which a candidature was prevented but where the struggles apparently went differently. He held “the level of unity and cohesion of the movements” (Dulani 2011b: 127) as being mostly responsible for convincing the presidents to resign. But his cases differed from the Burkinabe term amendment struggle of 2014, since in Malawi (2002) and Zambia (2001) the amendments to bypass term limits were hindered by members of parliament who voted against it, so the amendments were unable to pass the necessary threshold. Activists, who he refers to as ‘social movements’ (he does not provide clear definitions or demarcations for such terms), succeeded through cohesive campaigning in getting politicians to vote against the constitutional amendment the incumbent introduced in parliament. These examples thus support the expectation that for democratic states, the cohesion of campaigns are decisive for their outcomes. However, his cases are states with frequent elections and which are rated as democratically stable overall. Regarding my cross-case results, one can argue that in such states that feature democratic institutions with longer traditions, these institutions themselves (such as constitutional councils or parliaments) are necessary to control tenure restrictions, if they fail instead, like in the case of Senegal, opponents are worse prepared to prevent such democratic backslidings. Where instead such institutions are not well respected – in terms of perceived legitimacy and knowledge –, activists are more willing to stay outside of institutionalized arenas and seem more ready for direct confrontations, as in the Burkinabe case.

To summarize the findings regarding cross-case divergent outcomes, my observations showed how the struggles, to a certain extent and even within the episodes of contention, resembled each other until the last stage. The Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré found himself in front of tens of thousands people who were employing tremendously disruptive methods aimed against public representative buildings and the private houses of ruling elites, and a military who had refused orders to open fire upon the unarmed protestors. The Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, in contrast, was able to rely on the well-equipped riot police to control dissidents in the streets while the legitimation of his extended candidature was passed by the Constitutional Council. Instances of civilian casualties
divided his opponents and ended up resulting in an abrupt end to the confrontations and an overall demobilization. Ultimately, the comparative analysis across these two cases demonstrated that not one group of actors or key mechanism could completely explain cross-case-dissimilarity, but rather the combination of enduring mass mobilizations, the extensive use of disruption, and the refusal of soldiers to shoot protestors were the key features that prevented the renewed candidature of Blaise Compaoré.

6.1.3 The division of tasks – Social movements and political parties

In addition to the theoretical links between protests and presidents that guided my investigation, we observed yet another crucial disparity between theoretical conceptualizations and the empirical evidence. Social movements and other civil society groups constantly engaged in mutual relations with opposition parties and thus the clear-cut separation between political elites and non-elites turned out to exist only in theory. Starting with the social movements at the forefront and having my case selection be based on comparable characteristics (see 3.2.3), the insights of my cross-case analysis captured some of the complexity of actors’ interrelations and thus set the relative impact of social movements. In neither case did one actor prove to be the most relevant, but rather multiple factors that came together in that moment in time. With regard to my second research concern of the role of social movements, in both cases, the newly created movements of Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen called for protest side-by-side opposition leaders, spoke at their rallies, or entered protest coalitions despite the engagement of these opposition actors from the formalized political arena. At the same time, their much broader framed protest claims address likewise these groups of actors with whom they ally temporarily. While often conceptualized and portrayed as being strictly opposed or hostile to each other, these different groups of actors are far more interwoven than assumed by the scholarly community and described in the media. According to the academic understanding, I would have expected political parties to be only relevant as ‘partners in crime’ who provide access to the political arena. In both cases under study however, political parties, including the ruling party, mobilized their followers to ‘protest’. In the national and European media coverage, the role of the ‘youth movements’ was dramatically overemphasized, while that of the political

531 In line with my understanding of protest, I consider such mobilizations by governing elites not to be protest events, although I admit their resembling appearance.
parties was neglected or downplayed. This point is also made by Lila Chouli (2015) referring to the Burkinabe case: „The role of these ‘citizen’ movements in the mobilisation in Burkina Faso – and not in the popular insurrection – is indisputable, however it seems largely overrated in the media, especially the international media.” (Chouli 2015: 326).

Dieter Rucht (2017) has also detected such a bias already in European reporting, saying that “journalists are keen to unveil the latest trends, to report especially on spectacular and/or disruptive social movement actions, often exaggerating the ‘newness’ or ‘uniqueness’ of what they are observing, and overestimating the role of certain ‘leaders’ in an attempt to give their stories a ‘personal spin’” (Rucht 2017: 46-47). In particular, the popularity of the leaders in the cases of Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen that acted as front men resulted in a great acceleration in the attention being paid to the cases by journalists, scholars and politicians. This extra attention was, in turn, helpful for increasing mobilization, and means it is not surprising to see musicians or sportsmen became more and more political figures in many African states in the time since (de Waal/Ibreck 2013: 316-317). Nonetheless, it led to a bias in the reporting on the actual effects of these social movements. My in-depth analysis that sets them in relation to other actors and events questions such a reading. In view of my overall research interests, what part these social movements played within the struggles, the in-depth analysis uncovers their specific role in the initial mobilizations, but also their limited leadership as the various dynamics played out. The latter point holds particularly true for the Burkinabe case, when eventually the mass protests were mostly leaderless – a characteristic scholars have identified in uprisings in the Middle East also (Sela 2016: 282-283). In a recently published book on popular protest in Africa, Lisa Mueller (2018) talks about the ‘generals of the revolutions’ in order to distinguish them from the ‘foot soldiers’ who follow. Such a conceptualization may mislead one to create the image of movement leaders deciding on strategies by themselves, and thus having profound independent agency in directing the character and strategies of revolutions. I found instead that movement leaders and key figures of the political opposition divided the tasks: While movement leaders animated the crowds or mobilized especially the young people, opposition members helped

532 I put ‘youth movements’ in brackets since my focus was not to investigate their constituency. First impressions led to serious doubts about an early labeling as representatives of the youth. Only if we use the denomination of ‘youth’ also in socioeconomic and not only age-related terms (in line with Jan Abbink (2005)) might it seem justified.

533 Besides, the last phase of the struggle in Burkina Faso illustrates that the leadership might not last for the whole uprising but instead needs to be carefully researched for each episode of contentions as well as each smaller sequence of contentious episodes.
with their access to resources and organizational capacities, called for some sort of ‘protest marches’ themselves, and – as must be expected – negotiated in tandem for change in the political arena.534

Each case discussed here shed light on an aspect that is worth further investigation: In Burkina Faso, the specific function of the Chef de File de l’Opposition (CFOP), which is an institutionalized role established in 2009 of the opposition in parliament and its spokesperson, and in general the case-specific arrangements would be interesting to study in terms of their power to shape future changes of governance and governments (for an interesting early attempt see Bertrand 2018). In Senegal, in turn, M23 portrayed themselves as a social movement but operated as a civil society umbrella organization that had numerous parties involved in the background. Hence, I would be curious to further investigate and compare across cases these kinds of coalitions. For other ‘hybrid regimes’ on the continent, Adrienne LeBas (2011) comes to quite a similar conclusion — that opposition parties as allies take up the role of coordinators for the contentious collective actions.535 In her cases this led to a takeover of the movement by opposition leaders in their own potentially diverging interests, leading her to warn about focusing on the short-term direct effects for protests, if in practice they are being mediated by elites. These insights call for more empirically grounded examinations when it comes to elite-protestor interactions. Therefore, my study supports the findings of Swen Hutter and colleagues (forthcoming) on movement-party relations in European and American examples, who argue that the lack of representation of citizens’ causes leads to more frequent and closely-linked relations of citizens’ movements and political parties, and so the authors call for us to overcome the strict separation of institutional arenas on one side and social movements in the periphery on the other side.536 This is all the more of interest, since studies point at a representation crisis for Senegal (see for instance Diome 2014).

534 Examples are, for instance, when the newly created MPP provided office space for a local branch of CAR or when leaders of Balai Citoyen repeatedly appeared on the front stage of opposition rallies in Burkina Faso, or in Senegal, when opposition parties apparently paid for travel costs and provided transports for the young people from the banlieues in order to facilitate their participation in protest events in central Dakar; see chapter four for details. I elaborated the role of such ‘youth movements’ further in a policy paper on the issue, see Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop (2017b). For the argument on youth mobilization see also Michel Luntumbue (2017).

535 Adrienne LeBas (2011) studied party-building and democratization in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya.

536 I discussed together with my colleague Jannis Grimm this conceptual distinction in general in our editorial for a special issue on movement-institution-relations that was based on a working group I initiated on this specific topic (see Grimm/Wienkoop forthcoming).
6.1.4 Political culture, past protest experiences, and civil-military relations – Critical antecedents to the term bid

Beyond these above findings about the two respective episodes of contention, the comparative analysis uncovered that these ‘exceptional times’, a term repeatedly used by movement leaders for contentious episodes, are embedded in the history of a country, whose legacy significantly shapes the cross-case divergence as a critical antecedent. Despite facing situations that were in ways very similar – institutions paving the way for another candidature and state security forces repressing protests – protest leaders ‘read’ their respective situations in significantly different ways. Especially once the established institutions began to legitimize the extended candidature attempts, protest leaders found themselves at the same juncture – the escalation of protester-police clashes. At that turning point, repressive state counteractions resulted in demobilization in Senegal, while in Burkina Faso actors accelerated their efforts to oust Blaise Compaoré through continuous mass mobilizations and employing all available disruptive means that increased in severity with every step. Similar to the findings of Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007), repressive counteraction of governments does not necessarily result in less mobilization, but only if actors actually fear further causalities, as was the case in Senegal. But if the extent of the repressive reaction is instead seen as unjust, it may lead to further mobilizations like in Burkina Faso, especially if the overall repressiveness of the regime is already judged as excessive. The rich insights based on my fieldwork depicts actors that interpret differently the contexts they are acting in, although the struggles happened in comparable semi-presidential system that are partially democratically open and whose populations generally supports term limits by large margins. For that reason one of my key contributions to the research field is highlighting the relevancy to not only integrate actors more rigorously, but to position them properly within their historical contexts and their political culture. What these cases of most similar systems highlight is not so much the importance of the whole system, but rather how experiences, prior positioning within the political system, and existing know-how matter. This closer inspection that traced the perspectives of actors back, listening to how they themselves explain their choices, preferences, and the options they perceived, unveils how democratic pathways, the manner of regime changes, and the rule of

537 Repressive threats are the costs of individuals to participate in social movement activities, while the current threat or repressiveness is the overall costs individuals face under the regime in general (Goldstone/Tilly 2001).
the incumbent shaped state-society as well as civil-military relations. This means that the institutional-buildings alone in a path dependancy do not determine the stability of democratic regimes or norms, but rather the developed political culture as well as the self-understanding of security forces does. From this it follows that scholars studying regime types and democratization, should likewise consider how the institution-building processes make an impact on democratic and thus political culture.

Thus, my study points to three relevant critical antecedents that I detected to be present prior to the struggles for institutional compliance only in Burkina Faso: the *interconnectedness of challengers*, the *culture of contestation*, and the *overlap of military revolts and popular overthrow*. When it comes to the choices of actors, it wasn’t political systems or levels of democratic openness that determined their actions, but rather (personal, or orally or collectively transmitted) their past experiences with regime changes, or in the words of political culture approaches, their political socialization. This means that it is essential not only to differentiate the divergent regime types but rather to retrace the building of institutions and norms likewise. Institutions shape political culture that than shape actors in their strategies and perceptions. This study illustrates for instance the importance of the predominantly orally transmitted memories of revolutionary heritage in Burkina Faso, and of democratic pride in Senegal. Such narratives that are present in everyday (political) life are relevant for future pro-democratic struggles to come.

Although both West African countries are classified as relatively democratic, *how* they are democratic and undemocratic differ. For instance, the way the state actually ‘managed’ contention indicates such variations: Since independence, the three rulers who governed Senegal up until 2011 followed a divide-and-rule strategy, that in generally involved several civil society leaders joining government arrangements temporarily, and thus lack the capacity to mobilize opposition across societal groups. The first post-independence president was able to ease episodes of contention through controlled leadership change from above, which was afterwards sold as an early example of democracy, while most of the democratic achievements such as the multiparty system remained as facades. Burkinabe actors had witnessed several overthrows by protests and the military acting in tandem, but had never experienced any changes of heads of states through elections, and so they seemingly then had no trust in voting Compaoré out of office. Thus, they committed resolutely to mass
mobilizations, for which actors seemed well prepared.\textsuperscript{538} In contrast, Senegalese actors had voted an incumbent out of office before and had never experienced a power turnover with protests playing a primary role, so then it is not surprising that they split on the issues of strategy, with some campaigning and others protesting.

The point in time in which the term bid actually happens appears to be relevant, even more so if we consider that under Blaise Compaoré we had already witnessed one term amendment in 1997, which opponents were unable to prevent. For that reason, not only the precedents for regime changes and protest experiences are crucial, but so is the style of rule of the incumbent. Burkinabe opposition actors for example justify their use of disruptive action and street-activism strategies by referring to the violence of the rule of an incumbent that has been filling his own pockets and those of his family for too long. These observations are in line with more recent works on the Middle East that point to the relevance of state integration of opponents, and the opposition’s overall position in relation to the political system including the state and its security forces (Kamara 2008; Sela 2016; Bayat 2013, 2017; Lust-Okar 2005, 2004).

My findings therefore point to a more profound aspect to which I will come back in my outlook on future research: Not so much are institutional differences relevant for the manner in which contentious collective actions play out, but rather are the specific relations among actors, which I assume differ tremendously within the assortment of existing hybrid regimes (see for instance Osa/Schock 2007: 124-126). Actors in the two West African cases, and I expect this holds true for many other examples, interpreted reactions and opportunities through various lenses. This is all the more relevant as the dichotomist categorization of democratic states on one hand and authoritarian states on the other seem less and less appropriate today, since the majority of states are in a ‘grey zone’ (for Africa see van de Walle 2009, 2002).\textsuperscript{539} Maryjane Osa and Kurt Schock questioned the importance of political openness in hybrid regimes, which are characterized by a constantly changing “combination of repression and promises of future reforms” (Osa/Schock 2007: 128), while repressions may lead either to a decrease or rise of mobilization (Martin 2015). This points to an aspect Adrienne LeBas (2011) highlighted regarding hybrid regimes in Africa: “Past strategies of

\textsuperscript{538} One example is the notion of several involved protest leaders that they called their constituencies to prepare for following escalations (see 4.1.4).

\textsuperscript{539} This denomination refers to the discussion I participated in on “Demokratie in Afrika: Stagnation in der Grauzone” organized by the GIGA Institute on January 25, 2018, Berlin.
authoritarian states structure what organizational resources are available to social movements, which group identities are salient, and what kinds of coalitions of non-state actors are possible” (LeBas 2011: 36). This means that the management of contestation by governing elites of the past influenced the form of coalitions, protests, and perceptions of the regimes’ legitimacy today. I was only able to identify such critical antecedents due to my small-n-comparison design that allowed the embedding of these struggles into their historical contexts.

In line with comparative historical analysis approaches, this study underlines that episodes of contention, or respectively critical junctures, do not occur in a vacuum, nor do term amendment struggles that may lead to moments of disruption. Like the Northern African uprisings we have seen in recent years, these anti-term mobilizations in Senegal and Burkina Faso are “spin-off mobilizations” (della Porta 2016: 308), which have been growing in number over the last few decades. This means that although such moments indicate a disruption of routinized politics, they are nevertheless shaped and constrained by the existing civil-state and civil-military relations, an argument Nic Cheeseman (2018) makes about how the rules of the game shape political trajectories. This implies that every regime or leadership change will have a lasting impact on future political developments and leave behind a political legacy. Some particular crises, these that I call term bids that can be threats to prior democratic achievements, function as moments for the reemergence of memory — memory that may be personally lived, but mostly seems to be related to shared historical narratives. This becomes visible when young Burkinabe understand themselves as ‘children of Sankara’ without most of them having actually lived during his rule, or when Senegalese protest leaders glorify the country’s democratic accomplishments but confess to the country’s current undemocratic nature. This political cultural impact is a striking feature I discovered, which should be explored in more detail in the future.

I observed that Senegalese actors, whose public and political arenas grew steadily more authoritarian under Wade’s presidency, still behaved as actors in democratic states. They built alliances based on organizational ties, shied away from radicalization and instead respected institutions, even though all agreed on the general illegitimacy and role as the prolonged arm of a too powerful president of these institutions. It seems that Senegalese actors found themselves caught between democratic pride and their past on one side, and growing authoritarian rule on the other – although one can question the democratic success
story in the first place, given it was elite-led leadership change and only the one time voting-out of someone in office. All of these findings point at a crucial aspect that is more topical than ever before: Once regimes democratize institutionally and citizens perceive their governments as acting overall within a democratic system, people face obstacles to preventing the authoritarian turns of rulers. In states with past experience of popular and military overthrows, even if these were driven by some sort of ‘unholy alliance’, mass protests can prevent the short-term outcome of an enforced candidature like we saw in Burkina Faso. The attempt to change the constitutional limits to ruling has been ultimately perceived by many as the last step from de jure democratic, to de facto authoritarian state practices, and hence the last opportunity to get rid of an unpopular president. Thus they conceived the prevention of a further candidature as ‘resistance to authoritarian consolidation’. This is in line with the work of researchers on political elites such as Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young (2018), who highlight the impact of former experiences and illustrate that changes of government in earlier periods affect the later decisions regarding presidential ruling. Based on my findings, I would expand their argument to say that not only are governing elites influenced by these experiences, but so are the protest leaders and activists. Below I will discuss the implications of this for democratization in Africa in particular, and also for the promotion of democracy more generally.

6.1.5 Summary

To sum up, once a president succeeds in amending the constitution or circumventing the constitutional boundaries to his personal power, the process to push this candidature through is not straightforward. On the contrary, term bids function in a similar manner to other types of political opportunities, and thus also trigger confrontations between opponents and supporters of the governing elites. These groups of actors are, however, themselves diverse. My study in particular questioned the notion of single-minded crowds who act in concert, outside of political arenas. Instead, I found closely interlinked relations among opposition parties and civil society groups or respectively social movements. However, neither the forms of these coalitions, nor how divided the elites were, were the most relevant factors for the cross-case divergence I observed. In order to make sense of cross-case differences, we

540 I used this title for a policy paper I wrote with my colleague Eloise Bertrand on the mobilizations against the tenure prolongation in Burkina Faso, see Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop and Eloise Bertrand (2018).
need to place episodes of contention and critical junctures back into their national historical contexts. It was clear that the levels that mass protests and the use of disruptive tactics reached, as well as the choices made by state security forces, were influenced by past experiences with protests, regime or leadership changes, and the nature of the current presidency. Even though the protests against the government exploded in 2014, they had been building up over the previous number of decades. As a result, in the Burkinabe case widespread mobilization in tandem with disruptive tactics and soldiers refusing to shoot protestors resulted in the prevention of another term of Blaise Compaoré. This means that it wasn’t the institutional settings such as power-sharing arrangements, constitutional laws, democratic openness, or majoritarian parliamentary distributions that determined the divergent outcomes of the two struggles, but rather the long-running interrelations and self-understandings of civil society groups and state security forces. How far these deduced patterns and insights are capable of being applied across cases will be critically reviewed in the next section.

6.2 Limitations and outlook

Given the fact that this approach was novel in its design and the topic itself was understudied, I chose term amendment struggles that were most similar at their respective outsets in 2011 (Senegal) and 2013 (Burkina Faso), in terms of their institutional preconditions, the social movements at the forefronts, high public support of tenure restrictions, and the occurrence of large-scale protests. Such an approximate most-similar-systems design allowed me to dive deeply into the dynamics of the confrontations, but also comes with limitations to its generalizability of my findings.

6.2.1 What I cannot explain (yet)

Since my intent was not to develop a general theoretical model, the causal mechanisms I have identified first and foremost explain the divergent outcomes in these particular cases, and at most can shed light on other term amendment struggles. In view of the selection criteria, I assume that high support for term limits is necessary for such broad mobilizations
and for the use and acceptance of disruptive means of protest.\textsuperscript{541} If citizens do not support or see the need for tenure restrictions on presidencies, then I would not expect any social movement or other civil society group to mobilize around the issue to such an extent. Furthermore, citizens may turn against the contentious collective actors when they use disruptive means for a purpose they consider to be irrelevant or false. With regard to the institutional or social movement characteristics, my results pointed their lack of importance in determining the actual outcome. Although I will reason in the following section what these insights imply for democratization in Africa and the power of protest and social movements in particular, further research will be needed to show if such results can also be found in other political contexts in which presidents attempt democratic backsliding.

The relevant dimensions I deduced to be productive or permissive conditions, or critical antecedents, are primarily case-specific. However, I then endeavored to abstract the relevant dimensions in order to make them fruitful for further investigation (see Figure 5.2). I reasoned that the divergence of the outcomes relates back to three dimensions – the scope and size of mass protests and use of disruptive tactics, the disloyalty of security forces, and to critical antecedents, in reference to past protest experience, rule of the incumbent, and former regime changes. Since the two cases under study differed in all three aspects within the critical juncture, I am unable to draw conclusions on their respective necessities, i.e. if all of them need to be present or if some are enough to produce the divergence. In the Senegal example, in contrast to Burkina Faso, the spread of mobilization and the use of disruptive tactics occurred only to a small extent, while there were no instances of soldiers or policemen disobeying orders. This means that I cannot know for certain if the same amount of participants across societal groups using disruptive means had existed in Senegal would have prevented Wade’s candidature, irrespective of the behavior of the public security forces. To properly understand these interdependencies, an in-depth analysis from the street level view would have been necessary, in order to explore the daily local dynamics. In particular, that narrow time period of those final intense days, between October 21 and October 31, 2014 in Burkina Faso, would be of great interest. For instance, Burkinabe protest leaders portray the point in time when the state house was set on fire as a momentous event that triggered the broad mobilization and potentially its longevity. Such profound relevance of certain events

\textsuperscript{541} Since the findings of the 5th round of Afrobarometer surveys reveal majority support for term limits on an average of 75\% on the continent (Dulani 2015), this scope condition of popular support shall not exclude many cases if ever.
has been shown by Donatella della Porta (2014) in other cases that she labels ‘eventful democratization’. Although I took such events to be significant for the Burkinabe struggle, only a more thorough and adequate analysis of local dynamics on the street level would allow clear-cut conclusions.

Another aspect that my qualitative approach and focus on processes and interrelations is unable to fully assess is the threshold, or as more quantitatively-oriented scholars would call it, the value, of the respective dimensions: How many soldiers need to refuse orders in order to result in a serious threat? How many people have to attend a protest for it to lead to some sort of popular coercion or the refusal of security forces to carry out orders? How diverse do mass mobilizations have to be in order to translate into popular coercion? How widespread do disruptive tactics have to be to endanger a regime or force a government to change course? Qualitative process-tracing does not allow any conclusions to be drawn on such weighting and evaluating of various links in the causal chain. However, in relation to the quantitative aspects of protest events, their duration and size in terms of number of participants, this can be measured, and when compared with those of other worldwide figures, the Burkina Faso example comes out near the top (see Brancati 2016).

Another blind spot are the cases of term bids where the presidential plan went through to a rerun despite constitutional limitations, but in which no protests occurred. Due to my research objective of understanding protest-president linkages, these cases were only of minor importance. Nevertheless, this means that my findings offer no insights to the study of those dimensions that explain a lack of anti-term mobilization. However, the comparison of one case in which mass mobilization happened with one in which it did not, and in which both cases the candidature was prevented, was not feasible although it would have been of great interest methodologically. This is because until today there is not a single case where the incumbent rescinded their attempts to stay in power longer than allowed constitutionally, without facing stiff headwinds from the streets and squares (see chapter three, Figure 3.2).

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542 In his statistical coverage of protests worldwide, Dawn Brancati (2016) illustrates that most of them attracted between 1.000 and 10.000 participants, while only exceptionally more than 100.000 people were mobilized (Brancati 2016: 24). Similarly, the majoritarian of protests lasted one or between three and five days, while only a small percentage longer than eleven days. The second peak of protests in Burkina Faso represents thus also in worldwide comparison rather long lasting protests with thirteen days and several hundred thousand protestors (see Figure 4.1).

543 Namely, Burkina Faso (Compaoré, 1997), Namibia (Nujoma, 1999), Guinea (Conté, 2001), Togo (Eydéma, 2002), Gabon (Bongo, 2003), Chad (Déby, 2005), Uganda (Museveni, 2005), Congo-Brazzaville (Sassou-Nguesso, 2015), and Rwanda (Kagame, 2015).
Moreover, I was interested in collective decisions and even though I tried to account for the diversity of actors, my work suffers from too strong a focus on leaders, i.e. spokespersons or representatives of civil society groups, or social movement leaders. Even though I tried to account for ‘activists’ with regard to protest events and include them in my analysis, I was still unable to conduct interviews or even surveys with these protest participants (who can be further distinguished for instance from bystanders, adherents, or constituents, among other groups) (McCarthy/Zald 1977). Scholars working on social movements or protests in Africa are confronted with the challenge that there is not available data on mass demonstrations, in contrast to the regular observations that are made of demonstrations in Germany for example. This was not majorly problematic for my study, insofar as my focus was mainly on the strategies that are usually decided on by leaders (Mueller 2018); however it did limit the explanatory power of my research when it comes to leader-activist relations, and shedding light on how they mutually influence each other. Further, my data collection lacked interviews with members of opposition parties or state security forces. I replaced this missing first-hand data with the document analyses of declarations, media interviews, protest calls, human rights reports and expert interviews. Nonetheless, the armed forces as well as the police remained ‘black boxes’ to a certain extent. This is a weakness I share with many other studies on contentious politics, revolutions or democratization.

Last but not least, my two cases ended up pointing to another group of actors that I did not explore due to my theoretical guidance – religious or ‘traditional’ authorities. In Senegal, Muslim authorities repeatedly commented on the evolving situation and provided moral judgements regarding what is right and wrong, and the importance of this perspective was reflected in my interview partners consistently referring to these statements of the religious authorities. In Burkina Faso, actors sometimes mentioned the Mossi king, the Mogho Naba, with regard to his usual role as mediator. From all my background research and data collection and analysis of the Burkina Faso case, my overall impression was that he seemed

544 See for instance the Institute for Social Movement Studies in Berlin who regularly observe demonstrations such as the recent FridaysforFuture-mobilizations, https://protestinstitut.eu/projekte/demonstrationsbefragung/ (online accessible on April 10, 2019, unfortunately only available in German).

545 There are, however, some noteworthy attempts to fill this gap. For an example of a comprehensive study of the police in Africa, see that of Jan Beek and colleagues (2017) who focused on the street-level view, and thus broke down this institution. They answer the suggestions made by Jan W. Duyvendak and James M. Jaspers’ (2015) in their book on ‘breaking down the state’.

546 I use here the term traditional due to the lack of any more adequate wording and with the intention of relating my argument back to existing research. However, this label does not mean that I understand them as traditional and thus old-fashioned, in some sort of contrast to ‘modern’ societies or state rule.
to stay relatively neutral in the conflict, although I did not explore this possibility in greater detail. This is all the more interesting since it is widely known that these ‘traditional chiefs’ represented the main power base of Compaoré’s rule (Loada 2010). This aspect of religious or longstanding authorities is a dimension most studies seem to ignore and simply assume not to matter, but with regard to state-society relations and the perceived legitimacy of disruption action, such actors would be an interesting group to look at.\footnote{Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz (2013) come to the conclusion for the ‘Arab spring’ that the role of religion and respectively religious actors often lack in most classical works on democratization.}

6.2.2 What others may soon find out

To date, there has been no other attempt to study term bids from the perspective I have suggested: as episodes of democratization, in a systematic and theory-guided manner. While my framework allowed me to perform an empirically-grounded cross-case analysis, I do not expect it to be applicable to all term amendment struggles and to contain explanations for all cross-case divergence. Nonetheless, I call upon scholars to make use of my findings and approach in their attempts to study other contexts, mechanisms and groups.

For now, these findings should guide further research on cases where the tenures of presidents are restricted by law and these restrictions are then challenged by the incumbent who has reached the end of their permitted term. Geographically such instances have not been limited to Africa South of the Sahara, despite how regional studies have largely limited the debates thus far.\footnote{Because most scholars working on Northern Africa position themselves more in the field of Middle Eastern studies than in African studies concerning area distinctions. Gladly, these scholars – in combination with researches working on Latin America – talk more and more to each other. For one convincing example see Irene Weipert-Fenner and Jonas Wolf (2015) whose findings on mobilizations in Latin American states proved fruitful for the study of the ‘Arab uprisings’.} The recent case of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who resigned on April 2, 2019 and whose resignation followed massive anti-term mobilizations, reminds us to “not forget that Tunisia and Egypt are African countries” (Manji 2012: 1), since until today this topic has been exclusively debated among ‘Sub-Saharan African experts’. With regard to the work being done on North African and Middle Eastern countries, I advocate more cross-regional comparisons. This seems all the more appropriate considering that the overthrows in Algeria and Sudan happened shortly one after the other, with the latter representing a state whose society consider themselves to be both African and
In particular, the study of the Sudanese case would be rewarding since it represents a regime that is widely perceived to be authoritarian. For a long time, social movement scholars expected mobilizations would not take place in such closed systems, but some studies on authoritarian regimes, and above all the recent incidents such as the most recent mass protests in Sudan that eventually toppled the government, have proved such scholars wrong (see for instance Osa/Corduneanu-Huci 2003).

Another approach that would more directly build upon my work would be to more fully integrate the idea of protest spaces into research. Similar to my in-depth analysis of the final protests and their dynamics in October 2014 in Burkina Faso, this would mean concentrating on a shorter time span and following events from an especially local perspective. For instance, during my fieldwork I noticed that Central Dakar featured natural limitations due to the surrounding sea, and contains only three major roads to enter the city center that make it entrance easier to block for either state or anti-state forces. Ouagadougou, in turn, is a much larger capital, in which straight forward protest strategies like, ‘everyone goes outside’, are more difficult to prevent. This was an aspect none of my interviewees highlighted, but at the same time it was not something that my interview guidelines were oriented towards. Future research here on this would be interesting in order to critically investigate under which geographical circumstances mass protests are able to avoid repression.

Departing from my cross-case findings and on top of the additional dimensions I have just suggested looking into, I propose three further research pathways to expand the framework I presented: to disaggregate state forces further and their relation to (civilian or political) opposition, to study the interrelations between political parties and social movements, and to add a transnational level of analysis, one that pays particular attention to the diffusion of (protest) frames and strategies.

First, the cross-fertilization of studies that are concerned with institutional changes in one way or another mirrors how term amendment struggles are not only interesting for regional experts looking at term bids, but also for researchers of other episodes of contention where democratic backslidings are ‘negotiated’ between those supporting and opposing democratic
norms and practices. Recent examples in Europe illustrate that this may be also be interesting for contexts beyond the African continent. Bases on this I call upon scholars to explore more of these gradual changes such as legislative or procedural developments. This means a refocus on “episodes of democratization” (della Porta 2016: 3), sometimes with uncertain and conflicting outcomes, instead of a concentration just on ‘complete’ regime turnovers (see Mahoney/Thelen 2010b). I strongly advocate a rethink of the still omnipresent linear conceptualization of democratization between the two ideal poles of democratic and authoritarian, since such distinctions are seldom able to make sense of cross-case divergence, as evidenced by my study. Instead, it would be more interesting to deduce the historical patterns of civil-state and civil-military relations that shape the outcomes of struggles, such as governing elites trying to revoke democratic achievements or consolidate authoritarian rule.\(^550\) Ellen Lust-Okar (2008) provides a convincing example based on her studies of the Middle East: She puts forward a typology of structures of contestation that apply for all states that are not ‘fully’ democratic. A first application of my cases to this typology would suggest that the manner in which Senegalese presidents handled opposition indicates, what she calls, divided structures of contestation. This means that only some actors gain access to the political arena while others are left out, which seems consistent with the dominant strategy of divide-and-rule in Senegal. Burkinabe actor constellations on the other hand exhibit a rather exclusive but unified structure of contestation. However, it would require further research to properly establish and verify these preliminary classifications.\(^551\) Also of interest is the role and self-understanding of the military in this regard. Just like in the general population, within the state security forces we also see considerable differences of opinions between generations. Young foot soldiers apparently perceive themselves to be closer to the young citizenry than to the political elites. This is further evidence against taking groups of actors such as the military to be homogenous blocks. In both of my cases, the clientelism and political patronage style of ruling of the older and better-established generations threatened the younger ones. For armed forces, Maggie Dwyer (2018) has already shown that military coups are not necessary ‘from above’, and thus underlined the complexity of civil-military affairs. Military officers, in turn, usually come to occupy the position of interim president in these scenarios. The political developments in Burkina Faso that have

\(^{550}\) Because scholars studying authoritarian regimes have shown that these rulers also need to legitimate their rule (Albaugh 2011), and that it is not uncommon to find democratic enclaves within such closed systems (Gilley 2010).

\(^{551}\) Another convincing example of state management of dissidents or groups that are conceived as operating outside of the political arena, is the work by Sebastian Elischer (2019) on Salafi groups.
taken place since the time period under investigation in my study also evidence internal fights over power, when two different military officers each declared themselves transition president, and one then staged a coup of the other years later. Another case of interest, also for future comparison, would be the case of Niger in 2010 where “the military staged a ‘corrective coup’” (Elischer/Mueller 2018: 4) when former President Mamadou Tandja tried to prolong his term. In sum, this means we would be better served to think more in terms of practices, state management, and plural state actors with conflicting interests, and less in terms of linear democratic or authoritarian polarities.\footnote{One interesting approach is the study of Aurel Croissant and colleagues (2018) that dives into the behavior of the armed forced when they are confronted with non-violent anti-incumbent mass protests.}

Secondly, the interconnectedness of episodes of contention and formalized politics needs to be better explored, not only with regard to the way state actors and institutions manage contention, but also the interrelations of social movements and opposition parties. In both West African examples, contentious collective actions and the relevant actors were highly interwoven with political parties. Although the link from divided elites to mobilization and their use for negotiations is well studied, it is less well-known if and how such coordinated actions (Burkina Faso) or temporary alignment (Senegal) affects political parties. For instance, Adrienne LeBas (2011) argued from her study of ‘protest to party’ linkages that elites are only willing to form representative and accountable institutions if they are pushed to do so by demonstrations. She even positions political parties “as the primary link between elites and masses” (LeBas 2011: 11; see also Kriesi 2004: 75). For the West African cases, we do observe such connections, especially in the early stages of the conflict, but their role decreases over time, particularly in Burkina Faso. Conducting research on these interrelations would enable scholars to better understand whether certain impacts are “movement or party-powered” (Rucht 1987: 304), referring to the prominent group actually contributing ideas and incentives. Moreover, in both cases political parties copied mobilization campaigns and strategies, especially visible in the Senegalese case where parties imitated the movement’s slogans and creative repertoires of contention. In view of the findings on political parties in West Africa, which conclude that their mobilization capacities are generally weak (Bleck/van de Walle 2011), it would be of interest to know if they actually ‘learn’ from (new) social movements. Also, vice versa, potential questions of interests could be, how does the close involvement of social movements with political parties affect their credibility on the long run? Informal talks during my fieldwork pointed towards
a growing mistrust among civilian anti-government forces in view of their closeness to political parties. I explore this idea a bit more when I briefly discuss what happened to the social movements once these eventful times had passed.

Third, I came across various protest frames while studying my two cases. Although this dimension did not lie at the center of my attention, protest leaders seemed automatically to speak on behalf of the people who they mobilized, outlining their views and motives. For instance, clearly these protests could be discussed and characterized as anti-corruption-mobilizations (Prause/Wienkoop 2017) or anti-neoliberal-protests (see for example della Porta 2017). But however diverse the claims from within the protest movements may have been, the recent mass demonstrations in Algeria illustrates how the ‘anti-term-frame’ diffused across states. This all relates to questions of how movement ideas, collective action frames and practices spread from one movement to another across regions and cultures (Benford/Snow 2000). For term struggles, Claudia Simons and Denis Tull (2015) already made this point and questioned how relevant the timing of the Burkinabe uprising was for the presidential decision and protest strategies (see also Yarwood 2016). Lila Chouli (2012b) also pointed out such learning effects for the Burkinabe struggle (see also Pitroipa 2013). We do not know what would have happened if the Burkinabe case had have come first, and how Balai Citoyen could have influenced and empowered Y’en a marre. Such research questions are all the more relevant considering the increasing use of new technologies to spread information about protests and exchange strategies (Castells 2015; Juris 2012) – activities that I observed in both movements, who both had Twitter accounts and Facebook groups through which they could inform and relay their mobilization success stories. Although I don’t consider these online activities to be massively important for the local mobilizations, I see them as having relevance for frame diffusion and drawing attention from the international media (see also Mattoni/della Porta 2014).553 If protest events are framed as anti-term protests, they might receive more attention than others. Particularly in the case of the Senegalese movement, a circle of core members including the leaders put great effort into the diffusion of their frames. Recently, a ‘university’ for social movements in Africa was even organized and numerous movements from the continent were invited.554 Other examples of such diffusion include meetings of Balai Citoyen and Y’en marre at cultural

553 I already made this argument on the role of the digital distribution of protest images elsewhere; see Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop (2017c).
554 Informal talk with movement leader and information from internal Facebook group.
events such as the festival Ciné Droit Libre in Ouagadougou, or when their leaders traveled to the DR Congo to exchange with the Congolese movement Lutte pour le Changement (LUCHA) who clearly state that they were created following the role model of Y’en a marre (see also König 2913, 2014).\(^5\) Apparently, governments judge such exchanges as dangerous to their ability to maintain their grip on power, since the Congolese government arrested the West African movement leaders.\(^5\) Yet, we would need more research on such diffusion in order to be better equipped to draw conclusions on the importance of timing to term bids, an aspect that authors often pick up on without having actually researched it in any sort of depth.

### 6.3 What comes after exceptional times – A brief outlook on political developments in Burkina Faso and Senegal

In both country cases, respondents highlighted the respective episode of contention as being an unusual time, and thus set them in contrast to ‘normal times’, referring to periods in which politics follow the routinized track.\(^5\) This leads to our remaining concern of what happened after the candidature (Senegal) or resignation (Burkina Faso) of the incumbent? Studies on other regions have illustrated how “[…] far-reaching social transformation seems possible; however, without the construction of alternatives, political action is once again channeled into elite-controlled institutional politics, and more far-reaching social transformation is averted” (Schock 2015: 306). This seems to also be true for the West African cases. In both cases, the heads of governments eventually changed, following the resignation of Compaoré, and in Wade’s case, electoral defeat. However, both of the current incumbents, in Burkina Faso Marc Roch Kaboré and in Senegal Macky Sall, were part of the former regime administration and belonged to the inner circles of the former ruler. This indicates quite clearly that they belong to the same political elite that the previous crop of presidents did. Consequently, it is not surprising that despite the perceived success of all the mobilization, protest leaders now exhibit certain disillusionment in view of the subsequent presidencies.

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55. Alex Fielding (2015), and from an informal talk with one of their representatives on February 16, 2016, at the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Berlin.


55. Donatella della Porta (2016) illustrates how activists in Northern Africa and Sothern Europe similarly framed issues as existing in 'exceptional times'.
when I interviewed most of them in 2017. At the same time, all of them showed pride in their mobilization successes, and the conviction that they are able to remobilize citizens if the governing elites’ rule were to become illegitimate or unjust.

Again, this attitude was stronger in the Burkinabe respondents, which may be due to the fact they had a second uprising just one year after the first. On 16 September 2015, less than a month before the elections should have taken place, members of the former presidential guard under General Gilbert Diendéré, a loyal companion of Compaoré, attempted to topple the transitional government by force. For a second time, the Burkinabe people resisted massively, and this time there was even heavier involvement of the trade unions who organized a general strike (Kaboré 2016; Eizenga 2015; see also Zeilig 2016). External actors also soon condemned the coup attempt and called for the armed forces to hand over power to a civilian government. These external attempts at mediation failed, however, due to the unsatisfactory resolutions that resulted on what the role of former regime supporters was to be, including immunity for coup perpetrators and inclusive elections that would encompass CDP members, which caused unrest in the Burkinabe population (Saidou 2018). Eventually, the Mogho Naba and army chief successfully negotiated the end of the military regime only six days later, so that already on September 24, 2015 the transitional government was back in office (Eizenga 2016). An Afrobarometer survey conducted in May 2015 showed that the majority of the population was in favor of stopping the installation of a military regime, with four out of five Burkinabe preferring democracy to any other regime (Afrobarometer 2015). On November 29, 2015, elections were held and Roch Marc Kaboré, chairman of the Mouvement du peuple pour le progrès (MPP) which was created by those who split off from the ruling party, received 53.5 % of the votes in the first round of presidential elections. These elections have been widely celebrated as being highly democratic, due to the programmatic debates in the run-up to the voting, transparency, monitoring (including real-time data transmission of local electoral booths), and having over 60% voter registration (see for details Arriotti 2016). Despite these praiseworthy democratic achievements, the fact remains that most MPP members come from the same patronage system and have continued the old practices of clientelistic ruling, including vote-buying. Such practices are particularly prevalent in more remote areas, highlighting the

561 Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI) and Burkina Open Data Initiative (Boni) monitored the elections closely and were early to publish the countings of votes.
enduring cleavage between a young urban constituency and rural elites (Hilgers/Loada 2013: 195). Moreover, opposition parties are often one-man-parties and weakly institutionalized, as is clearly evidenced by the fact that in 2015 there were seventy-five registered opposition parties.

With regard to the civilian opposition, the fact that Burkina Faso became known internationally as a success story of people’s revolt definitely empowered these groups further. The downside of this praise and recognition is an observable competition among the actors involved over credit for this success, additionally fueled by the externally driven attention paid to Balai Citoyen who gained overwhelmingly more media coverage than representatives of long-lasting protest coalitions, CCVC and CODMPP, as well as opposition leaders. The story of an African youth movement that rose against authoritarian rule seemed a better sell than the significance of longstanding anti-regime forces. These leaders, in turn, criticized Balai Citoyen for their lack of ideological conviction and visions for profound changes in the future. In view of their current activities, one can say that the movement has institutionalized, and we can see that they used the donor funds they received for community projects, like those of more established civil society organizations. I personally estimate their potential to mobilize again as being limited, since my findings clearly point to the importance of specific circumstances being present, as well as to the importance of other groups of actors and their interrelations. Since 2016, there have been recurrent terrorist attacks and parts of the country’s Northern territory are under continued threat. These additional issues compound, rather than solve, any other dissatisfactions people may harbor such as persistent socioeconomic grievances or democratic deficits.

The same bias of media coverage we found in Burkina Faso is can also be detected in that of Y’en a marre, and also resulted in similar competitive relations among the actors who seem to worry even more about getting their recognition. Given this sense of bitterness, it is not surprising that soon after the protests in 2011 and 2012 rumors began to spread about

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562 For a detailed analysis of the following events and their policy implications, see Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop (2015).
563 By institutionalization, I refer to Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s (2007) understanding of a process as the “incorporation of performances and political actors into the routines of organized politics” (Tilly/Tarrow 2007: 216).
564 I made this argument on the cross-movement alliances and their differences with regard to mutual relations and mobilizations in length elsewhere, see Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop (2017a), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/it-takes-more-to-tango-cross-movement-alliances-of-youth-led-movements-in-west/ (accessed on April 9, 2019).
external funds that *Y’en a marre* had received. \(^{565}\) Ultimately the group was able to survive such attempts to discredit them. Following the uprisings, they continued their role as watchdogs and consistently voiced their concerns about bad governance, often in unusual manners and through both smaller and broader protest events. Their voice is still one of the very few that speak out on behalf of the young unemployed Senegalese, a group political parties seemed to have forgotten going back a long time (Resnick 2014: 625-627). Nonetheless, they received several funding opportunities and eventually responded by opening up a second office that now serves as the institutionalized arm of their headquarters in the suburbs. Their various projects reflect this attempt to remain a mobilizing force, while at the same time executing local projects.\(^{566}\) None of their leaders ended up taking any job offers from the current government or from external actors, which distinguishes them from other civil society groups, of whom several members joined government or international organizations.\(^{567}\)

It seems that the well-known divide-and-rule strategy continues in Senegal under Macky Sall, who has just been voted in by Senegalese voters on February 24, 2019 in the first round, winning 58.3% of the voting share. In contrast to the Burkina Faso case however, the manner in which these elections took place received widespread criticism and the opposition called for boycotts.\(^{568}\) Similarly, the parliamentary elections that were held some months earlier, on July 30, 2017, became known for the prevention of voter registration, among them the leaders of *Y’en a marre* who had no access to vote. Given these developments, one could pessimistically ask the question: why should we even be concerned with term bids or term amendment struggles, when self-reproducing circles of elites will keep on governing anyway?

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\(^{565}\) In particular, the leaders of *Y’en a marre* were later accused of accepting donations from international non-governmental organizations. Oxfam have been regularly brought up and have, in turn, underlined in an informal conversation that they supported the individual leaders only for a smaller community project after the uprisings in 2011 and 2012 (see also Touré 2017: 69; interview with representative of COS/M23, February 16, 2017, Dakar). Similarly, the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) and USAID supported an electoral campaign of *Y’en a marre* after the uprisings in 2011/12.

\(^{566}\) For instance, they mobilized citizens to register for voting for the parliamentary elections in 2017 with their campaign *Sama carte! Damay voté*, My card, I vote. They protested against the French currency, the CFA, but pursued at the same time community projects to inform about the danger of migration and the options for young people in Senegal. See for more information https://yenamarre.sn/ (accessible online on April 15, 2019).

\(^{567}\) For instance, the main representative of RADDHO took a job offer of the local branch of Amnesty International while the spokesperson of one movement became involved in governmental affairs.

In both cases, however, we can also notice some gradual changes towards more sustained democratization. On March 20, 2016, a constitutional referendum passed in Senegal that limited the age of the ruling president to a maximum of seventy-five, and the term itself to five years, while in the same month, a commission in Burkina Faso drafted a new constitution in which it is laid out that presidential term limits are part of the intrinsic unchangeable law section, so that any changes to them now require a 4/5 legislative majority. Moreover, corrupt practices of state officials in Burkina Faso are now denounced far more resoundingly than they ever had been before.\textsuperscript{569} As well as this, the long-standing investigative files into the deaths of Norbert Zongo and Thomas Sankara were reopened after having been previously closed, marking the meeting of yet another demand put forward by activists in 2013/14.\textsuperscript{570}

In both cases, we observe two quite contradictory currents with regard to democratization: On the one hand, in both cases the same political elites regained power. On the other hand, tenure restrictions have been strengthened within the constitutions, and presidents (Senegal and Burkina Faso) or elections (Burkina Faso) are now better monitored than they ever have been.

\section*{6.4 What have we learned}

What do these outlooks teach us in light of the aim of promoting resilient democratization? Unsurprisingly, term limits do not automatically lead straightforwardly to more resilient democratic regimes, however they can help prevent autocratic outcomes by creating political opportunities for actors to strengthen the norm of recurrent leadership changes, and to ensure that the practices outlined in the letter of the law are enforced. Independently of the short-term outcomes that I observed and analyzed, what has transpired since reveals the legal enforcement and thus strengthening of tenure limitations for heads of state has taken place. If we start thinking of democratization more in the sense of ongoing struggles over democracy, we recognize that seemingly democratic institutional arrangements do not

\textsuperscript{569} One example is the so-called ‘tablet-affair’, when members of parliament received free tablets, which sparked protests and immense media reporting.

\textsuperscript{570} I described further details and debate policy advices
automatically translate into more power to the people, that basic ideal of democracy. On the contrary, it seems that the relatively early establishment of ‘democratic’ institutions in Senegal led to a strong narrative of being a democratic role model, externally and nationally, while the actual practices happening seemed anything but democratic. I personally read the Senegalese political legacy as having provided pathway to political stability, but one on which unpleasant regime critics are institutionally restrained or violently repressed.571 In states like Senegal, where governments in the past have alternated either through elitist leadership change or through the ballot box, opponents were unable to keep the mobilization going. Instead, most of them preferred the use of existing institutional channels such as elections, and overall the civil opposition seemed to lack grassroots engagement and input, and were made up of highly professionalized civil society groups whose leaders behave in the same manner as other elites.572 Institutionalized actors such as the police and constitutional judges likewise failed to hinder the expansion of personal power. This process went on for many years before the very eyes of these diverse institutions and civic opponents.

The central lesson for democracy promotion is thus to overcome an overly narrow focus on the setup of institutions, which have been found repeatedly to validate rather than prosecute the expansion of presidential power (see Grauvogel/Heyl 2017; for courts specifically see Winter 2017; Stroh/Heyl 2013; Heyl/Stroh 2014).573 In both cases, institutions failed in their functions of providing checks-and-balances mechanisms and promoting power-sharing, and instead contributed to the legitimization of presidential power-seeking. Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young proclaimed enthusiastically that “the police, legislatures, courts and even the military now serve as agents who will defend the constitution” (Posner/Young 2018: 268). I would advise caution and a healthy skepticism in response to such statements. Courts did not prevent the candidature of Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal, and while the Burkinabe army did indeed seem loyal to the constitution and the people, the subsequent coup illustrated their own internal divisions. I would even go so far as to doubt that the refusal to shoot protestors relates back to constitutionalism, but rather to the particular civil-military relations we found in Burkina Faso. This means that more open confrontations as opposed to

571 Here, I refer to the national round tables as an example of an institutional channeling of conflict potential and take up the point of repressive threats in view of the equipment and live ammunition of the Senegalese mobile intervention police (see chapter four and five).

572 For this argument on growing professionalization and simultaneously decreasing grassroots see Miles Larmer (2010), Nikolai Brandes and Bettina Engels (2014), or Alex de Waal and Rachel Ibreck (2013).

573 For the argument that even authoritarian ruling presidents are in need of legitimization see Dan Slater (2003). Ericka A. Albaugh (2011) illustrates with the case of Cameroonian president Paul Biya how an “autocrat’s toolkit” works not so much in overthrowing completely democratic institutions but rather in working through them and modifying them constantly for ones personal interest.
institutional channeling may lead to more resilient democratic systems in the future, although such confrontations are likely to cause disruption and uncertainty for a period. External actors in Senegal were too quick to call for moderation, as state security forces suppressed non-violent protestors who were trying to defend previous democratic accomplishments. It seems that contentious collective actors do indeed have the potential to prevent democratic backslidings in the short-run, once their actions spread widely, they manage to disrupt routinized institutional channels, and they have friends in parliament and the army, as the relevant Burkinabe actors had.

If institutions are built up too early and come packaged with democratic narratives, citizens are confronted with unresponsive elites who expand their power, and they are unable to stop them. These insights challenge the often implicit underlying norms of external democracy promotion that favor political and civilian stability, and recite the mantra of ‘elections at all costs’. While the Senegalese trajectory has often been judged to be more ‘successful’ with regard to the regular governmental turnover and the absence of civilian unrest, the Burkina Faso example with its troubled transitions and the prominent role played by the army has resulted in pessimism about the prospects for democracy. The role played by the armed forces in the Burkinabe struggle deserves special attention. We should rethink our initial judgments upon hearing about ‘defected security forces’ when in reality their ‘disloyalty’ was towards a president acting undemocratically, and their loyalty lay instead with the masses of people. This question yet another (often implicit) norm of military obedience to heads of states.

These past experiences of governmental turnover proved crucial for the later decisions, capabilities, behavior and mutual relations of the actors involved in the struggles. Therefore, these insights can provide us with a glimmer of hope. Since prior waves of protest played a crucial role for the size of the mobilizations and the knowledge of actors in Burkina Faso, one can assume that these protests that I have analyzed, as well as future protests, will shape the prospective outcomes of struggles for more democracy that are yet to come. Although many of these struggles may not lead to more democracy in the short-run, these pro-democracy forces will build up their know-how and networks in the course of these uprisings, and eventually share their lessons not only across time, but across borders and societies. The best starting point might then be to promote the platforms for such knowledge

See also Judith Vorrath (2013) and Sten Hagberg and colleagues (2018), chapter four on Burkina Faso.
exchange and networking, so citizens’ can themselves become empowered to protest whenever the next time a president feels his time is not yet up.


Kriesi, Hanspeter (1996): The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context. In: McAdam et al. (eds.), *Comparative Perspective on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing*. USA: Cambridge University Press, 152-84.


Mahoney, James/ Thelen, Kathleen (2010b): Explaining institutional change: ambiguity, agency and power. UK: Cambridge University Press.


Olouwu, Dele et al. (1999): Governance and Democratisation in West Africa. Senegal: CODESRIA.


Skocpol, Theda (1999): *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. UK: Cambridge University Press.


(accessed on April 19, 2019)


(accessed on March 09, 2019)


Tarrow, Sidney (1996): States and Opportunities: the Political Structuring of Social Movements. In: McAdam, Doug et al. (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 41-61.


Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich mich noch keiner Doktorprüfung unterzogen oder mich um Zulassung zu einer solchen beworben habe.


Hamburg, 23.10.2020

Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop
Appendix A: Interview guideline – Protest leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Séjour de recherche</th>
<th>Nom</th>
<th>Date / Lieu</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Pour commencer/Tout d'abord

- Je vous remercie pour la participation à cet interview/disponibilité pour cette interview.
  (Thanks for willingness to be interviewed)
- Le Contexte/Contexte (background information)
  - Je suis doctorante de l’université de Lüneburg, en Allemagne (my status) → ma carte de visite
  - Projet de recherche: les effets des manifestations (research project)
  - Première étape de ma recherche: Dakar jusqu’à la fin du mois d'avril (research stay)
- Durée: 60 minutes
- Des information formelles:

| Participez-vous à cette interview de votre plein gré? (Interview voluntarily) |
| L’interview sera enregistré – Êtes-vous d’accord? (Interview recorded) |
| Le contenu sera seulement utilisé pour mon projet de recherche et comme référence en fin de publication/en annex de la thèse |
| Ces informations sont confidentielle et, si favorisez/vous le souhaitez, rendent/rendues anonymes |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question principale</th>
<th>Questions spécifiques</th>
<th>Commentaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Comment votre mouvement a-t-il créé? (emergence of SMO) | - Avec quelles autres organisations?  
- Avec quelles ressources financières? |  |
| Optionnel
Pourquoi avez-vous décidé de créer un groupe de manifestation à cette époque/à ce moment-là?  
Y’en a marre: Janvier 2011  
M23: Juin 2011 |  |
| Faisiez-vous déjà partie d’une autre organisation? | - un parti politique?  
- un syndicat?  
- une association de la jeunesse/étudiante?  
- une initiative citoyenne?  
- un club sportif? |  |
<p>| Avant la participation au mouvement, aviez-vous déjà manifesté? (protest experience) |  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Y’en a marre</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pourquoi avez-vous décidé de manifester contre le troisième mandat de Abdoulaye Wade alors que vos revendications principales concernaient les conditions socioéconomiques?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Qui étaient les principaux partenaires dans la lutte contre le troisième mandat du (Abdoulaye Abdoulaye Wade (président))?</strong> (partner organizations)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- d’autres mouvements?</td>
<td>- les partis politiques?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- les syndicats?</td>
<td>- les sociétés de jeunesse/étudiantes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- des initiatives citoyennes?</td>
<td>- les forces de sécurité?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- autres?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Syndicats (1. Question!)</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouquoi avez-vous choisi de participer aux manifestations au début?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Syndicats</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouquoi avez-vous aussi soutenu les manifestations contre le troisième mandat de Abdoulaye Wade tout en sachant que cet engagement pourrait avoir des conséquences négatives quand Abdoulaye Wade serait réélu?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Y’en a marre/Syndicats</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pourquoi avez-vous décidé de participer aux manifestations du M23 et même d’être membre dans ce collectif? (strategic allies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Y’en a marre/Syndicats</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pourquoi avez-vous confiance dans l’alternative offerte par le M23 alors qu’il s’agit d’un movement créé par des membres de la classe politique?</td>
<td>Le M23 ayant été créé par l’opposition, c’est-à-dire par des membres de la classe politique, comment se fait-il que vous ayez confiance dans l’alternative offerte par le M23?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>M23</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>À part de manifestations contre le troisième mandat, quelles sont les autres revendications en commun de ces membres? (collective identity)</td>
<td>- Depuis l’élection présidentielle, quelles actions avez-vous effectué? (Sources?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>M23</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Le mouvement était (et est) très divers, comment choisissez-vous les mots d’ordre?</td>
<td>- Qui a le droit de parler au nom du M23?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Comment fonctionne les processus décisionnels du movement?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optionnel</td>
<td>- Auriez-vous un organigramme à me donner?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le mouvement était (et est) très divers, comment décidez-vous des actions à mener?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pouvez-vous décrire la relation entre le mouvement et <em>(strategic allies)</em></td>
<td>- ...les syndicats?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ...des partis politiques?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En quel groupe avez-vous la plus grande confiance?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En observant les statistiques de l’intensité des manifestations, pouvez-vous expliquer les variations/la grande amplitude de variation?</td>
<td>- le nombre de manifestants?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- la participation de l’opposition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- la couverture de vos manifestation par la presse?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- les réactions internationales?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quel élément a le plus compté pour être entendu par/ attirez l’attention de/ faire réagir la classe dirigeante?</td>
<td>- votre l’impression: est-que les médias ont rapportés de votre manière?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- la radio, les médias sociaux ou les journaux – quels étaient les plus importants?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les médias, quel rôle ont-ils joué?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y’en a marre</td>
<td>Pourquoi accorder une telle importance aux médias étrangers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dans le documentaire de Rama Thiaw (<em>The revolution won’t be televised</em>), on voit que votre décision de ne pas recourir à des stratégies de rupture/à la désobéissance civile était influencée par la présence des médias internationaux? <em>(international actors)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optionnel</td>
<td>- ...la population pour mobiliser et informer les gens?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment avez-vous comminiqué avec</td>
<td>- ...les politiciens? Étiez-vous en contact direct avec des politiciens de l’opposition (ex. Macky Sall)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pourquoi avez-vous choisi d’arrêter la manifestation contre le troisième mandat et appelé les gens à voter?</td>
<td>En tant que collectif, étiez-vous tous d’accord pour l’appel au vote?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les manifestations de la société civile n'ont pas pu empêcher la troisième candidature de Abdoulaye Abdoulaye Wade – pourquoi à votre avis?</td>
<td>Pensez-vous que le succès aurait été plus grand si vous aviez utilisé d’autres tactiques plus violentes qui auraient pu empêcher la candidature de Abdoulaye Wade? Pourquoi pas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avez-vous l’impression que la majorité de la population auraient été</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pourquoi n’avez-vous pas essayé de perturber la décision du conseil constitutionnel comme</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d’accord pour manifester ou même se révolter contre la décision</strong></td>
<td><strong>Balai citoyen au Burkina Faso a attaqué l’Assemblée Nationale?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>constitutionnelle?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(popular support)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Optionnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pourquoi ne vous êtes-vous pas révolté contre la décision de la cour</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>constitutionnelle?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(divided elites)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quel était le soutien de la classe dirigeante à Abdoulaye Wade?</strong></td>
<td><strong>La formation de l’Alliance pour la République par Macky Sall et d’autres ancien membres</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(divided elites)</strong></td>
<td><strong>de PDS a-t-elle influencé vos manifestations?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dans quelle mesure votre décision a-t-elle été influencée par la</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pouvez-vous commenter l’évolution graphique de la réponse policière/répression?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>réponse des forces de l’ordre?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Quel a été le rôle de l’armée?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(répression capacity)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qu’avez-vous pensé des réactions étrangères/occidentales?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(international actors)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aujourd’hui X s’adapte plutôt au système politique réglé – pensez-vous</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Qui a le droit de parler au nom de X?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>que les changement politiques sont possible dans ce cadre institutionnel?</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Auriez-vous un organigramme à me donner?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Y’en a marre: éducation du future citoyens</strong></td>
<td><strong>- un organigramme?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Y’en a marre/Syndicats</strong></td>
<td><strong>- un état récapitulatif complet des recettes?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comment fonctionnent les processus décisionnels au movement?</strong></td>
<td><strong>- des tracts?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avez-vous plus d’information sur votre collectif?</strong></td>
<td><strong>- des liens (site web)?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pourriez-vous me donner les coordonnées d’autres fondateurs /participants?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Et vos partenaires?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix B: Interview guideline – Protest participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Séjour</th>
<th>Nom</th>
<th>Date / Lieu</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sexe</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Pour commencer/Tout d'abord

- Je vous remercie pour la participation à cet interview/disponibilité pour cette interview. (Thanks for willingness to be interviewed)
- Le Contexte/Contexte (background information)
  - Je suis doctorante de l’université de Lüneburg, en Allemagne (my status) → ma carte de visite
  - Projet de recherche: les effets des manifestations (research project)
  - Première étape de ma recherche: Dakar jusqu’à la fin du mois d'avril (research stay)
- Durée: 60 minutes
- Des information formelles:

| Participez-vous à cette interview de votre plein gré? (Interview volontarily) | L’interview sera enregistré – Êtes-vous d’accord? (Interview recorded) |
| - | |
| Le contenu sera seulement utilisé pour mon projet de recherche et comme référence en fin de publication/en annex de la thèse | Ces informations sont confidentielle et, si favorisez/vous le souhaitez, rendent/rendues anonymes |

### Question principale

| Depuis quand êtes-vous **membre** de ce collectif? | Quels étaient vos motifs pour prendre part à ses manifestations? |
| - | - conditions socioéconomiques? |
| - troisième mandat? |
| - règles démocratiques? |

### Questions spécifiques

| Faisiez-vous déjà partie d'une autre organisation? |
| - un parti politique? |
| - un syndicat? |
| - une association de la jeunesse/étudiante? |
| - une initiative citoyenne? |
| - un club sportif? |

### Commentaires

| Avant la fondation de X, aviez-vous déjà manifesté? (protest experience) | De quelle façon? |
| - de façon violente ou pacifique? |
| - par des grèves? |

| A quelles **actions** avez-vous participé entre 2011 et 2012? | En plus des manifestation, comment avez-vous soutenu le mouvement? (financièrement?) |

| Les **forces de sécurité** (surtout la police) ont essayé | **Au vu des répressions, seriez-vous prêts à manifester de nouveau?** |

v
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Réponse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d'arrêter les manifestations – avez-vous peur de manifester et pensez-vous pour cette raison d'arrêter votre engagement?</td>
<td>En regardant les effets de vos manifestations, seriez-vous prêts à manifester de nouveau?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| La troisième candidature de Aboulaye Wade n'a pas pu émpecher sa candidature, entre autre à cause de l'accord constitutionnel - Pourquoi ne vous êtes-vous pas révolté contre... | - Peur de repression?  
- Acceptance des règles démocratiques?  
- Décision du représentant de X? |
| Qui a décidé de respecter la decision de la cour constitutionnelle?     | - Comment fonctionne les processus décisionnels du mouvement?            |
| Finalement, ëtiez-vous d'accord avec la stratégie d'appel au vote?      |                                                                        |
| D'après vos experiences, pensez-vous qu'on pourrait influencer la politique institutionalisée en manifestant/par la manifestation? | De quelle façon les citoyens pourraient-ils communiquer leurs exigences et influencer les politiciens?  
(ou: leurs revendications; leurs souhaits) |
| Aujourd'hui X s'adapte plutôt au système politique réglé – pensez-vous que les changement politiques sont possible dans ce cadre institutionnel? |                                                                        |
| Pouvez-vous me donner les coordonnées d'autres participants?            |                                                                        |
Appendix C: Interview guideline – Experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research stay</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date / Place</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Main question</th>
<th>Sub questions</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources of SMOs</td>
<td>Which were the <strong>main actors</strong> or organizations during the protest waves…</td>
<td>..in 2011 against the electricity cuts and other socioeconomic grievances?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Optional</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who <strong>dominated</strong> the protests…</td>
<td>…in 2012 against the 3rd term of Aboulaye Wade?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why did the protesters mainly use <strong>nonviolent tactics</strong>?</td>
<td>Why did they not use more violent forms of protest <em>after</em> the decision of the constitutional court?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Protest repertoire)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How did the movement actors <strong>financed</strong> their activities – their headquarter, technical equipment, posters etc.?</td>
<td>Membership fees? Corporate partners? International development aid? International NGO partners? Trade unions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>From your point of view, who <strong>dominated the local media</strong> – particular representatives of the movement or the counter-statements by the government?</td>
<td>Were there differences between radio, newspaper and television?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In general, would you say that the main press <strong>reported in favor</strong> for the protesters or the opposite, in favor for Wade?</td>
<td>Would you say that this reporting manner <strong>changed over time</strong> – and why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How important has been the <strong>social media</strong> locally – do the national press used it as an information source?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic alliances/ Broad coalitions</td>
<td>In your opinion, to be recognized by the public and heard by government officials, which <strong>partner organizations</strong> within the protest waves were essential?</td>
<td>Opposition parties? Former ruling party members? Trade unions? Students/youth organizations? International/professional NGOs?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How close are the <strong>opposition parties</strong> and the protest leaders?</td>
<td>Do they represent as well a certain local elite?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elites-regime-interaction</td>
<td>In your opinion, what were the events that influenced the most decisions of Wade?</td>
<td>Which ones marked changes in the interaction of protesters and public authorities? (shifts)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Why did the protest movement decided to stop protesting against the 3rd term and call for voting in the upcoming elections (“Ma carte est mon arme”)? (cognitive shift)</td>
<td>Y’en a marre In general, would you say that this or other decisions such as joining the M23 movement led to the division of the protest movement?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Would you say that the participating organizations agreed on that strategy – or where there more radical and less radical parts of the movement? (division of protest movements)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Do you think that the protesters had a chance to stop Wade running for a third candidacy and if so, by using which form of tactics – negotiations, riots, general strikes? (relational shift)</td>
<td>Are there any mistakes of Wade in handling the protests and the mobilization against his third term?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In the end, Wade has been not reelected. Would you say, that Wade by behaving differently – either before or during the election campaign – had a chance to win the second round of the presidential elections?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular support</td>
<td>How would you judge the overall popular support</td>
<td>…for the protest claims In 2011? …for the protests against the 3rd term? …for the decision of the constitutional court to allow the 3rd candidacy of Wade?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division of elites</td>
<td>As members of the ruling party and funded its own party, would you say that the support within the political elite declined since 2010?</td>
<td>What you say that the majority of the members of the PDS are loyal to Abdoulaye Wade and supported his decision to run for a 3rd term?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Do those parts of the ruling elite can be classified as prodemocracy forces?</td>
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<tr>
<td>International reaction</td>
<td></td>
<td>the AU to? the UN to?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final questions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>How important has been the reaction of international actors and other states such as the EU to? France?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Did I left out essential questions for my research interest?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you have further suggestions of local experts that might be of interest for my knowledge? Can you put me in contact with representatives of X?</td>
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</table>
Appendix D: Handout on research project

Term Amendment Struggles in Burkina Faso and Senegal

Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop
Center for the Study of Democracy, Leuphana University Lüneburg

Abstract PhD Project

Over the last years, presidents tried to extend their constitutional term limit in several African states. The announcement of the presidents to run for another term in office led to broad mobilization and civic uprisings against such tenure amendments, the political system in general and socioeconomic inequalities - but with diverging results. In Burundi the protests were repressed by national security forces and escalated into a national crisis whereas in Burkina Faso and in Senegal the former presidents ended their terms of office. This leads to the empirical puzzle of how protest movements influence politics and decisions of political elites. Particularly the developments in Burkina Faso and in Senegal are mostly interesting as both countries have numerous aspects in common and the movement coalitions learned from each other. But despite those common characteristics the protests proceeded differently: While in Burkina Fasos’ president Blaise Compaoré left office directly without campaigning for another term, Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal based on the decision of the Constitutional Court run for another candidacy but lost the following election. The aim of this research project is to find out if and under which conditions do protest movements have an effect on those term amendment struggles.

By tracing back the processes, the comparison of the movement-elites-interactions allows to figure out which institutional preconditions and contextual shifts influence the effects of contentious collective actions. Or to put it in other words, which actors and institutional constellations make a protest effect most likely – and how those institutionalized framework itself is the result of the protest waves. Further the significance of term limits for democratization will be theoretically discussed and empirically underlined. The answer will be particularly important considering that most African presidents tried to rule longer than foreseen by the respective constitution.

The results of this research project will give new insights into the interactions of protest and state actors. This offers knowledge on conditions in- and outside the movements to effect successfully the outcome of established politics. The final results will develop further the knowledge on contentious politics. As the current theories are based mainly on examples of Europe and the US, the project tends to correct the ongoing Western bias and use African case studies for theory-development alike. Besides the academic knowledge, the project aims at best to offer examples of effective protesting and hence empower other citizens to take actively part in politics and shape their own democratic culture beyond West Africa.