TY - RPRT A1 - Desgranges, Gabriel A1 - Heinemann, Maik T1 - Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information N2 - This paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox is also given. KW - Erwartung KW - Rationale Erwartung KW - Eductive Learning KW - Private Information KW - Rational Expectations KW - Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibrium Y1 - 2005 UR - http://pub-data.leuphana.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/362 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:luen4-opus-3134 ER -